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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses cross-appeals filed by the revenue and the assessee against different orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Chennai, relating to assessment years 1991-92, 1992-93, and 1993-94. The revenue filed delayed appeals against the CIT (Appeals) order dated 15-9-1998, seeking condonation of delay of approximately seven years. The assessee’s appeals challenge the validity of fresh assessments made by the Assessing Officer under section 144 read with section 251 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, following the setting aside of original assessments by the CIT (Appeals). The CIT (Appeals) had set aside the original assessments without directing a fresh assessment. The Assessing Officer proceeded to make fresh assessments, which the assessee contended were without jurisdiction. Both parties filed appeals before the Tribunal, which are consolidated in this order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay of approximately seven years in filing the revenue’s appeals against the CIT (Appeals) order can be condoned.
  2. Whether the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to pass fresh assessment orders under section 144 read with section 251 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the absence of any specific direction from the CIT (Appeals) to do so.
  3. Whether the additional legal ground raised by the assessee challenging the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer can be admitted and decided by the Tribunal.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The delay in filing appeals was due to a bona fide misunderstanding that setting aside the assessments conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make fresh assessments after giving reasonable opportunity to the assessee.
  • Subsequent judicial pronouncements clarified that setting aside without directions amounts to annulment, prompting the department to contest the CIT (Appeals) order despite delay.
  • The issues raised involve substantial questions of law and are of vital importance; non-condonation would cause substantial loss to the revenue.
  • No prejudice would be caused to the assessee by condoning the delay, and a liberal approach should be adopted as per Supreme Court precedent (AIR 1987 SC 1353).
  • Reliance was placed on previous Tribunal orders condoning delay in similar cases.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The affidavits filed by the department lack personal knowledge and are vague, especially regarding the reasons for delay and judicial pronouncements.
  • The additions sustained by the CIT (Appeals) were minor and based on estimates; no substantial question of law arises.
  • Condonation of delay after 13-15 years would prejudice the assessee’s ability to defend the case due to loss of materials.
  • Wrong understanding of law by department officials does not justify condonation of delay.
  • Reliance on Tribunal and Supreme Court decisions including Jt. CIT v. Tractors & Farm Equipments Ltd. and Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. to oppose condonation.
  • The decision not to file appeals was taken by a senior official (CIT Central), indicating deliberate inaction.
  • Regarding the jurisdictional issue, the Assessing Officer acted without direction from the CIT (Appeals), thereby acting without jurisdiction.
  • The legal meaning of "set aside" was explained by reliance on Black's Law Dictionary and various case laws to show that setting aside without direction annuls the assessment and bars fresh assessment.
  • Requested admission of additional legal ground challenging jurisdiction of the fresh assessments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353 Liberal approach in condoning delay; litigants do not benefit by late appeals. Supported department’s plea for condonation of delay.
Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 Delay caused by lack of due care is not sufficient cause for condonation. Assessed that department’s negligence precluded condonation.
Fu Sheen Tannery v. ITO [2003] 262 ITR 456 / [2004] 134 Taxman 25 (Calcutta HC) Setting aside of assessment without direction for fresh assessment amounts to annulment; fresh assessment without direction is invalid. Held that Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to make fresh assessment without direction; assessment annulled.
Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Kattigi [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC) Distinction between inordinate delay and short delay in condonation applications. Used to explain cautious approach for inordinate delay like present case.
Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [2002] 253 ITR 798 (SC) Distinction between inordinate and short delay; principle that law assists vigilant litigants. Reinforced view that delay due to negligence is not condonable.
V.B. Gadkari v. Sales-tax Officer [1985] 59 STC 362 (MP) Assessment based on guesswork without material is vitiated by error apparent and can be quashed. Supported assessee’s contention that assessments without jurisdiction are void.
Ganga Prasad Sharma v. CIT [1981] 132 ITR 87 (MP) Assessment order must disclose basis of computation; non-disclosure vitiates order and allows fresh assessment. Supported assessee’s argument on invalidity of fresh assessment without direction.
R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad & Fatechand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission [1989] 176 ITR 169 (SC) Nullity of order due to violation of natural justice; power of judicial review concerned with legality of procedure. Used to emphasize that fresh assessment without proper direction is invalid.
Pulipati Subbarao & Co. v. AAC [1959] 35 ITR 673 (AP) Order setting aside without direction to make fresh assessment does not empower fresh assessment. Supported assessee’s position on absence of jurisdiction for fresh assessment.
ITO v. Kalyan Kumar Roy Trust [2000] 75 ITD 36 (Cal) Difference between annulment and setting aside; setting aside requires clear direction for fresh assessment. Held that mere setting aside without direction annuls assessment; no power to reassess.
CIT v. Ratanabai N.K. Dubhash [1998] 230 ITR 495 (Bom) Assessment completed without jurisdiction is liable to be annulled; fresh assessment possible only if time-limit permits. Supported assessee’s contention that fresh assessment without jurisdiction is void.
CIT v. Rajesh Talkies [1996] 220 ITR 107 (Punj. & Har.) This precedent was cited but specific rule not detailed in the opinion. Referenced in support of legal submissions by assessee.
National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax [1998] 229 ITR 383 (SC) Tribunal has jurisdiction to admit and decide legal grounds raised for the first time before it. Basis for admitting additional legal ground by assessee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the revenue’s application for condonation of delay in filing appeals against the CIT (Appeals) order. It noted the inordinate delay of approximately seven years and found that the delay was caused by negligence and lack of diligence on the part of the revenue authorities, who took nearly three years after a relevant High Court judgment to decide on filing appeals despite the appeals being already time-barred by over four years. The Court emphasized the distinction between short and inordinate delay, relying on Supreme Court precedents to hold that delay caused by negligence is not a sufficient cause for condonation. Consequently, the Court dismissed the revenue’s appeals as barred by limitation.

