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  • sub-section (2A) of section 153, assessments covered by sub-section (2A) of section 153
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  • sub-section (2A) of section 153, assessments covered by sub-section (2A) of section 153
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  • section 250 or section 254
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  • section 271(1)(c)
  • section 31(3)(b).
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Tribunal Opinion (P.K. Bansal, Accountant Member)

Factual and Procedural Background

The summarized opinion concerns four appeals relating to the same assessee; three of these (ITA Nos. 638/98 & 217, 218/99) were heard together and disposed of by a common order.

The original assessments for the three assessment years were completed on 21-3-1988. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)], whose order dated 1-6-1989 partly allowed the assessee's appeal. The CIT(A)'s order directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to rework the computation of unexplained investment in the money-lending business (giving credit for instalments received, computing peak credit, allowing past savings, applying a 24% rate for interest income and deducting business expenditure) and to make further enquiries to establish whether the assessee carried on a pawning business (with interest to be charged at 20% if so).

The assessee did not pursue these particular grounds (ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9) before the Tribunal, and the Tribunal disposed of the appeals on 13-12-1994. The assessee, having received no communication that the CIT(A) order had been given effect to, applied for refund of tax paid on 24-7-1995. The AO passed orders under sections 251/254 on 30-8-1995 (for each assessment year) that applied adjustments in respect of the unexplained investment and pawning business. The assessee appealed to the CIT(A) against those AO orders, arguing that they were barred by limitation and unsustainable on merits. The CIT(A) held the AO's order not barred by limitation (invoking section 153(3)) and partly allowed the assessee's appeal on merits.

The present appeals challenge the AO's 30-8-1995 orders and, in a related appeal (ITA No. 639/98), challenge an order of penalty under section 271(1)(c) that followed from the additions the AO made.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the orders passed by the Assessing Officer on 30-8-1995 (which reworked unexplained investments and pawning income in consequence of the CIT(A)'s directions) were barred by limitation under the provisions of section 153(2A) of the Income-tax Act.
  2. Whether the penalty imposed on the assessee under section 271(1)(c) could be sustained in view of the finding on limitation and the quashing (if any) of the AO's consequential orders.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Assessee's) Arguments (as presented)

  • Section 153(2A) requires that where fresh assessment is made "in consequence of" an order under section 250, the fresh assessment must be passed within two years from the end of the financial year in which the CIT(A)'s order was received by the Chief Commissioner/Commissioner. The CIT(A)'s order dated 1-6-1989 would have been received within two months, so the AO should have completed consequential assessments by 31-3-1992.
  • The CIT(A) had restored the matters relating to unexplained investment (grounds 7 & 8) and the pawning business (ground 9) to the AO's file; these issues were "set aside" and therefore section 153(2A) applies. The fact that the term "set aside" was not used verbatim in the CIT(A)'s order is immaterial if the substance shows the matter was set aside.
  • When directions require fresh enquiry, collection of material, appreciation of evidence and a fresh decision, they amount to the assessment being set aside and should attract the two-year limitation provided by section 153(2A). Reliance was placed on authoritative commentary (Pithisaria & Chaturvedi) and various judicial decisions supporting the application of the two-year period where assessments or parts thereof are set aside.
  • The filing of an appeal before the Tribunal does not extend the limitation period; thus the AO could not keep proceedings open indefinitely.

Respondent's (Revenue / Departmental) Arguments (as presented)

