AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 21 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • MAHARASHTRA COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT 1960
  • Section 13(2) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (for short, Slum Act).3.
  • Section 2(bb) of the ID Act
  • Section 37(1B) of the Town Planning Act, Regulation 33(10)
  • section 3C of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority
  • Section 152 of the Town Planning Act. Section 151
  • Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and corresponding Section 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act,
  • section 3B;(h-c) Slum Rehabilitation Authority means the Slum Rehabilitation Authority
  • Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936.97. Section 40 of the Town Planning Act
  • Section 3A(3)(c) of the Slum Act
  • Section 22(m) of the Town Planning Act
  • Sections 3A, 3B, 3C, 3K, 3S, 13(2) of the Slum Act, Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act
  • clauses 1.14, 1.15 and 1.16 of Appendix IV of Regulation 33(10). Clause 1.15
  • Sections 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 135 and 136 of the Town Planning Act
  • Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Under Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act,
  • Regulation 33(10).98. Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act
  • Section 13(2) of the Slum Act
  • Area Development Act, 1976,(iii)
  • Sub-Section 10 of Section 12 of the Slum Act;
  • Section 40 of the Town Planning Act. A perusal of Section 40
  • Section 2(g-a) defines the expression Slum Area. Section 2(h-b) defines the expression Slum Rehabilitation Area. Section 2(h-c)
  • provisions of the Slum Act and in particular Sections 2(b-a), 2(ga), 2(h-b)(h-c)
  • section 3A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Implementation, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971.105.
  • Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act, 1965; and(c) (i)
  • Slum Act. Section 37(1B) reads thus:37. Modification of final Development Plan(1B)
  • Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, SRA
  • sub-section (2) of section 3A;(g-a) Slum
  • sub-section (1) of section 4;
  • Rule 2(b)
  • Section 13(2) of the Slum Act.109.
  • Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949;(b)
  • Sub-section (2) of modified Section 13
  • Slum Rehabilitation Area.94. Section 354-AAA of the Corporation Act reads thus:354-AAA. Empowerment of Slum Rehabilitation Authority
  • Section 152 of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
  • issued.116. Section 3A of the Slum Act
  • Section 13(2) the Slum Act, (ii)
  • Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short, General Clauses Act).108.
  • section 4A;(h-b) Slum Rehabilitation Area
  • Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Section 2(15) of the Town Planning Act
  • Bombay Municipal Corporation Act,
  • section 3A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971
  • Section 2(19)(b) read with Section 37(1B) and 154(4) of the Town Planning Act
  • supplied]95. Section 2(b-a) of the Slum Act
  • Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act, 1948,
  • sub-section (10) of Section 12 of the Slum Act;3)
  • provisions of the Slum Act, Regulations, Town Planning Act
  • Section 3A(3)(d)
  • Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act,
  • Clause 1.15 of Appendix IV of Regulation 33(10)
  • Slum Rehabilitation Area in Section 2(h-b)
  • Redevelopment) Act, 1971,
  • section 4 of the Slum Act
  • Section 50 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short, Town Planning Act)
  • Section 3-A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (for short the 1971 Act)
  • Section 3A(3) of the Slum Act
  • provisions of the Slum Act, Town Planning Act, Regulations and the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (for short, Corporation Act). Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act
  • Sections 2(15) and 2(19) of the Town Planning Act
  • section 4 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971
  • Section 3D modified various provisions of the Slum Act. Section 13
  • Section 3C of the Slum Act.115. Section 44 of the Town Planning Act
  • sections 25, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 89, 90, 107, 112, 1[126(1)(b)], 135, 136 and 142
  • Section 13 of the Slum Act
  • Section 2(h-c) defines the expression Slum Rehabilitation Authority. Section 3A(2)
  • section 40;(b)
  • Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Section 2(19)(b)
  • sub-section (1) of section 3C of the Slum Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 21 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • MAHARASHTRA COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT 1960
  • Section 13(2) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (for short, Slum Act).3.
  • Section 2(bb) of the ID Act
  • Section 37(1B) of the Town Planning Act, Regulation 33(10)
  • section 3C of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority
  • Section 152 of the Town Planning Act. Section 151
  • Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and corresponding Section 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act,
  • section 3B;(h-c) Slum Rehabilitation Authority means the Slum Rehabilitation Authority
  • Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936.97. Section 40 of the Town Planning Act
  • Section 3A(3)(c) of the Slum Act
  • Section 22(m) of the Town Planning Act
  • Sections 3A, 3B, 3C, 3K, 3S, 13(2) of the Slum Act, Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act
  • clauses 1.14, 1.15 and 1.16 of Appendix IV of Regulation 33(10). Clause 1.15
  • Sections 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 135 and 136 of the Town Planning Act
  • Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Under Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act,
  • Regulation 33(10).98. Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act
  • Section 13(2) of the Slum Act
  • Area Development Act, 1976,(iii)
  • Sub-Section 10 of Section 12 of the Slum Act;
  • Section 40 of the Town Planning Act. A perusal of Section 40
  • Section 2(g-a) defines the expression Slum Area. Section 2(h-b) defines the expression Slum Rehabilitation Area. Section 2(h-c)
  • provisions of the Slum Act and in particular Sections 2(b-a), 2(ga), 2(h-b)(h-c)
  • section 3A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Implementation, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971.105.
  • Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act, 1965; and(c) (i)
  • Slum Act. Section 37(1B) reads thus:37. Modification of final Development Plan(1B)
  • Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, SRA
  • sub-section (2) of section 3A;(g-a) Slum
  • sub-section (1) of section 4;
  • Rule 2(b)
  • Section 13(2) of the Slum Act.109.
  • Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949;(b)
  • Sub-section (2) of modified Section 13
  • Slum Rehabilitation Area.94. Section 354-AAA of the Corporation Act reads thus:354-AAA. Empowerment of Slum Rehabilitation Authority
  • Section 152 of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act.
  • issued.116. Section 3A of the Slum Act
  • Section 13(2) the Slum Act, (ii)
  • Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short, General Clauses Act).108.
  • section 4A;(h-b) Slum Rehabilitation Area
  • Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Section 2(15) of the Town Planning Act
  • Bombay Municipal Corporation Act,
  • section 3A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971
  • Section 2(19)(b) read with Section 37(1B) and 154(4) of the Town Planning Act
  • supplied]95. Section 2(b-a) of the Slum Act
  • Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act, 1948,
  • sub-section (10) of Section 12 of the Slum Act;3)
  • provisions of the Slum Act, Regulations, Town Planning Act
  • Section 3A(3)(d)
  • Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act,
  • Clause 1.15 of Appendix IV of Regulation 33(10)
  • Slum Rehabilitation Area in Section 2(h-b)
  • Redevelopment) Act, 1971,
  • section 4 of the Slum Act
  • Section 50 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short, Town Planning Act)
  • Section 3-A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (for short the 1971 Act)
  • Section 3A(3) of the Slum Act
  • provisions of the Slum Act, Town Planning Act, Regulations and the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (for short, Corporation Act). Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act
  • Sections 2(15) and 2(19) of the Town Planning Act
  • section 4 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971
  • Section 3D modified various provisions of the Slum Act. Section 13
  • Section 3C of the Slum Act.115. Section 44 of the Town Planning Act
  • sections 25, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 89, 90, 107, 112, 1[126(1)(b)], 135, 136 and 142
  • Section 13 of the Slum Act
  • Section 2(h-c) defines the expression Slum Rehabilitation Authority. Section 3A(2)
  • section 40;(b)
  • Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Section 2(19)(b)
  • sub-section (1) of section 3C of the Slum Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These Writ Petitions, instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenge the judgment and order dated 19.6.2017 passed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA), and the judgment and order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee. The proceedings arise from suo motu action initiated by the CEO, SRA under Section 13(2) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Slum Act).

Petitioners include K.S. Chamankar Enterprises and Krishna Shantaram Chamankar (referred to collectively as ‘Chamankars’), various slum dwelling societies such as Andheri Kasam Nagar SRA Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (Kasam Nagar Society), Andheri Anna Nagar Shivshakti SRA CHS Ltd. (Anna Nagar Society), and Vitthal Rakhumai (Andheri) SRA CHS Ltd. (Vitthal Rakhumai Society), as well as developers and financiers such as L & T Asian Realty Project Ltd., L & T Realty Limited, and Prime Builders & Developers.

The dispute concerns the redevelopment of slum and non-slum plots in Andheri (West), Mumbai, including several plots bearing specific C.T.S. numbers. The Chamankars were appointed as developers by the slum dwellers’ societies and entered into a development agreement with the State of Maharashtra on 27.11.2006. Various permissions and approvals were issued by the SRA over the years, and some constructions such as the New Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi and High Mount Guest House at Mumbai were completed or near completion. However, delays in completing the overall slum rehabilitation scheme led the CEO, SRA to initiate proceedings under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, culminating in termination of Chamankars as developers and directions for the societies to elect new developers.

Several parties sought intervention and impleadment, citing concerns about delays, representation, and rights of slum dwellers. The Apex Grievance Redressal Committee heard the appeals against the CEO’s order and modified certain directions, including excluding Chamankars from participating in the election of new developers.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) is a Planning Authority?
  2. Whether the CEO, SRA has jurisdiction to issue a show cause notice and pass the impugned order, and whether SRA has jurisdiction over High Mount Guest House and Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi?
  3. Whether there was inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of Chamankars in implementing the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme?
  4. Whether the agreements executed between Chamankars and Prime Builders, as well as the tripartite agreement among Chamankars, L & T, and Prime Builders, were validly entered into?
  5. Whether L & T can be appointed as a developer by setting aside the modified clause (2) of the operative part of the Committee’s order?
  6. Whether this is a fit case for invocation of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Chamankars and Supporters)

  • Chamankars contended that CEO, SRA lacked jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, as such powers reside with the SRA only, and no delegation to CEO was made under Section 3S of the Slum Act.
  • They argued that Section 13(2) applies only against property owners, not developers.
  • Chamankars claimed the delay in project completion was due to non-issuance of timely permissions by authorities, not their fault.
  • They asserted vested rights under the development agreement dated 27.11.2006, supported by Cabinet meetings and Government Resolution, which cannot be arbitrarily undermined.
  • They challenged the exclusion of Chamankars from the election of new developers and the appointment of Prime Builders, who they claimed were blacklisted and disqualified.
  • Chamankars submitted that the CEO and Committee’s findings went beyond the scope of the show cause notice.
  • They alleged violation of natural justice, as a status report used against them was prepared without notice and not shared.
  • Chamankars denied that the agreements with Prime Builders and L & T were valid, highlighting lack of prior written approval as required by the development agreement.

Respondents (State, SRA, Committee, and Others)

  • The State and SRA contended that CEO, SRA has jurisdiction under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act and was empowered to issue the show cause notice and pass the impugned order, supported by delegation under the Town Planning Act and General Clauses Act.
  • They argued that SRA is the planning authority in respect of the slum rehabilitation scheme, and the CEO acts under delegated powers.
  • Respondents asserted there was inordinate and unexplained delay by Chamankars in implementing the scheme, with only a fraction of the required tenements constructed over many years.
  • They maintained that the agreements with Prime Builders and L & T violated the development agreement’s terms and were without approval.
  • The Committee justified the exclusion of Chamankars from the election process, emphasizing the necessity of slum dwellers’ participation and the requirement of 70% consent for appointment of new developers.
  • Respondents argued that the findings were within the scope of the show cause notice and that no prejudice was caused by non-disclosure of the status report, which merely reflected known construction stages.
  • They contended that L & T had no vested rights to be appointed as developer and that the modified clause (2) was lawful and necessary for effective project completion.

Intervenors (L & T and Prime Builders)

  • L & T submitted that they had financed the project substantially and sought appointment as developer, relying on the powers under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act.
  • They contended that the requirement of 70% consent from slum dwellers for initial approval is distinct from the power of SRA to appoint a recognized agency under Section 13(2).
  • Prime Builders supported the impugned orders and denied any claim to developer status.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Om-Sai Darshan Co-Operative Housing Society v. State Of Maharashtra, 2007 (1) Bom. C.R. 476 No requirement for notification under Section 3C of Slum Act for sanctioning redevelopment scheme under Regulation 33(10). Rejected as advancing Chamankars' case; Court held SRA is Planning Authority only for areas declared under Section 3C.
U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 777 State cannot resile from development agreement; action to undermine agreement is unfair and arbitrary. Supported Chamankars' submission on vested rights under development agreement.
AIR India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617 Government discretion in commercial contracts; courts should not substitute executive decisions absent malafides. Supported Chamankars' argument on executive discretion in contracts.
Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P) Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 138 Similar principle on discretion in commercial contracts. As above.
Sterling Computers Limited v. M & N Publications Limited, (1993) 1 SCC 445 Similar principle on discretion in commercial contracts. As above.
State of Karnataka v. All India Manufacturers Organization, (2006) 4 SCC 683 Government largesse must be based on sound, transparent policy; arbitrariness prohibited. Respondents relied on this to assert arbitrary grant to Chamankars.
State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder, (2011) 8 SCC 737 Similar principle on government largesse and arbitrariness. As above.
D.K Yadav v. J.M.A Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 Orders cannot go beyond the scope of show cause notice. Court rejected Chamankars' contention that impugned orders exceeded notice scope.
Saci Allied Products Ltd., U.P. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut, (2005) 7 SCC 159 Similar principle on scope of show cause notice. As above.
Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Chief Executive Officer, Slum Rehabilitation Authority, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1 Section 13(2) of Slum Act empowers SRA to remove developer under specified circumstances; issue of CEO's jurisdiction not decided. Court held CEO has jurisdiction based on delegation; no positive finding on CEO's authority in this case.
Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, (1985) 2 SCC 670 Delegation of powers must be by special or general order. Respondents relied to counter Chamankars' delegation argument.
State of U.P. v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 681 Similar principle on delegation and jurisdiction. As above.
Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, (2008) 9 SCC 31 Violation of natural justice is fatal only if prejudice caused. Court applied to reject Chamankars' natural justice claim due to lack of shown prejudice.
Kedar Shashikant Deshpande v. Municipal Council, (2011) 2 SCC 654 Jurisdictional objections must be raised timely; waiver applies otherwise. Court held Chamankars could not raise CEO jurisdiction objection late.
Balasaheb Arjun Torbole v. Administrator, 2010 SCC OnLine 1279 & (2015) 6 SCC 534 SRA is a Planning Authority under the Slum Act. Cited in support of SRA's planning authority status.
Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 Court should not enforce contractual obligations via writ jurisdiction. Cited to reject L & T's claim to be appointed as developer through writ.
Mohammad Swalleh v. Third Addl. District Judge Meerut, (1988) 1 SCC 40 Government largesse must be transparent and non-arbitrary. Respondents relied to assert arbitrariness in Chamankars' position.
State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481 Similar principle on government largesse and fairness. As above.
Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 16 Setting aside orders reinstating a party may revive illegal possession. Relied by respondents to oppose reinstatement of Chamankars.
CIDCO v. Platinum Entertainment, (2015) 1 SCC 558 Government must act lawfully and not arbitrarily when granting contracts and largesse. Referred to in analysis of government conduct.
Raman Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 Government contracts must be based on sound policy and fairness. As above.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined whether SRA is a Planning Authority. It held that SRA is a Planning Authority only in respect of Slum Rehabilitation Areas declared under Section 3C of the Slum Act, as defined under Section 2(19) of the Maharashtra Town Planning Act. The Court rejected arguments that subordinate regulations (such as Regulation 33(10)) could enlarge this definition. However, in the peculiar facts of the case, since the development agreement appointed SRA as the planning and implementing agency and all development permissions were issued by SRA, the Court proceeded on the premise that SRA functioned as Planning Authority for this scheme.

