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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • section 255 read with Rule 29 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules
  • SECTION 9 CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT
  • section 22A of the Chartered Accounts Act, 1949
  • Rule 46-A of the Income-tax Rules
  • provisions of section 41(1)
  • Sub-clause (b) of sub-rule (1)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • section 255 read with Rule 29 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules
  • SECTION 9 CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT
  • section 22A of the Chartered Accounts Act, 1949
  • Rule 46-A of the Income-tax Rules
  • provisions of section 41(1)
  • Sub-clause (b) of sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These are three applications by the assessee under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act directed against a Tribunal order dated 30-8-1988 in ITA No. 739(Del.)/88, seeking rectification of alleged mistakes in that order. The underlying assessment (assessment year 1984-85) arose after a search at the assessee's premises which produced books of account showing trading results different from those appended to the return. The assessing officer made additions (notably Rs. 15,85,197.83 and Rs. 4,41,774) on account of discrepancies and excise duty refund. The assessee argued lack of adequate opportunity of hearing before the assessing officer; the matter proceeded to the CIT(A) and then to this Tribunal, which heard the parties and issued the order impugned. The present applications seek rectification of specific factual recitals and alleged errors in reasoning of that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tribunal's order dated 30-8-1988 contains rectifiable mistakes under section 254(2) requiring correction.
  2. Whether an alleged failure to give the assessee adequate opportunity of hearing by the assessing officer could not be cured by the appellate process and therefore required remand to the assessing officer.
  3. Whether refunds of excise duty amounting to Rs. 4,41,774 are taxable under section 41(1) of the Act.
  4. Whether specific factual recitals in the Tribunal's order (dates and statements of the assessee's replies) were incorrect and required amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • Contended the assessing officer did not give a proper opportunity of hearing regarding the addition of Rs. 15,85,197.83 based on discrepancies between seized books and accounts filed with the return.
  • Argued that failure of hearing by the assessing officer could not be cured by the appeal process and relied on Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.
  • Sought rectification of factual errors in the Tribunal's order (incorrect date and misstatement of the assessee's plea).
  • Contended that the excise duty refund should not be taxable under section 41(1) due to an alleged subsisting liability to customers.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna [1987] 164 ITR 1 That a defect of natural justice in a trial body cannot be cured by sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body; hearing by the original body is not replaceable by an appeal. The Tribunal held the precedent does not assist the assessee because the facts differ: the assessing officer did give opportunity and the assessee failed to avail itself of the opportunity or produce material before the CIT(A).
Megarry J. Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders [1971] 1 CH 34 Supporting statement that failure of natural justice in a trial body cannot be cured by fairness in an appellate body. The Tribunal relied on the quoted principle as background but found it inapplicable on the facts since the assessing officer had given opportunity and the appellate forums could consider additional evidence under relevant rules.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak AIR 1988 SC 1531 That transferring a case to a forum lacking statutory jurisdiction affects specific rights (trial by prescribed forum, rights of revision and appeal, etc.). The Tribunal held this authority inapplicable because, unlike Antulay where an improper forum was used, here the assessing officer lawfully had jurisdiction and did afford opportunity; limitation prevented further adjournment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal examined the chronology: search occurred; seized material became available (photocopies obtained by the assessee on 18-3-1987); the assessing officer queried the assessee on excise remission on 26-3-1987 and on profit variation on 27-3-1987; hearings were adjourned to 30-3-1987 and then to 31-3-1987 when the assessee did not furnish explanation (accountant alleged ill). The Tribunal found that the assessing officer had given opportunity and the assessee knew what to explain. The Tribunal observed the assessee had the seized material and could have produced evidence before the CIT(A) (Rule 46-A allows additional evidence at first appeal; section 250(4), section 251, and section 255/read with Rule 29 allow enquiries and additional evidence). The Court analysed the precedents relied upon and concluded they were distinguishable on facts: Antulay involved trial before a forum without statutory jurisdiction; L.K. Ratna involved no hearing on guilt by the trial body. The Tribunal noted the assessee did not seek interim relief under Rule 46-A during the appeal, nor did it invoke Rule 29 before this Tribunal to produce additional material. The Tribunal also addressed the excise refund issue: it found no evidence of an established liability to customers or that excise duty had been separately realised from customers; therefore section 41(1) applied to tax the refund in the year under consideration, and any claim for deduction could only arise upon actual refund to customers in later years with supporting evidence. The Tribunal rejected the asserted factual corrections (date and wording) after verifying the order-sheet and observing that the assessee's present clarifications were either unsupported or consistent with what was recorded.