  • The CIT(A)'s order did not contain any specific direction to "set aside" the assessment in respect of these two issues. Instead, the CIT(A) gave definite findings/directions for the AO to work out income as per the CIT(A)'s findings; therefore section 153(2A) is not attracted.
  • Where the assessment is being made to give effect to findings or directions in the CIT(A)'s order, clause (ii) of section 153(3) applies and no time-limit is prescribed for such consequential action; hence the AO's order passed on 30-8-1995 was not time-barred.
  • Reliance was placed on Pulipati Subbarao & Co. v. AAC (35 ITR 673) and other authorities for the proposition that where there is no direction to make de novo assessment, the AO cannot conduct a fresh enquiry. The DR argued the present CIT(A) order contained directions to work out income under definite findings, distinguishing the assessee's contention of a "set aside."
  • The DR conceded that the assessee did not prosecute grounds 7, 8 and 9 before the Tribunal (i.e., these grounds were not before the Tribunal), which was admitted in submissions to the Bench.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
CIT v. Smt. Kamla Devi [1996] 217 ITR 330 (All.) Illustration that where assessments are set aside, reassessments completed after limitation may be barred. The court noted this decision but observed it did not help the assessee here because in Kamla Devi the setting aside of assessments was not in dispute.
Manik Chand Burman v. ITO [1998] 229 ITR 90 (All.) Where no limitation is prescribed, assessments should be completed within a reasonable time; historical background of the circular/cenral legislation leading to insertion of section 153(2A). The court relied on the proposition that the department did not intend to keep proceedings open for years and applied the reasoning to hold the AO's fresh decision of 30-8-1995 was beyond the limitation period.
CWT v. Parmanand Bhai Patel [1997] 225 ITR 915 (MP) Noted in the list of authorities relied upon by the assessee (cited for limitation principles). The decision formed part of the body of authorities the bench considered when deciding limitation applied to partial set-aside situations (court treated it as supportive of the assessee's contention generally).
Gulabchand Motilal v. CIT [1988] 174 ITR 117 (MP) Interpretation of legal fiction in section 153(2A) and application of time limits where assessments are set aside with direction/finding. The court treated this case as supporting the proposition that section 153(2A) applies where assessments are set aside with certain directions and findings of appellate authorities.
CIT v. Purshottamdas T. Patel [1994] 209 ITR 52 (Guj.) Assessment completeness involves determination of total income and tax; failure to determine tax within prescribed time can render assessment time barred. The court observed the issues in that case differ from the present facts and held the case not applicable here on the point in dispute.
Narinder Singh Dhingra v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1973] 90 ITR 110 (Delhi) After expiry of limitation, Tribunal cannot restore case to AO to remove bar of limitation and make fresh assessment long after the limitation period. The court cited this to support the proposition that limitation cannot be circumvented by later restorations.
Khalsa Provisions v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, New Delhi [1982] 135 ITR 817 Earlier authority dealing with setting aside and reassessment principles (cited among several historical authorities). Referenced as part of the historical judicial material considered; the court noted these earlier decisions addressed pre-section-153(2A) law.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Chitranjali [1986] 159 ITR 801 (Cal.) Earlier authority on related assessment and limitation principles. Included among prior decisions cited; the court observed such decisions relate to period before insertion of section 153(2A).
R.K. Sawhney, Executor of the Estate of Late R.B. Nathuram v. CIT [1987] 166 ITR 128 (Delhi) Decision cited among authorities dealing with assessment/limitation questions. Considered part of the precedent material; the court used it in reviewing the state of law historically.
Hope (India) Ltd. v. CIT [1993] 203 ITR 118 (Cal.) Another historical decision on assessment matters cited by parties. Referenced among decisions the court considered when analysing limitation and consequences of setting aside assessments.
Jain Cloth House v. ITO (ITA Nos. 274 & 275/D/92) Addressed whether penalty under section 271(1)(a) was tax-based and relationship between assessed tax and penalty when part of assessment is set aside. The court found this case not applicable to the present facts for the proposition that section 153(2A) applies where assessment is set aside as to some issues.
Smt. Naina Devi Nahata v. ITO 52 ITD 668 Authority cited for proposition that filing appeal before Tribunal will not extend limitation. The court recorded reliance on this decision (as cited by the assessee) to support that limitation cannot be extended by filing further appeals.
Pulipati Subbarao & Co. v. AAC [1959] 35 ITR 673 (AP) Where appellate order did not direct a de novo assessment but only directed limited administrative action, AO could not proceed to make a fresh assessment (AO lacked jurisdiction to conduct fresh enquiry beyond the direction given). The DR relied on this case; the court distinguished it, observing that in the present matter the CIT(A) gave directions that required fresh appreciation and enquiry by the AO and therefore Pulipati Subbarao was not applicable to help the revenue.
CWT v. V.S. Paramanand Bhai Patel 92 ITR 319 (MP) Earlier reported decision addressing setting aside of assessments and limitation consequences. The court cited this decision (in a different paragraph) for its relevance to limitation computation from the date of the CIT(A)'s order setting aside the assessment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal’s analysis proceeded in the following logical steps as recorded in the opinion:

  1. Identification of the statutory provisions at issue: the Tribunal examined section 153(2A) and clause (ii) of section 153(3) of the Income-tax Act (both reproduced in the opinion) to determine whether the AO's consequential orders fell within a limited time-frame or were exempt from it.
  2. Legal distinction drawn by the provisions: the court explained that where an assessment is "set aside" an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of the appellate order must be made within the period specified in section 153(2A). By contrast, clause (ii) of section 153(3) applies where an assessment is made "in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction" in an appellate order — and for such cases no time-limit is prescribed by sub-sections (1) and (2).
  3. Examination of the CIT(A)'s order to determine its true effect: the Tribunal reviewed the CIT(A)'s directions on grounds 7, 8 and 9. For grounds 7 & 8 (unexplained investment in money-lending), the CIT(A) directed the AO to give allowance for instalments received, to compute peak credit, to allow estimated past savings (Rs. 1,00,000 as estimated), to apply a 24% average rate for interest income, and to deduct business expenditure to compute net interest income. For ground 9 (pawning business), the CIT(A) directed further enquiry to establish whether the assessee carried on such business and, if so, to apply a 20% interest rate.
  4. Functional test for "set aside": the Tribunal rejected a narrow, literal requirement that the word "set aside" be explicitly used. Instead, the court applied a contextual/functional test: if the appellate order requires the AO to conduct fresh enquiries, appreciate evidence afresh, and reach a new decision on the issue (including giving opportunity to the party), that is, in substance, setting the assessment aside on that issue.
  5. Application to present facts: the CIT(A)'s directions, the Tribunal found, required the AO to call for the assessee, appreciate documents and evidence, compute instalments, peak credit and related items — tasks which could not be undertaken without a fresh inquiry and application of mind. Therefore these directions amounted to setting aside the AO's findings on those issues and restoring them to the AO for fresh determination.
  6. Harmonious reading of sections 153(2A) and 153(3): the Tribunal held both provisions must be interpreted harmoniously. Where an appellate order results in a matter being set aside (even in respect of some issues), section 153(2A)'s limitation applies; where the order merely gives directions to give effect to findings/directions without setting aside, section 153(3) may apply (and no time limit is prescribed). The factual conclusion was that the CIT(A) had set aside the AO's decision on the issues in question.
  7. Consideration of precedent: the Tribunal reviewed numerous authorities cited by both sides, analysing which were applicable and which were distinguishable (for example distinguishing Pulipati Subbarao on the basis that the AAC's order in that case did not envisage de novo assessment, whereas the CIT(A)'s directions here did require fresh enquiry). The Tribunal relied on precedents and commentary supporting the proposition that where an assessment (or part of it) is set aside, reassessment must comply with the time-limits now prescribed under section 153(2A).
  8. Conclusion on limitation: applying the legal test to the CIT(A)'s directions and the statutory language, the Tribunal concluded the AO's orders dated 30-8-1995 were barred by limitation under section 153(2A) because the CIT(A)'s order dated 1-6-1989 had to be acted upon within the period prescribed by section 153(2A) (the Tribunal computed the relevant expiry as 31-3-1992 for these directions) and the AO's actions in 1995 were beyond that period.
  9. Consequential reasoning on penalty: because the additions that supported the penalty were based on the now-quashed AO orders (which were made on estimate basis and later quashed for being time-barred), the Tribunal held the penalty under section 271(1)(c) could not be sustained.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Tribunal quashed the orders dated 30-8-1995 passed by the Assessing Officer for the assessment years 1984-85 to 1986-87 as barred by limitation under section 153(2A) of the Income-tax Act.

Implications and consequences:

  • The AO's consequential assessment orders of 30-8-1995 (which had reworked unexplained investments and pawning income) stand quashed as time-barred under section 153(2A).
  • Because the AO's orders were quashed, the other grounds raised by the assessee challenging the merits of those orders do not survive for consideration.
  • In the related appeal (ITA No. 639/98), the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal against the order sustaining penalty; it set aside the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) because the additions giving rise to the penalty were themselves quashed as time-barred.
  • The appeals of the assessee were allowed in result: all the appeals disposed of in this common order were allowed.
  • No broader novel legal principle was announced beyond the Tribunal's interpretation and application of section 153(2A) to the facts; the Tribunal relied on existing judicial authorities and commentary in reaching its view. The opinion does not state that it is laying down a new precedent beyond the reasoning applied to these facts.