On CEO, SRA's jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice and pass the impugned order under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, the Court held that CEO, SRA had authority by virtue of delegation under Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, notwithstanding the absence of a special/general order under Section 3S of the Slum Act. The Court rejected Chamankars' contention that Section 13(2) applies only against owners and not developers. It also declined to entertain the argument about lack of delegation to CEO, SRA, as it was not raised before the authorities below and was waived.

The Court declined to consider jurisdiction over non-slum plots such as High Mount Guest House and Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi, as the impugned orders did not address these specifically, and such issues would require separate proceedings.

Regarding delay, the Court found that Chamankars caused inordinate and unexplained delay in implementing the slum rehabilitation scheme, with only a fraction of the planned tenements constructed over more than a decade. The findings of the CEO, SRA and the Committee were based on material on record and were not perverse or contrary to evidence.

The Court rejected Chamankars' contention that the impugned orders went beyond the show cause notice, holding that the authorities dealt with submissions made before them.

On natural justice, the Court held that non-supply of the Executive Engineer’s status report did not cause prejudice to Chamankars, as the report reflected known facts, and no miscarriage of justice was demonstrated.

On validity of agreements with Prime Builders and L & T, the Court held that these were not validly entered into as they lacked prior written approval from the Engineer in-charge as required by clause 24 of the development agreement.

Regarding appointment of L & T as developer, the Court held that the modified clause (2) directing election of the developer by 70% consenting eligible slum dwellers was lawful and necessary. Chamankars, having been removed as developer for non-performance, could not participate in the election. L & T had no vested right to be appointed as developer by setting aside this clause.

Finally, on the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court held that no case was made out for interference. The findings of delay and breach were based on record, and the Court declined to enter into contractual disputes or question the validity of the development agreement, which remained unchallenged.

The Court also granted an interim direction restraining the three societies from convening General Body meetings under the modified clause (2) for eight weeks, with no further extensions.

Holding and Implications

The Petitions are dismissed.

The Court upheld the authority of CEO, SRA to initiate proceedings and remove Chamankars as developers due to inordinate delay and breach of the development agreement. It affirmed the modified clause (2) of the Committee’s order requiring election of a new developer by 70% consent of eligible slum dwellers, excluding Chamankars from participation. The Court found no jurisdictional defect or violation of natural justice warranting interference. No appointment of L & T as developer was ordered by the Court. The Court did not adjudicate on the validity of the development agreement or issues relating to non-slum plots, leaving those matters open for separate proceedings.

No new legal precedent was established; the decision primarily applies the existing statutory framework and prior case law to the facts. The direct effect is the termination of Chamankars as developers and direction for the slum dwellers’ societies to elect a new developer in accordance with the law and regulations.

    K.S. Chamankar Enterprises And Anr. v. The State Of Maharashtra And Ors.

    R.G. Ketkar, J.:— Heard Mr. A.Y. Sakhare, learned Senior Counsel for Petitioners in WP[L] Nos. 3563/2017 & 3261/2017, Mr. Shyam Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in WP No. 2840/2017, Mr. S.U. Kamdar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in WP[L] No. 3617/2017, Mr. S.G. Surana, learned Counsel for the petitioner in WP[L] No. 3597/2017 & for respondent no. 6 in WP[L] No. 3563/2017, Mr. G.S. Godbole, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in WP[L] No. 3583/2017, Mr. H.T. Pawar, learned Counsel for the petitioner in WP[L] No. 296/2018, Mr. Shreepad Murthy, learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP[L] No. 229/2018, Mr. Pravin Samdani, learned Senior Counsel for respondent no. 4 in WP[L] No. 3563/2017 and for intervenor in all connected petitions except WP[L] No. 3563/2017, Mr. P.K. Dhakephalkar, learned Senior Counsel for Apex Grievance Redressal Committee & SRA in all Petitions except WP[L] No. 3261/2017, Mr. Yash Momaya, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 & 2 in WP[L] No. 3261/2017 & for respondents No. 1 & 3 in WP No. 2840/2017, Mr. Rahul Narichania, learned Senior Counsel for Prime Builders & Developers in WP[L] Nos. 3563/2017, 3583/2017, 3597/2017, & 3617/2017, Mr. A.R. Shaikh, learned Counsel for respondent No. 7 in WP[L] No. 3563/2017, Mr. Abhay Patki, learned AGP for State of Maharashtra in WP[L] No. 229/2018 & WP No. 2840/2017, Mr. Amar Mishra, learned AGP for State of Maharashtra in WP[L] No. 296/2018, Ms. Jyoti Chavan, learned AGP for State of Maharashtra in WP[L] Nos. 3563/2017, 3583/2017 & 3597/2017, Ms. Jyoti Chavan, learned AGP for State of Maharashtra in WP[L] No. 3261/2017, Mr. M.A. Sayed, learned AGP for State of Maharashtra in WP[L] No. 3617/2017, at length.

    2. All these Petitions, instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia challenge the judgment and order dated 19.6.2017 passed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) as also the judgment and order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Apex Grievance Redressal Committee (for short, ‘Committee’). These Petitions arise out of suo motu proceedings initiated by CEO, SRA under Section 13(2) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (for short, ‘Slum Act’).

    3. Writ Petition [L] No. 3563/2017 is instituted by K.S. Chamankar Enterprises and Krishna Shantaram Chamankar inter alia praying for (a) declaration that respondent No. 2 Committee and respondent No. 3 CEO, SRA have no authority or entitlement or jurisdiction to interfere with the agreement dated 27.11.2006 and the resolution dated 18.11.2006 with regard to the development rights given under these instruments to the petitioners for slum and non-slum plot bearing C.T.S. Nos. 825/1 (part), 825/2, 835(part), 836(part), 839/1(part) and 839/2(part) situate at village Ambivali, Andheri (West), Mumbai Sub-urban District (for short, ‘suit property’); (b) declaration that the petitioners are entitled to undertake and complete the project, namely, construction of Rehab Buildings, Staff Quarters, Testing Track, Sale Component Building (SCB) on the suit property; (c) setting aside (i) show cause notice dated 12.1.2017 issued under Section 13(2) the Slum Act, (ii) order dated 19.6.2017 passed by CEO, SRA, (iii) order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Committee thereby permitting the petitioners to complete the project on such terms and conditions as may be deemed fit and proper by this Court; (d) issuance of writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction in the similar nature permitting the petitioners to continue the redevelopment of the suit property; (e) declaration that NOC granted by the Regional Transport Office (RTO) dated 26.5.2003 and the Letter of Intent (LOI) issued by SRA dated 27.10.2004 and repeated revision, revalidation and/or amendment of said LOI are legal, valid, subsisting and existing and binding upon respondent Nos. 1 (State of Maharashtra), 2 and 3 and same cannot be revoked or cancelled or terminated with regard to the suit property and are binding upon them, and (f) perpetual injunction restraining respondents No. 2 and 3 from in any manner implementing the show cause notice dated 12.1.2017 and the orders dated 19.6.2017 and 28.11.2017 thereby appointing any other developer or architect with regard to the suit property.

    4. In this Petition, Chamber Summons (L) No. 63 of 2018 is taken out by Moiuddin Inamdar and eight others, who are members of Andheri Kasam Nagar SRA Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (for short, ‘Kasam Nagar Society’) inter alia for impleadment and/or intervention on the ground that the applicants and other slum dwellers have suffered immensely due to inordinate delay in the implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme by petitioner No. 1 and that the Administrator appointed on Kasam Nagar Society is not taking any steps to represent the cause of members.

    5. Writ Petition [L] No. 3261/2017 is instituted by K.S. Chamankar Enterprises and Krishna Shantaram Chamankar inter alia praying for issuing writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction in the similar nature directing the respondents to issue permission and approval to the pending work of High Mount Guest House as specified in paragraph-4(b) as per the policy decision taken by the 1 respondent - State of Maharashtra in the meetings dated 5.5.2006 and 28.8.2006, Government Resolution dated 18.11.2006 and agreement dated 27.11.2006.

    6. Writ Petition No. 2840/2017 is instituted by K.S. Chamankar Enterprises and Krishna Shantaram Chamankar inter alia praying for issuing writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction in the similar nature directing the CEO, SRA to issue commencement certificate to enable the petitioners to construct RTO Staff Quarters and Testing Track along with the underground car parking on the plots bearing CTS No. 825/1 (part) and 825/2 as per the policy decision taken by the 1 respondent in the meetings dated 5.5.2006 and 28.8.2006, Government Resolution dated 18.11.2006 and agreement dated 27.11.2006.

    7. The petitioners in W.P. [L] No. 3563/2017, W.P. [L] No. 3261/2017 and W.P. No. 2840/2017 shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as ‘Chamankars’.

    8. Writ Petition [L] No. 3583/2017 is instituted by Sandeep Y. Toraskar and 21 others (for short, ‘Sandeep’), who are the members of Andheri Anna Nagar Shivshakti SRA CHS Ltd. (for short, ‘Anna Nagar Society’). They have prayed for quashing and setting aside the order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Committee.

    9. Writ Petition [L] No. 3597/2017 is instituted by Vitthal Rakhumai (Andheri) SRA CHS Ltd. (for short, ‘Vitthal Rakhumai Society’) inter alia challenging the judgment and order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Committee in Application (L) No. 9/2017 as also the judgment and order dated 19.6.2017 passed by CEO, SRA. Ishwar Govind Rathod and four others claiming to be members of Vitthal Rahhumai Society have taken out Chamber Summons No. 48/2018 for impleadment/intervention on the ground that the office bearers of their society have filed this Petition by keeping its members in dark. The applicants and other hutment dwellers have suffered immensely due to inordinate delay in the implementation of the slum rehabilitation scheme by Chamankars.

    10. Writ Petition [L] No. 3617/2017 is instituted by (i) L & T Asian Realty Project Ltd., (ii) L & T Realty Limited and (iii) Sudhir Kulkarni (for short, collectively ‘L & T’), inter alia praying for (a) writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction in the similar nature quashing and setting aside the show cause notice dated 12.1.2017 and orders dated 19.6.2017 and 28.11.2017 passed by CEO, SRA and the Committee respectively; and (b) issuance of writ of mandamus directing the State of Maharashtra, Committee, CEO, SRA and Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Eastern and Western Suburbs to appoint the petitioners No. 1 & 2 as developer to complete the SRA scheme.

    11. Anna Nagar Society took out Chamber Summons (L) Nos. 50/2018, 43/2018, 53/2018, 48/2018, 55/2018 in Writ Petitions (L) No. 3261/2017, No. 2840/2017, (L) No. 3583/2017, (L) No. 3597/2017 and (L) No. 3617/2017 respectively inter alia praying for impleadment and/or intervention on the ground that the applicants and other slum dwellers have suffered immensely due to inordinate delay in the implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme by Chamankars.

    12. Moiuddin Inamdar and eight others, who are members of Kasam Nagar Society took out Chamber Summons (L) Nos. 52/2018, 46/2018, 44/2018, 47/2018 and 49/2018 in Writ Petitions (L) No. 3261/2017, No. 2840/2017, (L) No. 3583/2017, (L) No. 3597/2017, (L) No. 3617/2017 respectively inter alia for impleadment and/or intervention on the ground that the applicants and other slum dwellers have suffered immensely due to inordinate delay in the implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme by Chamankars and that the Administrator appointed on Kasam Nagar Society is not taking any steps to represent the cause of members.

    13. Prime Builders took out Chamber Summons (L) Nos. 59/2018, 58/2018, 60/2018 and 56/2018 in the Writ Petitions (L) No. 3261/2017, No. 2840/2017, (L) No. 3583/2017, (L) No. 3597/2017 respectively inter alia for impleadment and/or intervention on the ground that Chamankars entered into several agreements, namely, (i) memorandum of understanding dated 16.3.2004, (ii) development agreement dated 22.10.2004, (iii) development agreement dated 9.3.2007, (iv) supplementary agreement dated 22.7.2017 with the applicant for joint implementation of the subject Slum Schemes of Vithal Rakhumai Society, Kasam Nagar Society and Anna Nagar Society on the suit property. It is further contended that the applicants have invested substantial amount for implementation of the slum rehabilitation scheme. By orders dated 19.6.2017 and 28.11.2017 passed by CEO, SRA under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act by the CEO, SRA and the Committee respectively, Chamankars have been removed as developer.

    14. Writ Petition (L) No. 229/2018 is instituted by Vijay Nandeshwar (for short, ‘Vijay’) and eight others who are members of Kasam Nagar Society inter alia challenging the orders dated 19.6.2017 and 28.11.2017 passed by CEO, SRA and the Committee respectively.

    15. Writ Petition (L) No. 296/2018 is instituted by Mohamed Hassan Sheikh (for short, ‘Sheikh’) and another. The petitioners are claiming right through Ms. Afsana Parveen Ansari whose name appears at Sr. No. 220 in Annexure-II approved by the authority. Chamankars executed an agreement dated 28.3.2013 with petitioner No. 2 wherein Ms. Afsana Parveen Ansari is a party. The petitioners have inter alia prayed for (a) quashing and setting aside the order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Committee; (b) issuing writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order of direction directing the State of Maharashtra to revoke and cancel the agreement dated 27.11.2006 executed between the State of Maharashtra and Chamankars for breach of clause 24 of the said agreement and blacklisting the names of all the developers from the Panel of SRA and inviting fresh tenders from renowned builders and/or taking up the project by the State of Maharashtra for the benefit of the State and the slum dwellers; (c) quashing and setting aside the decisions taken by the Cabinet Infrastructure Sub-Committee in its meetings dated 5.5.2006 and 18.10.2006 as also the decision taken by the Urban Development Department of the State Government under Section 50 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short, ‘Town Planning Act’) and the notification dated 16.11.2006 for deleting the reservation of RTO on non-slum plot admeasuring 31,218.80 square meters.

    16. As the common questions of law and facts arise in these Petitions, same can conveniently be disposed of by this common order. At the joint request of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the facts from Writ Petition [L] No. 3563/2017 are taken into consideration for the sake of brevity and convenience. The facts and circumstances as giving rise to filing of this petition, briefly stated, are as under:

    17. In the year, 1998, the slum dwellers situate on plots bearing CTS No. 835(part), 836(part), 839/1-2 (part) formed Vitthal Rakhumai Society and appointed M/s. K.S. Chamankar Enterprises, a Partnership firm as their developer for redevelopment of the said plots under Regulation 33(10) read with Appendix IV of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 1991 (for short, ‘Regulations’). Since the plots are owned by Government of Maharashtra, the Additional Collector (Encroachment) and the Competent Authority (for short, ‘Competent Authority’) issued the certified Annexure-II on 22.9.1998. There are 161 slum dwellers, out of which 98 slum dwellers were held eligible.