Holding and Implications

All three applications under section 254(2) moved by the assessee are hereby rejected.

Direct effect: the Tribunal refused rectification of the cited paragraphs and dismissed the miscellaneous applications; the impugned additions (including taxation under section 41(1) of Rs. 4,41,774) stood as held in the Tribunal's order. The opinion does not announce any broader legal precedent beyond its application to the facts; no new legal principle was laid down.

    Tin Box Co. v. Income-tax Officer

    Per Agarwal, JM - These are three applications by the assessee under section 254(2) of the Act directed against an order dated 30-8-1988 passed by a Bench of this Tribunal in ITA No. 739(Del.)/88 for assessment year 1984-85 praying that certain mistakes that have crept in the aforesaid order be rectified.

    2. We have beard the learned counsel for the assessee and the learned Departmental Representative and have perused the material placed before us. We will first deal with the assessee’s application that was filed in this Tribunal on 5-1-1989 and is now registered as M.A. No. 89(Del.)190. In the aforesaid appeal it was contended on behalf of the assessee that the assessing officer had not given a proper opportunity of hearing regarding an addition of Rs. 15,85,197.83 p made by him to the assessee’s income on the basis of the discrepancy in the trading results as disclosed in the trading and profit & loss account submitted with the return and the trading results as disclosed in the books of accounts found during a search at the assessee’s premises which contained duly closed accounts and trading & profit and loss account and balance-sheet prepared therefrom. This contention was dealt with by the Tribunal in Paragraph 19 of its order as below:-

    " 19. We have given careful consideration to the peculiar facts of the present case. We will straightway agree with the assessee’s submission that the ITO had not given to the assessee proper opportunity of being beard. But the same is not true of the first appellate authority. By the time the matter reached him, the assessee had with him photostat copies of all the relevant material seized by the Department from the assessee’s possession and, in addition, had the benefit of knowing the findings of the ITO. Nothing, therefore, prevented the assessee from stating its case before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) had not barred the assessee at any stage from leading its evidence and stating its case. If there was any material in the seized record, on which it wanted to rely, it could easily bring it to his attention as all the seized material was with the assessee. If it wanted to rely on some evidence, which was not in the seized record, it was apparently with it and within its special knowledge and so it was for it to bring it on record. Rule 46A was there to aid the assessee in this respect and to enable it to lead additional evidence if it wanted to lead it. It made no such attempt before the CIT(A), except making the bald averment that the assessee’s books of account, which had been seized by the Department, were not complete implying thereby that there were certain transactions outside the said books, which had not been recorded therein, what were these transactions, with whom these were entered into and when, how were they financed and how they re- conciled the discrepancies highlighted by the ITO in his order etc., nothing was stated before the CIT(A). Despite our query in this regard as to why the relevant evidence, if any, was not produced before the CIT(A), no satisfactory reply has been forthcoming from the assessee. We are, therefore, unable to hold that proper opportunity of hearing was not given to the assessee. Appeal, it need not be stated, is nothing but continuation of assessment proceedings, and it afforded the opportu- nity asked for by the assessee, but prima facie, the assessee did not avail of it and there is no worthwhile explanation for not doing so. The appeal before us, it need not be stated, is not against the order of the ITO but against that of the CIT(A), and if it cannot be faulted on the ground of lack of opportunity, it will be wrong for us to set aside his order and restore the matter to the ITO for de novo hearing by him. The procedure of appeal is not intended to prolong the course of litigation, or to enable one of the sides to set up an altogether new factual plea, which was never set up earlier, even though it was in the special knowledge of the assessee and should have been in the normal course, set up at the first available opportunity. We, therefore, reject the assessee’s plea of inadequacy of opportunity of hearing to it by the CIT(A). We have gone through the various authorities relied upon by the assessee. They all lay stress on the principle that the assessee must be provided an effective and adequate opportunity of being heard. There can certainly be no two opinions on this principle. But whether such opportunity was denied to the assessee is a question of fact to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. We have already recorded our finding in this record, and, according to it, the assessee had all the opportunity to say what it wanted to say and place such evidence on record as it felt proper. Such opportunity was deliberately not availed by the assessee for best reasons known to it."

