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  • sub-section (1) of section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), the Central
  • Section 12 of the Customs Act read with Section 2 of the Customs Tariff Act.
  • allowed.3.Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act,
  • :-10.Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act,
  • SECTION 3 A CUSTOMS TARIFF ACT 1975
  • Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act
  • CENTRAL EXCISE ACT
  • Section 3(1) of Customs Tariff Act
  • Central Excise Rules, 1944
  • Central Excise Tariff Act,
  • Section 3(1) of C.T. Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • sub-section (1) of section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), the Central
  • Section 12 of the Customs Act read with Section 2 of the Customs Tariff Act.
  • allowed.3.Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act,
  • :-10.Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act,
  • SECTION 3 A CUSTOMS TARIFF ACT 1975
  • Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act
  • CENTRAL EXCISE ACT
  • Section 3(1) of Customs Tariff Act
  • Central Excise Rules, 1944
  • Central Excise Tariff Act,
  • Section 3(1) of C.T. Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Order per Justice S.N. Jha, President)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are appeals instituted by the Revenue challenging the common order of the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 3-10-2007 which had set aside the assessment recorded on certain Bills of Entry. The respondent, M/s. Malwa Industries Ltd., a textile manufacturer, imported goods described as "Dystar Indigo VAT 40 per cent SOL/Indigo Powder 90 percent Wettable" falling under Tariff Heading 32041559. On import, additional duty (countervailing duty or CVD) was levied under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The respondent disputed liability to excise duty (and therefore to corresponding CVD) on the ground that the imported goods were exempt under Notification No. 4/2006-C.E., dated 1-3-2006 (which specified certain finishing agents and related products at a nil excise rate when used “in the same factory”). The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the respondent’s contention, deleted the additional duty, and allowed the appeals against the original assessment; the Revenue appealed that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the imported goods in question (finishing agents/dye carriers) are exempt from excise duty under Notification No. 4/2006-C.E. (entry at S. No. 67, Chapter/heading 3204 or 3809) when they are "used in the same factory", and consequently whether additional duty under Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 is chargeable on their import.
  2. How the phrase "used in the same factory" in the Notification should be interpreted in the context of imported goods: does it require that the goods be produced/manufactured in the same factory in which they are used, or can imported goods qualify when they are used in the importer’s manufacturing factory?
  3. Whether the principle, as expounded in Thermax and followed in subsequent decisions, that actual production or manufacture in India is not necessary to attract Section 3(1) (i.e., one must "imagine" the importer had manufactured the goods in India), applies to the present notification and facts.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The exemption (nil excise rate) in Notification No. 4/2006 is subject to the condition that the goods are used "in the same factory", which the Revenue construes to mean they must be used in the same factory in which the goods were manufactured.
  • If the goods are manufactured elsewhere and sold to another factory, or if the goods are imported (and thus not manufactured in the same factory), the exemption cannot be claimed and excise duty (and hence additional duty on import) is leviable.
  • Relied upon precedents including the Larger Bench decision in Priyesh Chemicals and Metals v. Collector of Central Excise (Bangalore) and CCE, New Delhi v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal (Supreme Court) to support the view that conditions in the notification must be strictly satisfied and that Thermax’s correctness had been doubted.

Respondent's Arguments (M/s. Malwa Industries Ltd.)

