AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • rules. Sub- sections (1) and (4) of the said section
  • section 143(3)/254/147 of the IT Act, 1961
  • (Twenty-second) Amendment Rules, 2001
  • section 35(1)( ii) of the IT Act, 1961,
  • rule 3 of the IT Rules, 1962
  • section 143(3)/254/143(3)/147
  • rule 3(1) of the IT Rules,
  • rule 3 of IT Rules, 1962
  • rule 3(a)(ii ) of IT Rules
  • rule 3(1) of the Rules
  • rule 3(1) of IT Rules,
  • rule 3 of IT Rules
  • clause (9) of rule 3
  • section 143(3)/147
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • rules. Sub- sections (1) and (4) of the said section
  • section 143(3)/254/147 of the IT Act, 1961
  • (Twenty-second) Amendment Rules, 2001
  • section 35(1)( ii) of the IT Act, 1961,
  • rule 3 of the IT Rules, 1962
  • section 143(3)/254/143(3)/147
  • rule 3(1) of the IT Rules,
  • rule 3 of IT Rules, 1962
  • rule 3(a)(ii ) of IT Rules
  • rule 3(1) of the Rules
  • rule 3(1) of IT Rules,
  • rule 3 of IT Rules
  • clause (9) of rule 3
  • section 143(3)/147
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Bench: B.R. Mittal, J.M.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, an individual serving as Managing Director of M/s Carbide Cutting Tools (P) Ltd., filed a return for assessment year (A.Y.) 2001-02 showing total income of Rs. 7,20,470. The Assessing Officer (AO) observed that the assessee had been provided furnished rent-free accommodation by his employer and that this perquisite had not been included in the assessee's return nor in the employer's TDS records. After receiving a notice under section 148, the assessee offered Rs. 1,20,000 as the perquisite value for rent-free furnished accommodation. Initially, in the absence of full details, the AO estimated the perquisite at Rs. 5,63,725 (10% of salary) and completed assessment under section 143(3)/147 on total income of Rs. 86,55,450. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) upheld the AO's computation, but the Tribunal set aside that issue to the AO to determine fair rent after giving the assessee opportunity to furnish particulars. Pursuant to that direction and after set-aside proceedings, the AO recomputed the perquisite at Rs. 1,49,894 and passed an assessment order dated 15th June, 2006. The learned Commissioner of Income Tax (CIT) issued a show-cause under section 263, holding the AO's order to be erroneous and prejudicial on the ground that amended rule 3(1) of the Income-tax Rules (substituted by the Twenty-second Amendment Rules, 2001) applied with effect from 1st April, 2001 and required valuation at 10% of salary (which in this case resulted in a higher amount). The assessee appealed against the CIT's order under section 263 before the Tribunal (this opinion is the appellate court's judgment on that appeal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned CIT was justified in invoking jurisdiction under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground that the AO's reassessment (after Tribunal's set-aside) was "erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue" for not applying the substituted rule 3(1) of the Income-tax Rules w.e.f. 1st April, 2001 to A.Y. 2001-02.
  2. Whether the substituted rule 3(1) (Twenty-second Amendment, 2001) was applicable to the assessee's case for A.Y. 2001-02, in view of clause (9) of the substituted rule which provided an option for employees to compute perquisites for the period 1st April, 2001 to 30th September, 2001 in accordance with the pre-amendment rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The Tribunal had set aside the matter for the limited purpose of determining the fair rent after giving the assessee opportunity to produce documentary evidence; the AO, on set-aside, examined documents produced under section 142(1) and computed the perquisite at Rs. 1,49,894 based on those documents (electricity, repairs, municipal annual value, and furniture valuation).
  • The Tribunal did not direct the AO to apply rule 3 in computing the perquisite; rule 3 prescribes a method for determining the value of rent-free accommodation but does not determine fair rent, which may be ascertained by other recognised methods (rental value, municipal valuation, etc.).
  • When a matter is remanded by the Tribunal for limited purposes, the AO derives jurisdiction from that order and cannot introduce a new source of income or deal with points not the subject-matter of the remand. Thus the AO was confined to the Tribunal's direction.
  • The AO took a possible view on facts before him; where two views are possible, the AO's view cannot be treated as erroneous and prejudicial such as to attract section 263. (Assessee relied on authorities supporting this proposition.)
  • The substituted (twenty-second) amendment to rule 3 was notified on 25th September, 2001 w.e.f. 1st April, 2001, but clause (9) gave an option to the employee to compute perquisites for the period 1st April, 2001 to 30th September, 2001 according to pre-amendment rules; therefore the amended rule did not automatically apply to the assessee for A.Y. 2001-02.
  • By the time the notification of 25th September, 2001 was issued, the employer had already deducted tax under section 192, filed Form 24, issued Form 16, and the assessee had filed the return — all within prescribed time under the pre-amendment rules; application of the substituted rule would prejudicially affect the assessee and run counter to section 295(4).