    3. It is contended in the miscellaneous application as well as in the arguments raised before us that after recording a finding in the second sentence of the aforesaid paragraph that the ITO had not given the assessee a proper opportunity of being heard, the Tribunal erred in making the remaining observations in the aforesaid paragraph and in not remanding the matter to the assessing officer for a fresh decision after giving the assessee proper opportunity of hearing. It was contended that the right of being heard by the assessing officer having been violated the defect could not be cured by the appeal before the CIT (Appeals) or before this Tribunal. The learned counsel contended that the case was fixed for hearing on the 30th of March, 1987 when the assessee was required to explain the discrepancy in the profit and it was adjourned to 31st of March, 1987 when the discrepancy could not be explained because the Accountant had fallen sick. According to him because of paucity of time the necessary explanation could not be given. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna [1987] 164 ITR 1 in which it was held that where the Executive Council of the Institute failed to give an opportunity of hearing to the member guilty of conduct the order of punishment was bad. In that case disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a Chartered Accountant. The disciplinary committee found the member concerned guilty and referred the matter to the Executive Council which was obliged to hear the assessee. The Executive Council merely heard the assessee on the question of punishment and did not allow the member an opportunity of being heard on the very question of guilt. On this basis the High Court, to which an appeal lay against the order of the Executive Council, quashed the proceedings and in appeal it was urged on behalf of the institute that the provision of an appeal under section 22A of the Chartered Accounts Act, 1949 was a complete safeguard against any insufficiency in the original proceedings before the Council and it was not mandatory that the Member should be heard by the Council before it proceeds to record its findings. This contention was negatived by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and a reference was made to the following observations of Megarry J. Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders [1971] 1 CH 34:-

    "If one accepts the contention that a defect of natural justice in the trial body can be cured by the presence of natural justice in the appellate body, this has the result of depriving the member of his right of appeal from the expelling body. If the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal? Even if the appeal is treated as a hearing de novo, the member is being stripped of his right to appeal to another body from the effective decision to expel him. I cannot think that a natural justice is satisfied by a process whereby an unfair trial, though not resulting in a valid expulsion, will nevertheless have the effect of depriving the member of his right of appeal when a valid decision to expel him is subsequently made. Such a deprivation would be a powerful result to be achieved by what in law is a mere nullity; and it is no mere triviality that might be justified on the ground that natural justice does not mean perfect justice. As a general rule, at all events, I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body."

    4. Reliance was also placed on another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak AIR 1988 SC 1531, in which it was held that the transfer of a case by the Supreme Court to be tried by a Judge of the High Court was invalid when the law provided that the trial should be held by a Special Judge. It was held that the transfer affected the following rights of the accused: -

    "(i) The right to be tried by a Special Judge in accordance with the procedure established by law and enacted by Parliament.

    (ii) The right of revision to the High Court under section 9 of the Criminal law Amendment Act.

    (iii) The right of first appeal to the High Court under the same section.

    (iv) The right to move the Supreme Court under Article 136 thereafter by way of a second appeal, if necessary."

    5. We have given our careful consideration to the two authorities cited by the learned counsel for the assessee and, in our view, they do not help the assessee. It has to be remembered that the addition,, referred to above, is based on the book results as shown by the books of accounts regularly maintained by the assessee’s Accountant. The assessee had shown different results in the copies of accounts as appended to the return of income. Therefore, as soon as the search had taken place the assessee should have known that it has to explain the discrepancy. The assessment proceedings started at least from 18-11-1986 and on 18-3-1987 the assessee had obtained photo copies of all the seized material. It was on 26-3-1987 that the assessee was asked to explain about the remission of excise duty amounting to Rs. 4,45,454 and on 27-3-1987 the assessee was asked to explain the variation in the profit as disclosed in the return and as disclosed in the seized material. The relevant entry about this is at Serial No. 4 of the order sheet dated 27-3-1987. The case was adjourned to 30-3-1987 and the assessee attended on that date and the case was adjourned to 31-3-1987, on which date the assessee did not furnish any explanation as the Accountant was alleged to have fallen ill. It is, thus, not a case in which no opportunity whatsoever was given. It is a case in which the assessee knew what it had to explain and was given opportunity to explain the same and since the limitation was to expire on 31-3-1987 no further adjournment could be given.