Note: This summary is limited strictly to the content and reasoning contained in the provided Tribunal opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in that text.

    Pooran Singh v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle I, Firozabad

    P.K. Bansal, Accountant Member - These four appeals, since relate to the same assessee and three appeals out of these are having common issues involved, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common order.

    ITA Nos. 638/98 & 217, 218/99

    2. The brief facts of aforesaid three appeals are that the original assessments were completed on 21-3-1988 for all the three assessment years. The assessee went in appeal before the CIT(A), which was disposed of vide order dated 1-6-1989. The appeal of the assessee was partly allowed. Ground Nos. 7 and 8, which relate to the addition of unexplained investment made by the assessee in the money-lending business, were disposed of in the following manner :—

    "It is observed from the above that the Assessing Officer has not given credit of the instalments received by the appellant, for working out the total investment made in money-lending business. The Assessing Officer is, therefore, directed to give allowance to the payment of instalments received while working out the total investment. For this purpose peak credit should be worked out, due allowance to be given for the past savings of the appellant, which has been estimated by the Assessing Officer at Rs. 1,00,000. As mentioned in the preceding para that for the purpose of working out the interest income from money-lending average rate of 24% should be applied and the business expenditure for earning such income should be deducted to workout the net income from interest. The Assessing Officer should therefore, work out the interest income only after the total investment is worked out in the manner given above."

    3. In respect of ground No. 9 taken by the assessee, which relate to the estimation of income from pawning business, the CIT(A) held as under in para 6.1 of its order :—

    "From the above it is observed that during the search operation the locker sealed was not opened and no evidence for pawning business was collected by the department. Further it is stated that the business was being done by his nephew Shri Beni Ram and whatsoever jewellery was available taken over by him because his nephew decided not to live with the appellant. From the Asstt. Order it is also noticed that the statement of Shri Beni Ram was not recorded during the course of hearing of the case to come to the conclusion that the pawning business was being done by the appellant. In view of this the Assessing Officer is directed to make further enquiry to establish that the appellant was doing pawning business and after ascertaining the amount of investment in the pawning business the rate of interest will be charged at 20% because in the pawning business the risk is not involved much as compared to money-lending business."

    4. The assessee went in appeal before the ITAT, but the issue relating to the aforesaid ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were not taken in the appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal disposed of the appeals of the assessee for all the three assessment years vide its order dated 13-12-1994. The assessee since did not get any intimation or notice from the department for giving effect to the order of the CIT(A) dated 1-6-1989, made an application for the refund of the tax paid on 24-7-1995. The Assessing Officer passed the order under section 251/254 on 30-8-1995 for each of the assessment years. While passing the orders, the Assessing Officer dealt with the issue relating to the determination of the unexplained investment and also the income from pawning business. The assessee went in appeal against the aforesaid orders of the Assessing Officer before the CIT(A) challenging the legality of the order that it was barred by limitation and also that the addition made by the Assessing Officer were not sustainable on merits. The CIT(A) held that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was not barred by limitation, as it was covered by the provisions of section 153(3) while on merits, the appeal of the assessee was partly allowed.

    5. Ground Nos. 1 to 4 in the assessment year 1984-85 and grounds taken in assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87 except the alternative ground, relate to the issue whether the assessments framed by the Assessing Officer were barred by limitation as per provisions of section 153(2A) of the Income-tax Act.

    6. In respect of the issue relating to time-barred assessment, the learned authorized representative contended that under section 153(2A) the assessment framed in consequence of the order passed under section 250 should have been passed by the Assessing Officer within two years from the end of the financial year in which the order of the CIT(A) was received by the Chief Commissioner of the Income-tax or Commissioner of Income-tax. In this case, the order of the CIT(A) dated 1-6-1989 would have been received within two months and thereby the assessments must have been completed by 31-3-1992. The provisions of section 153(2A) were clearly applicable as the CIT(A) has restored the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer in respect of the two issues relating to the quantum of the undisclosed investment in money-lending business as well as to ascertain whether the pawning business belonged to the assessee. These issues arise out of ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 taken by the assessee before the CIT(A) against the original assessment framed on 21-3-1988. This case does not fall under section 153(3). The order was not passed in consequence of any finding or direction. These orders were passed as these issues were got set aside and went back to the file of Assessing Officer. The word ‘set aside’ has been defined in Webster’s Dictionary to mean," To put to one side, discard, to set apart for a purpose, overrule". The CIT(A) has set apart the decision of the Assessing Officer on these two points, i.e., for the computation of unexplained investment in the money-lending business, the Assessing Officer has to enquire whether the assessee carried on the pawning business or not. Merely that the words ‘set aside’ have not been mentioned, does not mean that these issues were not set aside. Reliance was also placed on the commentary by Pithisaria and Chaturvedi at page 3708, Vol. 3, IV Edition, in which it is mentioned :

