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  • provisions of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980.
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  • provisions of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (Justice V.S. Aggarwal)

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, Nafe Singh, is an Assistant Sub-Inspector in the Delhi Police. A departmental inquiry was initiated against him arising out of alleged unauthorized early-morning vehicle checks conducted on 27.06.2001 by a PRG team on Outer Ring Road. The charge alleged that the applicant and others were flagging down heavy commercial vehicles on both carriageways, that two constables fled the spot, and that the applicant issued 15 challans "without mentioning the time" and failed to inform senior officers or the Traffic Control Room — conduct said to indicate assembly with a common mala fide intention to collect illegal entry money. The inquiry officer recorded evidence and concluded that the act was a minor aberration and that the charge was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

On receipt of the inquiry report the disciplinary authority recorded a note of disagreement, communicated it to the applicant, and after considering his reply imposed the penalty of censure (order dated 30.5.2002). The applicant's name was also kept in a "secret list of doubtful integrity" by an order dated 21.5.2003. An appeal against the censure was dismissed (order dated 20.11.2003). The applicant filed the present application seeking quashing of the disciplinary and appellate orders and the secret-list order, along with consequential benefits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disciplinary authority's "note of disagreement" was legally valid when it did not constitute a tentative disagreement limited to the findings of the Inquiry Officer, and whether such a non-tentative note vitiates the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty imposed.
  2. Whether the conduct of the applicant — issuing traffic challans before the official shift time — amounted to "misconduct" justifying departmental punishment, given the absence of proven mala fide or other aggravating factors.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The applicant contended that the note of disagreement recorded by the disciplinary authority was not a tentative note of disagreement (i.e., it was not restricted to tentative reasons related to the Inquiry Officer's findings) and therefore the subsequent proceedings and the penalty deserved to be quashed.
  • On merits, the applicant's counsel argued there was little material against the applicant: the applicant and associates were posted for duty from 8 A.M. to 8 P.M., and if they reached earlier and saw traffic violations they were duty bound to challan offending vehicles; issuing challans before 8 A.M. did not amount to misconduct.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion records that the reply was filed and the application was contested, but does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's specific legal arguments in opposition to the application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., JT 1999 (6) SC 62 When a disciplinary authority records a note of disagreement it should relate only to the findings of the Inquiry Officer; the authority must communicate tentative reasons for disagreement so the delinquent officer can respond to those reasons. The court relied on this authority to hold that the disciplinary authority's note in the present case was not tentative and hence improper; this supported quashing the proceedings founded on that note of disagreement.
Commissioner of Police v. Constable Pramod Kumar (Delhi High Court), CWP Nos.2665/2002 & 4563/2001, decided 12.9.2002 While disagreeing with the Inquiry Officer's findings, the disciplinary authority must act in good faith and state tentative reasons for disagreement; it must not arrive at a final finding at the stage of recording disagreement or proceed with a pre-determined mind. The court cited this decision as a similar example where punishment was set aside because the disciplinary authority had reached a final conclusion rather than recording a tentative disagreement; it reinforced the conclusion that the present note of disagreement was improper.
State of Punjab and Others v. Ram Singh Ex-Constable, (1992) 4 SCC 54 Definitions and scope of "misconduct" were discussed, relying on Black's Law Dictionary — misconduct entails transgression of established rules, wrongful or unlawful behaviour, willful in character; mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence generally do not constitute misconduct. The court used this authority to examine whether the applicant's conduct amounted to "misconduct" and concluded that, in the absence of mala fide or willful wrongful conduct, the applicant's early challenge of vehicles could not be characterized as misconduct of the sort warranting punishment.
Union of India and Others v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286 If a public servant's conduct is inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of duty, it may amount to misconduct; disregard of essential conditions of service may constitute misconduct. The court cited this decision for the proposition that misconduct must be understood in context and that conduct inconsistent with the due discharge of duty can be misconduct; it then applied that contextual approach to hold the applicant's act did not meet that threshold here.
Pierce v. Foster; Laws v. London Chronicle; Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari; Satubha K. Vaghela These authorities were cited in the opinion (as referenced in the J. Ahmed discussion) as supporting precedents for what may constitute misconduct and for comparative reasoning on the disciplinary standards expected of public servants. The court referenced these authorities indirectly via the J. Ahmed discussion to illustrate established principles about misconduct; they supported the court's contextual analysis of whether the applicant's conduct reached the threshold of misconduct.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two related strands of analysis: (A) validity of the note of disagreement and the procedural propriety of the disciplinary action; and (B) merits—whether the applicant's conduct amounted to misconduct.