    6. The assessee then appealed to the CIT(A) and in the grounds of appeal lack of opportunity of hearing was contended only with reference to the addition of Rs. 15,85,198 and not with reference to the addition of Rs. 4,41,774 in respect of remission of excise duty that was added to the assessee’s income under section 41(1). Similarly in the appeal before this Tribunal lack of opportunity was a ground only with reference to the one addition, referred to above, and not with reference to the other addition on account of excise duty. The assessee’s appeal before the CIT(A) was instituted on 29-4-1987 and was heard on 4-1-1988. The assessee’s appeal before this Tribunal was filed on 8-2-1988 and was partly beard on 8-6-1988 and then on 28-7-1988. Under section 250(4) of the Act, the first appellate authority has the power to make such further enquiry as it thinks fit or may direct the ITO to make further enquiry and report the result of the same. Under section 251 the first appellate authority has the power to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or to set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the ITO for making a fresh assessment in accordance with such directions as may be given. Rule 46-A of the Income-tax Rules provides for admission of additional evidence before the first appellate authority. Sub-clause (b) of sub-rule (1) thereof covers a case where the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from producing the evidence, which he was called upon to produce by the assessing officer. Sub-clause (c) permits admission of additional evidence where the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from producing before the assessing officer any evidence which was relevant to any ground of appeal and sub-clause (d ) permits admission of additional evidence where the assessing officer had made the order appealed against without giving sufficient opportunity to the appellant to adduce evidence relating to any ground of appeal. Similarly the Tribunal has powers under section 255 read with Rule 29 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules to admit additional evidence if it is necessary to do justice to the appellant or the respondent. These provisions are meant to be utilised by the parties and are not just for decoration and a party must make use of them where its grievance is that either the assessing officer or the first appellate authority has failed to provide adequate opportunity to the assessee or in spite of the fact that although the assessing officer did provide such opportunity, for certain goods reasons the assessee could not effectively avail of it. In our view, it would not be proper for an assessee to contend that for every lapse here or there the case must always be sent back to the Assessing Officer.

    7. The two authorities, referred to above, and relied upon by the learned counsel for the assessee do not lay down the law as attempted to be propounded by him. In the case of A.R. Antulay (supra) the criminal case was ordered to be tried by the High Court instead of the Special Judge as prescribed by the law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, thus, transferred the case to a forum that had no jurisdiction to try the case and the action was challenged before the trial could conclude in the High Court. In the case before us the matter was lawfully dealt with by the assessing officer who had jurisdiction to assess the assessee and. he did give the assessee an opportunity of explaining the additions proposed to be made, though for the limitation intervening the assessing officer could not grant the assessee a further adjournment.

    8. In the case of L.K. Ratna ( supra) the Executive Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants did not hear the delinquent member at all on the question of establishment of guilt and though an appeal lay before the Hon’ble High Court the contention that the High Court could hear the member concerned on the question of guilt was held to be not a proper substitute for the hearing by the Executive Council. The facts in the case before us were different. The assessing officer did give the assessee an opportunity of explaining the relevant facts and the assessee ailed to avail of that opportunity.

    9. We, are, therefore, of the view that the observations made in paragraph 19 of the Tribunal’s order cannot be said to be erroneous and need no rectification. We may again mention here that not only did the assessee make no attempt to offer an explanation before the CIT(A), even before this Tribunal no attempt was made to avail the benefits of Rule 29 and produce the necessary material which the assessee pretends to have been prevented from producing before the assessing. officer for the non-grant of adjournment. It has to be remembered that the explanation that the higher profit, shown in the account books, that were seized during the search, was because of purchases that the partners made and that they failed to communicate to the Munim resulting in their non-recording in the account books was offered for the first time at the hearing of the appeal and without any supporting material whatsoever. The Tribunal in paragraph 20 has noted this conduct of the assessee and has mentioned that no positive evidence in support of the above averment was available with the assessee. If there were any such purchases it was the duty of the assessee to file the relevant details through the affidavits of the partners concerned. But nothing of the sort was done and, as observed by the Tribunal, it was merely a bare plea with no supporting material whats over. Thus, it is evident that the assessee did not suffer any real prejudice by the refusal of adjournment by the assessing officer because it appears that the assessee was merely trying to gain time and it has no genuine explanation to offer.

    10. It was contended that Rule 46-A could not be availed by the assessee because the CIT(A) had come to the finding that the assessing officer had given a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. This contention is not correct. An application in terms of Rule 46A has to be an interim application made during the pendency of the appeal and has to be disposed of before the appeal is finally taken up for hearing. While the finding that has been recorded by the CIT(A) is a finding arrived at after the final hearing of the appeal. The considerations while considering an interim application under Rule 46-A or a prayer for calling a report from the assessing officer on a certain aspect of the matter in terms of section 250(4) are different and a more lenient approach is adopted than the one taken to decide the question finally whether the assessing officer gave a reasonable opportunity of hearing or not.