    "The period of limitation in section 153(2A) is attracted where fresh assessment is being made for a particular year in pursuance of finding or direction incorporate in an order under section 250."

    7. It was contended that where the directions are for making enquiry or collecting new material or giving of opportunity or giving a fresh decision on those matters, these are the ingredients of ‘set aside’. The CIT(A), who passed the orders for the assessment years 1981-82 to 1983-84 also took the view that earlier assessments are set aside, that is why, he also set aside the assessments for the assessment years 1981-82 to 1983-84. Reliance was placed on the decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT v. Smt. Kamla Devi [1996] 217 ITR 3301 for the proposition that the assessment having been set aside must be completed within two years from the end of the financial year, in which the order under section 250 was passed by the CIT(A). Reliance was also placed on the decision of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Manik Chand Burman v. ITO [1998] 229 ITR 90 for the proposition that the assessment must be completed within two years. Reliance was also placed on the following cases :—

    (i) CWT v. Parmanand Bhai Patel [1997] 225 ITR 9152 (MP)

    (ii) Gulabchand Motilal v. CIT [1988] 174 ITR 1173 (MP)

    (iii) CIT v. Purshottamdas T. Patel [1994] 209 ITR 52 (Guj.).

    (iv) Narinder Singh Dhingra… v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax Delhi… [1973] 90 ITR 110 (Delhi).

    8. For the proposition of law that the limitation stipulated under section 153(2A) will apply in the case where some of the points are set aside. Reliance was also placed upon the Circular No. 19/13/68, copy of which was placed before us during the course of hearing. Reference was also made to the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in ITA Nos. 274 and 275/D/92 in the case of Jain Cloth House v. ITO. It was further contended that it appears to be illogical if we consider the spirit of section 153(2A) that when the assessment is fully set aside, the Assessing Officer gets two years for the completion, but in case it is restored on some points, the unlimited time is given to the Assessing Officer although there are executive instructions being issued from time to time that the appeal effect should be given within a fortnight. The filing of appeal before the Tribunal will not extend the limitation, for which reliance was placed on the case of Smt. Naina Devi Nahata v. ITO 52 ITD 668. Where the limitation has been provided under the law, it cannot be extended by any one and for this reliance has been placed on the decision of Jain Cloth House’s case (supra). In respect of the judgments relied upon by the CIT(A), it was submitted that these judgments cited by the CIT(A) relate to the period when section 153(2A) was not brought in the statute. These judgments are :—

    (a) Khalsa Provisions v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, New Delhi. [1982] 135 ITR 817 (Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Chitranjali [1986] 159 ITR 801 (Cal.)

    (c) R.K. Sawhney, Executor of the Estate of Late R.B. Nathuram v. CIT [1987] 166 ITR 1281 (Delhi)

    (d) Hope (India) Ltd. v. CIT [1993] 203 ITR 1182 (Cal.).

    9. The ld. AR carried us to the order of the CIT(A), by which the ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 of the assessee were disposed of, the copy of such order is appearing at pages 48 and 50 of the paper book and it was vehemently submitted that since the Assessing Officer has to take a decision on the basis of appreciation of the evidence or the documents as submitted by the assessee or collected by the revenue, the assessment in respect of these two issues has been set aside and restored to the file of the Assessing Officer.