(A) Procedural analysis — the note of disagreement

  • The inquiry officer recorded evidence and concluded that the charge against the applicant was a minor aberration and not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
  • On receipt of that report the disciplinary authority recorded a "note of disagreement." The court examined the content of that note and relevant authorities.
  • The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Yoginath D. Bagde, which mandates that a note of disagreement must relate only to the findings of the Inquiry Officer and that the disciplinary authority should communicate tentative reasons for disagreement so the delinquent may reply to those tentative reasons.
  • The court also relied on the Delhi High Court decision in Commissioner of Police v. Constable Pramod Kumar, which emphasized that the disciplinary authority must not reach a final conclusion at the stage of recording disagreement and must act in good faith.
  • In the present case the wording of the note ("I disagree with the findings of the E.O. on the following grounds:") was interpreted by the court as indicating total or final disagreement rather than a tentative, provisional disagreement limited to findings. Because the note was not tentative, the court held that the note of disagreement and the proceedings thereafter could not be sustained.

(B) Merits — whether the conduct amounted to misconduct

  • The court examined the nature of "misconduct" through cited authorities (notably State of Punjab v. Ram Singh and Union of India v. J. Ahmed), observing that misconduct generally involves willful, wrongful or unlawful behaviour and is distinguishable from mere error of judgment, negligence, or innocent mistake.
  • The court noted that the traffic challans issued by the applicant were not characterized in the inquiry as "illegal" challans; there was no proof of illegal gratification or that the applicant deliberately challaned improper persons.
  • The court accepted that the applicant may have been "over zealous" to show more work done, and that he issued challans before his official duty time of 8 A.M., but found no evidence of mala fide intent or conduct of a forbidden quality sufficient to constitute misconduct under the authorities cited.
  • The absence of a Daily Diary entry by the applicant was considered "link evidence" but, in the absence of additional proof of mala fide, did not complete a chain establishing misconduct. The court observed that even the detecting team had not made a Daily Diary entry.
  • Balancing the disciplinary interest of the police service in maintaining strict discipline against the evidence available, the court concluded that the applicant's conduct, in the factual matrix presented, did not constitute the kind of misconduct warranting departmental punishment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application is allowed and the impugned orders are quashed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the disciplinary authority's order of censure and the appellate dismissal (and the order placing the applicant's name in the secret list of doubtful integrity) are quashed insofar as they were founded on the impugned note of disagreement and the subsequent proceedings.
  • The court's decision rested on established authorities concerning (a) the requirement that a note of disagreement be tentative and restricted to the Inquiry Officer's findings, and (b) the established meaning of "misconduct" which excludes mere errors of judgment or isolated over-enthusiasm in the absence of mala fide or willful wrongdoing.
  • The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond applying existing precedent; it concludes that the particular disciplinary process and the characterization of the applicant's conduct were legally unsustainable on the facts before the court.

    Asi Nafe Singh v. Commissioner Of Police Police Headquarter Ito

    By Mr. Justice V.S.Aggarwal: Applicant (Nafe Singh) is Assistant Sub-Inspector in Delhi Police. By virtue of the present application, he seeks quashing of the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 30.5.2002 and of the appellate authority of 20.11.2003 whereby the conduct of the applicant, after disciplinary proceedings, had been censured. He also seeks quashing of the order of 21.5.2003 by virtue of which his name has been kept in the secret list of doubtful integrity. The applicant prays for consequential benefits.