Departmental Representative's (Respondent's/CIT's) Arguments

  • The AO did not compute the perquisite in accordance with the substituted rule 3(1) (Twenty-second Amendment, 2001) effective 1st April, 2001 and instead relied on documents submitted during the set-aside proceedings; therefore the assessment was erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue.
  • Learned CIT relied on the Supreme Court decision in BHEL Workers Union and also on CIT v. Isthmian Steamship Lines to support the proposition that the amended rule applied from A.Y. 2001-02 and thus the AO should have valued the perquisite at 10% of salary.
  • The CIT submitted that amended rule 3 applied to A.Y. 2001-02 and that the AO's failure to apply it warranted invoking section 263 to correct an order erroneous and prejudicial to revenue.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
BHEL Workers Union & Anr. v. Union of India [2008] 217 CTR (SC) 19 Relied upon by learned CIT to contend that an amendment (or explanation) should be applied from A.Y. 2001-02; cited in support of retrospective application from 1.4.2001. The court held that this authority was not applicable to the facts of the assessee's case and that its ratio could not be imported to justify the CIT's exercise of jurisdiction under section 263 here.
CIT v. Isthmian Steamship Lines [1951] 20 ITR 572 (SC) Cited by Departmental Representative in support of the proposition that an amendment may be held to apply from a retrospective effective date. The opinion records that the D.R. relied on this decision; the court did not base its ultimate conclusion on this authority but noted the D.R.'s reliance.
Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 83 (SC) Explains the meaning of "erroneous" and "prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue" under section 263 — in particular, where two views are possible an AO's view adopted in law will not necessarily be erroneous and prejudicial. The court expressly relied on this authority to conclude that where the AO has taken a possible view based on evidentiary material, that view cannot be treated as erroneous and prejudicial so as to justify section 263 intervention.
Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. ITO [1960] 40 ITR 618 (SC) Cited by the assessee to support the proposition that the AO's powers on remand are limited to the subject-matter of the Tribunal's direction. The decision was listed among authorities relied upon by the assessee; the court's reasoning reflects the same principle that an AO on remand must act within the scope of the Tribunal's direction.
Puranmal Radhakishan & Co. v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 294 (Bom) Cited by the assessee for the proposition restricting AO's power on remand and supporting the limited scope of reassessment proceedings pursuant to appellate directions. The opinion records that the assessee relied on this decision; the court treated this as part of the assessee's authorities supporting limited AO jurisdiction on remand.
Asstt. CIT v. Anima Investment Ltd. [2001] 247 ITR 22 (Delhi) Cited by the assessee among authorities to support limits on AO's jurisdiction on remand. Included in the list of cases relied upon by the assessee; the court referenced the general proposition without making this decision a basis of its primary holding.
CIT v. Lal Chand Agarwal [2003] 259 ITR 497 (Raj) Cited by the assessee to support his position on AO's powers and reassessment limits. Recorded as a citation relied upon by the assessee; the court's analysis accords with the general principle urged by the assessee.
CIT v. Mahindra & Co. [1995] 215 ITR 922 (Raj) Cited by the assessee in the context of limiting reassessment powers and scope of matters on remand. Noted as part of the assessee's authorities; the court's reasoning aligns with the broader principle these cases support.
Ramesh P. Modi v. CIT [2009] 122 TTJ (Mumbai) 566 Cited by the assessee to support the proposition that where two reasonable views are possible, the CIT should not invoke section 263. Recorded as relied upon by the assessee; the court's conclusion that two views being possible precludes a section 263 invocation is consistent with the principle advanced.
Seksaria Biswan Sugar Factory Ltd. v. IAC [1990] 184 ITR 123 (Bom) Discusses limits on retrospective application of rules and the principle that retrospective rules should not be applied so as to prejudice assessees. Cited in relation to section 295(4). The court relied on the principle in this decision to support the view that retrospective application of the substituted rule which prejudices the assessee should not be enforced; it was used in reasoning about section 295(4) limitations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a two-fold enquiry corresponding to the competing contentions: (A) whether the CIT validly invoked his power under section 263 on the ground that the AO's order was erroneous and prejudicial; and (B) whether the substituted rule 3(1) (Twenty-second Amendment, 2001) applied to the assessee for A.Y. 2001-02 such that the AO's not applying it rendered his order erroneous.

