[Order per : A.C.C. Unni, Member (J)]. - This matter has come up before this Larger Bench on the basis of order dated 29-10-1999 passed by a single Member Bench of the Tribunal (WRB) in Appeal No. E/3173/99-NB in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara v. M/s. Asia Brown Boveri Ltd.
2. Single Member in Para 3 of the aforesaid order had observed : "The ld. Single Member in the said judgment allowed the case of the Department. There is conflict of decisions between the order in the appellants' case and the case of Chandigarh Bottling Company. It is to be mentioned here that in the Chandigarh Bottling Company case, the judgment of the appellant company was not cited. In the judgment of the appellants' case, the very ground of distinguishing each other has been referred to in Para 4 thereof. There is a divergence of opinion between two Members. Therefore the matter is placed before the President for constituting Larger Bench to look into the correctness of the judgments”.
3. We have heard Shri M.C. Sharma, ld. CDR for the Revenue and Shri V. Laxmikumaran, ld. Advocate who addressed the Bench as an intervener to assist the Bench in the matter.
4. Ld. CDR explained the facts of the case leading to the present reference and stated that the Respondents herein, viz., M/s. Asia Brown Boveri Ltd. had been issued two Show Cause Notices by the Department alleging that the assessee had received certain inputs from S.S.I units and had subsequently cleared the same as such under Rule 57F(1)(ii) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 after paying duty at the concessional rate. Department alleged that this was not in consonance with the provisions of Rule 57F(1)(ii). In the Order-in-Original, the Asstt. Commissioner held that the assessee was required to pay the applicable rate of duty on the date of clearance of the inputs under Rule 57F(1)(ii). When the matter was heard in Appeal by Commissioner (Appeals), the Commissioner (Appeals), placing reliance on the Tribunal decisions in C.C.E. v. American Auto Services [(T)] and Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. v. C.C.E. [1997 (95) E.L.T. 476] set aside the Order-in-Original and held that appropriate duty of excise meant the rate of duty which the inputs suffered in the first instance, that is, the rate at which credit was taken and that it was the said rate of duty which was to be debited at the time of clearance of the goods under Rule 57F(1)(ii). When the matter came up in appeal before the Tribunal, the ld. Single Member observed that in the case of C.C.E., Chandigarh v. Chandigarh Bottling Company reported in , the Single Member Bench had taken a view contrary to the view taken by the Tribunal in the earlier case of C.C.E. v. American Auto Services. The Single Member Bench had decided the issue on the basis of the Departmental representative's contention that the M/s. American Auto Services case had dealt with the issue of classification of the inputs which was not an issue before him in the Chandigarh Bottling Co. case. In view thereof, ld. Single Member accepted the contention of the Revenue and held that the rate of duty on the date of clearance of the inputs under Rule 57F(1)(ii) would apply to such clearances. In view of the conflict in the views expressed in the aforesaid two cases the referral order suggested the hearing of the divergence of opinion by a Larger Bench. Accordingly by an Order dated 17-2-2000, the Hon'ble President constituted the present Larger Bench for hearing the matter.
5. As regards the constitution of the Larger Bench by the Hon'ble President pursuing the referral order, ld. Counsel had pointed out that inasmuch as the Tribunal decision in M/s. American Auto Services (supra) being a decision of a Larger Bench consisting of three members, the same was binding on the other Benches of the Tribunal and to the extent the referral order had recommended to the Hon'ble President the constitution of a Larger Bench to resolve a divergence of opinion between a three Member Bench and a Single Member Bench was not a proper and legal order and the order of the Hon'ble President constituting a five Member Bench to determine the difference of opinion between a three Member Bench and a Single Member Bench was beyond the competence of the Hon'ble President. In response to querries from the Bench ld. JDR, Shri S. Srivastava submitted that there was no bar to a Single Member Bench doubting the correctness of an earlier decision of the Tribunal even if that decision was rendered by a Bench consisting of a larger number of Members than the Bench doubting the correctness of the earlier decision. In this connection, he relied on the observations of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. reported in at Paras 9 to 12 thereof. He submitted that in terms of Section 129C(5) of the Customs Act, 1962, where the Members of a Bench of the Tribunal differed in opinion on a point the point, it is to be decided according to the opinion of the majority. If there was no majority of the Members and if the Members were equally divided, they should state the point or points on which they differed and make a reference to the Hon'ble President who may either hear the point or points himself or refer the case for hearing of such point or points by one or more of the other Members of the Tribunal and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Members who have heard the case, including those who first heard it. Ld. JDR submitted that under Section 129C(5) the Hon'ble President was competent to hear the point himself or refer the matter for hearing by one or more of the other Members of the Tribunal. He underlined the fact that the Hon'ble President himself had the power to hear the point or points and decide the matter himself. Alternatively, he could also refer the point or points to be heard by one or more of the other Members of the Tribunal. Reliance was also placed on the observations of the Apex Court in Paras Laminates case (supra) in which it has been observed that it was vital to the administration of the justice that those exercising judicial powers must have necessary freedom to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision if and when subsequent proceedings brought to light what is perceived by them as erroneous decision in an earlier case. In such cases, it was reasonable and efficacious that the case is referred to a Larger Bench. In the Paras Laminates case, a two Member Bench had doubted the correctness of a decision of an earlier Bench consisting of three Members and reference to a Larger Bench made by the Hon'ble President was upheld by the Apex Court in the said judgment. Following the ratio of the said judgment, ld. JDR submitted that there was no legal infirmity in the referral order nor in the constitution of the present Larger Bench of five Members to hear the divergence of opinion between the three Member Bench decision in the American Auto Services case and the Single Member Bench decision in Chandigarh Bottling Co. case. In this connection, he also relied on the Supreme Court decision in Bengal Immunity Co. case reported in AIR 1955 661 (S.C).