Regarding the assessee’s appeals, the Court analyzed the legal effect of the CIT (Appeals) setting aside the original assessments without directing a fresh assessment. By examining authoritative definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary and relevant case law, the Court concluded that such setting aside amounted to annulment of the assessment. Since the CIT (Appeals) did not give any direction to the Assessing Officer to make a fresh assessment, the Assessing Officer lacked jurisdiction to pass fresh assessment orders under section 144 read with section 251 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on multiple precedents to support this view, including the Calcutta High Court’s decision in Fu Sheen Tannery, which held that fresh assessment without direction is invalid.

The Court admitted the additional legal ground raised by the assessee challenging jurisdiction and allowed it, holding that the impugned assessment orders were without jurisdiction and therefore void. As a result, the impugned assessments were cancelled. Since the legal issue was decisive, the Court refrained from examining the merits of the additions. The revenue’s cross-appeals against the CIT (Appeals) order became infructuous and were dismissed accordingly.

Holding and Implications

The revenue’s appeals in ITA Nos. 279, 280, and 281/Mds./2006 and ITA Nos. 1221, 1222, and 1223/Mds./2002 are dismissed as barred by limitation or infructuous.

The assessee’s appeals in ITA Nos. 1148, 1149, and 1150/Mds./2002 are allowed.

By this decision, the Tribunal holds that the Assessing Officer cannot make a fresh assessment after the CIT (Appeals) has set aside the original assessment without directing a fresh assessment, as such an act amounts to annulment of the assessment and bars reassessment in the absence of clear directions. This ruling underscores the importance of jurisdictional limits in assessment proceedings and clarifies the legal effect of appellate orders setting aside assessments.

No new precedent is created beyond the application of existing authoritative principles and case law. The decision directly affects the parties by dismissing the revenue’s delayed appeals and cancelling the impugned assessments against the assessee.

    Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle-II(2), Chennai v. Jaya Publications

    ORDER

    Per Bench :

    1. These cross-appeals of the revenue and the assessee are directed against different orders of the CIT (Appeals), Chennai. The relevant assessment years involved in these appeals are 1991-92 , 1992-93 and 1993-94. Since common issues are involved in these appeals, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this consolidated order.

    2. First, we deal with the revenue's appeals in ITA Nos. 279 , 280 and 281/Mds./ 2006. These appeals of the revenue are directed against the common order of the CIT (Appeals)-I, Chennai, dated 15-9-1998. The relevant assessment years involved in these appeals are 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94.

    3. These appeals are filed by delay of 2569 days. Shri M. Rajasekhar, IRS, Dy. Commissioner of Income- tax, Central Circle-II(2) i/c, Chennai filed an affidavit dated 31-1-2006 requesting therein condonation of delay. The contents of the same are as under :

    "(1) I am the Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle II( 2) and well acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.

    (2) The order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in ITA Nos. 1, 5 and 7, dated 15-9-1998 was received in this office on 18-11-1998 and since the limitation for filing appeal before ITAT is 60 days, the appeal ought to have been filed on or before 13-1-1999, but has been filed only on 31-1-2006 with a delay of 7 years.

    (3) The reasons for the delay as ascertained from the records of this office are submitted as under :

    The revenue while perusing the CIT(A)'s order in ITA Nos. 1, 5 and 7, dated 15-9-1998 was under the bona fide impression that setting aside of assessment has conferred the jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a fresh assessment after giving reasonable opportunity to the assessee. In view of the recent judicial pronouncements to the effect that setting aside of assessments by CIT(A) without giving any direction for fresh assessment amounts to annulment of assessment, it is felt necessary to contest the impugned order of the CIT(A).

    (4) It is submitted that the department has raised substantial question of law and the issues raised are of vital importance. If the delay in filing the appeal is not condoned, a meritorious case would be lost, causing substantial loss to the revenue. No prejudice will be caused to the respondent herein by condoning the delay and the matter could be agitated on merits. Furthermore, as per the judgment reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court page 1353, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the Court should adopt a liberal approach in condoning the delay on the reasons, inter alia, that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

    (5) It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to condone the delay of 7 years in filing this appeal and, thus, render justice."

    4. Later on, Shri A. Sundararajan, The Asstt. CIT, Central Circle II(2) , Chennai filed an affidavit dated 3-8-2007 which is received by this office on 6-8-2007. The contents of the same are as under:

    " (1)I am the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle II(2) and well acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.

    (2)The order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in ITA Nos 1 , 5 and 7/98-99, dated 15-9-1998 was received in this office on 18-11-1998 and since the limitation for filing appeal before ITAT is 60 days, the appeal ought to have been filed on or before 13-1-1999 , but has been filed only on 31-1-2006 with a delay of 7 years and 18 days.

    (3)The reasons for the delay as ascertained from the records of this office are submitted as under :

    The revenue while perusing the CIT(A)'s order in ITA Nos. 1 , 5 and 7 , dated 15-9-1998 was under the bona fide impression that setting aside of assessment has conferred the jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a fresh assessment after giving reasonable opportunity to the assessee. In view of the recent judicial pronouncements to the effect that setting aside of assessments by CIT(A) without giving any direction for fresh assessment amounts to annulment of assessment, it is felt necessary to contest the impugned order of the CIT(A).

    (4)It is submitted that the department has raised substantial question of law and the issues raised are of vital importance. If the delay in filing the appeal is not condoned, a meritorious case would be lost, causing substantial loss to the revenue. No prejudice will be caused to the respondent herein by condoning the delay and the matter could be agitated on merits. Furthermore, as per the judgment reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court page 1353, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that the Court should adopt a liberal approach in condoning the delay on the reasons inter alia that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

    (5)In this regard, it is respectfully submitted that my predecessor Shri M. Rajasekhar, Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle II(2), Chennai had filed a petition before the Hon'ble ITAT on 31-1-2008. However, in the said petition condonation was sought only for a period of 7 years. The actual period of delay was 7 years and 18 days.