A. On the scope of section 263 — The court emphasized the statutory prerequisites for the exercise of section 263(1): the CIT must be satisfied both that (i) the order of the AO is erroneous and (ii) it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The court reiterated the principle that section 263 is not intended to correct every mistake; it applies only where an order is erroneous and prejudicial. Relying on the Supreme Court's exposition in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd., the court explained that when the AO adopts one of the courses permissible in law and where two views are possible based on the facts and materials, adverse revenue consequence alone does not make the AO's order "erroneous and prejudicial" to invoke section 263.

The court then reviewed the procedural history: the Tribunal had set aside the earlier assessment on this specific issue and directed the AO to determine the fair rent after giving opportunity to the assessee. In compliance, the AO issued notices under section 142(1), received documents (electricity bills, repair bills, furniture value, municipal annual value) and recomputed the perquisite at Rs. 1,49,894. The AO thus exercised judicial discretion and adopted a view reasonably open on the basis of the material before him. The court concluded that such a possible view could not be characterized as erroneous and prejudicial in the statutory sense and therefore section 263 could not be invoked merely because the CIT preferred a different view.

B. On applicability of substituted rule 3(1) — The court examined the notification effecting the Twenty-second Amendment (S.O. 940(E), dated 25th September, 2001) which stated that the substitution "shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April, 2001" and that "this rule shall come into force with effect from the 1st day of April, 2001." Crucially, clause (9) of the substituted rule provided a proviso: the employee may, at his option, compute the value of all perquisites made available to him for the period from 1st April, 2001 to 30th September, 2001 in accordance with the rules as they stood prior to the amendment.

The court read the proviso literally and held that it conferred an option on the employee to compute perquisites for the stated period under the pre-amended rule. The opinion notes that the assessee and his employer had completed the relevant formalities (tax deduction under section 192, deposit, filing Form 24, issuing Form 16, and filing the return) before the notification of 25th September, 2001. The court observed that the CIT himself had directed the AO to examine the assessee's claim if the assessee exercised the option under the proviso. Given that the AO had taken a plausible view based on the documents and that clause (9) allowed the assessee to elect the pre-amendment computation for the relevant period, the court held that the CIT was not justified in setting aside the AO's order or directing recomputation under the substituted rule.

C. On retrospectivity and section 295(4) — The court discussed section 295(4) (power to make rules, including retrospective effect, subject to restriction that retrospective effect should not prejudicially affect assessees). It concluded that retrospective application of a rule which prejudices an assessee should not be made applicable. The court relied on Seksaria Biswan Sugar Factory Ltd. to support this limitation on retrospective operation where prejudice to the assessee results. Applying these principles, the court found that applying the substituted rule to the assessee despite the proviso and the pre-notification compliance would be prejudicial and contrary to the scheme of section 295(4).

D. Overall conclusion of analysis — Because the AO, acting within the scope of the Tribunal's direction and on the basis of the material before him, adopted a permissible view, the AO's order could not be treated as erroneous and prejudicial within the meaning of section 263. Additionally, the legal and textual construction of clause (9) of substituted rule 3(1) supported the assessee's option to adopt pre-amended computation for the relevant period, rendering the CIT's reliance on retrospective application inappropriate in the facts of this case. The court therefore found the CIT's exercise of power under section 263 unjustified.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the impugned order passed by the learned CIT under section 263 is quashed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The order of the learned CIT dated 25th March, 2009 (setting aside the AO's assessment dated 15th June, 2006 under section 263 and directing recomputation by applying substituted rule 3(1)) is quashed and the grounds of appeal taken by the assessee are allowed. Consequently, the AO's reassessment (in which the perquisite value was recomputed at Rs. 1,49,894 pursuant to the Tribunal's set-aside) stands, because the CIT's attempt to direct recomputation under the substituted rule was disallowed.
  • No new broad legal precedent was laid down beyond the application of established principles: the court applied established principles constraining the exercise of section 263 (must be both erroneous and prejudicial) and interpreted clause (9) of the substituted rule 3(1) and section 295(4) in the factual context. The decision confirms that where the AO takes a view reasonably open on the material and where statutory provisos permit an assessee's option, the CIT should not invoke section 263 merely because a different view would yield more revenue.