    10. The Ld. DR on the other hand pointed out that there is no specific direction by the CIT(A) for setting aside the assessments in respect of these two issues as pointed out by ld. A.R. According to the ld. DR the provisions of section 153(2A) are not applicable in this case. The reliance was placed on the decision of Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Pulipati Subbarao & Co. v. AAC [1959] 35 ITR 673 . Referring to the order of the CIT(A), it was pointed out that the income was to be worked out by the Assessing Officer as per the definite findings/directions of the CIT(A). Therefore, these issues have not been set aside. Thus, it was vehemently submitted that there was no delay and the order passed by the Assessing Officer was not barred by limitation, as no time limit has been prescribed for passing consequential order for giving effect to the order of the CIT(A). The sequencewise details as brought by the Assessing Officer are given in the order of the CIT(A) dated 21-9-1998. On the query from the Bench whether the assessee has gone in appeal before the Tribunal in respect of ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 taken before the CIT(A), the Ld. DR was fair enough to concede the position that the assessee has not gone in appeal before the Tribunal in respect of these grounds and these grounds were not the subject-matter before the Tribunal.

    11. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the materials on record. We have also gone through the orders of the tax authorities below as well as the legal luminaries cited before us. For deciding the issue involved, it is necessary to look into the provisions of section 153(2A) and clause (ii) of section 153(3), which are reproduced as under for ready reference :—

    "(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1971, and any subsequent assessment year, an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 250 or section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment, may be made at any time before the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner :

    Provided that where the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, on or after the 1st day of April, 1999 but before the 1st day of April, 2000, such an order of fresh assessment may be made at any time upto the 31st day of March, 2002."

    "(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and recomputations which may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2A) be completed at any time—

    ............................................................................................................................................................

    (ii)Where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 250, 254, 260, 262, 263 or 264 or in an order of any court in a proceedings otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under this Act;"

    12. From the reading of the aforesaid provisions it is clear that the assessment is to be made when it is set aside within 2 years from the end of the financial year in which the order setting aside was received by the Commissioner or Chief Commissioner. But in case assessment is made to give effect to any finding or direction contained in the order as given in the section, no time limit is prescribed i.e., the effect can be given within any time. In this case from the facts it is clear that the appellate authority has not set aside the assessment completely but two issues were sent to the Assessing Officer so that the Assessing Officer can determine the income relating to those issues and thereby work out the assessed income of the assessee. Whether this will tantamount to be setting aside the assessment relating to those issues. Whenever an assessment is set aside always generally directions and findings are given by the appellate authority. Therefore we cannot hold that the provisions of section 153(2A) will not apply to such cases. In our opinion, it is not essential that the word ‘set aside’ should be written in the order, where the order has been set aside, the order has been set aside must be borne out of the facts and context of the order. The provisions of section 153(2A) and 153(3) are to be interpreted harmoniously. The word ‘set aside’ is defined in Webster 3rd New International Dictionary as "to put to one side, to discard, to set apart for a purpose, overrule". Going to the order of the CIT(A) relating to the ground Nos. 7 & 8, we find that the CIT(A) noted that the Assessing Officer has not given credit of the instalment received by the assessee for working out the total investment made in money-lending business, therefore, he directed the Assessing Officer to give allowance for the same for working out the total investment and also directed that for this purpose peak credit should be worked out and allowance must be given for the past savings made by the assessee. For working out the interest income, CIT(A) directed that the rate of 24% should be applied and the business expenditure for earning such income should be deducted for working out the net income from interest. Thus direction was given that the interest income should be worked out only after working out the total investment. These directions are not the one which can be followed by the Assessing Officer without calling the assessing and without appreciating the various evidences/documents which are required for working out instalments received by the assessee, peak credit, computation of total investment, working out the expenditure incurred for by the Assessing Officer by applying its mind. This will also tantamount to be the restoring the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer to be decided afresh after giving the hearing to the party and following the direction of the CIT(A). This also implies that the assessment relating to these issues stand set aside and to be decided afresh in accordance with the directions of the CIT(A).

    13. The various case laws cited before us are being dealt with as under :—

    a. CIT v. Kamla Devi 217 ITR 330 (All.) - In this case the assessments completed by the Assessing Officer for the assessment years 1971-72 & 1972-73 were set aside under section 263 by the CIT vide order dated 27th Dec., 1973. The fresh assessments were completed by Assessing Officer on March 26, 1977. On reference, Hon’ble High Court held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessments were barred by limitation. This case will not help the assessee as in this case the assessments were set aside is not in dispute.

