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  • provisions of Section 130(1) of the Customs Act, 1962,
  • law.7. Section 129B (1) of the Customs Act
  • Section 130(1) of the Customs Act,
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  • provisions of Section 130(1) of the Customs Act, 1962,
  • law.7. Section 129B (1) of the Customs Act
  • Section 130(1) of the Customs Act,

    Collector Of Customs, Bombay v. K.G Parab & Sons

    [Order per : P.K. Desai, Member (J)]. - Invoking the provisions of Section 130(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, the Collector of Customs, Bombay has filed the present application, seeking reference to the High Court at Bombay, on the question, as mentioned hereafter, pleading the same to be a question of law arising out of this Bench’s Order No. 2022/91-WRB, dated 7-11-1991 in Appeal No. CD (BOM) 867/85 filed by the Respondents here.

    2. The Respondents here were the holder of Customs House Agent’s Licence since 1936. Consequent to detection of a case of misdeclaration, where the respondents were engaged as CHA, proceedings were initiated in relation thereto and along with that, enquiry was also held against the CHA, vide Regulation 24(2) read with Regulation 25 of the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 1965, alleging acts of misconduct/misbehaviour on nine counts, and an Enquiry Officer was nominated to hold the enquiry, who conducted the enquiry and submitted his report therefore. The report so submitted indicated that out of the nine counts on which the acts of misconduct were alleged, eight of them, were not sustainable, however, on one count, the allegation could be sustained. The Collector of Customs, as the competent authority, thereupon, served the notice to the Respondents, enclosing the copy of the report of the Enquiry authority and called upon them to show cause why penalty as provided for under the said Regulations, should not be imposed, and thereafter went on to decide the same. In deciding the matter, the Collector, however disagreed with the conclusion drawn by the Enquiry Authority on eight counts, where the said authority had held the allegations as not sustainable, held them as established and passed the order cancelling the CHA licence of the respondent. In appeal preferred against the said order, it was pleaded that, though it was open to the Collector to take a view different from the one taken by the Enquiry Authority, it was incumbent on him to issue a proper Show Cause notice to the respondents, clearly mentioning that he was not in, prima facie, agreement with the findings in the said report, and intended to differ therefrom and that therefore, cause might also be shown as to why allegation on those counts ought not also, be considered in holding the acts of misconduct as duly proved. Plea was raised that the order of the Collector was thus, in total non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, as the notice issued by him made no reference in that regard, and with the copy of the report of Enquiry Authority enclosed, they were called upon to show cause only in relation thereto, and thereby gave an impression that final order was to be passed, considering the allegations as held proved by the Enquiry Authority. Convinced of the said factual position, this Bench concluded that this was a violation of the principles of natural justice, and hence quashed and set aside the said order of the Collector of Customs and gave a further direction to restore the licence.

    3. The Collector of Customs, has however, by filing the present application, sought reference to the High Court on the following question, as is formulated by him.

    “Whether in the fact and circumstances of the case, was it not necessary on the part of the Honourable Tribunal to remand the case back to the Adjudicating Authority for a fair trial of case afresh, particularly when the Honourable Tribunal had not decided the case on merits.”

    4. Mrs. Lipika Mazumdar Roy Choudhari, the Ld. SDR has submitted that the only ground that has weighed with the Tribunal, is of not granting of a fair trial to the respondents and then referring to three decisions of the Tribunal in Orient Woollen Textile Mills v. Collector - 1986 (25) E.L.T. 754 (Tri.), D & H Secheran Electronics v. Collector of Customs & Excise - and Fish Net Making Plant v. Collector of Central Excise - (Tri.) pleaded that when the order was held as not sustainable on non-granting of a fair trial, the Tribunal was required to remand the matter. In her submission in any case, a question of law, of the nature as formulated, does arise from the Order of this Tribunal and as such reference to the High Court is called for.