This summary is strictly limited to the matters and citations contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Subrata Kumar Nag v. Commissioner of Income-tax

    B.R. Mittal, J.M. :

    This appeal by the assessee is directed against the order dt. 25th March, 2009 of learned CIT, Kolkata-IV, Kolkata pertaining to assessment year 2001-02. The assessee has raised several grounds and they are all against the setting aside of the assessment order under section 143(3)/254/147 of the IT Act, 1961 dt. 15th June, 2006 by learned CIT by invoking his powers under section 263 of the IT Act with direction to AO to recompute the value of perquisites of the assessee for a6st. yr. 2001-02 by applying rule 3(1) of IT Rules as substituted.

    2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the assessee, an individual, is the managing director of M/s Carbide Cutting Tools (P) Ltd. Return of income for the assessment year under appeal was filed showing total income of Rs. 7,20,470. The AO observed that the, assessee had resided in the furnished accommodation provided by his employer without charging any rent and the said perquisite was not either offered for taxation by the assessee in his return or by his employer in TDS Form No. 16. Consequently in response to notice under section 148 the assessee offered Rs. 1,20,000 as perquisite for rent-free furnished accommodation. In absence of full details, the AO estimated the value of perquisite at Rs. 5,63.725, which was @ 10 per cent of his salary and added the same to his total income and the assessment under section 143(3)/147 was completed on a total income of Rs. 86,55,450. Before the learned CIT(A) the assessee's case was that as per rule 3(a)(ii ) of IT Rules where 10 per cent of salary exceeds the fair rental value of the property, the valuation of the same shall be limited to the fair value of the accommodation. However, the AO wanted the assessee to produce documents to substantiate the fair rent claimed by the assessee and estimated the value of accommodation at 10 per cent of salary. The learned CIT(A) rejected the assessee's plea and upheld the computation made by the AO. The assessee carried the matter before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide order dt. 21st Sept., 2005 in ITA No. 1123/Kol/2005 set aside the issue to the file of AO for fresh determination of fair rent of rent-free accommodation for the purpose of computing perquisite. The relevant portion of the direction of the Tribunal reads as under :

    "16. We have considered the submissions. In our considered opinion, the issue has been decided by the authorities below hurriedly. It appears that the assessee has also not complied fully with the requirement for furnishing necessary details to determine the fair rent of the property. Therefore, this issue is set aside to the file of the AO for passing a fresh order after providing necessary opportunity to the assessee to determine the fair rent for the purpose of computing perquisite. Accordingly, this issue is set aside."

    2.1. In view of the above direction of the Tribunal, the AO reconsidered the issue after examining the documents filed by the assessee in response to notice under section 142(1) of the Act. The AO arrived at perquisite value of rent-free furnished accommodation at Rs. 1,49,894 as against Rs. 1,20,000 shown by the assessee in assessment order passed under section 143(3)/254/143(3)/147 of the Act, dt. 15th June, 2006.

    3. The learned CIT, however, held that impugned assessment is erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue as according to him the AO has made the assessment without applying the provisions of the Act properly. He, therefore, issued show-cause notice under section 263 of the Act, stating as under :

    "According to rule 3(1) of the IT Rules, as substituted by the IT (Second Amendment) Rules, 2001 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2001, the perquisite value in respect of an accommodation provided by a private (i.e., other than Government) employer where the accommodation is owned by the employer is to be taken as 10 per cent of salary in cities having population exceeding 4 lakhs as per 1991 census. In your case the salary has been worked out at more than Rs. 40 lakhs and 10 per cent of the same have been a sum above Rs. 4 lakhs. However, the perquisite value adopted by the AO is only Rs. 1,49,000."