  • The phrase "same factory" should be read to mean the factory of the importer where manufacturing activity takes place; it should not be construed to require that the goods themselves were manufactured in that factory.
  • For the purpose of Section 3(1) (CVD), actual production or manufacture in India is not necessary (relying on the Explanation to Section 3(1) and Supreme Court authority). Therefore, where excise duty is not leviable on account of the notification (nil rate), the importer will not be liable to pay CVD.
  • Relied on Thermax Pvt. Ltd. (S.C.), Hyderabad Industries (Constitution Bench), Plastic Processors (Delhi), and Lohia Sheet Products (S.C.) as supporting authorities that importers can benefit from exemptions and that the notification applies to imported goods used in the importer’s factory.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thermax Private Limited v. Collector of Customs (Bombay) (S.C.) (1992) 4 SCC 440 Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act: the CVD should be assessed by imagining the importer had manufactured the goods in India; actual manufacture in India is not necessary; importers may claim concessions where the user qualifies. The court treated Thermax as authoritative and binding unless overruled by a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court, and applied its principle to hold that actual production is not necessary and the importer may claim the benefit of the notification.
Hyderabad Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (Constitution Bench, S.C.) Explained the purpose and meaning of Section 3(1) and its Explanation: to determine CVD one must imagine production/manufacture in India and actual manufacture is not required. The court noted that Thermax was quoted with approval in Hyderabad Industries and relied upon the same interpretative approach to Section 3(1) in reaching its conclusion.
Lohia Sheet Products v. Commissioner of Customs (S.C.) = 2008 (152) ECR 173 Interpreted a notification provision ("used within the factory of production") and held the entry did not require the scrap to have been generated in that factory; followed Thermax and Hyderabad Industries. The court relied on Lohia to support the interpretation that the notification's wording should not be read to require generation/manufacture in the same factory and applied the same logic to the present notification.
Plastic Processors v. Union of India (Delhi) Held that actual manufacture or production in India is not necessary to attract additional duty under Section 3; the importer can be treated as if he had manufactured the goods in India for purposes of determining CVD. The court cited Plastic Processors as supporting authority for the proposition that actual production is not necessary and used that proposition in interpreting the notification and Section 3(1) here.
Priyesh Chemicals and Metals v. Collector of Central Excise (Tribunal - Larger Bench) Addressed requirement that conditions in the notification must be satisfied for exemption (as relied upon by the Revenue). The court recorded that Revenue relied on this Larger Bench decision but concluded that the principle from Thermax (no need for actual manufacture) governs and that the conditions here were satisfied; thus Priyesh did not change the outcome.
Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal (S.C.) Questioned/doubted Thermax in part and referred certain matters to a Larger Bench (order dated 3-10-2005). The court observed that the order in Hari Chand Shri Gopal is not a final decision on the point. It further noted that paragraph 5 of that order does not appear to have doubted the Thermax proposition that actual production is not necessary; therefore Hari Chand Shri Gopal did not displace Thermax for present purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by close textual reading of Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and the Notification No. 4/2006-C.E. The court:

  1. Set out the legal framework: Section 3(1) levies an additional duty (CVD) equal to the excise duty leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India. The stated object is to place importers and domestic manufacturers on parity.
  2. Noted the Explanation to Section 3(1) (as elaborated by appellate jurisprudence) which clarifies that actual production or manufacture in India need not be fulfilled in fact; for CVD assessment one must imagine the goods were manufactured in India and determine what excise duty would have been leviable.
  3. Quoted and relied upon the Supreme Court authorities (Thermax, Hyderabad Industries) and other decisions (Plastic Processors, Lohia Sheet Products) that consistently applied the principle that an importer should be assessed as if he had manufactured in India and that the applicability of concessionary notifications depends on the nature and use of the goods rather than literal pre-existence of domestic manufacture.
  4. Considered the language of the Notification — particularly the phrase "used in the same factory" — and evaluated possible literal constructions. The court observed that a literal construction requiring the goods to have been produced in the same factory would render the notification inapplicable to imports (anomalous result), since imported goods cannot have been manufactured in the importing factory in India.
  5. Adopted a purposive interpretation: "used in the same factory" was read to mean that the goods must be used in the factory of the importer (i.e., not used elsewhere), and not that the goods must have been manufactured there. This approach aligns with precedent (Lohia, Thermax, Hyderabad Industries) which rejected an interpretation that imports could never qualify for such notifications.
  6. Applied these principles to the facts: it was not disputed that the goods are finishing agents and fit the description in the notification's Table; the respondent had one factory where manufacturing occurred and used the imported goods there. Consequently, the conditions of the notification were satisfied.
  7. Addressed contrary authorities: the court acknowledged that Hari Chand Shri Gopal had expressed doubts about Thermax and referred matters to a Larger Bench, but held that that order was not a final decision displacing Thermax. The court also noted that Thermax continued to be followed (including by Lohia) and thus bound the court unless overruled by a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court.
  8. Concluded that the Commissioner (Appeals) rightly modified the assessment by deleting the additional duty; there was no error calling for interference by the Tribunal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Appeals dismissed.