    b. Manik Chand Burman v. ITO 229 ITR (All.) - The Assessing Officer issued notices dated Nov. 11, 1976, January 18, 1983 and January 28, 1983 calling upon the assessee to furnish information to enable him to complete the assessment pursuant to the order dated 30th December, 1957 setting aside the assessment order for the assessment year 1949-50. The assessee filed writ before Hon’ble High Court for quashing the notices. Hon’ble High Court held that when no limitation is prescribed to complete an assessment, the same should be done within a reasonable time. It was also observed that prior to the insertion of sub-section (2A) in section 153 of the Income-tax Act, in the year 1970 there was a circular No. 10-P(V-68) of 1968 dated Oct. 15, 1968 to the effect that if any assessment has been set aside in appeal that should normally be completed within two years. The period of limitation as suggested in the said circular was afterwards accepted by the Central Legislation and sub-section (2A) came to be inserted in section 153 of the Income-tax Act. From this it is manifest that the department never intended to keep the proceedings open for years. Therefore, the notices were held barred by limitation. The proposition of law laid down is applicable to the case before us because the Assessing Officer decided the issue restored to his file only on 30-8-1995 while the directions were given by the CIT vide order dated 1-6-1989. The period of limitation gets expired on 31-3-1992 and proceedings cannot be kept pending till unlimited period.

    c. CWT v. V.S. Paramanand Bhai Patel 92 ITR 319 (MP) - The assessee continued to hold 50% share in the goodwill of the firm and also was entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 50,000 p.a. CIT(A) vide order dated 14-9-1979 directed to work out the value of goodwill for all the years separately from 1964-65 to 1974-75 and then to include 50 per cent thereof in the net wealth of the assessee. On appeal Tribunal held that the value of interest of the assessee in the goodwill would be yield of the asset of goodwill. The Assessing Officer did not give effect to the order of the CIT(A) but give affect to the order of Tribunal dated 26-6-1982. On this when again matter travelled to Tribunal, Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed by Assessing Officer were barred by limitation and accordingly cancelled these assessments. On a reference, it was held that the basic order setting aside the assessments for the years 1964-65 to 1974-75 was passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) on 14-9-1979. No effect thereto was given by the Assessing Officer till expiry of four years from the end of the financial year in which the said order under section 23 was passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). There was no challenge before the Tribunal that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) setting aside the assessment order was wrong. The challenge of the assessee before the Tribunal was only limited to the mode of valuation of the asset to be done by the Assessing Officer in compliance with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) setting aside the assessment. The period of limitation was to be computed from the date of the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and if that be so then the reassessment for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1974-75 was barred by limitation. The case is applicable to the extent that the revenue has not gone into appeal before the Tribunal against the finding of the CIT(A) relating to the ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 and accordingly the limitation if applicable will apply from the date when the order of the CIT(A) was received by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner.

    d. Gulab Chand Motilal v. CIT 174 ITR 117 (MP) - In this case the Assessing Officer made addition for the assessment year 1975-76. CIT(A) held that income related to the assessment years 1964-65 to 1974-75. Reassessment after issuing notices under section 147 were competed on Sep. 10, 1981. The assessee contended that the reassessments made were barred by time. When the matter travelled to High Court. Hon’ble High Court held that in interpreting a legal fiction, the court, after ascertaining the purpose for which the fiction is created, has to assume all those facts and consequences, which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. By virtue of sub-section (2A) of section 153, assessments covered by sub-section (2A) of section 153 have to be completed within the time limit prescribed by that provision. In order to give full effect to the fiction introduced by Explanation 2 to section 153, and to the object of insertion of sub-section (2A) in section 153, it must be held that where fresh assessment is being made for a particular assessment year in pursuance of a finding or direction incorporated in an order under section 250, section 254, section 263 or section 264, passed in proceedings relating to another assessment year, then the fresh assessment would be deemed to have been made, for the purpose of section 150 and section 153 in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction setting aside or cancelling the assessment for that particular year. The reassessments for the assessment years 1971-72 to 1974-75 were barred by limitation. This case supports the contention that section 153(2A) will apply where the assessments are set aside with certain direction and findings of the appellate authorities.

    e. Narinder Singh Dhingra… v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax Delhi… 90 ITR 110 (Delhi) - In this case it was held that after the expiry of limitation period the Tribunal cannot restore the case to the file of Assessing Officer and direct him to proceed from the stage of the return and make a fresh assessment under the old Act, and thus confer jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer to remove the bar of limitation and proceed on the basis of the return long after the expiry of the period of limitation.

