P.K. Bansal, Accountant Member - These four appeals, since relate to the same assessee and three appeals out of these are having common issues involved, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common order.
ITA Nos. 638/98 & 217, 218/99
2. The brief facts of aforesaid three appeals are that the original assessments were completed on 21-3-1988 for all the three assessment years. The assessee went in appeal before the CIT(A), which was disposed of vide order dated 1-6-1989. The appeal of the assessee was partly allowed. Ground Nos. 7 and 8, which relate to the addition of unexplained investment made by the assessee in the money-lending business, were disposed of in the following manner :—
"It is observed from the above that the Assessing Officer has not given credit of the instalments received by the appellant, for working out the total investment made in money-lending business. The Assessing Officer is, therefore, directed to give allowance to the payment of instalments received while working out the total investment. For this purpose peak credit should be worked out, due allowance to be given for the past savings of the appellant, which has been estimated by the Assessing Officer at Rs. 1,00,000. As mentioned in the preceding para that for the purpose of working out the interest income from money-lending average rate of 24% should be applied and the business expenditure for earning such income should be deducted to workout the net income from interest. The Assessing Officer should therefore, work out the interest income only after the total investment is worked out in the manner given above."
3. In respect of ground No. 9 taken by the assessee, which relate to the estimation of income from pawning business, the CIT(A) held as under in para 6.1 of its order :—
"From the above it is observed that during the search operation the locker sealed was not opened and no evidence for pawning business was collected by the department. Further it is stated that the business was being done by his nephew Shri Beni Ram and whatsoever jewellery was available taken over by him because his nephew decided not to live with the appellant. From the Asstt. Order it is also noticed that the statement of Shri Beni Ram was not recorded during the course of hearing of the case to come to the conclusion that the pawning business was being done by the appellant. In view of this the Assessing Officer is directed to make further enquiry to establish that the appellant was doing pawning business and after ascertaining the amount of investment in the pawning business the rate of interest will be charged at 20% because in the pawning business the risk is not involved much as compared to money-lending business."
4. The assessee went in appeal before the ITAT, but the issue relating to the aforesaid ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were not taken in the appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal disposed of the appeals of the assessee for all the three assessment years vide its order dated 13-12-1994. The assessee since did not get any intimation or notice from the department for giving effect to the order of the CIT(A) dated 1-6-1989, made an application for the refund of the tax paid on 24-7-1995. The Assessing Officer passed the order under section 251/254 on 30-8-1995 for each of the assessment years. While passing the orders, the Assessing Officer dealt with the issue relating to the determination of the unexplained investment and also the income from pawning business. The assessee went in appeal against the aforesaid orders of the Assessing Officer before the CIT(A) challenging the legality of the order that it was barred by limitation and also that the addition made by the Assessing Officer were not sustainable on merits. The CIT(A) held that the order passed by the Assessing Officer was not barred by limitation, as it was covered by the provisions of section 153(3) while on merits, the appeal of the assessee was partly allowed.
5. Ground Nos. 1 to 4 in the assessment year 1984-85 and grounds taken in assessment years 1985-86 and 1986-87 except the alternative ground, relate to the issue whether the assessments framed by the Assessing Officer were barred by limitation as per provisions of section 153(2A) of the Income-tax Act.
6. In respect of the issue relating to time-barred assessment, the learned authorized representative contended that under section 153(2A) the assessment framed in consequence of the order passed under section 250 should have been passed by the Assessing Officer within two years from the end of the financial year in which the order of the CIT(A) was received by the Chief Commissioner of the Income-tax or Commissioner of Income-tax. In this case, the order of the CIT(A) dated 1-6-1989 would have been received within two months and thereby the assessments must have been completed by 31-3-1992. The provisions of section 153(2A) were clearly applicable as the CIT(A) has restored the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer in respect of the two issues relating to the quantum of the undisclosed investment in money-lending business as well as to ascertain whether the pawning business belonged to the assessee. These issues arise out of ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 taken by the assessee before the CIT(A) against the original assessment framed on 21-3-1988. This case does not fall under section 153(3). The order was not passed in consequence of any finding or direction. These orders were passed as these issues were got set aside and went back to the file of Assessing Officer. The word ‘set aside’ has been defined in Webster’s Dictionary to mean," To put to one side, discard, to set apart for a purpose, overrule". The CIT(A) has set apart the decision of the Assessing Officer on these two points, i.e., for the computation of unexplained investment in the money-lending business, the Assessing Officer has to enquire whether the assessee carried on the pawning business or not. Merely that the words ‘set aside’ have not been mentioned, does not mean that these issues were not set aside. Reliance was also placed on the commentary by Pithisaria and Chaturvedi at page 3708, Vol. 3, IV Edition, in which it is mentioned :
"The period of limitation in section 153(2A) is attracted where fresh assessment is being made for a particular year in pursuance of finding or direction incorporate in an order under section 250."