    (6)It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to condone the delay of 7 years in filing this appeal and, thus, render justice."

    5. The learned Departmental Representative has drawn our attention to the affidavits filed by the department and supported the contention raised by the department in the affidavits by placing reliance on the order of the Tribunal in ITA Nos. 389 and 416 , 379 to 388/ Mds./2005 and others (Khemka Group), in ITA Nos. 390 to 396 and 418/Mds./ 2005 in the case of Smt. Anitha Devi and in ITA Nos. 352 to 360 and 413 and 415/Mds./ 2005 in the case of Smt. Sadhana Devi. He also filed a copy of the aforesaid orders of the Tribunal and pointed out that huge delay has been condoned by this Tribunal in these cases. Finally, he requested the Bench that the delay in dispute may be condoned, the appeals may be admitted and the cases may be decided on merits.

    6. The assessee has filed the written submissions opposing the condonation of delay. It was submitted by the assessee in the written submission that the petition for condonation of delay in filing these appeals deserves to be dismissed because the deponent could not have been personally aware of the facts of the case and mere affirmation on the basis of records should not be accepted. The reasons given in para 3 of the affidavit for the delay are also vague as it does not refer to the person who had been under bona fide impression that setting aside of assessment gives power for the Assessing Officer to re-do the assessment. The details of recent judicial pronouncements referred to in the affidavit were not given. The statement of the department that substantial question of law was raised and the issues raised are of vital importance also appears to be vague. The CIT (Appeals) sustained the additions only to the extent of Rs. 1 ,63, 312 representing (i) inflation of purchase, (ii) cash credits and no substantial question of law is involved. Even the additions sustained are on the basis of estimate and guess work. Further it was submitted that the previous year to which the appeal relates, pertains to the period of nearly 13-15 years back and condonation of the delay will considerably prejudice the respondent's interest, insofar as he will not have all materials to defend the case. It was further submitted that wrong understanding of the law by the higher officials of the department will not justify the condonation of delay. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Tribunal in ITA Nos. 352 to 360 , 278 to 396 , 413 , 415 , 416 and 418 (Khemka Group of cases) and filed a copy of the orders of the Tribunal dated 22-12-2006 and 29-11-2006 wherein delay was condoned. He contended that in Khemka Group of cases, the renowned firm of Chartered Accountants - B.B. Naidu & Co. who is handling the Khemka Group of cases admitted that there was a lapse on their part by their own letter. He summarized the facts of the Khemka Group cases and distinguished the facts of the present case. Further he relied on the decision of the Tribunal in Jt. CIT v. Tractors & Farm Equipments Ltd. [2007] 104 ITD 149 (Chennai) (TM) and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 to support his contention. Finally, it was submitted that the decision of not filing the appeals has been taken by the CIT (Central), who is almost the highest authority in the Income-tax hierarchy in the State. Further he contended that the decisions of the Tribunal relied on by the department is not helpful to the department since the facts of those cases are distinguishable from the facts of the present cases. Therefore, he requested the Bench that the delay should not be condoned and the appeals may be dismissed as barred by limitation.

    7. We have heard both the parties and perused the records available with us. We have also gone through the affidavits filed by the department. It is pertinent to note that both the aforesaid affidavits have filed by Higher Authorities of the department and in the first affidavit dated 31-1-2006, they requested the condonation of delay of 7 years and in the second affidavit dated 3-8-2007 , they requested for the delay of 7 years and 18 days. Actually, the delay to be filed in days and not in years and this is not expected from such Higher Authorities of the Income-tax Department.