    f. CIT v. Purshottam Das T Patel 90 ITR 110 (Delhi) 209 ITR 52 (Guj.) - In this case it was held that the order of assessment cannot be construed to mean assessment of total income only. Unless the total income is determined and the determination of tax is also done, it cannot be said that there is complete order of assessment. These two steps may be taken simultaneously or separately but should be taken within the time prescribed under section 153. Since ITO failed to determine the tax payable on assessed income within prescribed time i.e., demand notice not being served within prescribed time, though assessment order is so served, assessment became time barred. The issue involved in this case is different; therefore, this case is not applicable to the facts of the case before us.

    g. Jain Cloth House, Nehru Ground v. ITO ITA Nos. 274 & 275/D/92 - The issue involved in this case relate to the imposition of the penalty under section 271(1)(a). In this case it was held that penalty under section 271(1)(a) was tax based in the relevant period. The assessed tax has to be determined with reference to asst. Order. If part of assessment has been set aside then assessment has to be completed first and then the question of levy of penalty examined with reference to assessed tax. There has to be tax and complete assessment. This case in our opinion is not applicable to the facts of the case before us. It does not lay down the proposition that the limitation under section 153(2A) will apply even if the assessment has been set aside in respect of some of the issues.

    h. Pulipati Subbarao and Co. v. AAC 35 ITR 673 (AP) (relied by DR) - In this case, the Assessing Officer treated the assessee as an unregistered firm for assessment year 1952-53. In appeal AAC set aside the assessment and directed the ITO to receive a duplicate application for registration from the petitioner and to deal with it according to law. The ITO issued a memo to the petitioner to produce its account books. The assessee objected that the assessment order passed by AAC did not envisage a de novo assessment and the only matter which ITO had to consider was the application for registration. In the writ petition, it was held that the order passed by AAC did not contain a direction as is envisaged under section 31(3)(b). What all he directed the ITO to do was to receive a duplicate copy of the application and to dispose of it in accordance with law. The order of AAC being specific, it is not open to ITO to conduct a fresh enquiry and proceed to make a fresh assessment without reference to the previous assessment inasmuch as he was not directed to do so and there being no other provision in the Act empowering him to do so, I am satisfied that the notice issued by the second respondent, calling upon the petitioner to submit himself to a fresh assessment is without jurisdiction. In our opinion, this case will not apply to the facts and the issue involved before us. In the case before us, the CIT(A) has given the direction to the Assessing Officer to decide those issues afresh after appreciating the material and the evidences and for which we have already held the hearing was required and the total income of the assessee cannot be determined without deciding those issues. Thus, this case will not help the revenue.

    14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the setting aside the assessment will include therein even the assessment, which has been set aside on some of the issues because an assessment can be regarded to be completed only when the total taxable income is determined and tax to be paid by the assessee is worked out. Until and unless, part of the issues are not decided, the total income of the assessee cannot be determined and the Assessing Officer cannot raise the demand for the tax payable by the assessee. The setting aside the assessment could be borne out of the order of the authorities. We, therefore, hold that the orders passed by the Assessing Officer on 31-8-1995 are barred by limitation as the limitation as laid down under section 153(2A) will apply to the facts of the case before us. Accordingly, we quash the orders dated 30-8-1995 passed by the Assessing Officer for the assessment years 1984-85 to 1986-87. Since the orders passed by the Assessing Officer stand quashed, the other grounds taken by the assessee on merit do not survive.

    ITA No. 639/98

    15. This appeal has been filed by the assessee against the order of the CIT(A) dated 21-9-1998 by which CIT(A) has partly sustained the order of the Assessing Officer of imposing the penalty on the assessee holding that the appellant has concealed the particulars of the income.

    16. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and have gone through the order of the authorities below. We find that the additions were made in the returned income of the assessee merely on estimate basis. The additions in respect of which the penalty stand sustained does not survive in view of our order in ITA No. 638/98 as this order dated 30-8-1995 has already been quashed by which the additions were made by the Assessing Officer on estimate basis, therefore, the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow the appeal of the assessee and set aside the orders of the Income-tax authorities imposing the penalty on the assessee under section 271(1)(c).

    17. In the result, all these appeals of the assessee are allowed.

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    Pooran Singh v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle I, Firozabad
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