S.B Sinha, J.:—Both these appeals are directed against a judgement and order dated 4.9.97 passed in Writ Petition No. 6090(W)/97 and W.P No. 6091(W)/97 by a learned single Judge of this Court whereby and whereunder the writ petitions filed by the writ petitioners-respondents were allowed with certain directions

2. The fact of the matter is not much in dispute.

3. The writ petitioners who are 42 in numbers had completed their respective Class-X and XII studies from one Park Point School which was not affiliated with the appellants. It appears from the writ petitions that advertisements had been issued by the said institution, inter alia, on the premise that the students of the said institution can appear at Central Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter referred to as (CBSE) examination. They had filled up forms for appearance in the said concerned examinations but when Admit Cards despite promises made by the Principal of the institution had not been issued, they suspected foul play and lodged a First Information Report. It stands admitted that the said institution is not affliliated with the appellant. As the career of the students were involved, they filed a writ application praying, inter alia, the following reliefs:—

“(a) a writ of and/or in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 5 to each and every one of them and/or their servants and/or their subordinates to issue forthwith the admit card and to arrange examination for All India Secondary Certificate Examination under the Central Board of Secondary Education;

(b) A writ of and/or writs in the nature of Mandamus directing the Respondents authorities each of them and/or its agents and/or the sub-ordinates to inspect the Park Point School situated at No. 371, Jodhpur Park and to certify the regular attendance of the students in accordance with the Scheme of examination as prescribed by the rules of the Central Board of Secondary Education and issue admit card for appearing at the examination and to conduct examination for the students as stated herein of the Park Point School situated at No. 371, Jodhpur Park Calcutta-68 on the basis of regular school students.”

4. The learned trial Judge keeping in view of the purported helplessness of the students asked the learned Advocate of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangasthan to submit a list of affiliated schools. Some of the said schools having been noticed and appeared before the court and agreed to allow certain students to appear from their schools. The learned trial judge, however, issued certain directions that the writ petitioners could be permitted to appear. The operative portion of the order reads thus:—

“I make it clear that the schools, however, will apply for permission from the C.B.S.E only after being satisfied with the credentials that should be presented by the students to the schools which they are to produce before the schools on or before 29th September, 1997, positively. I further make it clear that even if the C.B.S.E grant such permission, the students would only be allowed to appear next year's final examination through their respective schools, if they come out successful in the test examination, but not as regular students of such institutions, but as external students as a special case under the Court's order and the eligibility of the students will entirely depend upon their performances in the test examinations. I also make it clear that the students would also abide by the rules and regulations of the forwarding schools including the payment of fees of the respective institutions, I make it clear further that this order will not create any precedent in future and this order as well as the permission granted by the C.B.S.E and also permission given by the schools to such students, all will be limited to the writ petitioners only the C.B.S.E is also directed to give advertisement in the Newspapers through-out in India that no students from unrecongnised and/or unaffiated school will be allowed to sit in any examinations conducted and/or governed by the C.B.S.E in future as I am of the view that such students have no right to sit in any examinations conducted by the C.B.S.E nor they have any locus standi, even to move any Court of Law.”

5. Mr. Pranab Kumar Chattopadyay, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the directions issued by the learned trial Judge are contrary to law. According to the learned Counsel the sympathy expressed by the learned trial Judge is a misplaced one as this court has no jurisdiction to issue any direction contrary to or inconsistent with the statutory provisions. It was further submitted that in terms of the Examination Bye-Laws of the appellants the writ petitioners could not have been allowed to appear as external candidates inasmuch as only those who had failed in examination taken by the appellant, can in terms of the said Regulations appear in that capacity. The learned Counsel further informs us that even the schools had not applied for permission of the appellant despite directions made in that regard by the learned trial Judge.

6. It is beyond any dispute that the said Park Point School was not affiliated with the appellant. The writ petitioners might have taken admission under a misconception but it is beyond any civil of doubt that unless the statute permits appearance of students as private candidates they cannot be permitted to do so.

7. In A.P Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, reported in (1986) 2 SCC 667, the Apex Court stated the law in the following terms:—

“Shri Venugopal suggested that we might issue appropriate directions to the University to protect the interest of the students. We do not think that we can possibly accede to the request made by Shri Venugopal on behalf of the students. Any direction of the nature sought by Shri Venugopal would be in clear transgression of the provisions of the University Act and the regulations of the University. We cannot by our flat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulations made by the University itself. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the court to disobey the laws.”

8. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1926 the Apex Court was also considering a matter relating to a direction issued by the High Court in respect of the students who had taken admission in an unauthorised allege; upon taking into consideration various decisions including All Bihar Christian School Association v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1988 SC 305 and State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph Teachers Training Institute, reported in (1991) 2 JT (SC) 343 and upon considering the provision of Article 51A of the Constitution of India it was held:—

“In that behalf compliance of the statutory requirements is insisted upon. Slackening the standard and judicial fiat to control the mode of education and examining system are detrimental to the efficient management of the education. The directions to the appellants to disobey the law is subversive of the rule of law, a breeding ground for corruption and feeding source for indiscipline.”