    3.1. In response to the said notice, the assessee submitted explanation in support of his contention that rule 3 of IT Rules as substituted by IT (Twenty-second) Amendment Rules, 2001 vide notification dt. 25th Sept., 2001 is not applicable to assessment year 2001-02, in as much as it was made with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2001, which is concerning with financial year 2001-02 relevant to assessment year 2002-03. It was further contended that as per proviso to clause (9) of rule 3 above, option is open to the employee concerned to compute the value of all perquisites for the period beginning from 1st April, 2001 and ending on 30th Sept., 2001 in accordance with rules as they stood prior to this amendment. Therefore, when proviso to amended rule speaks of computing perquisite as per pre-substituted rule 3 for financial year 2001-02, in that case the assessee's computation of perquisite under the amended rule for financial year 2000-01 relevant to assessment year 2001-02 shall not be as per law. Learned CIT was not convinced with the explanation of the assessee. He referred to decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BHEL Workers Union & Anr. v. Union of India [2008] 217 CTR (SC) 19 : [2008] 7 DTR (SC) 122 and held that the order passed by the AO is not just erroneous but prejudicial to the interest of Revenue. The relevant portion of his observation in this regard is as under :

    "Once it is established beyond doubt that rule 3 would be applicable from the assessment year 2001-02 and not from assessment year 2002-03 as has been contended by the assessee, the income of the assessee has to be computed as per rule 3 of the IT Rules, 1962 which has not been done by the assessee. Since the AO has failed to apply the provisions of IT Act read with the rules properly, the action of the AO is unsustainable in law. Hence it can be concluded that the AO has made the order in undue haste without applying the provisions of the Act properly, the order passed by the AO is not just erroneous but prejudicial to the interest of Revenue."

    4. The learned counsel for the assessee stated the background of passing assessment order under section 143(3)/254/143(3)/147 by the AO and order under section 263 of the Act by learned CIT. Learned Authorised Representative made his submissions to support the order passed by the AO and the same are as under :

    (a)The Tribunal set aside the matter to the file of AO for passing a fresh order determining the fair rent after providing opportunity to the assessee. Thereafter, in response to notice under section 142(1), the assessee furnished before the AO the required documents, bills, vouchers etc. in connection with the following perquisites :

    (i) Electricity charges (for M.D. accommodation) Rs. 52,274
    (ii) Repair and maintenance (-do-) Rs. 36,720
    (iii) Furniture provided to the assessee Rs. 11,26,643
    (iv) Annual value of house property as per Calcutta Municipality Rs. 37,230

    On the basis of above information and evidences, the AO determined the perquisite value of rent-free furnished accommodation at Rs. 1,49,894 as against Rs. 1,20,000 shown by the assessee, as under :

    10% of cost of furniture Rs. 1,12,664  
    Valuation of house property Rs. 37,230 Rs. 1,49,894.

    (b)That reassessment vide order dt. 15th June, 2006 was done by the AO pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal setting aside the earlier assessment on this issue with certain specific direction to determine the fair rent for the purposes of computing perquisite. The Tribunal did not ask the AO to apply rule 3 in computing such perquisite. That rule 3 of IT Rules merely prescribes the method for determining the value of the rent- free accommodation provided by the employer and does not, in any way, determine the 'fair rent' of any property, for which there are other methods like considering the rental value, municipal valuation etc.

    (c)That in a set aside assessment, the AO derives jurisdiction from the order of Tribunal and, thus the AO cannot introduce a new source of income, nor can he deal with any point which was not the subject-matter of appeal before the Tribunal in such set aside assessment proceeding. Therefore, when the powers of the Tribunal are limited to the subject- matter of appeal, the powers of the AO in reassessment cannot extend beyond the same. In this connection, learned Authorised Representative relied on the following decisions :

    (i) Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v . ITO [1960] 40 ITR 618 (SC);

    (ii)Puranmal Radhakishan & Co. v . CIT [1957] 31 ITR 294 (Bom);

    (iii) Asstt. CIT v. Anima Investment Ltd. [2001] 247 ITR 22 (Delhi)(TM)(AT);

    (iv) CIT v. Lal Chand Agarwal [2003] 259 ITR 497 at 510 (Raj.)

    (v )CIT v . Mahindra & Co. [1995] 215 ITR 922 at 928 (Raj.).