The court held that the Commissioner (Appeals) correctly modified the assessment and deleted the additional/countervailing duty charged on the import of the goods. The goods in question fell within the description in Notification No. 4/2006-C.E. and were chargeable at the nil rate of excise when "used in the same factory" — interpreted to mean used in the importer’s factory (and not requiring that the goods themselves be manufactured in that factory).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The respondent, M/s. Malwa Industries Ltd., is not liable to pay the additional/countervailing duty on the imported goods in dispute; the assessment as modified by the Commissioner (Appeals) stands.
  • Precedential effect: The court followed existing Supreme Court authority (Thermax and Hyderabad Industries) and subsequent decisions (Lohia, Plastic Processors) in holding that actual production or manufacture in India is not necessary for the purpose of Section 3(1). The opinion explicitly notes that Thermax remains authoritative until overruled by a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court; thus the decision does not announce a novel legal principle but applies and reaffirms established authorities.

Pronounced in open court on 30-4-2008. (Order per Justice S.N. Jha, President.)

    Commr. Of Customs, Amritsar v. Malwa Industries Ltd.

    [Order per : Justice S.N. Jha, President]. - These appeals by the Revenue are directed against the common order of the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 3-10-2007 setting aside the assessment on the Bills of Entry.

    2. The respondent, M/s. Malwa Industries Ltd., is engaged in the business of textile and textile goods and in that connection imports certain goods for use as raw material in the manufacture of textile goods. It submitted Bills of Entry for clearance of Dystar Indigo VAT 40 per cent SOL/Indigo Powder 90 percent Wettable falling under Tariff Heading 32041559. Additional duty (CVD) was charged on the assessable value of the goods in terms of Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. Feeling aggrieved and contending that the goods were not liable for excise duty under Notification No. 4/2006-C.E., dated 1-3-2006, the respondent preferred appeals. By the impugned order, upholding the contention of the respondent, assessment was modified deleting the additional duty (CVD), and the appeals were allowed.

    3. Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 provides for levy of additional duty equal to excise duty. If the import is found to be covered under the said Notification dated 1-3-2006, the respondent would not be liable for any additional duty as the goods in question was chargeable to ‘nil’ rate of excise duty. Having regard to its significance, the provision i.e. Section 3(1) may be quoted as under :-

    “3. Levy of additional duty equal to excise duty. - (1) Any article which is imported in India shall, in addition, be liable to a duty (hereinafter in this Section referred to as the additional duty) equal to the excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India and if such excise duty on a like article is leviable at any percentage of its value, the additional duty to which the imported article shall be so liable shall be calculated at that percentage of the value of the imported article.
    Provided........................................................................
    Explanation - In this section, the expression ‘the excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India’ means the excise duty for the time being in force which would be leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India, or, if a like article is not so produced or manufactured, which would be leviable on the class or description of articles to which the imported article belongs, and where such duty is leviable at different rates, the highest duty.”

    4. On a plain reading it is manifest that the goods imported into India are liable to a duty - called additional duty - equal to excise duty leviable on a like goods if produced or manufactured in India. The object underlying the provision is that an importer should not be placed at more advantageous position vis-a-vis the producers/manufacturers of similar goods in India.

    5. Before referring to the respective case of the parties and the contentions advanced it would be appropriate to extract the relevant part of the Notification dated 1-3-2006 as under :-

    “In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), the Central Government, on being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts excisable goods of the description specified in column (3) of the Table below......... as are given in the corresponding entry in column (2) of the said Table, from so much of the duty of excise specified thereon under the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, as is in excess of the amount calculated at the rate specified in the corresponding entry in column (4) of the said table and subject to the relevant conditions specified in the Annexure to this notification, and the Condition number of which is referred to in the corresponding entry in column (5) of the Table aforesaid.
    ……………………………………………………………………………….