    8. We find that the revenue authorities have taken the decision to file the present appeals only after the judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Fu Sheen Tannery v. ITO [2003] 262 ITR 456/[2004] 134 Taxman 25. We have gone through the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court which has been passed on 1-4-2003 and the revenue filed the present appeals only on 3-1-2006. They have taken almost three years time after the delivery of the aforesaid judgment to decide as to whether these appeals are to be filed in this Tribunal or not, knowingly that the present appeals have already become time-barred by more than 4 years which is not expected from the revenue authorities. Therefore, we are of the view that the department has not taken any keen interest to prosecute the matter in dispute and file the appeals within the prescribed time.

    9. Further we find that the department in their affidavits contended that if the delay in filing the appeals is not condoned, a meritorious case would be lost, causing substantial loss to the revenue and they requested that a liberal approach should be adopted in condonation of delay. After going through the facts of the present cases and the conduct of the revenue authorities in dealing with the present appeals, i.e., not filing the present appeals within the prescribed time and taking so much time to decide as to whether these appeals are to be filed before this Tribunal or not, we are of the view that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay to inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case, the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, so the case calls for a more cautious approach, in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case, keeping in mind that in considering the expression "sufficient cause", the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance. It is to be noted that in the case of Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Kattigi [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC), the delay was only 4 days. In the case of Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [2002] 253 ITR 798/122 Taxman 114 (SC), the delay of 7 days was considered. In this case, the Hon'ble Apex Court clearly laid down that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. The law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. This principle is embodied in the dictum : vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subsveniunt. The delay cannot be condoned if the appellant's case is hard and calls for sympathy or merely out of benevolence to the party seeking relief. In granting the indulgence and condoning the delay, it must be proved beyond the shadow of doubt that the revenue was diligent and was not guilty of negligence whatsoever. The sufficient cause within the contemplation of the limitation provision must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the provisions. In the case of Ramlal (supra) , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the cause for the delay in filing the appeal, which by due care and attention, could have been avoided, cannot be a sufficient cause within the meaning of the limitation provision. Where no negligence, or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the appellant, a liberal construction of the limitation provisions has to be made in order to advance substantial justice. Seekers of justice must come with clean hands. We do not find any reasonable cause for condoning the delay. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the delay was due to negligence and inaction on the part of the revenue authorities and the inordinate delay of 2569 days cannot be condoned and the appeals are dismissed as time-barred.

    10. Now, we deal with the assessee's appeals in ITA Nos. 1148 , 1149 , 1150/Mds./ 2002 as well as the revenue's appeals in ITA Nos. 1221 , 1222 and 1223/Mds./ 2002. These cross-appeals of the assessee and the revenue are directed against the order of the CIT (Appeals) in respective assessment years. In the present case, the original assessments were set aside by the CIT (Appeals) vide his order dated 15-9-1998 as follows :

    "2.8 So the existing situation is that the appellant had furnished the particulars in response to notice under section 142(1) and now has prepared the trading and P & L account for all the assessment years. Earlier it had furnished some details before the Assessing Officer. This is the first time, the assessee carried on this business. So, in the absence of past performance details, the Assessing Officer should have taken the profit disclosed by similar traders for estimating the net profit. He should not have made additions left and right without putting them to the appellant. So, I find that the assessments were made without wisdom and against the settled and invariable principles of justice. They deserve to be set aside.

    3. The assessments are set aside."

    10.1 Subsequent to this, the Assessing Officer issued notices under section 142(1) of the Act along with letters and the assessee was asked to furnish the details. The assessee complied with the notices but the Assessing Officer was not satisfied with the details furnished by the assessee as well as the explanations offered. Accordingly, he vide order dated 26-3-2001 passed the fresh assessments under section 144 , read with section 251, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the above assessment years considering the entire issues and making various additions. Aggrieved by these assessment orders, the assessee went in appeal before the CIT (Appeals) who partly allowed the appeals of the assessee. Aggrieved, the assessee as well as the revenue have filed these appeals before the Tribunal.