    18. On 22.12.1998 the slum dwellers situate on plot bearing CTS Nos. 825/1 (part), 825/2 formed Anna Nagar Society and appointed M/s. K.S. Chamankar Enterprises, a Partnership firm as their developer for redevelopment of these plots under Regulation 33(10) read with Appendix IV of the Regulations. These plots are affected by Mogra Nalla, Tata High Power Tension Line and proposed D.P. Road. There were physical constraints to implement the slum rehabilitation scheme as the land area left for construction purpose was very less.

    19. The slum dwellers of Kasam Nagar area situate touching the Anna Nagar Society and on the same plot of land and RTO plot of land situate in the same survey number, approached the developer K.S. Chamankar Enterprises for redevelopment of their slum which is locked due to Mogra Nala on east side of said plot. Due to constraints in their planning, the developer M/s. K.S. Chamankar Enterprises joined/clubbed the proposal of Kasam Nagar Society in the scheme of Anna Nagar Society.

    20. In order to make the slum rehabilitation scheme viable, M/s. K.S. Chamankar Enterprises submitted revised proposal in January, 2000 to SRA realigning the boundary of RTO's non-slum plot of land and slum plot of land for joint development of Anna Nagar Society and Kasam Nagar Society. In the meantime, on 11.8.2000, the Competent Authority issued certified Annexure II. There are total 235 slum dwellers out of which 188 slum dwellers were held eligible. Out of 188 slum dwellers, 153 eligible slum dwellers i.e. 81% had given consent in favour of the Chamankars. The Competent Authority further certified that CTS No. 825 admeasures 7232 square meters. After scrutinizing the revised amalgamated proposal of Anna Nagar Society and Kasam Nagar Society, the CEO, SRA forwarded the proposal to the Transport Commissioner on 4.3.2002.

    21. By order dated 30.1.2003, the State of Maharashtra directed the Transport Manager to issue NOC and thereafter the Transport Commissioner vide letter dated 26.5.2003 issued NOC for implementation of SRA Scheme on entire RTO plot of land. By letter dated 3.1.2004 addressed by RTO, Andheri (West) to the Executive Engineer, SRA granted development rights of the non-slum plot of land admeasuring 33192 square meters and gave approval to the plans of RTO Office building and residential quarters thereof to be constructed on non-slum plot of land.

    22. On 30.6.2004, the Competent Authority certified Annexure-II. There are total 350 slum dwellers out of which 135 slum dwellers are held eligible. Out of 135 eligible slum dwellers 102 eligible slum dwellers i.e. 75% had given consent in favour of Chamankars. The Competent Authority certified that CTS No. 825/1(part) and 825/2(part) admeasures 6699 square meters and is occupied by Kasam Nagar Society. On 12.10.2004, the SRA issued LOI for Anna Nagar Society and Kasam Nagar Society. On 22.10.2004, Chamankars executed Memorandum of Understanding with Prime Builders. On 15.2.2005, the SRA issued Intimation of Approval (IOA) for composite building No. 1 consisting of ground + seven floors for Anna Nagar Society. On 24.8.2005, Plinth Checking Certificate was issued by SRA and the commencement certificate was issued on 8.8.2006. On 23.5.2006, the SRA issued amended LOI. In pursuance thereof, composite building No. 1 is completed and is occupied by 155 eligible slum dwellers of Anna Nagar Society.

    23. On 26.6.2006, SRA issued LOI for Vitthal Rakhumai Society. On 5.5.2006 and 28.8.2006, the proposal for joint development of RTO slum and non-slum plot was thoroughly discussed in the meetings of Cabinet Infrastructure Committee presided over by the then Hon'ble Chief Minister Shri Vilasrao Deshmukh. On 18.11.2006, the Government of Maharashtra issued resolution in pursuance of the decision taken in the meeting of Cabinet Infrastructure Committee. On 27.11.2006, the Government of Maharashtra, through Public Works Department executed development agreement with Chamankars for developing slum and non-slum portion of RTO plots. In the meantime, Chamankars through Architect submitted the proposal for clubbing the slum rehabilitation scheme for (1) Anna Nagar Society, (2) Kasam Nagar Society on CTS No. 825/1 (part) and 825/2 with duly approved slum rehabilitation scheme i.e. Vitthal Rakhumai Society on CTS No. 835(part), 836(part), 839/1(part) and 839/2.

    24. On 6.7.2007, the CEO, SRA approved clubbing of two slum schemes. On 9.7.2007, SRA issued clubbed LOI. On 16.4.2008, the Government of Maharashtra amended Regulation 33(10) of the Regulations. By that amendment, the carpet area of residential rehab tenement to be provided free of cost to slum dwellers was increased to 269 square feet from 225 square feet carpet area. In view thereof, the slum dwellers of Anna Nagar Society and other societies in the clubbed/amalgamated schemes demanded that they should be given benefit of the amended Regulation i.e. to provide 269 square feet carpet area. Accordingly, Chamankars through Architect submitted proposal for conversion of said slum rehabilitation scheme for providing 269 square feet carpet area to the remaining eligible slum dwellers.

    25. In the meantime, Chamankars through their Architect submitted proposal for development of non-slum plot under Regulation 33(14)D and to be clubbed along with duly approved slum rehabilitation scheme under Regulation 33(10) of the Regulations of Anna Nagar Society and Kasam Nagar Society with Vitthal Rakhumai Society.

    26. On 26.4.2012, CEO, SRA approved the said proposal. In pursuance thereof, on 27.4.2012, SRA issued clubbed LOI. In the year 2013, the Government of Maharashtra approved the conversion proposal for construction of remaining rehab tenement of carpet area 269 square feet. On 21.11.2013, SRA issued amended clubbed LOI for construction of remaining rehab buildings. Chamankars entered into finance agreement initially on 9.3.2007 with Prime Builders and tripartite agreement dated 30.9.2011 with L & T Asian Realty Project LLP and L & T Realty Limited. Chamankars constructed RTO office building admeasuring about 7013 square meters comprising of basement + ground + three upper floors and handed over possession to the State Government in the year 2013. Chamankars constructed New Maharashtra Sadan at Delhi, which was handed over to the Government in the year 2013. Chamankars also constructed High Mount Guest House admeasuring about 6000 square meters situate at Malbar Hill, Mumbai and said building is nearly at the completion stage.

    27. In support of this Petition, Mr. Sakhare submitted that Chamankars have constructed new Maharashtra Sadan, New Delhi and handed over possession to the State Government in the year 2013. High Mount Guest House at Malbar Hill is almost completed. In the year 2013, Nalla was widened and shifted. In respect of Rehab Building No. 1, IOA was issued on 15.4.2005, commencement certificate was issued on 24.8.2005. Rehab Building No. 1 is completed and part occupation certificate was issued on 7.9.2007. He submitted that 155 slum dwellers of Anna Nagar Society are occupying the said building. He further submitted that in respect of RTO office building, IOA was issued on 26.8.2005. Commencement certificate was issued on 29.11.2005. Amended IOA was issued on 3.2.2009. Commencement certificate was issued on 4.2.2009. Occupation certificate was issued on 13.12.2011.

    28. He submitted that RTO office building is completed. In respect of Rehab Building No. 2 for accommodating the slum dwellers of Kasam Nagar Society, IOA was issued on 6.11.2007 for the Project Affected Persons (PAP). Amended IOA for 269 square feet carpet area was issued on 26.12.2013. Application for commencement certificate was made on 22.7.2015. Till date, the commencement certificate is not issued for (a) staff quarters, (b) Rehab Building No. 2, and (c) SCB and Testing Track. On 18.11.2015, CEO, SRA forwarded letter to PWD for its NOC of issuing further approvals in the scheme. Insofar as the Testing Track on non-slum plot is concerned, principal approval for car parking under Testing Track is granted by CEO, SRA. IOA was issued for parking below 4000 square meters along with share building. However, commencement certificate till date is not issued. Mr. Sakhare submitted that insofar as the sale building is concerned, IOA was issued on 19.7.2007. Commencement certificate was issued on 1.12.2007. Application for commencement certificate is made on 17.12.2013. Amended IOA was issued on 24.3.2014.

    29. Mr. Sakhare has taken us through the relevant dates and events in respect of the subject matter to contend that because of not issuing timely development permissions, the constructions could not be completed. He submitted that the delay cannot be attributed to Chamankars. Despite this, on 12.1.2017, CEO, SRA initiated suo motu proceedings under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act and issued notices to (1) M/s. K.S. Chamankar Enterprises (Developers), (2) M/s. P.S. Chamankar and Associates (Architect) and (3) the Chief Promoters of (i) Anna Nagar and Kasam Nagar Societies and (ii) Vitthal Rakhumai Society. Chamankars filed reply on 24.1.2017 and written submissions on 3.4.2017 and 16.5.2017 (Exhibits-B to D). On 3.4.2017 and 10.4.2017 all the three societies filed their written submissions to the show cause notice (Exhibits-E, F & G). On 14.5.2017 and 15.5.2017, M/s. P.S. Chamankar and Associates (Architect) submitted their written submissions to the show cause notice (Exhibits-H & J). By impugned order dated 19.6.2017, CEO, SRA terminated the appointment of M/s. K.S. Chamankar Enterprises as developers in respect of Anna Nagar, Kasam Nagar and Vitthal Rakhumai Societies. CEO, SRA further ordered holding of General Body meeting of the slum dwellers on the site in the presence of Joint Registrar (Co-operation) for appointing new builder by all the three societies by way of election with 70% consent. Said procedure was to be completed within one month. CEO, SRA further directed that all the aspiring developers in the present case should face the G.B. meeting and come out as a builder with 70% consents, amongst other direction.

    30. Aggrieved by this decision, L & T filed application (L) No. 2/2017, K.S. Chamankar Enterprises and Shri Krishna Shantaram Chamankar filed application (L) No. 8/2017, Vitthal Rakhumai Society filed application (L) No. 9/2017, Sandeep filed application (L) No. 10/2017, Kasam Nagar Society filed application (L) No. 11/2017, and P.S. Chamankar & Associates filed application (L) No. 34/2017 before the Committee. Before the Committee detailed arguments were advanced on behalf of the parties and written submissions were also tendered. After considering the material on record, the Committee dismissed the applications and modified clause-2 of the operative part of the order dated 19.6.2017 of CEO, SRA. The Committee held that the General Body meeting of the slum dwellers should be held on the site in the presence of Joint Registrar (Co-operation) and the new builder excluding M/s. K.S. Chamankar Enterprises and any entity associated with Developer that has been black listed by SRA will be decided by all the three societies by way of election with 70% consent of eligible slum dwellers. Whosoever is recommended by the said societies as new developer, must have required financial and technical capacity to complete the subject slum rehabilitation scheme in general and rehab component in particular within a period of three years.

    31. Mr. Sakhare submitted that in the present case, CEO, SRA initiated suo motu proceedings under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. The CEO, SRA has no jurisdiction to issue show cause notice as also pass the order dated 19.6.2017. In the first place, Section 13(2) of the Slum Act can be invoked only against the owner of the property and not against the developer. Secondly, the power under Section 13(2) can be exercised by the SRA. In the present case, the SRA has not delegated its powers to CEO by issuing any special or general order as contemplated under Section 3S of the Slum Act. SRA is a planning authority as contemplated by Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Under Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act, the government has issued notification dated 13.9.1996 delegating the powers of SRA exercisable under Sections 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 135 and 136 of the Town Planning Act to CEO. In other words, the powers exercisable by SRA under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act are not delegated to CEO, SRA. In that view of the matter, issuance of show cause notice on 12.1.2017, hearing before the CEO, SRA and ultimately order dated 19.6.2017 passed by the CEO, SRA are without any authority of law and without any jurisdiction. Said order is, therefore, null and void. He submitted that the Committee committed error in relying upon Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 while holding that the powers of SRA have been delegated to CEO, SRA.

    32. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the findings recorded by CEO, SRA and the Committee are beyond the purview of the show-cause notice. Even on this ground the impugned orders are liable to be quashed and set aside. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme envisaged in the present case is an integrated scheme of development. Under the Integrated Scheme, Chamankars inter alia were to develop slum and non-slum plots; to construct Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi, RTO Office and Staff Quarters, RTO Testing Track and High Mount Guest House at Mumbai. SRA has jurisdiction only in relation to the slum component/plot under Regulation 33(10) and Regulation 33(14) and not in respect of non-slum plot pertaining to High Mount Guest House and Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi. SRA cannot be a planning authority in respect of these two buildings. Insofar as the construction of High Mount Guest House is concerned, the Planning Authority would be Mumbai Municipal Corporation as well as the Public Works Department of the State of Maharashtra. In respect of Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi, the planning authority would be New Delhi Municipal Corporation. Thus, the CEO, SRA and the Committee had no authority or jurisdiction to decide the questions relating to non-slum plot.

    33. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the circular dated 13.11.1997 issued by CEO, SRA permits the developer to raise 80% of the project costs by way of finance. In particular he relied upon clause (11)(b) which requires the developer to arrange 20% of the funds for construction of the rehab tenement as initial investment ready for investment in the scheme. Clause (c) provides that the plan for 80% of the amount required for construction of rehab tenement etc. for a building scheme can be made available from various sources. The Authorities below committed serious error in interpreting the tripartite agreement dated 30.9.2011. Clauses of the tripartite have to be interpreted in the light of the circular dated 13.11.1997 and Chamankars cannot be faulted for involving L & T and Prime Builders to raise finance for carrying out the integrated development of entire scheme. The finding recorded by the Committee that Chamankars sold the entire project is, therefore, clearly erroneous.

    34. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the rights have been accrued in favour of Chamankars in pursuance of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006. Said agreement was arrived at after detailed and thorough discussion in the Cabinet meetings dated 5.5.2006 and 28.8.2006 and also Government Resolution dated 18.11.2006. Vested rights have been created in favour of Chamankars in pursuance of the decision taken by the State Government.

    35. Mr. Sakhare submitted that CEO, SRA while passing order on 19.6.2017 directed holding of general body meeting of the slum dwellers on the site in the presence of Joint Registrar (Co-operation) for appointing new builder by all the three societies by way of election with 70% consent. However, the Committee modified clause-2 and directed exclusion of Chamankars and any entity associated with Chamankars from facing general body meeting of three societies. Thus the three societies will pass general body resolutions and elect developer with 70% consenting eligible slum dwellers by excluding Chamankars. Said direction was passed in an appeal preferred by Chamankars. The Committee committed grave error in issuing that direction. He, therefore, submitted that the modified clause-2 of the order of the Committee deserves to be set aside. He submitted that the authorities below failed to appreciate that Prime Buildres is black listed and cannot be allowed to face general body meeting of three societies. Prime Builders is disqualified from being appointed as a developer.

    36. Mr. Sakhare invited our attention to the provisions of the Slum Act and in particular Sections 2(b-a), 2(ga), 2(h-b)(h-c) which define the expressions “Chief Executive Officer”, “Slum Area”, “Slum Rehabilitation Area, and “Slum Rehabilitation Authority” respectively, Sections 3A, 3B, 3C, 3K, 3S, 13(2) of the Slum Act, Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act which defines the expression “Planning Authority”, Section 37(1B) of the Town Planning Act, Regulation 33(10) read with Appendix IV as also Regulation 33(14)D.