6. On a consideration of submissions made by both the sides and the case law relied on by the Departmental representative, we note that the Apex Court judgment in Paras Laminates case has examined both the aspects, viz., (a) the competence of one Bench of the Tribunal to differ from the view taken by another Bench of the Tribunal and (b) the power of the Hon'ble President to constitute and refer a case to a Larger Bench a matter where Members of the Bench differ in opinion on any point and to refer such a case to one or more Members of the Tribunal. It has been observed in Paragraph 11 of the said judgment that Section 129C confers the power of reference upon the Hon'ble President and the power should be construed to be wide enough to enable the Hon'ble President to make a reference where Members of a Bench find themselves unable to decide a case according to what they perceive to be the correct law and fact because of the impediment of an earlier decision with which they cannot honestly agree. The Apex Court had stated: "In such cases, it is necessary for the healthy functioning of the Tribunal that the President should have the requisite authority to refer the case to a Larger Bench. That is the power which is implied in the express grant authorising the President to constitute Benches of the Tribunal for effective and expeditious discharge of its functions”.
7. Respectfully following the ratio of the aforesaid judgment we find no infirmity in the Single Member Bench in Chandigarh Bottling case not following the three Member Bench decision in American Auto Service case, though we also at the same time fully reiterate and emphasise the observation of the Apex Court in Para 9 of the Paras Laminates case stating that a two Member Bench must not lightly disregard the decision of another Bench of the Tribunal on an identical question particularly when the earlier decision is rendered by a Larger Bench in the interest of continuity, certainty and predictability in the administration of justice. For the same reason we find also no infirmity in the order of the Hon'ble President in referring the present issue to this Larger Bench.
7. As regards merits of the case and interpretation of Rule 57F(1)(ii) as it stood at the relevant time, we have considered the submissions made from both sides and the case law referred to by the Departmental representative.
8. Rule 57 F(1) read as follows :
"Rule 57 F(1). Manner of utilisation of the inputs and the credit allowed in respect of duty thereon - (1) The inputs in respect of which a credit of duty has been allowed under rule 57A may -
(i) be used in, or in relation to, the manufacture of final products for which such inputs have been brought into the factory; or
(ii) shall be removed, after intimating the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, having jurisdiction over the factory and obtaining a dated acknowledgement of the same from the factory for consumption or for export under bond as if such inputs have been manufactured in the said factory :
Provided that where the inputs are removed from the factory for home consumption on payment of duty of excise, such duty of excise shall in no case be less than the amount of credit that has been allowed in respect of such inputs under Rule 57A."
9. In SAE Ltd. v. CCE [], the Tribunal had, after examining the case law cited, held that the question to be answered was what will be the rate of duty applicable in case of inputs removed under Rule 57F(1). The question was whether the rate of duty which is applicable on the date of removal is to be taken as the applicable rate or whether it should be the rate at which credit was taken in terms of Rule 57A. The Single Member had observed in the said decision that since in the facts of the case the appellants were not manufacturers of the inputs but had only purchased duty paid inputs which were later cleared, the appropriate rate would be the rate on which the inputs were cleared from the original manufacturer of the inputs. Therefore it was held that there was no justification for recovery of a higher rate of duty.
10. In Ponds India Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise [] a two Member Bench took the view that in terms of Rule 57F(1) goods which had been removed from the factory has to be treated as if the goods were being removed as manufactured in the said factory by virtue of the deeming provision. It was held that duty would be required to be collected in respect of the said goods in terms of the provisions of the rules at the rate that would apply to the goods when actually manufactured or produced in the factory. The duty to be paid may in certain cases be more than the credit that was taken when the goods were brought into the factory but it cannot be less than the amount of credit that was taken by virtue of the proviso to Rule 57 F(1). In the facts of the case, the demand for enhanced duty and differencial was held to be maintainable in law.