    11. The assessee has raised various grounds of appeal on merits and also filed additional ground of appeal. The additional ground filed by the assessee is reproduced as under :

    "The order of the Assessing Officer passed under section 144, read with section 251, of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is without jurisdiction, against the law and without specific direction by the CIT (Appeals). Therefore, the same is void ab initio,null and void, illegal and deserves to be cancelled."

    12. The ld. counsel for the assessee stated that the additional ground raised by the assessee is very much essential for the decision of this case. He stated that the additional ground is a legal ground and it can be raised at any time. Further he stated that the assessee has raised a question of law from the facts and circumstances of the case and he requested that the same may be admitted. He further stated that keeping in view the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax [1998] 229 ITR 383, the assessee can raise any legal ground for the first time before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the same under the law.

    13. On the contrary, the learned Departmental Representative opposed the admission of the additional ground and stated that the assessee has not raised this ground before the lower authorities. Therefore, he requested that the additional ground raised by the assessee may be dismissed.

    14. We have heard both the parties and perused the relevant records available with us. We have gone through the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. (supra). We are of the considered opinion that the additional ground raised by the assessee is a legal ground and can be raised before the Tribunal. Accordingly, we admit the same.

    15. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the assessee stated that the Assessing Officer completed the assessment under section 144 , read with section 251, of the Act without any order or direction given by the CIT (Appeals). He drew our attention towards the main order of the CIT (Appeals) dated 15-9-1998 and stated that the CIT (Appeals) has adjudicated the issues in dispute on the basis of law and facts of the case and after detailed discussion, he cancelled the same on merit vide order dated 15-9-1998. But the Assessing Officer completed the assessment under section 144, read with section 251, of the Act by mis-conceiving that the CIT (Appeals) has given direction to re-do the assessment. Actually, there is no order or direction by the CIT (Appeals) to the Assessing Officer to re-do the assessment. Therefore, the Assessing Officer has wrongly assumed jurisdiction in making the assessment in dispute which is without jurisdiction and not sustainable in the eye of law. To support his contention and clarify the meaning of word "set aside", the ld. counsel for the assessee relied on the Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 1372 and the following case laws :

    1.V.B. Gadkari v. Sales-tax Officer [1985] 59 STC 362 (MP)

    2.Ganga Prasad Sharma v. CIT [1981] 132 ITR 87 (MP)

    3.R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fatechand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission [1989] 176 ITR 169/ 43 Taxman 34(SC)

    4.Pulipati Subbarao & Co. v. AAC [1959] 35 ITR 673 (AP)

    5.ITO v. Kalyan Kumar Roy Trust [2000] 75 ITD 36 (Cal.)

    6.CIT v. Ratanabai N.K. Dubhash [1998] 230 ITR 495/100 Taxman 458 (Bom.)

    7.CIT v. Rajesh Talkies [1996] 220 ITR 107/87 Taxman 204 (Punj. & Har.)

    8.Fu Sheen Tannery's case (supra ).

    16. On the contrary, Shri Sudhakar Tiwari, CIT-DR controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee. He argued that the facts in the case laws cited by the learned counsel for the assessee are not identical to the facts of the present case and totally distinguishable. He stated that meaning of the word "set aside" is a clear-cut direction to the Assessing Officer to re-do the assessment after giving the opportunity to the party and decide the issue in dispute fresh under the law. The Assessing Officer completed the assessment in dispute under section 144 , read with section 251, of the Act in compliance with the order passed by the CIT (Appeals) dated 15-9-1998. Therefore, he contended that the Assessing Officer was justified in making assessment under section 144, read with section 251, of the Act.

    17. We have heard both the parties and perused the records available with us. We have also gone through the orders passed by the revenue authorities. We find that as per Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 1372 , the words "set aside" means :

    "To reverse, vacate, cancel, annul or revoke a judgment, order, etc."