    37. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the Executive Engineer had prepared status report on 10.3.2017. The status report was prepared on the basis of the site inspection which was carried out without notice to Chamankars. The status report was not given Chamankars till date. Chamankars are not aware about the contents of the said report. The Authorities below, however, relied upon the said report while passing the impugned orders. He, therefore, submitted that the authorities below have grossly violated the principles of natural justice by relying upon the material which was not made available to Chamankars. On this ground also the impugned orders deserve to be set aside.

    38. In support of his submissions, Mr. Sakhare relied upon following decisions:

    [i] Om-Sai Darshan Co-Operative Housing Society v. State Of Maharashtra, 2007 (1) Bom. C.R. 476 to contend that there is no requirement for issuance of notification under Section 3C of the Slum Act for sanctioning of the Slum Redevelopment Scheme covered by Regulation 33(10).

    [ii] U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Sant Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 777 and in particular paragraphs-27 and 35 thereof to contend that the State Government has entered into development agreement with Chamankars on 27.11.2006 by extending various benefits for encouraging it to make investment. The State Government thereafter cannot resile from such agreement and such action would be unfair and arbitrary and would seriously affect the credibility of the Government showing the shortsightedness in governance. In order to keep faith and maintain good governance it is necessary that respondent No. 1 State should not be permitted to terminate or withdraw from the development agreement dated 27.11.2006.

    39. Mr. Sakhare contended that in a commercial transaction of a complex nature a lot of balancing work has to be done after weighing all relevant factors. A final decision is always taken with an overall view and a holistic approach. The Court cannot in such matters substitute its decision for the decision of the party awarding the contract unless malafides are alleged while entering into the contract. In the present case, no malafides are alleged against the first respondent State in executing development agreement on 27.11.2006. The Government is not helpless in contractual matters. In contracts having commercial element it can be bestowed with discretion so that they may enter into contracts which are beneficial to the State. It is not healthy for the Courts to question or adjudicate upon every decision taken as a State in the execution of contracts cannot act like a quasi-judicial authority. The discretion must be given to the State Government authorities granting them liberty to assess the overall situation for the purpose of taking a decision as to whom the State should contract with and on what terms. If such contracts have been executed after following an informed decision making process, the Court must uphold the validity of the contract and grant freedom of “play in the joints” to the Executive. In support of these propositions, he relied upon the following decisions:

    [i] AIR India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 617 and in particular paragraphs-7, 11 and 12;

    [ii] Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P) Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 138 and in particular paragraph-12;

    [iii] Sterling Computers Limited v. M & N Publications Limited, (1993) 1 SCC 445 and in particular paragraphs-12, 16 to 18 and 25.

    40. He contended that this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot enter into the details or consider the arguments which require a detailed scrutiny of contractual disputes. The orders cannot travel beyond the show cause notice. It is not permissible for the State to change its line merely because the new Government has come in power especially since the development agreement dated 27.11.2006 is not terminated by the State. Such action on the part of this Government would be a colourable exercise of powers. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Since a valid and binding development agreement was executed but it is not terminated by the State Government, it is not permissible for the State Government through SRA to indirectly annul the agreement especially since the visiting rights are created in favour of Chamankars. SRA cannot act contrary to the State or plead a case which is different from respondent No. 1 State. He relied upon following decisions:

    [i] State of Karnataka v. All India Manufacturers Organization, (2006) 4 SCC 683 and in particular paragraphs-12, 41 to 51 and 57,

    [ii] State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder, (2011) 8 SCC 737

    41. He contended that the findings recorded by CEO, SRA and the Committee are beyond the purview of the show-cause notice and as such are liable to be quashed and set aside. He relied upon following decisions:

    [i] D.K Yadav v. J.M.A Industries Ltd. ., (1993) 3 SCC 259 and in particular paragraphs-8 and 9,

    [ii] Saci Allied Products Ltd., U.P. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut, (2005) 7 SCC 159 and in particular paragraphs-15 to 18.

    42. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in Susme's case (supra) did not decide the question whether CEO, SRA has power to issue a notice under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. Said decision was challenged before the Apex Court. In Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Chief Executive Officer, Slum Rehabilitation Authority, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1, no positive finding is rendered by the Apex Court that CEO, SRA has jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. The question as to whether by SRA they mean the SRA as a body corporate or the CEO, SRA or any other designate who is empowered to issue a notice under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act was neither raised nor decided. In the present case, there is no delegation of authority by SRA under Section 3S of the Slum Act to CEO. CEO, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 13(2). This issue goes to the root of the matter. He also submitted that respondent No. 4's submission that Chamankars did not raise this contention before the Authorities below cannot be countenanced as this is a jurisdictional issue and there cannot be a waiver.

    43. In support of Writ Petitions filed by L & T, Mr. Kamdar submitted that Chamankars have rehabilitated 155 eligible slum dwellers from Anna Nagar Society. Chamankars were to rehabilitate in all 911 persons which includes 464 eligible slum dwellers and 437 PAP. He submitted that assuming there is delay on the part of Chamankars, the authorities below should have removed Chamankars as a developer. On 9.3.2007, Chamankars and Prime Builders entered into agreement under which Prime Builders undertook to rehabilitate the eligible slum dwellers. On 30.9.2011, tripartite agreement was entered into between Chamankars, Prime Builders and L & T. Under this agreement, Chamankars undertook obligation to obtain all the development permissions. Prime Builders undertook to rehabilitate the eligible slum dwellers and the petitioners undertook to construct free sale buildings and sell the flats from the free sale buildings. L & T had financed Rs. 123 crores to Chamankars and Rs. 354 Crores to Prime Builders. Till date, L & T has paid Rs. 31 Lakhs towards compensation/transit accommodation. As on today, L & T parted with Rs. 478,32,00,000/-. L & T is paying till date the compensation to the eligible slum dwellers.

    44. Mr. Kamdar submitted that sub-clauses (ii), (iii) & (iv) of clause (II) of Regulation 33(10) lay down that certain areas specified therein shall be deemed to be Slum Rehabilitation Area. Section 3D of the Slum Act provides that on publication of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme under subsection (1) of Section 3B, the provisions of other Chapters of the Slum Act shall apply to any area declared as slum rehabilitation area, subject to modifications. Sub-section (2) of modified Section 13 empowers the SRA to entrust the development of any land to any agency recognized by it for that purpose. In other words, he submitted that the Committee was not justified in directing the slum dwellers of three societies to convene general body meeting in the presence of Joint Registrar (Co-operation) to elect developer by way of election with 70% consent. He submitted that the Committee should have exercised the power under modified Section 13(2) of the Slum Act and appointed agency.

    45. Mr. Kamdar invited our attention to clauses 1.14, 1.15 and 1.16 of Appendix IV of Regulation 33(10). Clause 1.15 lays down that where 70% or more eligible hutment dwellers in a slum or pavement in a viable stretch at one place agree to join a rehabilitation scheme, it may be considered for approval. Thus at initial stage 70% eligible hutment dwellers have to join a rehabilitation scheme. The modified clause 2 of the operative part of the Committee's order directing the three societies to convene a general body meeting for electing the developer is, therefore, contrary to the Scheme of the Regulations as also the provisions of the Slum Act. He, therefore, submitted that Clause - 2 as modified by the Committee be set aside and the SRA may be directed to appoint the agency as per the modified Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. In support of his submissions he relied upon following decisions:

    (i) Susme's case (supra) and in particular paragraphs-48 to 50, 63, 67, 68 and 91 to contend that under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, SRA has authority to take action and hand over development of land to some other reognized agency under three circumstances, namely,

    1) when there is contravention of the plans duly approved;

    2) when there is contravention of any restriction or condition imposed under sub-section (10) of Section 12 of the Slum Act;

    3) when the development has not taken place within the time, if any specified.

    He further submitted that in paragraphs-67 and 68, the Apex Court has clearly laid down that under Regulation 33(10) at least 70% of the slum dwellers have to come together and form a society for the purpose of slum rehabilitation scheme.

    (ii) Sterling Buildcom Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Maharashtra, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1281 and in particular paragraph-52, where the Division Bench of this Court observed that the requirement of obtaining consent of 70% from out of thousands of slum dwellers even in Town Development Schemes only helps the slum-lords and it does not really help the slum dwellers. The State Government ought to realize this and make special provisions for Township Redevelopment Project for appointing the developer on its own and doing away with the requirement of obtaining consent of slum dwellers.

    (iii) Paragraph-14 of the order dated 7.2.2013 in Appeal From Order No. 1019/2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram: S.C. Dharmadhikari, J.) [Ravi Ashish Land Developers Ltd. v. Prakash Pandurang Kamble]. In paragraph-14, the learned Single Judge observed that the statutory authorities under the Slum Act must ensure timely completion of the project by appropriate intervention and intermittently. They are not helpless in either removing the slum dwellers or the developers. The speed with which they remove slum dwellers from the site, it is expected from them and they must proceed against errant builders and developers and ensure their removal and replacement by other competent agency. Thus, the SRA is empowered under modified Section 13(2) of the Slum Act to appoint a recognized agency for carrying out development of the land.

    46. Mr. Kamdar submitted that revision of Appendix II containing the names of eligible slum dwellers is a continuing process. If the modified clause (2) of the Committee's order is to be implemented it will be a never ending process. For all these reasons, he submitted that modified clause-2 of the operative part of the Committee's order may be set aside thereby directing SRA to appoint recognized agency. Having regard to the credentials of L & T, namely, its financial capacity, the SRA may be directed to appoint L & T as developer. He submitted that L & T is ready and willing to submit bank guarantee in the sum of Rs. 100 Crores and undertakes to complete entire project within two years from the date of its appointment as a developer.

    47. In support of the Writ Petition instituted by Vitthal Rakhumai Society, Mr. Surana submitted that in this society there are 161 slum dwellers out of which 95 are held eligible. The society is duly registered on 12.4.2017 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. There are 235 occupants in Anna Nagar Society, out of which 188 slum dwellers are held eligible. 155 slum dwellers out of 188 eligible slum dwellers have been accommodated in the rehab building NO. 1. 33 eligible slum dwellers from Anna Nagar Society are yet to be rehabilitated. Insofar as Kasam Nagar Society is concerned, there are 350 occupants out of which 135 slum dwellers are held eligible. On 21.11.2013, the revised LOI in respect of amalgamated three societies was issued. CEO, SRA issued show-cause notice on 12.1.2017 and Vitthal Rakhumai Society filed reply supporting Chamankars.

    48. He submitted that CEO, SRA cannot invoke powers under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. The authorities below committed error in relying upon Section 152 of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. There is no special or general order under Section 3S of the Slum Act delegating powers of SRA to CEO. In addition, Mr. Surana adopted the submissions advanced by Mr. Sakhare.

    49. In support of Writ Petition instituted by Sandeep, Mr. Godbole submitted that the order of CEO, SRA suffers from lack of inherent jurisdiction. He submitted that Section 2(h-c) defines the expression ‘Slum Rehabilitation Authority’. Section 3A(2) lays down that every Slum Rehabilitation Authority shall consist of a Chairman, CEO and 14 other members, all of whom are to be appointed by the State Government. Section 3A(2A) lays down that the SRA is a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal with power to contract, acquire, hold and dispose of property and to do all things necessary for the purpose of the Act and may sue and be sued by its corporate name. Section 3D modified various provisions of the Slum Act. Section 13 is substituted. Modified Section 13(1) contemplates two situations, namely, (1) if the land owner/occupants themselves have come forward with a scheme for redevelopment of such land, the SRA has to scrutinize such application in accordance with the Regulations in its capacity as a planning authority as defined by Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. In such a case, SRA acts only as a Planning Authority. Another situation contemplated under Section 13(1) is where the land owners in occupation of such area do not come forward within a reasonable time for redevelopment scheme. SRA can pass an order directing redevelopment of such land by entrusting it to any agency for the purpose. In that event only SRA can exercise the powers under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. As in the present case, the owner of the land, namely, State of Maharashtra had appointed Chamankars, Section 13 of the Slum Act does not apply to the fact situation. The order of CEO, SRA, therefore, suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction.

    50. Mr. Godbole submitted that assuming without admitting that Section 13 is applicable, CEO, SRA has no power and/or jurisdiction to issue show cause notice and also to determine the show cause notice. SRA consists of Chairman, CEO and other 14 members and is a body corporate with perpetual succession. The Chief Minister, Minister of Housing etc. are ex-officio members of SRA.

    51. CEO, SRA also works under the supervision and control of SRA. Under Section 3S, SRA is empowered to delegate its powers to CEO by a special general order. In the present case, there is no such order. In support of these submissions, he relied upon following decisions:

    (I) Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, (1985) 2 SCC 670 and in particular paragraphs-5 and 11;

    (II) State of U.P. v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 681, and in particular paragraphs-16 and 17 thereof;

    (III) Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere v. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (1) Mh.L.J. 900 [F.B.]

    52. Mr. Godbole submitted that intervenors must not be allowed to intervene in the Petitions so as to support the impugned orders. Before the CEO, SRA only Sandeep and others had filed objections. Sandeep and others filed M.A. (L) 10/2017 before the Committee. Sandeep and others represented 54 members of Anna Nagar Society, the intervenors therefore have no locus to advance any submissions in the present proceedings.

    53. Mr. Godbole submitted that the development agreement dated 27.11.2006 was executed between the State of Maharashtra and Chamankars. It is not permissible to consider legality or otherwise of the development agreement. Nobody has challenged the validity of the agreement. Even the contracting parties, namely, Chamankars and State have not challenged the said agreement. The agreement is acted upon by Chamankars by constructing Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi, High Mount Guest House and RTO and substantial development of the slums at Mumbai. This Court, therefore, would not be justified in going into the question of legality and/or validity of the said agreement.

    54. Mr. Godbole further submitted Sandeep and others are rehabilitated in one building of Anna Nagar society, any delay in implementation of the slum rehabilitation scheme would cause prejudice as rehab building No. 1 has not been issued full occupation certificate. It, therefore, cannot be said that Sandeep and others have no locus to maintain this Petition. For all these reasons, he submitted that the impugned orders deserve to be set aside.

    55. In Writ Petition (L) No. 229/2018 filed by Vijay, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 19.6.2017 passed by CEO, SRA and the order dated 28.11.2017 passed by the Committee. In support of this Petition, Mr. Nagle submitted that the Committee was not justified in modifying clause (2) of the operative part of the order. Said clause will not serve any purpose by appointing a new developer for the scheme of Anna Nagar Society for which 82% slum dwellers are occupied in rehab building No. 1. He substantially adopted the submissions advanced by Mr. Sakhare. He submitted that the impugned orders may be set aside and the matter may be remitted for denovo consideration.

    56. Mr. Samdani appearing for respondent No. 4 in Writ Petition (L) No. 3563/2017 submitted that the State Government granted development rights to Chamankars without holding a public auction. Chamankars have committed breaches of the development agreement. In particular, Chamankars were to complete the construction of RTO Office building, staff quarters, testing track within two years as also rehabilitate 464 eligible slum dwellers and 437 PAPs within three years from the date of execution of the agreement. The time was essence of contract. Not only that Chamankars committed breach of the Clauses 13, 18 and 24 of the development agreement. He submitted that it is not the case of L & T and Prime Builders that Chamankars have assigned the development rights. The agreements executed by Chamankars in favour of L & T and Prime Builders are in violation of the express stipulation of clause-24 of the development agreement and are without prior written approval of the Engineer in-charge.