    (d)That when the AO has followed the direction given by the Tribunal to determine the fair rent of the property, the assessment order passed in pursuance of such direction was in order and valid. Learned CIT has tried to apply amended rule 3(1) of IT Rules, which was not subject before the Tribunal or passed any order in that direction.

    (e)That, further in the present case two views are possible. Learned CIT carries a different opinion than that of AO, who has exercised his quasi judicial power vested in him and arrived at a conclusion in accordance with direction of Tribunal and considering the requisite details filed before him. Therefore, such an order cannot be a subject-matter of section 263 of the Act. Learned Authorised Representative relied on the decisions in the cases of Ramesh P. Modi v . CIT [2009] 122 TTJ (Mumbai) 566 : [2008] 16 DTR (Mumbai)(Trib) 140 and Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 83 (SC).

    (f)That the impugned (twenty-second) amendment in rule 3 of IT Rules has been notified vide notification dt. 25th Sep., 2001 w.e.f. 1st April, 2001. The assessment year involved in this case is assessment year 2001-02, relevant to corresponding period 1st April, 2000 to 31st March, 2001. Learned CIT has, however, wrongly understood the same as for financial year 2000-01 relevant to assessment year 2001-02 without considering cls. (2) and (9) of the said substituted rule, which clearly provides that employee may at his option compute the value of all perquisites made available to him for the period beginning on 1st April, 2001 and ending on 30th Sept., 2001 as they stood prior to this amendment. Therefore, the case law relied upon by him in the case of BHEL Workers Union ( supra) was of no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the assessee's case.

    (g)That as per provisions of section 295(4) of the Act, it is well-established that even if there would be retrospective effect, the notification should not be applied if it prejudicially affects the interest of the assessee. In this case, by the time the notification dt. 25th Sept., 2001 was made, the assessee's employer had already deducted tax under section 192 and deposited the same with Government account with due date, annual return in Form No. 24 was also filed and salary certificate in Form No. 16 issued by 30th April, 2001 and the assessee filed his return of income by 31st July, 2001. Therefore, when computation has been made, tax has been deducted and deposited and certificate issued within the stipulated time as per existing rule, the amended rule 3 of IT Rules shall not be applicable to the case of the assessee.

    5. The learned Departmental Representative, on the other hand, relied on the order of learned CIT. He submitted that the AO has not computed the perquisite value of the accommodation provided to the assessee by his employer as per (twenty-second) amendment of rule 3 of IT Rules w.e.f. 1st April, 2001 and simply has gone by the documents and explanations given by the assessee during set aside- proceedings. Therefore, his action in not acting in terms of the said amended rule caused the assessment erroneous and thus prejudicial to the interests of Revenue. Relying on the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of BHEL Workers Union (supra) and CIT v. Isthmian Steamship Lines [1951] 20 ITR 572 (SC), he submitted that in the case of the assessee, amended rule 3 is applicable from the assessment year 2001-02 and not from assessment year 2002-03, as claimed by the assessee. The learned Departmental' Representative, therefore, submitted that the order of learned CIT passed under section 263 should be upheld.

    6. We have considered the rival contentions of the parties and gone through the materials placed on record. The reason as pointed out by learned CIT to justify his invoking jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act was that according to rule 3(1), as substituted by IT (Twenty-second Amendment) Rules, 2001 w.e.f. 1st April, 2001, the perquisite value of rent-free furnished accommodation provided to the assessee by his employer for assessment year 2001-02 should have been @ 10 per cent of salary of Rs. 40 lakhs, i.e., Rs. 4 lakhs and not Rs. 1,49,000 as adopted by the AO. He has, therefore, directed the AO to recompute the perquisite value of rent-free accommodation as per said amended rule, A bare reading of section 263 of the Act makes it clear that the prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction by learned CIT suo motu under it, is that the order of the AO is erroneous insofar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Learned CIT has to be satisfied of twin conditions, namely, (i) the order of the AO sought to be revised is erroneous; and (ii) it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. If one of them is absent-if the order of the AO is •erroneous but is not prejudicial to the Revenue or if it is not erroneous but is prejudicial to the Revenue, recourse cannot be had to section 263(1) of the Act. The provision cannot be invoked to correct each and every type of mistake or error committed by the AO. It is only when an order is erroneous that the section will be attracted. The arguments advanced on behalf of the assessee were of two folds, viz. (i) that the AO was abided in law by the direction of the Tribunal and hence the assessment order passed on 15th June, 2006 is in pursuance of such direction of Tribunal cannot be interfered with by invoking provisions of section 263 of the Act and (ii) that learned CIT without considering proviso to clause (9) of the amended rule 3(1) of the Rules has misinterpreted the application of assessment year in terms of such amended rule for the assessment year in question.