    5. Mr. M.W. Nadkarni the Ld. Advocate for the respondents on the other hand, submitted that, when the order of the authority below was ex facie void as the one passed in patent violation and non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, the same was rightly quashed. He pleaded that order of remand being a discretionary one, could not be claimed as of right, and when the Tribunal had exercised the discretion, the order so passed could not give rise to a question of law. He also submitted that at the time of hearing of the appeal, a plea was raised that the CHA was out of business, by virtue of initial suspension and then cancellation of the licence, for over nine years and any remand could further prolong the issue, when even otherwise, the CHA had virtually, been visited with due penal consequences, and pleaded that this was also one of the considerations not to use discretionary powers of remand but to quash the order simpliciter. He pleaded that prayer for reference on such an issue was merely to deprive the respondent of the benefit of the order of the Tribunal, and that, till this day, the order was not complied with. He pleaded that on the contrary, direction be given that the licence be restored forthwith.

    6. Considering the submissions, what is contemplated to be referred to the High Court, vide Section 130(1) of the Customs Act, is the question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal passed vide Section 129-B(1) of the said Act. There does not exist any precise definition of the word “question of law”. However, it can certainly be held, without any fear of contradiction, that no question of law could arise with regard to the order passed under the discretionary powers, if statutorily invested in the Tribunal. It may not be open to the party to plead that discretion exercised by the Tribunal in passing the final order, when available under the Statute, gives rise to a question of law.

    7. Section 129B (1) of the Customs Act reads thus :

    “The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order appealed against or may refer the case back to the authority which passed such decision or order with such directions as the Appellate Tribunal may think fit, for a fresh adjudication or decision, as the case may be, after taking additional evidence, if necessary.”

    A plain reading of the said sub-section clearly indicates that it is left to the discretion of the Tribunal whether order remanding back the matter to the adjudicating authority, need be passed.

    8. There are series of judicial pronouncements flowing from various courts of law including the Apex Court of the country, making it a settled proposition of law, that any order passed in violation of, or non-compliance with the principles of natural justice is a void order and a nullity and has to be quashed. No authentication by citation of any judicial pronouncement is called for. However, if at all necessary, a reference could be had to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v Union of India - AIR 1987 S.C. 818 and Raghunath Thaklcar v. State of Bihar - AIR 1989 S.C. 620.

    9. When the order is null and void, and on the factual position there is no challenge to the same, and when quashing the same is an unavoidable consequence, it has always remained a matter of discretion for the Tribunal to consider whether ends of justice would be properly met with by simply quashing the order or whether the given circumstances warranted a remand, and if and only if the Tribunal felt that remand was called for, then such an order for remand would be passed. The Tribunal has also, in Collector v. Pawan Trading Co. - (Tri.) held that it is permissible not to remand the case, if on the facts and circumstances, the authority does not deem it necessary, and in that particular case remand after a lapse of nine years was deemed not necessary.

    10. Though it may not be very material for the point at issue, significantly the authority which passed the void order, is now pleading that he ought to have been permitted to cure the lapse on his part and ought to have been given an opportunity to re-adjudicate. As indicated above, however, this is merely an observation not material for determination of the point at issue.

    11. Though not specifically mentioned, it was within the knowledge of the Tribunal that the proceedings were pending for nine years, and the respondents were out of business for that much period and further they were exonerated in adjudication proceedings in relation to the misdeclaration, when the present appeal came up for hearing, and it is obvious that Tribunal could not have overlooked these factors.

    12. The decisions of the Tribunal cited by the Ld. SDR, also do not indicate that the order of remand is the necessary consequence when the order is vitiated on non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. What the various benches of the Tribunal have held is that the circumstances before them warranted remand of the matters. These decisions therefore do not lay down any case law, having binding effect.

    13. To conclude, when the discretion is statutorily invested in the Tribunal, whether to remand the matter or not, no question of law, in relation thereto, could be held to have arisen, when the Tribunal has chosen not to do so. To reiterate, there is no challenge on the point that the order quashed by the Tribunal was a nullity, as passed without compliance with the principles of natural justice. The application, therefore merits no consideration and is rejected.

    14. A prayer is made on behalf of the respondents, that the department has been, in spite of the directions from the Tribunal, not restoring the CHA licence, though considerable time has lapsed and that therefore, same directions be given for restoration forthwith. Though it may not be desirable to give any specific direction in relation thereto, in this proceedings, it is expected that the findings and directions from the Tribunal are honored and complied with, when they have assumed finality with no appeal provided against the same, and compliance is not delayed on same pretext on another. It is hoped that there would be no further delay in complying with the order of the Tribunal and CHA licence to the respondents is restored.

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    Collector Of Customs, Bombay v. K.G Parab & Sons
    (Apr 13, 1992)