    57. He submitted that clause-6 of the development agreement specifically lays down that SRA shall be the planning and implementing agency and had issued necessary LOI, IOA, commencement certificate and occupation certificate in respect of RTO office building, residential quarters for the RTO staff and the transit camp building/s. SRA is a planning authority in terms of clause-3(e) of the development agreement and under Section 2(19)(b) read with Section 37(1B) and 154(4) of the Town Planning Act read with notification dated 13.9.1996.

    58. Under Regulation 33(10)(II)(ii) (iii) & (iv), SRA is the authority for development under Regulation 33(14)D. He submitted that consistently said view is taken in the following decisions:

    (i) Balasaheb Arjun Torbole v. Administrator & Divisional Commissioner, 2010 SCC OnLine 1279;

    (ii) Balasaheb Arjun Torbole v. Administrator, (2015) 6 SCC 534.

    59. Mr. Samdani submitted that the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners that CEO, SRA has no authority and jurisdiction to issue show cause notice and pass order under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act is wholly misconceived. CEO, SRA is having powers under the Slum Act for removal of the developer. This is supported by consistent view taken in following decisions:

    (i) Hind Ekta SRA CHS Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, Writ Petition (L) No. 673/2015 and in particular paragraphs-30 & 31.

    (ii) Hi Tech India Construction v. The Chief Executive Officer, Writ Petition No. 2349/2012.

    (iii) Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Chief Executive Officer, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4822 (Bombay High Court)

    (iv) Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Chief Executive Officer, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1 (Supreme Court).

    (v) Omkar Realtors & Developer Pvt. Ltd. v. Slum Rehabilitation Authority, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1650.

    60. Mr. Samdani submitted that in fact no such contention was advanced before CEO, SRA. It is, therefore, not open for Chamankars to raise the same before the Committee or before this Court. He relied upon paragraph-27 of the decision of Kedar Shashikant Deshpande v. Municipal Council, (2011) 2 SCC 654.

    61. Mr. Samdani submitted that Chamankars were appointed as developer by three societies, namely, Anna Nagar Society, Kasam Nagar Society and Vitthal Rakhumai Society were recognized by SRA by issuing LOI. Neither L & T nor Prime Builders were developers or were recognized or accepted as developer by CEO, SRA. In fact L & T has supported the impugned orders to the extent of removal of Chamankars as a developer and has further prayed for its own appointment as a developer.

    62. He submitted that the contention that the impugned orders are beyond the show cause notice is equally misconceived. He submitted that the authorities below have dealt with various contentions advanced by the parties before them. It is in these circumstances the authorities were required to deal with these contentions. It, therefore, cannot be said that the authorities below have traveled beyond the show cause notice.

    63. Mr. Samdani submitted that the contentions advanced on behalf of Chamankars that there is breach of principles of natural justice as the status report dated 10.3.2017 of the Executive Engineer was prepared without giving notice of site inspection and also said report was not given to them, is misconceived. He submitted that the report only lists out the stage of construction and it contained only the details of IOA and commencement certificate which were issued and in respect of which building occupation certificate is obtained. These documents are within the knowledge and possession of Chamankars. Chamankars have also not shown any prejudice caused to them by non-supply of the said report.

    64. Mr. Samdani submitted that though Chamankars claimed that 155 eligible slum dwellers of Anna Nagar Society are rehabilitated in rehab building No. 1, it is a matter of record that part-occupation certificate in respect of rehab building No. 1 is obtained which accommodates 72 eligible slum dwellers. Rest of the eligible slum dwellers are residing in rehab building No. 1 without occupation certificate. Admittedly 72 eligible slum dwellers out of 456 eligible slum dwellers have been rehabilitated in one building. 434 PAP tenements have not been constructed. Remaining rehab building work has not even been commenced. Chamankars were appointed by three societies in the year 1996/1998. The authorities below have concurrently found that there was inordinate and unexplained delay. This Court, therefore, will not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the development agreement itself postulates that the planning and implementation authority is SRA. Chamankars obtained LOI from SRA, CEO. It, therefore, does not lie in the mouth of Chamankars that SRA has no jurisdiction to remove him as a developer. Chamankars cannot approbate and reprobate. Once Chamankars submitted to the jurisdiction of SRA and have taken benefits and acted partially on the sanction, cannot turn around and say that CEO, SRA cannot remove them as a developer. The development agreement is co-terminus with the removal of the developer and has come to an end with the removal of Chamankars.

    65. Chamankars have neither any equity nor any right in continuation of the slum rehabilitation scheme as they committed breachs of the development agreement. He submitted that large piece of land was sought to be given to Chamankars without following a transparent process. The Government largesses are conferred on Chamankars in an arbitrary, non-transparent manner to Chamankars. He relied upon following decisions:

    (i) Akhil Bharatiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 5 SCC 29,

    (ii) Abdul Hamid Patel v. State Of Maharashtra, 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 184.

    66. Mr. Samdani submitted that Regulation 33(14) lays down the provisions relating to transit camp tenements for Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. Sr. No. 1 of clause (D) thereof reads thus:

    “(D) Or, the additional FSI could be used in the following manner:—

    Serial No. Location Addl. FSI FSI for tenements for SRA FSI for free sale component (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 1. Suburbs and extended suburbs 1.5 0.75 0.75

    67. He invited our attention to clause 3(e) of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006, which reads thus:

    “e) The Developer shall construct building/s for transit camp area admeasuring 21763.94 sq. mtrs. (BUA) on the slum plot or on any other place/s to be provided by the Developer, whether by way of amalgamation, clubbing/or other wise as per plans, specifications approved by S.R.A. in accordance with the provisions of the said Slum Act and shall hand it over free of cost to the Government (S.R.A.) as per terms and conditions of LOI to be issued by S.R.A. in this regard, and instructions issued by S.R.A. from time to time. The D.O. letter of S.R.A. bearing No. CEO/SRA/79 dated 29.6.2006 is annexed herewith as Annexure-10.”

    68. Mr. Samdani submitted that Chamankars were given additional FSI for constructing Permanent Transit Camps (PTC). However, no land was shown for PTC. The two plans produced on record by Chamankars did not show that any provision was made for PTC. In fact no IOA was issued for PTC. In short, he submitted that under the development agreement Chamankars were to construct building/s for transit camp area admeasuring 21763.94 sq. mtrs. (BUA) on the slum plot or on any other place/s to be provided by Chamankars, whether by way of amalgamation, clubbing/or other wise as per plans, specifications approved by S.R.A. in accordance with the provisions of the Slum Act and have to hand over it free of costs to the Government/SRA as per the terms and conditions of LOI to be issued by SRA in this regard and instructions issued by SRA from time to time. Though Chamankars were given additional FSI as per Regulation 33(D), they did not comply clause 3(e) of the development agreement. Mr. Samdani has also taken us through various clauses of the development agreement.

    69. Mr. Samdani, therefore, submitted that the Petitions instituted by Chamankars deserve to be dismissed.

    70. While opposing Writ Petition instituted by L & T, Mr. Samdani submitted that L & T never claimed to be assignee. L & T does not challenge the removal of Chamankars. If that be so after removal of Chamankars, L & T also goes out as it is claiming right in the free sale buildings of Chamankars. L & T is not a sub-contractor and also is not a developer. L & T has challenged only modified clause (2) of the operative part of the order of the Committee directing holding of general body meeting and appointing new developer with 70% consent by three societies. In such fact situation, L & T has no locus to maintain the Petition.

    71. He submitted that by notification dated 2.5.2014 issued by the State Government the provisions of Slum Act have been amended. The figures, letters and word “1 January, 1995” have been substituted by the figures, letters and word “1 January, 2000”. As a result of this notification the slum dwellers who were earlier held to be ineligible and who are between the period 1.1.1995 and 1.1.2000 will have an opportunity of proving their eligibility. If they are found to be eligible they would equally have right to be part of 70% consent for selecting a developer.

    72. The case of L & T is that of a financer who has given finances to Chamankars and Prime Developers. The agreements were entered into between Chamankars and the Prime Developers as also the tripartite agreement between Chamankars, L & T and Chamankars are illegal and are in breach of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006. Said agreement is also contrary to the slum rehabilitation scheme as there is no consent of CEO, SRA. He submitted that L & T has tried to change its stand in the present petition from that of the first round of litigation where it had filed earlier Writ Petition. In the earlier Writ Petition, L & T desired to participate in securing 70% consent for its appointment and needed longer time as against the time fixed by SRA. He submitted that as the development agreement executed between the State Government and Chamankars is illegal, if this Court sets aside the impugned order will amount to reinstating Chamankars as a developer thereby reviving the illegal possession. This Court will, therefore, refrain from invoking powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of this submissions, he relied upon following decisions:

    (I) Mohammad Swalleh v. Third Addl. District Judge Meerut, (1988) 1 SCC 40;

    (II) State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu, (1994) 2 SCC 481,

    (III) Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 16;

    73. Mr. Samdani submitted that the findings recorded by CEO, SRA and the Committee are not perverse findings warranting invocation of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He, therefore, submitted that the Petitions deserve to be dismissed.

    74. Mr. Dhakephalkar appearing on behalf of SRA supported the impugned orders. He submitted that it is common ground among the parties that SRA is a planning authority as contemplated by the Town Planning Act. Chamankars contended that CEO, SRA has no power to issue show cause notice and take decision under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. He submitted that the area in respect of which the slum rehabilitation scheme is deemed to be a Slum Rehabilitation Area.

    75. He invited our attention to clauses 2.2 and 2.3 of Appendix IV under Regulation 33(10). In the present case all the development permissions have been granted by SRA. It is, therefore, not open for any one to contend that SRA is not a planning authority. He relied upon paragraphs-56 and 57 of Susme's case (supra) where the Apex Court interpreted Section 3A(3) of the Slum Act dealing with the powers, duties and functions of SRA to get the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme implemented [sub-clause (c)] and to do all such other acts and things as may be necessary for achieving the objects of rehabilitation of slums [sub-clause (d)]. He, therefore, submitted that the contention advanced by Chamankars that CEO, SRA has no authority and/or jurisdiction to issue show cause notice and pass order removing Chamankars as developer is wholly misconceived and liable to be rejected.

    76. Mr. Dhakephalkar submitted that Chamankars contended that the impugned orders are liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. In that it is contended that copy of the status report dated 10.3.2017 prepared by the Executive Engineer was not supplied to Chamankars. The site inspection was carried out without notice to Chamankars. He submitted that no prejudice is caused to the petitioners. The status report prepared by the Executive Engineer depicts admitted position and Chamankars are not taken by surprise. He submitted that the contention that the impugned orders travel beyond the show cause notice is also misconceived. In pursuance of the show cause notice, details submissions, both oral as well as written, were advanced before CEO, SRA by the parties. All the parties were heard. While passing impugned orders, the authorities below have dealt with the arguments advanced by the parties. It, therefore, cannot be said that the impugned orders travel beyond the show cause notice. The parties invited the authorities to deal with the submissions. Even the status report of the Executive Engineer dated 10.3.2017 which was on record before CEO, SRA was not disputed by Chamankars. He relied upon the decision in Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, (2008) 9 SCC 31 to contend that violation of principles of natural justice becomes fatal only if it has caused prejudice to the person concerned.

    77. Mr. Dhakephalkar submitted that the challenge to modified clause (2) of the operative part of the Committee's order, is misconceived. The Committee was justified in modifying clause (2) requiring 70% consent of slum dwellers of societies for selecting the developer. He has taken us through the Scheme of the Slum Act to contend that Chapter II provides for declaration of slum areas and certain slum improvement areas deemed to be slum areas. Chapter III deals with slum improvement. Chapter IV dealt with slum clearance and redevelopment. Chapter V deals with acquisition of land. He submitted that Afzalpurkar Committee was constituted by the State Government which recommended participation of the slum dwellers for carrying out the purposes of the Slum Act.

    78. In pursuance of the recommendations of Afzalpurkar Committee, Chapter I-A dealing with Slum Rehabilitation Authority for implementing the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Chapter I-B dealing with protected occupiers from re-location and rehabilitation and Chapter I-C dealing with special provisions for in Situ Rehabilitation Housing Schemes for Protected Occupiers in Slum Areas, were added in the Slum Act. In order to successfully implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme it is imperative that the eligible slum dwellers participate in the said process. He submitted that bearing in mind this aspect, the Committee was justified in modifying clause (2) in the operative part of the order.

    79. He submitted that on the question of delay on the part of Chamankars, Authorities below have concurrently held that there was inordinate delay on the part of Chamankars in implementing the scheme. He, therefore, submitted that no case is made out for interfering with the impugned orders.

    80. Appearing on behalf of Prime Builders, Mr. Rahul Narichania took us through the application/appeal filed by L & T before the committee and in particular grounds J, L, P, Q, S and prayers therein. He submitted that before the Committee L & T did not pray for its appointment as a developer. L & T does not have vested rights in that regard. He relied upon paragraphs-21 and 22 of Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 to contend that the Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction to enforce the contractual obligation.

    81. In rejoinder, Mr. Sakhare submitted that it is not open to respondent No. 4 in Writ Petition (L) No. 3563/2017 to challenge the legality/validity of the development agreement between the State Government and Chamankars. He submitted that the validity or otherwise of the development agreement was not subject matter of the show cause notice. The validity of the development agreement was not questioned before the authorities below. CEO, SRA and the Committee did not deal with this aspect. In Writ Petitions instituted by Chamankars no reply is filed by the respondents, including 4 respondent. Chamankars, therefore, had no occasion to deal with this contention. Till date nobody has challenged the development agreement dated 27.11.2006. For the first time oral arguments are advanced in this Court as regards legality and validity of the said agreement without there being any material/foundation before this Court. He, therefore, submitted that this Court is not called upon to adjudicate upon the legality and/or validity of the said agreement. He submitted that said question need not be gone into by this Court.

    82. Without prejudice to these submissions, Mr. Sakhare has taken us through the chart showing steps taken by Chamankars. He submitted that seven departments were involved, namely, PWD, Finance, Transport, Law etc. All these departments approved the agreement. It, therefore, cannot be said that the Government has distributed largesses. He submitted that the subject property has reservations for RTO and is occupied by slums. RTO was finding it difficult to develop the property. There were financial constraints. The Government was not in a possession to develop the reservation for RTO. With this view in mind, the Government entered into development agreement with Chamankars for construction of New Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi, High Mount Guest House at Malbar Hill, Mumbai and the subject property. Chamankars completed the construction of Maharashtra Sadan, New Delhi and handed over possession in 2013 and substantially completed the construction of High Mount Guest House. He relied upon the decision in State of Karnataka (supra) and Susme Builder Pvt. Ltd. (Bombay HC) (supra) and in particular paragraph-71 thereof.