    Further the meaning of the word 'annul' at page 90 of the Black's Law Dictionary has given as under :

    "To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. To cancel; destroy; abrogate. To annul a judgment or judicial proceeding is to deprive it of all force and operation, either ab initio or prospectively as to future transaction."

    And the meaning of the word 'annulment' is given at page 91 as under :

    "To nullify, to abolish, to make void by competent authority. An "annulment" defers from a divorce in that a divorce terminates a legal status whereas an annulment establishes that a marital status never existed. Whealton v. Whealton, 67 Cal. 2 d 656 , 63 Cal Rptr. 291 , 294 , 432 P. 2 d 979. Grounds and procedures for annulment of marriage are governed by State Statutes."

    18. It is observed that the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of V.B. Gadkari (supra) , relied on by the assessee's counsel, has held as under :

    "the order of assessment did not refer to any material whatsoever on which the estimate was based. Thus, it was clear that the assessing authority made an assessment based on pure guess without reference to any evidence or material at all. Therefore, the order of assessment and the order dismissing the revision petition of the assessee were vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and deserved to be quashed."

    19. In the case law relied on by the learned counsel for the assessee, the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Ganga Prasad Sharma ( supra) has held as under :

    "in the instant case, the basis on which the computation of income was made was not disclosed in the assessment order. The assessment order and the impugned order of the Commissioner under section 263 were quashed giving liberty to the ITO to pass a fresh assessment order."

    20. In the case of R.B. Shreeram Durga Prasad & Fatechand Nursing Das ( supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :

    "allowing the appeal, (i ) that an appeal under article 136 of the Constitution of India lay to the Supreme Court against the order of the Settlement Commission;

    (ii ) that the earlier order passed by the Settlement Commission on 24-8-1977, was a nullity because it was made in violation of the principles of natural justice;

    (iii ) that, therefore, the application for settlement was still pending when the amendment made by the Finance Act, 1979 came into effect; and that amendment being procedural, the amended section 245 D would govern the proceedings and the Commission would have the power to overrule the objections of the Commissioner;

    (iv ) that the appellant was entitled to be heard on the Commissioner's objections;

    (v ) that on the facts, though the appellant had made its submissions on the Commissioner's objections, no clear opportunity had been afforded to it to demonstrate that the Commissioner was not justified in making the objections and that the Commission ought to accept the objections. It might be that in spite of the fact that concealment for the years 1948-49 to 1959-60 had been upheld in appeal, it would be possible for the appellant to demonstrate that in disclosure of concealment of income for a spread-over period, settlement for the entire period should be allowed and not bifurcated in the manner sought by the Commissioner. In exercise of its power of judicial review of the decision of the Settlement Commission, the Supreme Court is concerned with the legality of the procedure followed and not with the validity of the order."

    21. Further in the case law relied on by the assessee's counsel, the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Pulipati Subbarao & Co. ( supra) has held as under :

    "the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not contain a direction that the Income-tax Officer should proceed to make a fresh assessment such as was envisaged under section 31(3)( b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, the order was specific and all that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed the Officer to do was to receive a duplicate copy of the application for registration and dispose of it according to law and, therefore, it was not open to the Officer to conduct a fresh enquiry and proceed to make a fresh assessment."