7. It was contended that where the directions are for making enquiry or collecting new material or giving of opportunity or giving a fresh decision on those matters, these are the ingredients of ‘set aside’. The CIT(A), who passed the orders for the assessment years 1981-82 to 1983-84 also took the view that earlier assessments are set aside, that is why, he also set aside the assessments for the assessment years 1981-82 to 1983-84. Reliance was placed on the decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of CIT v. Smt. Kamla Devi [1996] 217 ITR 3301 for the proposition that the assessment having been set aside must be completed within two years from the end of the financial year, in which the order under section 250 was passed by the CIT(A). Reliance was also placed on the decision of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Manik Chand Burman v. ITO [1998] 229 ITR 90 for the proposition that the assessment must be completed within two years. Reliance was also placed on the following cases :—
(i) CWT v. Parmanand Bhai Patel [1997] 225 ITR 9152 (MP)
(ii) Gulabchand Motilal v. CIT [1988] 174 ITR 1173 (MP)
(iii) CIT v. Purshottamdas T. Patel [1994] 209 ITR 52 (Guj.).
(iv) Narinder Singh Dhingra… v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax Delhi… [1973] 90 ITR 110 (Delhi).
8. For the proposition of law that the limitation stipulated under section 153(2A) will apply in the case where some of the points are set aside. Reliance was also placed upon the Circular No. 19/13/68, copy of which was placed before us during the course of hearing. Reference was also made to the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in ITA Nos. 274 and 275/D/92 in the case of Jain Cloth House v. ITO. It was further contended that it appears to be illogical if we consider the spirit of section 153(2A) that when the assessment is fully set aside, the Assessing Officer gets two years for the completion, but in case it is restored on some points, the unlimited time is given to the Assessing Officer although there are executive instructions being issued from time to time that the appeal effect should be given within a fortnight. The filing of appeal before the Tribunal will not extend the limitation, for which reliance was placed on the case of Smt. Naina Devi Nahata v. ITO 52 ITD 668. Where the limitation has been provided under the law, it cannot be extended by any one and for this reliance has been placed on the decision of Jain Cloth House’s case (supra). In respect of the judgments relied upon by the CIT(A), it was submitted that these judgments cited by the CIT(A) relate to the period when section 153(2A) was not brought in the statute. These judgments are :—
(a) Khalsa Provisions v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, New Delhi. [1982] 135 ITR 817 (Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Chitranjali [1986] 159 ITR 801 (Cal.)
(c) R.K. Sawhney, Executor of the Estate of Late R.B. Nathuram v. CIT [1987] 166 ITR 1281 (Delhi)
(d) Hope (India) Ltd. v. CIT [1993] 203 ITR 1182 (Cal.).
9. The ld. AR carried us to the order of the CIT(A), by which the ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 of the assessee were disposed of, the copy of such order is appearing at pages 48 and 50 of the paper book and it was vehemently submitted that since the Assessing Officer has to take a decision on the basis of appreciation of the evidence or the documents as submitted by the assessee or collected by the revenue, the assessment in respect of these two issues has been set aside and restored to the file of the Assessing Officer.
10. The Ld. DR on the other hand pointed out that there is no specific direction by the CIT(A) for setting aside the assessments in respect of these two issues as pointed out by ld. A.R. According to the ld. DR the provisions of section 153(2A) are not applicable in this case. The reliance was placed on the decision of Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Pulipati Subbarao & Co. v. AAC [1959] 35 ITR 673 . Referring to the order of the CIT(A), it was pointed out that the income was to be worked out by the Assessing Officer as per the definite findings/directions of the CIT(A). Therefore, these issues have not been set aside. Thus, it was vehemently submitted that there was no delay and the order passed by the Assessing Officer was not barred by limitation, as no time limit has been prescribed for passing consequential order for giving effect to the order of the CIT(A). The sequencewise details as brought by the Assessing Officer are given in the order of the CIT(A) dated 21-9-1998. On the query from the Bench whether the assessee has gone in appeal before the Tribunal in respect of ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 taken before the CIT(A), the Ld. DR was fair enough to concede the position that the assessee has not gone in appeal before the Tribunal in respect of these grounds and these grounds were not the subject-matter before the Tribunal.
11. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the materials on record. We have also gone through the orders of the tax authorities below as well as the legal luminaries cited before us. For deciding the issue involved, it is necessary to look into the provisions of section 153(2A) and clause (ii) of section 153(3), which are reproduced as under for ready reference :—
"(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1971, and any subsequent assessment year, an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 250 or section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment, may be made at any time before the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner :
Provided that where the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, on or after the 1st day of April, 1999 but before the 1st day of April, 2000, such an order of fresh assessment may be made at any time upto the 31st day of March, 2002."
"(3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and recomputations which may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2A) be completed at any time—
............................................................................................................................................................
(ii)Where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 250, 254, 260, 262, 263 or 264 or in an order of any court in a proceedings otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under this Act;"
12. From the reading of the aforesaid provisions it is clear that the assessment is to be made when it is set aside within 2 years from the end of the financial year in which the order setting aside was received by the Commissioner or Chief Commissioner. But in case assessment is made to give effect to any finding or direction contained in the order as given in the section, no time limit is prescribed i.e., the effect can be given within any time. In this case from the facts it is clear that the appellate authority has not set aside the assessment completely but two issues were sent to the Assessing Officer so that the Assessing Officer can determine the income relating to those issues and thereby work out the assessed income of the assessee. Whether this will tantamount to be setting aside the assessment relating to those issues. Whenever an assessment is set aside always generally directions and findings are given by the appellate authority. Therefore we cannot hold that the provisions of section 153(2A) will not apply to such cases. In our opinion, it is not essential that the word ‘set aside’ should be written in the order, where the order has been set aside, the order has been set aside must be borne out of the facts and context of the order. The provisions of section 153(2A) and 153(3) are to be interpreted harmoniously. The word ‘set aside’ is defined in Webster 3rd New International Dictionary as "to put to one side, to discard, to set apart for a purpose, overrule". Going to the order of the CIT(A) relating to the ground Nos. 7 & 8, we find that the CIT(A) noted that the Assessing Officer has not given credit of the instalment received by the assessee for working out the total investment made in money-lending business, therefore, he directed the Assessing Officer to give allowance for the same for working out the total investment and also directed that for this purpose peak credit should be worked out and allowance must be given for the past savings made by the assessee. For working out the interest income, CIT(A) directed that the rate of 24% should be applied and the business expenditure for earning such income should be deducted for working out the net income from interest. Thus direction was given that the interest income should be worked out only after working out the total investment. These directions are not the one which can be followed by the Assessing Officer without calling the assessing and without appreciating the various evidences/documents which are required for working out instalments received by the assessee, peak credit, computation of total investment, working out the expenditure incurred for by the Assessing Officer by applying its mind. This will also tantamount to be the restoring the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer to be decided afresh after giving the hearing to the party and following the direction of the CIT(A). This also implies that the assessment relating to these issues stand set aside and to be decided afresh in accordance with the directions of the CIT(A).
13. The various case laws cited before us are being dealt with as under :—
a. CIT v. Kamla Devi 217 ITR 330 (All.) - In this case the assessments completed by the Assessing Officer for the assessment years 1971-72 & 1972-73 were set aside under section 263 by the CIT vide order dated 27th Dec., 1973. The fresh assessments were completed by Assessing Officer on March 26, 1977. On reference, Hon’ble High Court held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessments were barred by limitation. This case will not help the assessee as in this case the assessments were set aside is not in dispute.