    83. In rejoinder, Mr. Kamdar submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in Indian Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 ABR 699 has held that annexure-II is a continuous process. Section 13(2) of the Slum Act does not contemplate such exercise. He also relied upon the decision in Janhit Manch & Anr. v. State Of Maharashtra & Ors., 2007 (1) BCR 329 and in particular paragraph-133. He submitted that in paragraph-21 of the appeal/application of L & T apart from their prayer for setting aside the order dated 19.6.2017 passed by CEO, SRA, L & T prayed for its appointment as a developer of the slum rehabilitation project. In paragraph-9 of the order of the Committee, the Committee noted the prayer of L & T for its appointment as a developer. He submitted that L & T had invested Rs. 478/- Crores stage-wise, has financed Chamankars and also made payments of Rs. 35 Lakhs towards the rent. He submitted that under the modified Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, SRA is authorized to appoint agency. He relied upon the decision in Awdesh V. Tiwari v. CEO, SRA, 2006 (4) Mh.L.J. 282.

    84. In rejoinder, Mr. Godbole submitted that the slum rehabilitation development scheme is undertaken under Regulation 33(10). The scheme is sanctioned post amendment in respect of the cut-off date from 1.1.1995 to 1.1.2000. Modified clause (2) of the operative part of Committee's order requiring 70% consent of eligible slum dwellers of three societies is illegal. Initially 70% eligible slum dwellers from three societies had given consent. The plots were amalgamated in terms of clause 7.7 of Appendix IV under Regulation 33(10). He submitted that the State Government is a juristic entity and without State Government the authorities below were not justified in passing the impugned order which has the effect of terminating the development agreement.

    85. We have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned Counsel appearing for the parties. We have also perused the material on record as also the written submissions tendered by some of the Counsel appearing for the parties. In our opinion, following points arise for our consideration:

    1) Whether the SRA is a Planning Authority?

    2) Whether CEO, SRA has jurisdiction to issue show cause notice and pass impugned order and whether SRA has jurisdiction in respect of High Mount Guest House and Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi?

    3) Whether there is inordinate, unexplained delay on the part of Chamankars in implementing the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme?

    4) Whether the agreement executed between Chamankars and Prime Builders as also the tripartite agreement amongst Chamankars, L & T and Prime Builders were validly entered into?

    5) Whether L & T can be appointed as a developer by setting aside the modified clause (2) of the operative part of the Committee's order?

    6) Whether this is a fit case for invocation of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

    1) Whether the SRA is a Planning Authority?

    86. The arguments advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties revolve around the controversy as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, SRA is the Planning Authority. We will first deal with this issue on the basis of facts and followed by the provisions of law and the decisions relied upon by the parties. It is not in dispute that on 27.11.2006, the development agreement was entered into by and between the State Government and Chamankars. Clause-6 thereof provides that SRA shall be the planning and implementing agency and shall issue necessary LOI, IOA, commencement certificate and occupation certificate in respect of RTO office building, residential quarters for RTO staffs and the transit camp building/s as stated in clause-3(e). Clause 6 reads thus:

    “6. SRA shall be the planning and implementation agency and shall issue necessary LOI, IOA, Commencement Certificate and Occupation Certificate in respect of RTO Office Building, residential quarters for the RTO staff and the transit camp building/s as stated in clause no. 3(e).”

    87. Clause-7 thereof lays down that the developer (Chamankars) shall prepare the proposal based on plans and specifications approved by the Chief Architect, Govt. of Maharashtra for Government Component work, and to submit to the SRA and/or to the concerned authorities where ever required and after approval of SRA and/or the concerned authorities to said plan, the developer shall commence the respective work immediately.

    88. Clause-7.7 of Appendix IV under Regulation 33(10) reads thus:

    “APPENDIX IV

    [Regulation 33(10)]

    7. SLUMS AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN RESERVATIONS:—

    x x x x x x x x

    x x x x x x x x

    7.7 Wherever slum and municipal/MHADA property are found together or adjoining, it would be eligible for redevelopment using provisions of both DCR 33(7) and of DCR 33(10). Development of slum and contiguous non-slum area under any other provisions may be allowed together in order to promote flexibility of design as well as to raise more resources, provided the FSI on non-slum quantum of area shall be restricted to that permissible in the surrounding zone, [inclusive of admissible TDR or non-slum area.] Such a project shall be deemed to be a Slum Rehabilitation Project. The power under D.C. Regulation 11(4) for shifting and/or interchanging the purpose of designation/reservations shall be exercised by the Chief Executive Officer, Slum Rehabilitation Authority in respect of slum rehabilitation areas/projects.”

    89. Clause-7.7 lays down that the development of slum and contiguous non-slum area under any other provisions [other than Regulation 33(7) and Regulation 33(10)] may be allowed together in order to promote flexibility of design as well as to raise more resources, provided the FSI on non-slum quantum of area shall be restricted to that permissible in the surrounding zone, [inclusive of admissible TDR or non-slum area.] Such a project shall be deemed to be a Slum Rehabilitation Project. The power under Regulation 11(4) for shifting and/or interchanging the purpose of designation/reservations shall be exercised by CEO, SRA in respect of slum rehabilitation areas/projects. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the suit property is not declared as a Slum Rehabilitation Area as contemplated by Section 3C of the Slum Act. It also not in dispute that the Government land reserved for various purposes (namely, RTO, staff quarters of RTO, Testing Track etc.) is a non-slum plot. As against this, the three societies in question are in a slum plot area. It is also not in dispute that the slum plot and non-slum plots are contiguous. As per clause-7.7 of Appendix IV under Section 33(10) approval is given for development of slum and contiguous non-slum area together in order to promote flexibility of design as well as to raise more resources. It is also not in dispute that all the development permissions, such as, LOI, IOA, commencement certificate and occupation certificate are issued by SRA. All the parties in the present proceedings have proceeded on the premises that SRA is a Planning Authority. It is, therefore, not open for the parties now to turn around and contend that SRA is not the Planning Authority. Thus on facts in the instant case SRA has to be held as a Planning Authority.

    90. In order to consider the legal position as to whether in the present case SRA is a Planning Authority or not, we will have to consider the provisions of the Slum Act, Town Planning Act, Regulations and the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (for short, ‘Corporation Act’). Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act defines the expression “Planning Authority” and same reads thus:

    “2. Definitions

    In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

    x x x x x

    (19) “Planning Authority” means a local authority; and includes,—

    (a) a Special Planning Authority constituted or appointed or deemed to have been appointed under section 40;

    (b) in respect of the slum rehabilitation area declared under section 3C of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority appointed under section 3A of the said Act;]”

    91. Section 37(1B), inserted by Mah. 5 of 1996 permits SRA to submit proposal for modification in a final development plan for implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme declared under the Slum Act. Section 37(1B) reads thus:

    “37. Modification of final Development Plan

    (1B) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if the Slum Rehabilitation Authority appointed under section 3A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 is satisfied that a modification of any part of, or any proposal made in, a final Development plan is required to be made for implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme declared under the said Act, then, it may publish a notice in the Official Gazette, and in such other manner as may be determined by it, inviting objections and suggestions from any person with respect to the proposed modification not later than one month from the date of such notice; and shall also serve notice on all persons affected by the proposed modification, and after giving a hearing to any such persons, submit the proposed modification (with amendments, if any) to the State Government for sanction.”

    92. The Regulations are framed under Section 22(m) of the Town Planning Act and other enabling provisions. Regulation 33(10)(II) (ii)(iii) and (iv) read thus:

    “Regulation 33(10)

    II. Definitions of Slum, Pavement, and structure of hut.-

    (i) x x x x x

    (ii) If any area fulfills the conditions laid down in section 4 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 to qualify as slum area and has been censused or declared and notified shall be deemed to be and treated as Slum Rehabilitation Areas.

    (iii) Slum rehabilitation area shall also mean any area declared as such by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority though preferably fulfilling conditions laid down in section 4 of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 to qualify as slum area and/or required for implementation of any slum rehabilitation project. [Any area where a project under Slum Rehabilitation Scheme has been approved by CEO/SRA shall be deemed slum rehabilitation area.]

    (iv) Any area required or proposed for the purpose of construction of temporary or permanent transit camps and so approved by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority shall also be deemed to be and treated as Slum Rehabilitation Areas, and projects approved in such areas by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority shall be deemed to be Slum Rehabilitation Projects.”

    93. A perusal of the above extracted provisions shows that for the purpose of development under Regulation 33(10) of the slum also means the areas/pavement stretches hereafter notified or deemed to be or treated as such. It also lays down that if any area fulfills the conditions laid down in section 4 of the Slum Act to qualify as slum area and has been censused or declared and notified shall be deemed to be and treated as Slum Rehabilitation Areas. Slum rehabilitation area is also any area declared as such though preferably fulfilling conditions laid down in section 4 of the Slum Act to qualify as slum area and/or required for implementation of any slum rehabilitation project. Any area where a project under Slum Rehabilitation Scheme has been approved by CEO, SRA is also deemed to be slum rehabilitation area. Any area required or proposed for the purpose of construction of temporary or permanent transit camps and so approved by the SRA is also deemed to be and treated as Slum Rehabilitation Areas, and projects approved in such areas by the SRA is deemed to be Slum Rehabilitation Projects. Relying upon these provisions, it is sought to be contended that in the present case Slum Rehabilitation Scheme is approved by CEO, SRA and is, therefore, deemed to be Slum Rehabilitation Area.

    94. Section 354-AAA of the Corporation Act reads thus:

    “354-AAA. Empowerment of Slum Rehabilitation Authority for implementation of Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.

    Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette direct that the powers of the Commissioner under this Chapter and the powers of the Corporation and the Committees of the Corporation under this Act, if any, relating to building regulations and matters ancillary or consequential thereto, shall be exercised by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority appointed under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971, for the slum rehabilitation area declared under that Act.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    95. Section 2(b-a) of the Slum Act defines the expression “Chief Executive Officer”. Section 2(g-a) defines the expression “Slum Area”. Section 2(h-b) defines the expression “Slum Rehabilitation Area”. Section 2(h-c) defines the expression “Slum Rehabilitation Authority”. They read thus:

    “2. Definitions

    In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

    x x x x x

    (b-a) “Chief Executive Officer” means a Chief Executive Officer of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority appointed under sub-section (2) of section 3A;

    (g-a) “Slum area” means any area declared as such by the Competent Authority under sub-section (1) of section 4; and includes any area deemed to be a Slum area under section 4A;

    (h-b) “Slum Rehabilitation Area” means a slum rehabilitation area, declared as such under sub-section (1) of section 3C by Competent Authority in pursuance of the Slum Rehabilitation scheme notified under section 3B;

    (h-c) “Slum Rehabilitation Authority” means the Slum Rehabilitation Authority or Authorities appointed by the State Government under section 3A;”

    96. We have already extracted Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Section 2(15) of the Town Planning Act defines the expression “local authority” to mean

    (a) the Bombay Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, or the Nagpur Municipal Corporation constituted under the City of Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act, 1948, or any Municipal Corporation constituted under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949;

    (b) a Council and a Nagar Panchayat constituted under the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township Act, 1965; and

    (c) (i) a Zilla Parishad constituted under the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961,

    (ii) the Authority constituted under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976,

    (iii) the Nagpur Improvement Trust constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936.

    97. Section 40 of the Town Planning Act deals with ‘Special Planning Authority’. It is common ground that SRA is not covered by Section 40 and is, therefore, not a Special Planning Authority. The SRA also is not covered by Section 2(15) which defines the expression ‘local authority. The moot question, therefore, is whether SRA is a Planning Authority in respect of only the Slum Rehabilitation Area declared under Section 3C of the Slum Act or is a Planning Authority in respect of areas which are deemed to be and/or treated as Slum Rehabilitation Areas as contemplated by Regulation 33(10).

    98. Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act shows that the words used in defining the expression “Planning Authority” are “means a local authority; and includes,”. In the case of D.D.A. v. Bholanath Sharma (Dead) By L.Rs., (2011) 2 SCC 54, the Apex Court considered following decisions interpreting the expression “means” and “includes”:

    (1) P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 348;

    (2) Bharat Cooperative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685;

    (3) Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Labour Commissioner, (2007) 5 SCC 281.

    99. In DDA v. Bholanath (supra), the Apex court referred to the decision in P. Kasilingam (supra) and extracted paragraph-19 to the following effect:

    “19. …… A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by using the word ‘means’ or the word ‘includes’. Sometimes the words ‘means and includes’ are used. The use of the word ‘means’ indicates that “definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition”. (See: Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665 (CA); Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682.) The word ‘includes’ when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words “means and includes”, on the other hand, indicate “an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions”. (See: Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (Lord Watson), 1899 AC 99; Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164. The use of the words “means and includes” in Rule 2(b) would, therefore, suggest that the definition of ‘college’ is intended to be exhaustive and not extensive and would cover only the educational institutions falling in the categories specified in Rule 2(b) and other educational institutions are not comprehended. Insofar as engineering colleges are concerned, their exclusion may be for the reason that the opening and running of the private engineering colleges are controlled through the Board of Technical Education and Training and the Director of Technical Education in accordance with the directions issued by the AICTE from time to time.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    100. In DDA v. Bholanath (supra), the Apex court further referred to the decision in Bharat Cooperative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. (supra) and extracted paragraph-23 to the following effect:

    “23. …. when in the definition clause given in any statute the word “means” is used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the word “means” is used in the definition it is a “hard-and-fast” definition and no meaning other than that which is put in the definition can be assigned to the same. On the other hand, when the word “includes” is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring within it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise. Therefore, the use of the word “means” followed by the word “includes” in the definition of “banking company” in Section 2(bb) of the ID Act is clearly indicative of the legislative intent to make the definition exhaustive and would cover only those banking companies which fall within the purview of the definition and no other.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    101. In DDA v. Bholanath (supra), the Apex court also referred to the decision in Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories (supra) and extracted paragraph-33 to the following effect:

    “33. When an interpretation clause uses the word “includes”, it is prima facie extensive. When it uses the word “means and includes”, it will afford an exhaustive explanation to the meaning which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to the word or expression.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    102. Thus, the ‘Slum Rehabilitation Authority” appointed under Section 3A of the Slum Act is the Planning Authority only in respect of the “Slum Rehabilitation Area” declared under Section 3C of the Slum Act. The definition of the “Planning Authority” cannot be enlarged by referring to the sub-ordinate legislation, namely, Regulation 33(10). Sections 2(19) and 37(1B) will have to be interpreted harmoniously. If SRA appointed under Section 3A of the Slum Act is satisfied that in respect of a “Slum Rehabilitation Area” declared under section 3C of the Slum Act, for implementation of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme declared under that Act, a modification of any part of, or any proposal made in, a final Development plan is required to be made it can submit the proposal for modification, being a Planning Authority. This interpretation is also consistent with Section 354AAA of the Corporation Act which empowers the SRA appointed under Section 3A of the Slum Act to exercise the powers of the Commissioner, the Corporation and the Committees of the Corporation relating to building regulations and matters ancillary or consequential thereto in respect of only the Slum Rehabilitation Area declared under that Act. In other words, the State Government cannot authorize SRA to exercise the powers of the Commissioner, the Corporation and the Committees relating to building regulations and matters ancillary or consequential thereto by SRA in respect of the areas other than Slum Rehabilitation Area.