9. In Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal, reported in AIR 1993 SC 2412, the Apex Court has also deprecated the practice of passing interim order without adjudicating on basic issues in the following term:—

We are afraid that this kind of administration of interlocutory remedies, more guided by sympathy quite often of wholly misplaced, does no service to anyone. From the series of orders that keep coming before us in academic matters, we find that loose, ill-conceived sympathy masquerades as interlocutory justice expbsing judicial discretion to the criticism of degenerating into private benevolence. This is subversive of academic discipline, or whatever is left of it, leading to serious impasse in academic life. Admissions cannot be ordered without regard to the eligibility of the candidates. Decisions on matters relevant to be taken into account at the interlocutory stage cannot be deferred or decided later when serious complications might ensue from the interim order itself. In the present case, the High Court was apparently moved by sympathy for the candidates than by an accurate assessment of even the prima facie legal position. Such orders cannot be allowed to stand. The Courts should not embarrass academic authorities by itself taking over their functions.

10. In Dental Council of India v. Harpreet Kaur Bal reported in 1995 (1) Supp. SCC 304, the Apex Court observed:—

There are many pronouncements of this Court cautioning against exercise of jurisdiction characterised more by benevolence than on settled legal principles. A relief must be such as could be considered permissible in law and worked out by the application of legally recognised principles. The decision must have legitimacy of legal reasoning and should not incur the criticism of lacking objectivity of purpose and rational and legal justification. Where an educational institution embarks upon granting admissions without the requisite affiliation and recognition and the students join the institution with their eyes wide open as to the lack of legitimacy in the admission, it would be preposterous to direct the University to hold examinations for the benefit of such students. We cannot sufficiently deplore this attitude and approach. The High Court has, by its order, simply bolstered the hopes and aspirations of these students without any means of gratifying these expectations in a manner known to law. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the order under appeal as totally unjustified.

11. In Tarun Chakraborty… v. State Of West Bengal & Ors.…, reported in Cal. LT 1995 (2) HC 309, I had noticed:—

“In State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph Teachers Training Institute, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 87, it was held that the court cannot grant relief to a party on humanitarian grounds contrary to law.

12. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar, reported in AIR 1994 SC 2148, the law has been laid down in the following terms:—

“Thus apart from the directions as to appointment on compassionate grounds being against statutory provisions, such direction does not take note of this fact. Whatever it may be, the Court should not have directed the appointment on compassionate grounds. The jurisdiction under mandamus cannot be exercised in that fashion.”

13. In G. Kalyan Sundaram v. U.Co Bank, reported in Cal. LT 1995 (2) HC 201, I had observed that in the fact of that case even sympathy has no role to play and in that connection noticed:

“In Latham v. Richard Johnson & Nephew, Ltd. reported in 1911-13 AER (reprint) page 117, Farwell L.J observed:—

‘We must be very careful not to allow our sympathy with the infant plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiment is a dangerous will O' the wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles.’

In the State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph Teachers' Training College, reported in (1991) 3 SCC page 87 the Apex Court observed that court cannot grant relief on humanitarian ground contrary to law.”

14. Regulation 16 of the Examination Bye-Laws defines ‘Private Candidates’ in the following terms:—

“For the purpose of the bye-laws contained in this chapter and in Chapter 5, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context, a ‘Private Candidate’ means a person who is not a Regular Candidate but, under the provisions of these bye-laws, is allowed to undertake and/or appear in the All India/Delhi Senior School Certificate Examination or All India/Delhi Secondary School Examination of the Board.”

15. Regulation 17 enumerates the persons eligible to appear as Private Candidate at Delhi Senior School Certificate (Class-XII) Examination and Regulation 18 reads thus:—

“Persons eligible to appear as Private Candidate at All India Senior School Certificate Examination (XII).

(i) A candidate who had failed at the All India Senior Certificate Examination of the Board will be eligible to reappear at a subsequent examination as a private candidate in the syllabus and text books as prescribed for the examination of the year in which he will reappear.

(ii) Teachers serving in educational institutions affiliated to the Board who have already passed Secondary or an equivalent examination at least two years before taking the Senior School Certificate Examination. Teacher candidates shall submit his application form along with a certificate by the Head of school in which they are serving duly countersigned by the Director of Education of the State/Union Territory concerned to the Regional Officer of the Board of the region in which the teacher is serving.”

Regulation 21 provides for person eligible to appear as a Private Candidate for All India Secondary School Examination in the following terms:—

“(i) A candidate who had failed at the All India Secondary School Examination of the Board, will be eligible to reappear at the subsequent examination as a private candidate in the syllabus and text books as prescribed for the examination of the year in which he will reappear;

(ii) Teachers serving in institutions affiliated to the Board.”

16. As the writ petitioners do not come with the said provision in our considered view the impugned direction could not have been issued. In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained and accordingly the appeal is allowed but as nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondents there will be no order as to costs.

Ronojit Kumar Mitra, J.:—I agree.

Appeal allowed.

K.G