b. Manik Chand Burman v. ITO 229 ITR (All.) - The Assessing Officer issued notices dated Nov. 11, 1976, January 18, 1983 and January 28, 1983 calling upon the assessee to furnish information to enable him to complete the assessment pursuant to the order dated 30th December, 1957 setting aside the assessment order for the assessment year 1949-50. The assessee filed writ before Hon’ble High Court for quashing the notices. Hon’ble High Court held that when no limitation is prescribed to complete an assessment, the same should be done within a reasonable time. It was also observed that prior to the insertion of sub-section (2A) in section 153 of the Income-tax Act, in the year 1970 there was a circular No. 10-P(V-68) of 1968 dated Oct. 15, 1968 to the effect that if any assessment has been set aside in appeal that should normally be completed within two years. The period of limitation as suggested in the said circular was afterwards accepted by the Central Legislation and sub-section (2A) came to be inserted in section 153 of the Income-tax Act. From this it is manifest that the department never intended to keep the proceedings open for years. Therefore, the notices were held barred by limitation. The proposition of law laid down is applicable to the case before us because the Assessing Officer decided the issue restored to his file only on 30-8-1995 while the directions were given by the CIT vide order dated 1-6-1989. The period of limitation gets expired on 31-3-1992 and proceedings cannot be kept pending till unlimited period.
c. CWT v. V.S. Paramanand Bhai Patel 92 ITR 319 (MP) - The assessee continued to hold 50% share in the goodwill of the firm and also was entitled to receive a sum of Rs. 50,000 p.a. CIT(A) vide order dated 14-9-1979 directed to work out the value of goodwill for all the years separately from 1964-65 to 1974-75 and then to include 50 per cent thereof in the net wealth of the assessee. On appeal Tribunal held that the value of interest of the assessee in the goodwill would be yield of the asset of goodwill. The Assessing Officer did not give effect to the order of the CIT(A) but give affect to the order of Tribunal dated 26-6-1982. On this when again matter travelled to Tribunal, Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed by Assessing Officer were barred by limitation and accordingly cancelled these assessments. On a reference, it was held that the basic order setting aside the assessments for the years 1964-65 to 1974-75 was passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) on 14-9-1979. No effect thereto was given by the Assessing Officer till expiry of four years from the end of the financial year in which the said order under section 23 was passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). There was no challenge before the Tribunal that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) setting aside the assessment order was wrong. The challenge of the assessee before the Tribunal was only limited to the mode of valuation of the asset to be done by the Assessing Officer in compliance with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) setting aside the assessment. The period of limitation was to be computed from the date of the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and if that be so then the reassessment for the assessment years 1964-65 to 1974-75 was barred by limitation. The case is applicable to the extent that the revenue has not gone into appeal before the Tribunal against the finding of the CIT(A) relating to the ground Nos. 7, 8 and 9 and accordingly the limitation if applicable will apply from the date when the order of the CIT(A) was received by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner.
d. Gulab Chand Motilal v. CIT 174 ITR 117 (MP) - In this case the Assessing Officer made addition for the assessment year 1975-76. CIT(A) held that income related to the assessment years 1964-65 to 1974-75. Reassessment after issuing notices under section 147 were competed on Sep. 10, 1981. The assessee contended that the reassessments made were barred by time. When the matter travelled to High Court. Hon’ble High Court held that in interpreting a legal fiction, the court, after ascertaining the purpose for which the fiction is created, has to assume all those facts and consequences, which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. By virtue of sub-section (2A) of section 153, assessments covered by sub-section (2A) of section 153 have to be completed within the time limit prescribed by that provision. In order to give full effect to the fiction introduced by Explanation 2 to section 153, and to the object of insertion of sub-section (2A) in section 153, it must be held that where fresh assessment is being made for a particular assessment year in pursuance of a finding or direction incorporated in an order under section 250, section 254, section 263 or section 264, passed in proceedings relating to another assessment year, then the fresh assessment would be deemed to have been made, for the purpose of section 150 and section 153 in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction setting aside or cancelling the assessment for that particular year. The reassessments for the assessment years 1971-72 to 1974-75 were barred by limitation. This case supports the contention that section 153(2A) will apply where the assessments are set aside with certain direction and findings of the appellate authorities.
e. Narinder Singh Dhingra… v. The Commissioner Of Income Tax Delhi… 90 ITR 110 (Delhi) - In this case it was held that after the expiry of limitation period the Tribunal cannot restore the case to the file of Assessing Officer and direct him to proceed from the stage of the return and make a fresh assessment under the old Act, and thus confer jurisdiction on the Income-tax Officer to remove the bar of limitation and proceed on the basis of the return long after the expiry of the period of limitation.