    22. In the case of Kalyan Kumar Roy Trust (supra) , the Hon'ble Tribunal has held that :

    "7. We have no hesitation in accepting Mr. Raya's contentions. There is a difference between "annulment" of an assessment and "set aside" of the same only in the sense that in the former, the proceedings cannot be generally revived, whereas in the latter, they can be revived if there are clear directions to that effect; they are similar in the sense that "both wipe out the original orders" - see - the judgment in the case of Seghu Buchiah Setty's case (supra ) at page 544 (SC). Section 251(1)( a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which is in pari materia with section 31(3)( a) and 31(3)( b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922 confers upon the first appellate authority the power to annul the assessment as well as the power to set aside the assessment. However, the power to set aside the assessment is circumscribed by the condition that in such a case he should refer the case back to the ITO for making a fresh assessment in accordance with his directions. The reason for the difference is clear. An assessment is annulled when there is a lack of pecuniary jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the proceeding. In such a case after the assessment is annulled, there is no scope for passing a fresh assessment. However, if the assessment is set aside it is generally done only if there is a procedural irregularity which can be cured or if the assessment is made without property enquiry, etc. In such cases, the assessment will have to be set aside but since there is no lack of jurisdiction, the appellate authority would be bound in law to direct the assessing authority to make a fresh assessment after curing the irregularity. There are any number of authorities laying down the principles as to when an assessment is to be annulled and when it is to be only set aside for being redone afresh. But that is not the point that arises in the present appeals and, therefore, there is no need to refer to them. The position made clear by section 251(1)( a) is that that it would be the duty of the appellate authority to give clear directions for making a fresh assessment in case he decides to set aside the assessment. It follows therefrom that if there are no such directions, the ITO would not have the power to reframe the assessment since a mere set aside of the assessment as held by the Supreme Court in the judgment cited supra, would also wipe out or destroy the assessment order just as in the case of annulment."

    23. It is to be noted that in the case of Ratanabai N.K. Dubhash (supra ), the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has held that :

    "accordingly, that the admitted position was that on receipt of the draft order of assessment, the assessee did file objections and the Income-tax Officer completed the assessment himself on the basis of the draft order without forwarding the draft order and the objections to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and obtaining directions from him. Such an order, on the face of it, was beyond the powers of the Income-tax Officer under section 143, read with section 144 B, of the Act, and, hence, without jurisdiction. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in its conclusion that the assessment was liable to be annulled. There was a time-limit for making the assessment. If the original time-limit was still available, the Income-tax Officer could proceed from the stage at which the illegality which resulted in the annulment of the assessment supervened and to make the assessment afresh."

    24. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the CIT (Appeals) has set aside the assessment means that he annulled the assessment, since he has not given any direction to re-do the assessment. This view of ours is supported by the judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Fu Sheen Tannery (supra ), wherein it was held that :

    "it was clear that the appellate authority was conscious of the admission of the assessing authority that if the matter was remanded for fresh assessment it would require considerable time to explore, investigate, enquire to ascertain the actual position and, thus, decided to set aside the order of assessment without giving any direction for a fresh assessment. The order amounted to annulment of the assessment in toto. The order of fresh assessment was not valid."

    As such, the Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to pass any further order. He is duty bound to follow the direction of the CIT (Appeals) and he cannot sit over the order of the CIT (Appeals), who is a superior authority. The remedy lies with the department and he has to file an appeal against the order of the CIT (Appeals) if they have any grievance. In the present case, instead of filing the appeal in time against the CIT (Appeals) order dated 15-9-1998 , the Assessing Officer made a fresh assessment without jurisdiction which is against the law on the facts of the case and not sustainable in the eye of law. Therefore, the additional ground raised by the assessee is allowed and we cancel the impugned assessment order as well as the impugned order of the CIT (Appeals) in view of the precedents discussed above. Since we have allowed the legal issue raised by the assessee and cancelled the assessments, we refrain from going through the merits of the case and it is only academic. Accordingly, we allow the appeals of the assessee in ITA Nos. 1148, 1149 and 1150/Mds./ 2002. In view of the above, the appeals of the revenue in ITA Nos. 1221 , 1222 and 1223/Mds./ 02 become infructuous and we dismiss the same as infructuous.

    25. In the result, the revenue's appeals in ITA Nos. 1221 , 1222 , 1223/Mds./ 02 and 279, 280 and 281/Mds./ 2006 are dismissed and the assessee's appeals in ITA Nos. 1148 , 1149 and 1150/ Mds./2002 are allowed.

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    Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle-II(2), Chennai v. Jaya Publications
    (Nov 30, 2007)