    2. Some of the relevant facts are that a departmental inquiry had been initiated against the applicant pertaining to the following charge: I, R.K.Singh, Enquiry Officer charge you ASI Nafe Singh No.4589-D, Ct. Pratap Singh No.1466/T, Ct. Rajesh Kumar No.1158/T and Ct. Sunil Kumar No.3840/T that all of you were found flagging down all heavy commercial vehicles (HTCs) in both carriage ways on Outer Ring Road by a PRG Team surveillance on 27.06.2001. While Ct. Rajesh Kumar and Ct. Sunil Kumar fled away from the spot. You ZO/ASI Nafe Singh could not give any satisfactory reply about the unauthorized illegal morning checking of vehicles. On scrutiny of the challan book, it was found that you ZO/ASI Nafe Singh had issued 15 challans without mentioning the time because unauthorized and illegal checking of the vehicles was being conducted. Neither the senior officer, nor the Traffic Control Room were informed about the early morning checking. It shows that all of you had assembled at the spot with common malafide intention to collect illegal and entry money from commercial vehicles. You ZO/ASI Nafe Singh instead of restraining your subordinates from indulging in illegal activities, were involved yourself actively in conducting unauthorized checking of commercial vehicles with malafide intention for personal gains. The above act on the part of you ZO/ASI Nafe Singh No.4589-D, Ct. Rajesh Kumar No.1158/T, Ct. Sunil Kumar No.3840/T and Ct. Pratap Singh No.1466/T amounts to gross misconduct, malafide, negligence and dereliction in the discharge of your official duty, which render you liable to be dealt with departmentally under the provisions of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980.

    3. The disciplinary authority had appointed the inquiry officer. The inquiry officer recorded the evidence and held that the act of the applicant was a minor aberration. The charge was not proved beyond any reasonable doubt.

    4. On receipt of the report of the inquiry officer, the disciplinary authority had recorded a `note of disagreement which was communicated to the applicant. After considering the reply of the applicant, the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of censure. The appeal filed by the applicant was dismissed. Hence the present application.

    5. In the reply filed, the application is being contested. Learned counsel for the applicant, at the outset, argued that the note of disagreement was not a tentative note of disagreement and, therefore, the proceedings deserve to be quashed.

    6. The Supreme Court in the case of YOGINATH D. BAGDE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANR., JT 1999 (6) SC 62 in unambiguous terms held that when there is a note of disagreement, it should relate only with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. The findings of the Supreme Court in this regard are: .The Disciplinary Authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the TENTATIVE reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiring Authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reasons on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority are not germane and the finding of not guilty already recorded by the Inquiring Authority was not liable to be interfered with.

    7. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had considered a similar controversy in the case of COMMISSIONER OF POLICE v. CONSTABLE PRAMOD KUMAR, in CWP Nos.2665/2002 and 4563/2001, decided on 12.9.2002. Like in the present cases, a note of disagreement was recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. The Delhi High Court had set aside the punishment that had been imposed and concluded: However, while disagreeing with such findings, he must arrive at a decision in good faith. He while disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, was required to state his reasons for such disagreement but such a decision was required to be tentative one and not a final one. A disciplinary authority at that stage could not have pre-determined the issue nor could arrive at a final finding. The records clearly suggest that he had arrived at a final conclusion and not a tentative one. He proceeded in the matter with a closed mind. An authority which proceeds in the matter of this nature with a pre-determined mind, cannot be expected to act fairly and impartially.

    8. In the present case before us, note of disagreement clearly indicates that it was not a tentative note of disagreement but a total disagreement and, therefore, the note of disagreement and proceedings thereafter cannot be sustained. The note of disagreement reads: I have carefully gone through the entire evidence brought on D.E. file viz.-a-viz. defence statement of the delinquents and findings of the E.O. I disagree with the findings of the E.O. on the following grounds:-

    9. On this short ground, therefore, the application was liable to be allowed. However, the applicants learned counsel contended that on merits of the matter also, there is precious little against the applicant. He urged that there is no `misconduct that can be attributed to the applicant.

    10. According to the learned counsel, though the applicant and his associates were on duty from 8 A.M to 8. P.M. and if they reached earlier, noticed certain traffic violations and challaned those persons, they were duty bound to do so and, therefore, it cannot be taken to be a misconduct. The basic fact, which was not in dispute, was that the applicant was put on duty for traffic checking from 8 AM onwards but he conducted certain traffic challans before 8 AM.