    11. The next point raised in this application is about an addition of Rs. 4,41,774 under section 41(1) on account of refund of excise duty. The point has been disposed of by the Tribunal in its order dated 30-8-1988 as follows:-

    "29. Rs. 4,41,774 represented refunds of excise duty. These amounts, as pointed out by the learned CIT(A), were debited to the accounts, when originally the demand was created against the assessee. The refund would, in the circumstances, naturally attract the provisions of section 41(1) and as such the amount was rightly taxed by the authorities below for the year under consideration. If and when the assessee refunds any amount of excise duty to any customer, it may be open to it to claim deduction therefor in the accounts in the years in which the payments in question are made."

    12. On this point it has never been the assessee’s case that it was denied a proper opportunity of bearing. In the miscellaneous petition it is stated that although the Tribunal has observed that may be open to the assessee to claim a deduction thereof in the years in which the payments are made, there is no legal fiction in favour of the assessee to enable it to claim deduction in the year of payment. It is ultimately prayed that it may be held that the amount was not taxable under section 41(1) on account of the subsisting liability to repay the amount to the assessee’s customers. As is evident from the proceedings the assessee never established any existing liability in favour of its customers. Excise duty was never shown to have been realised from the assessee’s customers as a separate charge and that too under a specific or implied agreement that if it is not payable it will be refunded to the customers. Section 41(1) comes into operation as soon as the excise duty is refunded to the assessee. The taxability of such a refund is independent of an alleged liability, for which the assessee should show that such a liability exists and claim an independent deduction irrespective of the provisions of section 41(1). If under agreements with the assessee’s customers the assessee ever refunds any amounts to them then such amounts can certainly be claimed as business expenditure of those years. There is, therefore, no mistake in the Tribunal’s order on this point.

    13. No other point has been raised in M.A. No.89(Del.)/90 which deserves dismissal.

    14. The assessee’s application dated 5-1-1989, which has now been registered as M.A. No. 89/90 was earlier disposed of summarily vide order dated 1-2-1989. M.A. No. 90(Del.)/90 is an application dated 7-2-1989 praying that the said application dated 5-1-1989 be disposed of after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard. This has already been done and M.A. No. 90/90, therefore, now becomes infructuous.

    15. Now we come to assessee’s application dated 31-7-1990, which has been registered as M.A. No. 124(Del.)/90. In this petition it is contended that in para 7 of the Tribunal’s order at page 5 the date "27-3-1987" is wrongly mentioned and this should be 30-3-1987. This contention is not correct. The date 27-3-1987 is correctly mentioned in the Tribunal’s order and is supported by the copy of the order- sheet, which is on record. Then grievance is made of the following observation in paragraph 19 of the Tribunal’s order:-

    "Despite our query in this regard as 0 why the relevant evidence, if any, was not produced before the CIT(A), no satisfactory reply has been forthcoming from the assessee."

    It is submitted that the nature of the assessee’s reply has not been mentioned and the reply was that the CIT(A) came to the conclusion that reasonable opportunity was given by the ITO and hence the assessee was not entitled to lead additional evidence under section 46-A and it is prayed that this explanation may be incorporated in the order. What was the assessee’s explanation is difficult to remember after more than two years, but even if this was the explanation, the unsatisfactoryness thereof has been exposed by us in earlier part of the order and nothing further need be said on this subject. It remains an unsatisfactory reply. When during the pendency of an appeal an assessee moves an application in terms of Rule 46A he cannot comprehend what would be the finding of the authority concerned. Then the third point made in this application is that the following observation in the Tribunal’s order in paragraph 20 is not correct :-

    "Thus, according to the assessee finances outside the books were not utilised for financing the purchases admittedly outside the books."

    In support of the assessee’s contention it has been stated as below in the assessee’s petition under reference:-

    "It has been stated at several places in the order that the assessee was taking the plea that there were unrecorded/unaccounted purchases. This sentence is thus factually incorrect as no such plea was made. It was only submitted that the large cash balances indicate that these purchases may have in the short run been financed through these cash balances. This sentence may, it is pleaded, be suitably amended in the light of the assessee plea noted in the other parts of the order."

    Even the assessee’s present explanation that large cash balances indicate that these purchases may have, in the short run, been financed through these cash balances shows that what the Tribunal has recorded was the submission of the assessee at the time of hearing and has been correctly recorded. We do not find any contradiction in what has been recorded in the Tribunal’s order and what has been stated by the assessee in the present application.

    16. For the reasons discussed above all the three applications under section 254(2) moved by the assessee are hereby rejected.

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    Comments

    Tin Box Co. v. Income-tax Officer
    (Oct 11, 1990)