    103. It is also necessary to refer to Section 40 of the Town Planning Act. A perusal of Section 40 shows that SRA appointed under Section 3A is not a special planning authority. Section 2(15) defines the expression “Local Authority”, which also does not include SRA appointed under Section 3A of the Slum Act. The learned Counsel appearing for the parties heavily relied upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in Balasaheb Arjun Torbole (supra) where this Court after considering the provisions of the Slum Act, Regulations, Town Planning Act held that SRA appointed under Section 3A is a Special Planning Authority. Against this very decision, the matter was carried to the Supreme Court. In paragraph-6, the Apex Court considered the definitions of “Local Authority” and “Planning Authority” in Sections 2(15) and 2(19) of the Town Planning Act respectively. After extracting those provisions, it was observed thus:

    “It is relevant to note that ‘Planning Authority’ not only means a local authority but also includes by reference, the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) appointed Under Section 3-A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (for short ‘the 1971 Act’) in respect of a slum rehabilitation area.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    104. We have already extracted the definition of “Slum Rehabilitation Area” in Section 2(h-b) to mean a slum rehabilitation area, declared as such under sub-section (1) of section 3C by Competent Authority in pursuance of the Slum Rehabilitation scheme notified under section 3B. Thus, in our considered opinion, SRA will be Planning Authority only in respect of the Slum Rehabilitation Area declared as such under sub-section (1) of section 3C of the Slum Act. If the contention of the parties that Regulation 33(10) which lays down the areas which are treated or deemed to be Slum Areas is accepted, and therefore even in respect of these areas SRA is the Planning Authority, it will do violence to the express language employed in Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Section 2(19)(b) would have otherwise read thus:

    “(19) “Planning Authority” means a local authority; and includes,—

    (a) xxxxxxxx

    (b) the Slum Rehabilitation Authority appointed under section 3A of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Implementation, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971.”

    105. Mr. Sakhare relied upon the decision of Om-Sai Darshan Cooperative Housing Society (supra) to contend that there is no requirement for issuance of notification under Section 3C of the Slum Act for sanctioning of the redevelopment scheme covered by Regulation 33(10). In our opinion, said decision does not advance the case of Chamankars. We have already held that SRA is the Planning Authority only in respect of a slum rehabilitation area declared under Section 3C of the Slum Act.

    106. It is however not in dispute in the present case that though the suit property is not declared as a Slum Rehabilitation Area under Section 3C of the Slum Act, as per Clause-6 of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006, SRA is appointed as an implementing and planning authority. It is also not in dispute that all the development permissions have been issued by SRA in respect of slum and non-slum areas excluding High Mount Guest House and Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi. In view thereof, one has to proceed on the premises that SRA is a planning authority in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.

    2) Whether CEO, SRA has jurisdiction to issue show cause notice and pass impugned order and whether SRA has jurisdiction in respect of High Mount Guest House and Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi?

    107. Mr. Sakhare submitted that Section 13(2) of the Slum Act can be invoked only against the owner of the property and not against the developer. The power under Section 13(2) can be exercised by the SRA and not by CEO, SRA. It was submitted that SRA has not delegated its powers to CEO by issuing any special or general order as contemplated by Section 3S of the Slum Act. The Committee committed serious error in invoking Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for short, ‘General Clauses Act’).

    108. Mr. Sakhare further submitted that the Apex Court in Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has not categorically recorded a finding that CEO, SRA has jurisdiction to issue a notice under Section 13(2) of the Act. Even the Division Bench of this Court in Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra) did not decide the question whether CEO, SRA has power to issue a notice under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. In other words, the Division Bench of this Court and the Apex Court considered the question as to whether SRA has power under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act.

    109. Mr. Godbole while supporting this submissions also relied upon the decisions in:

    (I) Daman Singh (supra),

    (II) State of U.P. (supra),

    (III) Ambarish Rangshahi Patnigere (supra), &

    (IV) Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra) (Division Bench of this Court)

    110. On the other hand, Mr. Samdani relied upon following decisions:

    (i) Hind Ekta SRA CHS Ltd. (supra),

    (ii) Hi Tech India Construction (supra),

    (iii) Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra) (Bombay High Court),

    (iv) Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra) (Supreme Court), &

    (v) Omkar Realtors & Developer Pvt. Ltd. (supra).

    111. Mr. Samdani further submitted that no such contention was advanced before the CEO, SRA. It is, therefore, not open for the petitioners to raise this contention before the Committee or before this Court. He relied upon paragraph-27 of the decision of Kedar Deshpande (supra).

    112. In the present case, as noted earlier, Clause-6 of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006 specifically provides that SRA shall be the planning and implementing agency. CEO, SRA has issued all the development permissions, such as, LOI, IOA, commencement certificate in respect of residential quarters for RTO staff and transit camp and occupation certificate in respect of RTO office building.

    113. It is also material to note that by notification dated 13.9.1996, the Government has delegated the powers exercisable under Sections 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 135 and 136 of the Town Planning Act by SRA to CEO, SRA. Said notification is issued under Section 152 of the Town Planning Act. Section 151 deals with the powers to delegate by the State Government, Director of Town Planning, any regional board, planning authority or development authority etc. Section 152(4) lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in section 151, the powers and functions of a Planning Authority or New Town Development Authority, for the purposes of sections 25, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 89, 90, 107, 112, 1[126(1)(b)], 135, 136 and 142 can be exercised and performed by the following officers, namely:—

    (1) xxxxxx

    (2) xxxxxx

    (3) xxxxxx

    (4) In the case of any other local authority, Special Planning Authority or New Town Development Authority, by the Chief Executive Officer or person exercising such powers under Acts applicable to such authorities.

    114. The notification dated 13.9.1996 further recites that as per Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act, as amended in 1995, the SRA has acquired the status of the Planning Authority in regard to slum rehabilitation area declared under Section 3C of the Slum Act.

    115. Section 44 of the Town Planning Act deals with the application for permission for development and lays down that any person not being Central or State Government or local authority intending to carry out any development on any land has to make an application in writing for permission in such form and containing such particulars and accompanied by such documents, as may be prescribed. Section 45 deals with grant or refusal of permission. Section 51 deals with power of revocation and modification of permission to development. As CEO, SRA has issued all the development permissions indicated hereinabove, he has necessarily power to rescind the permissions. The petitioners cannot be heard to contend that though CEO, SRA has issued development permissions, he has no power to rescind those permissions. In our opinion, the Committee rightly relied upon Section 152(4) of the Town Planning Act and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and corresponding Section 21 of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act, which lays down that where by any Bombay Act or Maharashtra Act or Regulations, a power to issue notifications, orders or rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions if any to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.

    116. Section 3A of the Slum Act deals with appointment of SRA for such area or areas specified by the State Government by issuing notification in the official gazette. Sub-section (3) thereof deals with the power, duties and functions of the SRA. Amongst others, it includes the power to get the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme implemented (clause-c) and to do all such other acts and things as may be necessary for achieving the objects of rehabilitation of slums (clause-d).

    117. In the case of Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court has considered the scope of powers under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. In paragraph-50, the Apex Court was observed thus:

    “50. We cannot accept such a wide submission. According to us, Under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, the SRA has the authority to take action and hand over the development of land to some other recognized agency under three circumstances:

    i. When there is contravention of the plans duly approved;

    ii. When there is contravention of any restriction or condition imposed Under Sub-Section 10 of Section 12 of the Slum Act; and

    iii. When the development has not taken place within time, if any, specified.”

    118. Mr. Sakhare, Mr. Godbole and Mr. Surana contended that it may be that SRA has power under Section 3A(3) to take action when the development has not taken place within the time, if any, specified. However, there is no special or general order issued by SRA delegating its powers to CEO as per Section 3S of the Slum Act. We do not find any merit in this submission. For the reasons already recorded, we do not find that it is open to the petitioners to raise this contention after securing all the development permissions from CEO, SRA. That apart, we find merit in the submission of Mr. Samdhani that this submission was not advanced before CEO, SRA and, therefore, it cannot be advanced before this Court.

    119. In paragraph-27 of Kedar Deshpande (supra), the Apex Court has observed thus:

    “27. The next contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the Additional Collector had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the disqualification petition filed by the Respondents because he is not the Collector within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act has no substance. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Respondents, this argument was never raised before the Additional Collector who decided the disqualification petition nor this point was raised before the High Court. In Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Thiru R. Jambulingam, (1975) 3 SCC 254, this Court, did not allow the plea of lack of jurisdiction to be taken for the first time in an appeal, after the Appellant having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Authority in earlier proceedings.”

    120. Mr. Godbole submitted that modified Section 13(1) contemplates two situations, namely, (1) if the land owner/occupants themselves have come forward with a scheme for redevelopment of such land, the SRA has to scrutinize such application in accordance with the Regulations in its capacity as a Planning Authority as defined by Section 2(19) of the Town Planning Act. Another situation contemplated under Section 13(1) is where the land owners in occupation of such area do not come forward within a reasonable time for redevelopment scheme. SRA can pass an order directing redevelopment of such land by entrusting it to any agency for the purpose. In that event only the SRA can exercise the powers under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act. As in the present case, the State of Maharashtra being the owner of the land, had appointed Chamankars, Section 13 of the Slum Act does not apply to the fact situation. The order of CEO, SRA, therefore, suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. We do not find any merit in this submission. Section 3A(3)(c) of the Slum Act specifically empowers SRA to get the slum rehabilitation scheme implemented. Section 3A(3)(d) empowers SRA to do such other acts and things as may be necessary for achieving the objects of rehabilitation of slums. In view thereof, we do not find that the decisions relied by Mr. Godbole are of any assistance.

    121. We, therefore, hold that CEO, SRA had authority to issue show cause notice of 12.1.2017 as also pass impugned order dated 19.6.2017. The suo motu proceedings initiated by CEO, SRA under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act are not vitiated on the ground that it is without any authority of law and is without jurisdiction.

    122. It was contended by Mr. Sakhare that in any case SRA has no jurisdiction in respect of non-slum plot and more particularly in respect of High Mount Guest House and Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi. In respect of High Mount Guest House the planning department would be Mumbai Municipal Corporation as well as Public Works Department of State of Maharashtra. In respect of Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi, the Planning Authority would be New Delhi Municipal Corporation. We do not find any merit in this submission for more than one reason. In the first place, in W.P. (L) No. 3563/2017, Chamankars have prayed for declaration that respondent No. 2 Committee and respondent No. 3 CEO, SRA have no authority or jurisdiction to interfere with the agreement dated 27.11.2006 and resolution dated 18.11.2006 with regard to development rights given to them for development of the suit property, amongst other prayers. We have also referred to prayers made in WP of Sheikh. The basic controversy between the parties is as regards the validity of the orders passed by CEO, SRA and the Committee. In fact Chamankars and Sheikh are trying to enlarge the scope of the Petition. Secondly, said submission also over-looks the nature of the impugned orders passed by the CEO, SRA and the Committee. By order dated 19.6.2017, CEO, SRA had terminated the appointment of Chamankars as a developer in respect of Slum Rehabilitation Scheme of Anna Nagar Society, Kasam Nagar Society and Vithal Rakhumai Society under Section 13(2) of the Slum Act, amongst other directions. By order dated 28.11.2017, the Committee had maintained the order dated 19.6.2017 passed by CEO, SRA subject to modification of clause-2 of the operative part of the order. In other words, both the Authorities have not dealt with the issue relating to High Mount Guest House, Malbar Hill, Mumbai and Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi. In view thereof, we do not deem it appropriate to go into this question as also deal with prayers (b) & (c) of WP(L) No. 296/18 as it will amount to enlarging the scope of the present Petitions. Chamankars & Sheikh are at liberty to adopt proceedings in that regard.

    123. By the impugned order, the CEO, SRA has removed Chamankars as a developer on the ground of inordinate delay in implementing the slum rehabilitation scheme. That apart as per clause 7.7 of Appendix IV, the development of slum and contiguous non-slum area under any other provisions [other than Regulation 33(7) and Regulation 33(10)] can be allowed together in order to promote flexibility of design as well as to raise more resources. In the present case, as noted earlier, said exercise was already taken.

    124. In view thereof, we do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Sakhare. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly.

    (3) Whether there is inordinate, unexplained delay on the part of Chamankars in implementing the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme?

    125. Mr. Sakhare submitted that Chamankars have constructed New Maharashtra Sadan at New Delhi and handed over possession to the State Government in the year 2013. High Mount Guest House building is almost complete. He has taken us through the relevant dates and events in respect of the subject matter to contend that because of not issuing timely development permissions, the construction could not be completed. The delay cannot be attributed to Chamankars. As against this, on behalf of the respondents it was contended that Chamankars have constructed one rehab building to accommodate 155 eligible slum dwellers. Said building has been issued part occupation certificate. In other words, the full occupation certificate is not issued in respect of rehab building No. 1 constructed for Anna Nagar Society and Kasam Nagar Society. Chamankars have constructed RTO office building and handed over possession to the State Government. In respect of rehab building No. 1 of Vitthal Rakhumai Society, only one slab was completed. The construction in respect of rehab building No. 2 and rehab building No. 3 is not even commenced.

    126. With the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, we have perused the impugned orders. A perusal of the order dated 19.6.2017 passed by CEO, SRA shows that though 911 tenements were supposed to be constructed to accommodate 464 eligible slum dwellers and 437 PAPs, Chamankars constructed only building No. 1 out of seven planned buildings in the last 13 to 14 years. The first building was constructed for Anna Nagar Society and Kasam Nagar Society. Chamankars only accommodated 155 slum dwellers in this building during 13 years from the acceptance of the scheme. It means the Slum Scheme which was planned and conceived for total of 911 tenements for wherein only 155 tenements for slum dwellers have been constructed. From the report of the Executive Officer dated 19.4.2017, the Occupation Certificate in respect of building No. 1 is obtained for 72 slum dwellers. Occupation Certificate in respect of four floor to 7 floor and no Occupation Certificate is obtained for ground floor upto third floor. The speed of progress is very pathetic and alarming. It was further observed that from the perusal of the recent report of the Executive Engineer out of seven buildings planned, only one building i.e. building No. 1 composite building (ground to seven floors) was constructed. The construction of rehab building No. 2 which is planned for twenty-three floors with the intention of accommodating 224 slum dwellers is also not at all commenced. Only one rehab building and RTO office is constructed. Building No. 4 consisting of ground to twenty-three floor was planned for accommodation of further 475 tenements for slum dwellers. Only two floors are constructed so far and the work is completely stopped for last three years. On the spot there is only skeleton of ground plus two floors is standing. The office bearers of Vitthal Rakhumai Society submitted resolution supporting Chamankars having signatures of three office bearers. The CEO, SRA observed that “It is strange to understand, how the residents support Chamankars for non-performance of the builder for 12 long years.” The CEO also overruled the contention of Chamankars that many a times there was no cooperation and speedy approvals from the Government and SRA. The CEO observed that the objection is utterly wrong, baseless and misleading. From the beginning the SRA had offered many concessions and approvals. It approved clubbing of both the schemes of Anna Nagar Society, Kasam Nagar Society and Vitthal Rakhumai Society and allowed huge benefits to the builder. It also sanctioned scheme under Regulation 33(10) and 33(14)(D) for joint development of slum plot with non-slum plot. The CEO, SRA also dealt with the letter submitted by the President, Secretary and Treasurer of Vitthal Rakhumai Society and observed that the same appears to be not genuine. Even though they are claiming support of other members and submitting the resolution which is not supported by signatures of other members. The CEO, SRA further observed that presently the scheme is at halt completely. The CEO, SRA came to the conclusion that after the acceptance of the scheme during the last 20 years, out of 911 tenements, he had constructed 155 rehab tenements for slum-dwellers so for. He, therefore, held that this is the fittest case for termination of Chamankars for his non-performance.