    11. Misconduct is an expression, which is not capable of precise definition. The Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS v. RAM SINGH EX-CONSTABLE, (1992) 4 SCC 54 referred with advantage to the definition of `misconduct in Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition and thereupon further held that the misconduct is one which includes the delinquency in performance of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, willful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence can come within the purview of the misconduct. We reproduce the relevant portion of the decision of the Supreme Court in this regard: 5. Misconduct has been defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 999 thus: A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behaviour, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior, its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense, but not negligence or carelessness. Misconduct in office has been defined as: Any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, willful in character. Term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act. P.Ramanatha Aiyars Law Lexicon, Reprint Edition 1987 at page 821 defines `misconduct thus: The term misconduct implies, a wrongful intention, and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. In usual parlance, misconduct means a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left, except what necessity may demand and carelessness, negligence and unskilfulness are transgressions of some established, but indefinite, rule of action, where some discretion is necessarily left to the actor. Misconduct is a violation of definite law; carelessness or abuse of discretion under an indefinite law. Misconduct is a forbidden act; carelessness, a forbidden quality of an act, and is necessarily indefinite. Misconduct in office may be defined as unlawful behaviour or neglect by a public officer, by which the rights of a party have been affected.

    6. Thus it could be seen that the word `misconduct though not capable of precise definition, on reflection receives its connotation from the context, the delinquency in its performance and its effect on the discipline and the nature of the duty. It may involve moral turpitude, it must be improper or wrong behaviour; unlawful behaviour, willful in character; forbidden act, a transgression of established and definite rule of action or code of conduct but not mere error of judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of the duty; the act complained of bears forbidden quality or character. Its ambit has to be construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs, regard being had to the scope of the statute and the public purpose it seeks to serve. The police service is a disciplined service and it requires to maintain strict discipline. Laxity in this behalf erodes discipline in the service causing serious effect in the maintenance of law and order.

    12. In earlier decision rendered in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. J. AHMED, (1979) 2 SCC 286, the facts were little different. Shri J.Ahmed was a member of the Indian Administrative Service. He was posted as Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate in Nowgong District, Assam. There were large scale disturbances. He was served with charges that he failed to take the effective preventive measures. He did not show leadership qualities and did not personally visit the seen of the disturbance. The Supreme Court held that if a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct. A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct. The Supreme Court held: 11. Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of the service. It would follow that conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct (see Pierce v. foster [17 QB 536, 542]). A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London Chronicle (indicator Newspapers ((1959) 1 WLR 698)]. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway, Nagpur Division, Nagpur (61 Bom LR 1596), and Satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza (10 Guj LR 23). The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Strouds Judicial Dictionary which runs as under: Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence; errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct.

    13. In the present case before us, the traffic challans conducted by the applicant have not been taken to be illegal in terms that they were not the illegal traffic challans. It is apparent that he was over zealous to do more work in a day to show that he has conducted more traffic challans.

    14. During the course of the inquiry, no malafides had been shown in terms that he charged any illegal gratification or that he did not challan proper people.

    15. The police officers are duty bound to prevent traffic crimes at all times. If he was, therefore, a little before his duty time and saw certain traffic violations, in our considered opinion, it cannot be taken to be a misconduct of the nature that a person should be penalized.

    16. Our attention was drawn to the fact that no Daily Diary entry had been made by him in this regard. But even on that count, no misconduct is being attributed as it is only a link evidence. But in the absence of any other mala fides, the chain is not complete. It is interesting to note that team, which detected the applicant, even has not made any Daily Diary entry. There is a more thin line in such like matters between the conduct of persons to be termed as misconduct. Necessarily, misconduct should mean conduct arising out of ill motives; error of acts or of negligence, but innocent mistake should not constitute such misconduct. In the present case, as already referred to above, in the absence of any ill motive, if he endeavoured exuberance conduct to show more work done, there is precious little more against him. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be termed to be a misconduct.

    17. For these reasons, we allow the present application and quash the impugned orders. (S.A.Singh) (V.S.Aggarwal) Member (A) Chairman /NSN/

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    Asi Nafe Singh v. Commissioner Of Police Police Headquarter Ito
    (Jan 3, 2005)