    Table

    S.No. Chapter or heading or sub-heading or tariff item of the first schedule Description of excisable goods Rate Condition No.
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
    67 3204 or 3809 Finishing agents, dye carriers to accelerate the dyeing or fixing of dye-stuffs, printing paste, and other products and preparations of any kind used in the same factory for the manufacture of textiles and textile articles Nil -

    6. The case of the Revenue is that the exemption i.e. the ‘nil’ rate of duty provided in the notification is subject to the condition that the goods are used in the same factory which means that the goods must be used in the same factory in which they were manufactured. Where the goods are manufactured but sold to some other factory or person, for whatever purpose, excise duty would be leviable. Similarly, where the goods are not manufactured in the factory where they are used, the benefit of the Notification cannot be claimed. The case of the respondent is that if the expression ‘same factory’ is understood to mean the factory where the goods are actually manufactured, the notification can never be applied in the case of import of goods, for, in the case of import, there is no question of the goods being manufactured in the same factory. According to the respondent, ‘the same factory’ only means that the imported goods must be used in the factory of the importer where manufacturing activity takes place. It was submitted that in order to attract Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, by virtue of the Explanation to sub-section (1), it is not necessary that there should be actual production or manufacture - as held by the Apex Court, and, therefore, where excise duty is not leviable on the manufacture of goods, the importer would not be liable to pay any additional duty for import of like goods. In support of the contention reliance was placed on Thermax Pvt. Ltd. v. CC - (S.C.), Hyderabad Industries v. Union of India - (S.C.), Plastic Processors v. Union of India - (Del.) and Lohia Sheet Products v. Commissioner of Customs - (S.C.) = 2008 (152) ECR 173. On behalf of the Revenue, on the other hand, reliance was placed on the Larger Bench decision of the Tribunal in Priyesh Chemicals and Metals v. Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore - (Tribunal-LB) and CCE, New Delhi v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal - (S.C.). It was stated that correctness of the decision in Thermax Pvt. Ltd. has been doubted in Hari Chand Shri Gopal and matter has been referred to the Larger Bench.

    7. It is true that the decision in Thermax Pvt. Ltd. has been doubted in Hari Chand Shri Gopal but it appears notwithstanding the reference to Larger Bench vide order dated 3-10-2005, Thermax Pvt. Ltd. is still being followed, as a matter of fact, the case of Lohia Sheet Products was decided placing reliance on it. In any view, until Thermax Pvt. Ltd. is overruled by a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court, it will continue to hold the field as laying down the law on the subject and we have no option but to follow it. It would not be out of place to mention that the decision in Thermax Pvt. Ltd. was quoted with approval by the Constitution Bench in Hyderabad Industries Ltd.

    8. The question involved in Thermax Pvt. Ltd. was as to applicability of Rule 192 occurring in Chapter X of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 relating to concession. Dealing with the question the Apex Court observed as under :-