    127. A perusal of the order passed by the Committee shows that on 10.3.2017 the Executive Engineer submitted the status report in respect of nine buildings. As per said report, out of nine buildings planned only RTO building and building No. 1 composite building (ground plus seven floors) was constructed. The main construction of rehab building No. 2 which was planned for twenty-three floors to accommodate 224 slum dwellers has not commenced. Building No. 4 comprising ground plus twenty-three floors was planned for accommodating tenements/slum dwellers. As against this, only two floors are constructed and work is completely stopped for last three years. Building No. 6 is planned for permanent transit camp building and 667 PTC were to be provided. Currently the scheme is at halt completely. So far Chamankars could accommodate only 155 slum dwellers in the said building during 13 years from the grant of LOI and even 20 years after acceptance of the scheme. The Committee therefore observed that there was inordinate delay in implementation of the slum rehabilitation scheme by Chamankars. The Committee also came to the conclusion that Chamankars committed breach of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006. The Committee accordingly did not find any infirmity in the order dated 19.6.2017 passed by CEO, SRA and upheld that order by modifying direction No. 2 of the impugned order by excluding Chamankars and further directed the societies to elect the developer in the presence of Joint Registrar (Cooperation) with 70% consent of eligible slum dwellers.

    128. It has come on record that prior to entering into development agreement on 27.11.2006, Cabinet meeting was held on 5.5.2006. While approving the development of the suit property it was expected that Chamankars will start the development works and complete the same in relation to Government buildings within two years and development of the slum plot within three years. This was followed by meeting of 28.8.2006. Even in the meeting, said decision was reiterated. On 18.11.2006, resolution was passed wherein said decision was once again reiterated. Clause-1 of the development agreement lays down that the agreement shall mean the development agreement between the Government and Chamankars which shall include all annexures annexed thereto. The parties agreed that the recitals recorded in the agreement shall form integral part of the agreement as if the same are set out in the body of the agreement and the parties deemed to have recorded, repeated and confirmed the recitals recorded hereinabove. Clause-7 thereof laid down that Chamankars shall commence the respective work immediately and not later than three months from the date of execution of the agreement and shall complete the construction of building/s of the Government within a period of two years from the date of communication of necessary permissions for commencement of work from the competent authority and the time shall be the essence of the agreement. Thus Chamankars were expected to complete the construction of building/s of the Government within a period of two years and redevelopment of the slum plot within a period of three years from the date of communication of necessary permissions for commencement of work from the competent authority and the time was the essence of the contract. The Authorities below have concurrently found that Chamankars have caused inordinate and unexplained delay in implementing the slum rehabilitation scheme.

    129. After perusing the material on record, we do not find that the authorities below committed any error in arriving at the conclusions. It cannot be said that the findings recorded by the authorities below are perverse being based upon no material on record or that they are contrary to the material on record.

    130. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the findings recorded by the authorities below travel beyond the show-cause notice. He relied upon paragraphs-8 and 9 of D.K. Yadav (supra) and paragraphs-15 to 18 of Saci Allied Products Ltd. (supra).

    131. We do not find any merit in this submission. As noted earlier, Chamankars, Prime Builders, L & T and the representative of the societies appeared before the CEO, SRA. They submitted the written arguments. After considering the written submissions as also oral submissions advanced before CEO, SRA, the impugned order was passd on 19.6.2017. The petitioners cannot be heard to contend that the impugned order travels beyond the show-cause notice as CEO, SRA was bound to deal with the submissions advanced before him. Mr. Sakhare submitted that Section 13(2) can be invoked against the owner and not against the developer. In view of the decision of Apex Court in Susme Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the submission is stated to be rejected.

    132. Mr. Sakhare submitted that the authorities below relied upon the status report dated 10.3.2017 prepared by the Executive Engineer. Said report was prepared after inspecting the site without issuing prior notice to Chamankars. Even the copy of the status report was not furnished to Chamankars. Thus there is gross violation of principles of natural justice. In the case of Managing Director ECIL v. B. Karunakaran, (1993) 4 SCC 727 : AIR 1994 SC 1074, the Apex Court was considering the question whether non-furnishing of the enquiry report has caused prejudice to the delinquent employee. It was observed in paragraph 7(v) that the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to a “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice. In all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and Tribunals should call the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made the difference to the result in the case that should set aside the order of punishment.

    133. In the case of Haryana Financial Corporation (supra), in paragraph 21, the Apex Court held that the person who is not supplied with the report has to plead and prove that non-supply of report caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the status report of the Executive Engineer is on the record of CEO, SRA. Chamankars have not proved that had the report been given to them in advance, it would have made any difference. Even after perusing the assertions in the Petition, we do not find that the petitioners have pleaded and proved that because of non-supply of Executive Engineer report dated 10.3.2017, any prejudice is caused to them or that had the report been supplied to them, it would have made any difference to the ultimate findings and it would have had any bearing on the impugned orders. Basically the petitioners are not in a position to contradict the status report which depicts the stage of construction of building by Chamankars. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this submission.

    134. Point No. 3 is answered accordingly.

    (4) Whether the agreement executed between Chamankars and Prime Builders as also the tripartite agreement amongst Chamankars, L & T and Prime Builders were validly entered into?

    135. As noted earlier, it is nobody's case that Chamankars have assigned the beneficial rights under the development agreement dated 27.11.2006 either to L & T or Prime Builders. That apart, neither Chamankars nor L & T/Prime Builders have produced any deed of assignment. Clause-13 of the development agreement permits the builder (Chamankars) to assign, transfer its beneficial rights under the agreement, provided however the developer is made jointly and severally responsible and liable with the assignees insofar as the liability of carrying out the obligations assumed by and cast upon the developer under the agreement. The asignees and the developer are jointly and severally bound by the terms, conditions, obligations and stipulations provided therein. Clause-24 reads thus:

    “24. The Developer shall not sublet/sub contract the project or part of the project without the prior written approval of Engineer incharge.”

    136. A perusal of clause-24, extracted hereinabove, shows that Chamankars are precluded from sub-letting/sub-contracting the project or part of the project without prior written approval of the Engineer in charge. It is nobody's case that before entering into agreements/MOU with Prime Builders and L & T, Chamankars have obtained prior written approval of the Engineer in-charge. It, therefore, will have to be concluded that the agreement/MOU entered into between Chamankars on one hand and Prime Builders and the tripartite agreement dated 30.9.2011 between Chamankars, L & T and Prime Builders were not validly entered into. Point No. 4 is answered accordingly.

    (5) Whether L & T can be appointed as a developer by setting aside the modified clause (2) of the operative part of the Committee's order?

    137. Mr. Kamdar submitted that Clause 1.15 of Appendix IV of Regulation 33(10) lays down that where 70% or more eligible hutment dwellers in a slum or pavement in a viable stretch at one place agree to join a rehabilitation scheme, it may be considered for approval. Thus only at initial stage 70% eligible hutment dwellers have to join a rehabilitation scheme. He submitted that in paragraph-52 of Sterling Buildcom Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Division Bench of this Court observed that the requirement of obtaining consent from 70% from out of thousands of slum dwellers even in Town Development Schemes only helps the slum-lords and it does not really help the slum dwellers. The State Government ought to realize this and make special provisions for Township Redevelopment Project for appointing the developer on its own and doing away with the requirement of obtaining consent of slum dwellers. The modified Section 13(2) empowers the SRA to appoint a recognized agency for carrying out development of the land. Mr. Kamdar submitted that revision of Appendix II containing the names of eligible slum dwellers is a continuing process. If the modified clause (2) of the Committee's order is to be implemented it will be a never ending process.

    138. On the other hand, Mr. Samdani submitted that by notification dated 2.5.2014 issued by the State Government, the provisions of Slum Act have been amended. The figures, letters and word “1 January, 1995” have been substituted by the figures, letters and word “1 January, 2000”. As a result of this notification, the slum dwellers who were earlier held to be ineligible and who are beyond the period 1.1.1995 and 1.1.2000 will have an opportunity of proving their eligibility.

    139. Mr. Dhakephalkar submitted that Afzalpurkar Committee constituted by the State Government for carrying out the purpose of the Slum Act. In pursuance of the recommendations of Afzalpurkar Committee, Chapter I-A dealing with Slum Rehabilitation Authority for implementing the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, Chapter I-B dealing with protected occupiers from re-location and rehabilitation and Chapter I-C dealing with special provisions for in Situ Rehabilitation Housing Schemes for Protected Occupiers in Slum Areas, were added in the Slum Act. In order to successful implement the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme it is imperative that the eligible slum dwellers participate in the said process. He submitted that bearing in mind this aspect, the Committee was justified in modifying clause (2) in the operative part of the order.

    140. We find merit in the submissions of Mr. Samdani and Mr. Dhakephalkar. In the first place, the Committee was justified in excluding Chamankars from being getting elected by way of election on the basis of General Body resolution of three societies. Once the authorities below have removed Chamankars on the ground of causing inordinate and unexplained delay in implementing the slum rehabilitation scheme, Chamankars cannot be allowed to participate in the process of electing the developer. Secondly, the participation of the slum dwellers for completion of the slum rehabilitation scheme is essential. The eligible slum dwellers of three societies have, therefore, right to elect the developer and that right cannot be taken away without any justifiable reason. We do not find any justification for denying the eligible slum dwellers of three societies to elect the developer of their choice.

    141. In view thereof, L & T cannot claim that it should be appointed as a developer by setting aside modified clause-2 of the operative part of the Committee's order. Point No. 5 is answered accordingly.

    (6) Whether this is a fit case for invocation of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?

    142. Mr. Samdani submitted that large piece of land was given to Chamankars without following transparent process. The Government largesse are conferred on Chamankars by an arbitrary and non-transparent manner. He submitted that Chamankars have committed breach of the development agreement by entering into MOU and agreements with Prime Builders as also tripartite agreement between Chamankars, L & T and Prime Builders on 30.9.2011 which is contrary to clauses 13 and 24 of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006. He relied upon following decisions:

    (i) Akhil Bharatiya Upbhokta Congress (supra), and

    (ii) Abdul Hamid Patel (supra)

    143. Mr. Samdani further submitted that Chamankars were given additional FSI for constructing PTC. However, no land was shown for PTC.

    144. On the other hand, Mr. Sakhare submitted that validity of the development agreement was not the subject matter of the proceedings before the authorities below. Till date, nobody has challenged the validity of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006. This Court will not go into this issue. He submitted that the development agreement was arrived at after a detailed and thorough discussion in the Cabinet meetings dated 5.5.2006 and 28.8.2006 and also on the basis of the Government Resolution dated 18.11.2006. Prior thereto, Chamankars were appointed by all three societies by way of election with 70% consent. He submitted that seven departments were involved and all the departments approved the agreement. It, therefore, cannot be said that the Government had distributed largesse. He submitted that the subject property has reservations for RTO and is occupied by slums. RTO was finding it difficult to develop the property and that there were financial constraints. The Government was not in a possession to develop the reservation for RTO. With this view in mind, the Government entered into development agreement with Chamankars.

    145. Mr. Sakhare relied upon following decisions:

    (i) U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. (supra) and in particular paragraphs-27 and 35.

    (ii) AIR India Ltd. (supra) and in particular paragraphs-7, 11 and 12.

    (iii) Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. (supra) and in particular paragraph-12.

    (iv) Sterling Computers Limited (supra) and in particular paragraphs-12, 16 to 18 and 25.

    (v) State of Karnataka (supra) and in particular paragraphs-12, 41 to 50, 51 and 57.

    (vi) State of Tamil Nadu (supra).

    146. We do not find that these decisions in any way help Chamankars as the Government has not resiled from the agreement entered into with Chamankars. We are also not entering into the contractual disputes between the parties. In the present case validity of the orders passed by CEO, SRA and the Committee are under scrutiny.

    147. In paragraph-37 of CIDCO v. Platinum Entertainment, (2015) 1 SCC 558, the Apex Court observed that it is well settled that whenever the Government deals with the public by entering into a contract or issuance of licence or granting other forms of largesse, the Government cannot act arbitrarily on its sweet will but must act in accordance with law and the action of the Government should not give the smack of arbitrariness. The Apex Court referred to its earlier decision in Raman Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489.

    148. In paragraphs-65 and 66 of Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress (supra), the Apex Court observed thus:

    “65. What needs to be emphasised is that the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and/or officers of the State. Every action/decision of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to give largesse or confer benefit must be founded on a sound, transparent, discernible and well-defined policy, which shall be made known to the public by publication in the Official Gazette and other recognised modes of publicity and such policy must be implemented/executed by adopting a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary method irrespective of the class or category of persons proposed to be benefited by the policy. The distribution of largesse like allotment of land, grant of quota, permit licence, etc. by the State and its agencies/instrumentalities should always be done in a fair and equitable manner and the element of favouritism or nepotism shall not influence the exercise of discretion, if any, conferred upon the particular functionary or officer of the State.

    66. We may add that there cannot be any policy, much less, a rational policy of allotting land on the basis of applications made by individuals, bodies, organisations or institutions dehors an invitation or advertisement by the State or its agency/instrumentality. By entertaining applications made by individuals, organisations or institutions for allotment of land or for grant of any other type of largesse the State cannot exclude other eligible persons from lodging competing claim. Any allotment of land or grant of other form of largesse by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities by treating the exercise as a private venture is liable to be treated as arbitrary, discriminatory and an act of favouritism and/or nepotism violating the soul of the equality clause embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution.”

    149. It is no doubt true that nobody has questioned the legality and validity of the development agreement dated 27.11.2006. We find merit in the submission of Mr. Samdani that if the impugned orders are set aside, the effect will be reinstating Chamankars as a developer. The reliance placed by Mr. Samdani on the decision of Apex Court in Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo (supra) is well founded.

    150. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find that any case is made out for invocation of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The authorities below have concurrently held that there is inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of Chamankars in implementing the slum rehabilitation scheme. The findings recorded by the authorities below are based on material on record. It cannot be said that the findings recorded by the authorities below are perverse being based upon no material on record or that they are contrary to the material on record. Hence, the Petitions fail and the same are dismissed. In view thereof, Chamber Summonses also stand disposed of.

    151. At this stage, Mr. Sakhare orally seeks a direction against (i) Anna Nagar Society, (ii) Kasam Nagar Society and (iii) Vitthal Rakhumai Society that they should not convene General Body meeting as per modified clause (2) of operative part of the order of the Committee dated 28.11.2017 for a period of eight weeks from today. In view thereof, notwithstanding dismissal of the Writ Petitions, the said societies shall not convene General Body meeting for a period of eight weeks from today, with a clear understanding that no further extension shall be sought for and granted by this Court. Order accordingly.

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    K.S. Chamankar Enterprises And Anr. v. The State Of Maharashtra And Ors.
    (Mar 27, 2018)