11.1 In the Tribunal decision in Collector of Central Excise v. American Auto Services [] decided by a Three Member Bench of the Tribunal, it was held by majority that the term "appropriately" cannot be read to mean "effective duty of excise" as prevalent at the time of manufacture and removal of the goods at the first instance by the original manufacturer of the goods. It was observed "As Rule 57F(1)(ii) is placing a burden on the user to make the payment of duty, therefore the legal fiction has been created to consider the user of the inputs as a manufacturer, only to recover the credit already utilised by him on such inputs. This is a requirement for payment of duty on the inputs removed for home consumption as at the stage of its removal, the duty which it had suffered has already been utilsed by the user of input. Therefore, in order to undo this act, the duty which the input had sufferred earlier, is required to be paid back even if the duty had been reduced at a level lower than the rate at which duty had been paid by the original manufacturer. The proviso to Rule 57(1)(ii) makes this aspect clear. Therefore the rule directs the user of the inputs to maintain the level on rate on duty, even if the rates of duty have come down. This same benefit availed by Revenue is also required to be granted to the user of the inputs when the rates go up by recovering only the rate of duty utilised by him at the time of taking credit. Therefore "appropriate rate of duty of excise" has to be taken as the rate of duty he suffered at the first instance and it cannot be read to mean "effective rate of duty" as prevalent at the time of clearance of inputs for home consumption". The majority judgment took the view that the earlier decision in SAE India Ltd. case (supra) is required to be accepted and followed and the view taken in Ponds (India) Ltd. was not followed.
11.2 The dissenting Member however, took the view that the words used in Rule 57F(1)(ii) left no room for doubt as to what the legislature intended in the matter of recovery of duty on inputs which may be cleared as such from the factory. The expressions used in Rule 57F(1)(ii) was similar to the machinery provision in respect of recovery of duty under Rules 9 and 9A read with Rule 49 for clearance of goods either from the factory or from the warehouse. In the case of clearance of goods from the warehouse, the rate of duty applicable was the one chargeable at the time of clearance of the goods based on the assessable value approved. Ld. Single Member observed that after the duty burden has been lifted by virtue of taking of the Modvat credit on the goods, the status of the goods would become that of non-duty paid goods when they were lying in warehouse before clearance. There were number of provisions under the Central Excise law wherein certain reliefs are provided subject to the fulfilment of conditions and in cases where those conditions are not complied with, the duty required to be recovered is on the same lines as set out in Rule 57F(1)(ii). He cited the example of Rule 173L under which refund is allowed in respect of goods, which after clearance on payment of duty are received back for reconditioning and reprocessing and the goods after reconditioning have to suffer duty as if the same are manufactured in the factory even though the process carried out may not be strictly according to the definition of the 'manufacture' given under Section 2(f). Ld. Single Member had also observed that the position in regard to goods which were brought in as inputs and in respect of which Modvat credit is taken is somewhat analogous to the warehoused goods. Since the wording of the Rule was very clear as to the quantum if duty to be charged and once the language of the statute was clear, the same has to be given full effect not withstanding any anomalies that may ensue therefrom. If the framers of the statute had intended to recover only duty equivalent to the Modvat credit taken on the inputs on their clearances from the factory, then the wording of the Rule would have been that the goods could be cleared subject to payment of duty equivalent to the Modvat credit taken. Ld. Single Member therefore took the view that the appropriate rate of duty would be rate prevalent on the date of clearances of the goods.
12. The Larger Bench decision in American Auto was followed in further decisions of the Tribunal in Boving Fources Ltd. v. CCE [], CCE, Madras v. Enfield India Ltd. [1998 (28) RLT 234] and in Electronics Corpn. v. CCE, Hyderabad [], Voltas Ltd. v. CCE, Bombay [1999 (32) RLT 343], Pfizer Ltd. v. CCE, Chandigarh [1996 (16) RLT 408].
13. However, in CCE v. Chandigarh Bottling Co. Ltd. [] a Single Member distinguished the ruling in American Auto case since in that case the issue related to the classification of the inputs and since the inputs were not manufactured in the factory of the respondents the issue was a different one.
14. Ld. Counsel had brought to our notice the Tribunal decision in Tata Engineering and Locomotive v. CCE [Final Order No. 251/89-A] in which it was held that the duty paid by the assessee on the goods obtained by them under Chapter X has to be based on the value declared by the manufacturer from whom the appellants were purchasing the goods and not on the price which they obtained from their own buyers which decision had been upheld by the Apex Court by dismissing the appeal filed against it by Revenue in Civil Appeal No. 4049/89 by order dated 24-8-1995.
15. On consideration of the case law and the arguments advanced before us we are of the considered view that the Larger Bench decision of the Tribunal in the American Auto Service case has clearly explained the scope of Rule 57F(1)(ii) and the interpretation given to the said provision in the majority order represents the correct view. We agree with the observation in the majority order in that case that the requirement of Rule 57F(1)(ii) is for payment of duty on the inputs received for home consumption where the inputs have not been used by the manufacturer. The legal fiction of treating the inputs as having been manufactured by the recipients of the inputs was only to see that the manufacturer restores the original position by debiting the same rate of duty at which he had taken the credit. The proviso to Rule 57F(1) clearly explains the rationale for creating the legal fiction by providing that duty of excise payable at the time of removal for home consumption shall not be less than the amount of credit that has been allowed in respect of the inputs under Rule 57A. As has been observed by the majority in the Larger Bench decision in American Auto Services case the provision is intended to provide the same benefit availed of by the Revenue where the rate of duty has gone down during the interregnum.
16. In the light of the above discussion, we concur with the view taken by the majority in the American Auto Service case and reiterate it as the correct view. The reference is answered accordingly.