    6.1. We observe that assessment under section 143(3)/147 for the assessment year under appeal was first made computing the perquisite value of the assessee's rent-free furnished accommodation at Rs. 5,63,725 as against shown by the assessee in return of income of Rs. 1,20,000. The assessee was unsuccessful before learned CIT(A). On second appeal, the Tribunal vide order dt. 21st Sept., 2005 set aside the issue to the file of AO for the limited purpose of redetermining the fair rent of the property after examination of the documents and details that may be furnished by the assessee during set aside proceeding. The relevant direction of the Tribunal is already quoted in para 2 above of this order. The AO after examining/considering such details as required by him recomputed the perquisite value at Rs. 1,49,000 vide impugned assessment order dt. 15th June, 2006. The AO after verifying the documents gathered from the assessee in set aside proceeding and as per direction of Tribunal and after considering the explanation offered by the assessee exercised his judicial discretion in the matter while completing the reassessment. We are of the considered view that when AO has taken a possible view on the basis of details before him, in such circumstances, the view taken by the AO cannot be said to be prejudicial to the Revenue nor can it be said to be erroneous. In the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. ( supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :

    'The phrase 'prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue' has to be read in conjunction with an erroneous order passed by the AO. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the AO, cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, for example, when an ITO adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of revenue, or where two views are possible and the ITO has taken one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue unless the view taken by the ITO is unsustainable in law."

    In view of the above, the assumption of power by learned CIT under section 263 of the Act and issuing direction to the AO to recompute the perquisite value of rent-free furnished accommodation provided to the assessee by his employer for the purpose of taxing the same in his hands by prescribing a method as per rule 3(1) of IT Rules, in our considered opinion, cannot be endorsed.

    6.2. Further, in regard to application of amended rule 3 of IT Rules to the case of the assessee, we find that the impugned (twenty-second) amendment in rule 3 of IT Rules, 1962 has been notified vide Notification No. S.O. 940(E) dt. 25th Sept-, 2001 w.e.f. 1st April, 2001. The assessment year involved in this case is 2001-02, which covers the corresponding period from 1st April, 2000 to 31st March, 2001. According to learned CIT, the amendment brought into the statute is in force from assessment year 2001-02 and hence the amended provisions incorporated in the substituted rule 3 are applicable to the case of the assessee. Clause (2) of the said notification dt. 25th Sept., 2001 reads as under :

    "(2) they shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April, 2001."

    However, clause (9) of the said substituted rule further clarifies as under :

    "(9) This rule shall come into force with effect from the 1st day of April, 2001.

    Provided that the employee may, at his option, compute the value of all perquisites made available to him or any member of his household for the period beginning on 1st day of April, 2001 and ending on 30th day of Sept., 2001 in accordance with the rules as they stood prior to this amendment."

    On bare reading of the aforesaid proviso under clause (9) of the said substituted rule 3 of IT Rules promulgated on 25th Sept., 2001, it is amply clear that option was open to the employee concerned to compute the value of all perquisites made available to him beginning from 1st day of April, 2001 and ending with 30th day of Sept., 2001 in accordance with the rules as they stood prior to this amendment. Therefore, from the language of the said clause (9) it is clear to allow discretion to the employee concerned to compute the perquisite under pre-amended rule S of the IT Rules. As stated by the learned counsel and not disputed by the Department that the assessee before the notification made on 25th Sept., 2001 had already deducted tax under section 192 and deposited with Government account within the due date, i.e., by 7th April, 2001, annual return for salary in Form No. 24 also filed by 31st May, 2001 and salary certificate in Form No. 16 issued by 30th April, 2001. Even the assessee also filed his return of income by 31st July, 2001. Therefore, all these formalities had been completed by the assessee before the amendment was promulgated on 25th Sept., 2001. Therefore, these activities in terms of old rule were not in violation of the intention of the legislature as provided in clause (9) of the amended rule reproduced above. We further find that even the learned CIT has himself stated in last but one para of his order as under :

    "The AO is also directed to examine the claim of the assessee if the assessee exercise the option and claiming the rule as it stood prior to the amendment till September as per the Notifications No. S.O. 940(E) dt. 25th Sept., 2001."