    “11. It will at once be seen that there is nothing in the scheme of the rule which makes it inapplicable to an importer of goods. The assessee here has imported the goods and is selling them for use in a factory, a use which qualifies for the concession under the S. 8 Notifications. The types of use specified in the concessions notified could be of any kind and, even in the notifications under our consideration, they are many and varied. In respect of items falling under S. Nos. 3 and 8, in particular, the actual users may be private individuals or authorities and need not necessarily be manufacturers using the goods in question is an ‘industrial process’ in a narrow sense of that term. For instance, any computer room, hospital or factory purchasing parts of refrigerating and air-conditioning appliances and machinery for use in the computer room, hospital or factory would be entitled to claim the concession by following the prescribed procedure. Only, for claiming a concession in excise duty the user should be the manufacturer himself or he must have made the purchase from a manufacturer liable to pay excise duty on the item whereas in regard to a claim for CVD concession, the supplier will be an importer. The latter will be entitled to sell the goods at the concessional rate of duty (or at nil rate if there is an exemption) if the purchaser from him who puts the goods to the specified use (whether a manufacturer or not) fulfils the requirements of Rule 192. Since the concession under Rule l92 turns only on the nature and use to which the goods are put by the user or purchaser thereof and on whether he has gone through the procedure outlined in Chapter X, it would not be correct to deny it to a supplier of such goods on the ground that he is an importer and not a manufacturer. That aspect is provided for by Section 3(1) of C.T. Act which specifically mandates that the CVD will be equal to the excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India. In other words, we have to forget that the goods are imported, imagine that the importer had manufactured the goods in India and determine the amount of excise duty that he would have been called upon to pay in that event. Thus, if the person using the goods is entitled to the remission, the importer will be entitled to say that the CVD should only be the amount of concessional duty and, if he has paid more, will be entitled to ask for a refund. In our opinion, the Tribunal was in error in holding that the assessees could not get a refund because the procedure of Chapter X of the rules is inapplicable to importers as such.” [Emphasis supplied]
    We may also notice the relevant observations in Hyderabad Industries Ltd. as under :-
    “10. Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 provides for levy of an Additional Duty. The duty is, in other words, in addition to the Customs Duty leviable under Section 12 of the Customs Act read with Section 2 of the Customs Tariff Act. Secondly, this duty is leviable at a rate equal to the Excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article to the one which is imported if produced or manufactured in India. The Explanation to this Sub-section expands the meaning of the expression ‘the Excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India’. The Explanation to Section 3 has two limbs. The first limb clarifies that the duty chargeable under Sub-section (1) would be the Excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India. The condition precedent for levy of Additional Duty thus, contemplated by the Explanation is that the article is produced or manufactured in India. The second limb to the explanation deals with a situation where ‘a like article is not so produced or manufactured’. The use of the word ‘so’ implies that the production or manufacture referred to in the second limb is relatable to the use of that expression in the first limb which is of a like article being produced of (sic) manufactured in India.
    11. The words ‘if produced or manufactured in India’ does not mean that the like article should be actually produced or manufactured in India. As per the Explanation if an imported article is one which has been manufactured or produced then it must be presumed, for the purpose of Section 3(1), that such article can likewise be manufactured or produced in India. For the purpose of attracting Additional Duty under Section 3 on the import of a manufactured or produced article the actual manufacture or production of a like article in India is not necessary. As observed by this Court in Thermax Private Limited v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (S.C.): (1992) 4 SCC 440 that Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act ‘specifically mandates that the CVD will be equal to the Excise duty for the time being leviable on a like article if produced or manufactured in India. In other words, we have to forget that the goods are imported, imagine that the importer had manufactured the goods in India and determine the amount of Excise duty that he would have been called upon to pay in that event’. To our mind the genesis of Section 3(1) of Customs Tariff Act has been brought out in the aforesaid observations of this Court, namely, for the purpose of saying what amount, if any, of additional duty is leviable under Section 3(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, it has to be imagined that the articles imported had been manufactured or produced in India and then to see what amount of Excise duty was leviable thereon.” [Emphasis supplied]

    9. The case of Lohia Sheet Products was decided following the decisions in Thermax Pvt. Ltd. and Hyderabad Industries Ltd. As the relevant term of the notification which was subject matter of consideration in that case was somewhat similar to the notification involved in the present case we may refer to the facts of that case in brief. The appellant, Lohia Sheet Products, imported scraps and claimed exemption from additional duty under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act on the ground that the scrap was chargeable to nil rate of duty. The goods which qualified for nil rate of duty - as described in the notification was - was copper waste and scrap used within the factory of production for the manufacture of unrefined or unwrought copper, copper sheets or circles and handicrafts. The case of the Revenue was that the expression “within the factory of production” pre­supposes that only such waste and scrap is exempted from payment of duty which is generated and then used within the factory of production and since, in that case, the waste and/or scrap had been imported from abroad, it cannot be said that it was to be used in the factory of production. It may be kept in mind that in the present case too the stand of the Revenue is more or less the same. Rejecting the contention of the Revenue, their Lordships held as under :-

    “......The entry nowhere uses the word ‘generated’ or ‘imported’. The condition that only that scrap would be entitled to exemption which has been generated in the factory of production is, therefore, unwarranted and unsustainable. The word ‘within’ occurs after the word, ‘used’. The Assessing Authority as well as the Tribunal have arrived at the finding that only that scrap waste of copper would be entitled to the exemption which had been generated in the same factory because of the word, ‘within’ used in the Heading 74.04. According to them, the word, ‘within’ pre-supposes that the copper waste and scrap was generated in the same factory. We are unable to read the entry in the manner as suggested by the Revenue.”
    The Court recalled the dictum laid down in Thermax Pvt. Ltd., approved in Hyderabad Industries Ltd., that “one has to forget that the goods are imported, imagine that the importer had manufactured the goods in India, determine the amount of Excise duty that he would have been called upon to pay in that event”.