f. CIT v. Purshottam Das T Patel 90 ITR 110 (Delhi) 209 ITR 52 (Guj.) - In this case it was held that the order of assessment cannot be construed to mean assessment of total income only. Unless the total income is determined and the determination of tax is also done, it cannot be said that there is complete order of assessment. These two steps may be taken simultaneously or separately but should be taken within the time prescribed under section 153. Since ITO failed to determine the tax payable on assessed income within prescribed time i.e., demand notice not being served within prescribed time, though assessment order is so served, assessment became time barred. The issue involved in this case is different; therefore, this case is not applicable to the facts of the case before us.
g. Jain Cloth House, Nehru Ground v. ITO ITA Nos. 274 & 275/D/92 - The issue involved in this case relate to the imposition of the penalty under section 271(1)(a). In this case it was held that penalty under section 271(1)(a) was tax based in the relevant period. The assessed tax has to be determined with reference to asst. Order. If part of assessment has been set aside then assessment has to be completed first and then the question of levy of penalty examined with reference to assessed tax. There has to be tax and complete assessment. This case in our opinion is not applicable to the facts of the case before us. It does not lay down the proposition that the limitation under section 153(2A) will apply even if the assessment has been set aside in respect of some of the issues.
h. Pulipati Subbarao and Co. v. AAC 35 ITR 673 (AP) (relied by DR) - In this case, the Assessing Officer treated the assessee as an unregistered firm for assessment year 1952-53. In appeal AAC set aside the assessment and directed the ITO to receive a duplicate application for registration from the petitioner and to deal with it according to law. The ITO issued a memo to the petitioner to produce its account books. The assessee objected that the assessment order passed by AAC did not envisage a de novo assessment and the only matter which ITO had to consider was the application for registration. In the writ petition, it was held that the order passed by AAC did not contain a direction as is envisaged under section 31(3)(b). What all he directed the ITO to do was to receive a duplicate copy of the application and to dispose of it in accordance with law. The order of AAC being specific, it is not open to ITO to conduct a fresh enquiry and proceed to make a fresh assessment without reference to the previous assessment inasmuch as he was not directed to do so and there being no other provision in the Act empowering him to do so, I am satisfied that the notice issued by the second respondent, calling upon the petitioner to submit himself to a fresh assessment is without jurisdiction. In our opinion, this case will not apply to the facts and the issue involved before us. In the case before us, the CIT(A) has given the direction to the Assessing Officer to decide those issues afresh after appreciating the material and the evidences and for which we have already held the hearing was required and the total income of the assessee cannot be determined without deciding those issues. Thus, this case will not help the revenue.
14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the view that the setting aside the assessment will include therein even the assessment, which has been set aside on some of the issues because an assessment can be regarded to be completed only when the total taxable income is determined and tax to be paid by the assessee is worked out. Until and unless, part of the issues are not decided, the total income of the assessee cannot be determined and the Assessing Officer cannot raise the demand for the tax payable by the assessee. The setting aside the assessment could be borne out of the order of the authorities. We, therefore, hold that the orders passed by the Assessing Officer on 31-8-1995 are barred by limitation as the limitation as laid down under section 153(2A) will apply to the facts of the case before us. Accordingly, we quash the orders dated 30-8-1995 passed by the Assessing Officer for the assessment years 1984-85 to 1986-87. Since the orders passed by the Assessing Officer stand quashed, the other grounds taken by the assessee on merit do not survive.
ITA No. 639/98
15. This appeal has been filed by the assessee against the order of the CIT(A) dated 21-9-1998 by which CIT(A) has partly sustained the order of the Assessing Officer of imposing the penalty on the assessee holding that the appellant has concealed the particulars of the income.
16. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and have gone through the order of the authorities below. We find that the additions were made in the returned income of the assessee merely on estimate basis. The additions in respect of which the penalty stand sustained does not survive in view of our order in ITA No. 638/98 as this order dated 30-8-1995 has already been quashed by which the additions were made by the Assessing Officer on estimate basis, therefore, the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow the appeal of the assessee and set aside the orders of the Income-tax authorities imposing the penalty on the assessee under section 271(1)(c).
17. In the result, all these appeals of the assessee are allowed.