    From the above direction of learned CIT it is clear that he was also convinced with the intention of the legislature, otherwise he could not have directed the AO to examine the claim as per the notification, wherein option is provided to the assessee to compute the perquisite as per pre-amended rule. In this view or the matter, we are of the opinion that the AO has taken a possible view on the basis of facts before him to compute perquisite value of accommodation provided to the assessee by his employer. Therefore, the learned CIT is not justified to invoke his jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act.

    6.3. Before parting with, we may state that the case law relied upon by learned CIT in the case of BHEL Workers Union ( supra) is not applicable to the case of the assessee. Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the issue was in regard to section 17(2J(ii) r/w Expln. 1 inserted retrospectively w.e.f. 1st April, 2001. Therefore, the matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was entirely different and ratio of that decision cannot be applied in the given facts and circumstances of the assessee's case.

    6.4. Sec. 295 of the Act speaks of power to make rules. Sub- sections (1) and (4) of the said section read as under :

    "(1) The board may, subject to the control of the Central Government, by notification in the Gazette of India, make rules for the whole or any part of India for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

    (4) The power to make rules conferred by this section shall include the power to give retrospective effect, from a date not earlier than the date of commencement of this Act, to the rules or any of them and, unless the contrary is permitted (whether expressly or by necessary implication), no retrospective effect shall be given to any rule so as to prejudicially affect the interests of assessees."

    (Emphasis, italicized in print, supplied)

    It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that if the retrospective application of a notification prejudicially affects the interests of the assessee, then the same should not be applied. That is to say, section 295(4) puts restriction on the retrospective application of a notification if it adversely affects the interests of the assessee.. In this case, as stated above, the assessee did all the formalities in computing income, deducting tax thereon, filing of return etc. within the stipulated time before promulgation of this amended rule, which were also in terms of option provided in clause (9) of the said amended rule. Now if the amended rule is applied, though not applicable in the case of the assessee for the reasons stated above, it would be detrimental to the interest of the assessee, which is against the spirit of provisions of section 295 of the Act. Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Seksaria Biswan Sugar Factory Ltd. v . IAC [1990] 184 ITR 123 (Bom.), had the occasion to deal with retrospective application of amendment made in the statute. Relevant portion of the observation is reproduced below :

    "The assessment for the assessment year 1982-83 was originally completed allowing the petitioners' claim for deduction under section 35(1)( ii) of the IT Act, 1961, in respect of donation to a scientific research centre, then approved under that section by the prescribed authority. The approval was withdrawn by the prescribed authority by a notification dt. 2nd Jan., 1986, with retrospective effect. The ITO, thereupon, issued a notice under section 147(b) seeking to withdraw the deduction for the assessment year 1982-83. On a writ petition to quash the notice :

    Held, that section 295(4) empowers the CBDT to make rules with retrospective effect. Even there, the rules can be amended retrospectively but not to the prejudice of the assessees. That apart, that was in connection with the power to make rules as distinct from the power to issue notifications and that too not by the board but by the prescribed authority other than the board. Under the circumstances, it had to be held that the information in the form of retrospective cancellation of the approval of the concerned institution as an agricultural institute within the meaning of section 35(1)( ii) by notification dt. 2nd Jan., 1986, was invalid. The notice of reassessment based on that notification was also invalid and was liable to be quashed."

    7. Therefore, we hold that learned CIT was not justified in setting aside the assessment order dt. 15th June, 2006 and to give direction to the AO to recompute the value of perquisite of the assessee for assessment year 2001-02 by applying rule 3(1) as substituted by the IT (Twenty-second Amendment) Rules, 2001. Hence, we quash the impugned order passed by learned CIT under section 263 of the Act by allowing grounds of appeal taken by the assessee.

    8. In the result, appeal of the assessee is allowed.

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    Subrata Kumar Nag v. Commissioner of Income-tax
    (Nov 30, 2009)