    10. In the case of Plastic Processors (supra), while considering the validity of a circular of the Central Government directing that the relevant exemption notifications are applicable only in respect of plastics “reprocessed in India”, it was held that for the purpose of attracting additional duty under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act on the import of a manufactured or produced article, the actual manufacture or production of a like article is not necessary. In essence, what has to be imagined is that the importer had manufactured the goods in India and then the amount of excise duty that he would have been called upon to pay in that event has to be determined.

    11. Notification No. 4/2006, dated 1-3-2006, it may be clarified, is a notification issued under Section 5A of the Central Excise Act which empowers the Central Government to grant exemption from duty of excise in public interest. The rates of excise duty and the exemptions, if any, under Section 5A are nevertheless relevant for the purpose of levy of additional duty (countervailing duty) under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act. On import of any goods the importer is liable to pay, in addition to customs duty, a duty equal to excise duty applicable to goods “if produced or manufactured in India. It is, therefore, clear that the additional duty is leviable equal to, that is at the same rate, excise duty for goods if like goods are produced or manufactured in India, but as held by the Apex Court, actual production or manufacture is not necessary for levying additional duty. As observed above, the object underlying under Section 3 is to bring the importers at par with the domestic manufacturers. When no excise duty is leviable, it would follow that the importer would not be liable to pay any additional duty. The question as to whether the goods are actually produced or manufactured is not relevant at all.

    12. Adverting to the present case, the words “same factory” on the first blush would appear to suggest that the goods must also be produced or manufactured in the same factory, but if that interpretation were to be given, it would render the operation of the notification impossible in the case of import, for, there is no question of the goods being manufactured and then used in the same factory in the case of import. Where the goods are imported, there is no question of their being manufactured or produced in India. They can only be used in the manufacture of some other product as raw material apart from being sold in the market. It is to be kept in mind that actual production of a like goods is not essential, and if that be so, the Revenue cannot insist that notification can be applied only when the goods (imported goods) were manufactured in India. In the case of Lohia Sheet Products, the words were “used within the factory of production”. In the present case, the words are “used in the same factory”. In our opinion, the words “used in the same factory” simply mean that the goods in question should not be used in any other factory i.e. anywhere else other than the factory for the purpose of manufacture of textiles and textile articles. The case of the respondent is that it has only one factory of production. It is not in dispute that the goods in question are ‘finishing agents’ and they otherwise conform to the description in Column 3 of the Table appended to the notification - extracted above. The conclusion is irresistible that the ‘nil’ rate of duty was chargeable and, therefore, the respondent was not liable to pay any additional/countervailing duty on the import of goods under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act.

    13. The order in Hari Chand Shri Gopal (supra) is not final decision on the point and, in any view, from para 5 of the order it does not appear that the law laid down in Thermax Pvt. Ltd. that in order to attract Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, there need not be actual production or manufacture, has been doubted. Thermax Pvt. Ltd., it was observed, requires reconsideration as among other things the requirement that the applicant must obtain L-6 licence and also registration certificate for seeking remission/concession, was not taken into consideration.

    14. The decision in Priyesh Chemicals & Metals was relied upon in support of the contention that the conditions laid down in the notification must be satisfied. There cannot be two opinions on this point. Having found that there need not be actual production or manufacture of the goods in order to attract Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, muchless in the case of import of like goods, we are satisfied that the conditions stand satisfied and accordingly the goods in question was not liable for additional duty, and the impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) modifying the assessment on the Bills of Entry to that extent, therefore, cannot be said to be erroneous to warrant any interference by the Tribunal.

    15. In the result, we find no merit in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed.

    (Pronounced in the open Court on 30-4-2008)

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    Commr. Of Customs, Amritsar v. Malwa Industries Ltd.
    (Apr 30, 2008)