1. Defendants 6 and 7 in O.S No. 105 of 1975 on the file of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry, are the appellants. 1st respondent filed the suit against respondents 2 to 5 and appellants seeking specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 28.8.1974 executed by them i.e, respondents 2 and 3 for themselves and respondent 2 as father and guardian of respondents 4 to 6 in favour of 1st respondent in respect of the properties specified in the plaint schedule (suit property).
2. The case of the 1st respondents is that the suit property is the joint family property of respondents 2 to 6 and that 2nd respondent as Kartha of the Joint Family of himself and his sons i.e, respondents 3 to 6 for the purpose of discharging the family debts agreed to sell the suit property for Rs. 25,000/- on 28.8.1974 and as per the terms agreed she paid an amount of Rs. 13,900/- towards full satisfaction of the debt due under the Mortgage Bond executed by respondents 2 to 6 in favour of Merla Manikyam and Goril Ramu and Rs. 1,325, and Rs. 3,425 towards full satisfaction of the amounts due under the promissory notes dated 5-12-1971 and 17-9-1971 respectively, executed by respondents 2 and 3 in favour of Merla Ramanna besides clearing the hand loan of Rs. 598/- due to the said Merla Ramanna, in all amounting to Rs. 19,248/-. The balance sale consideration of Rs. 5,752 is agreed to be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed on or before 27.8.1975 Possession of the suit property was given to her on the date of agreement. On 10-1-1975 3rd respondent for himself and as a guardian of respondents 4 to 6 received Rs. 1,000/- from out of the balance sale consideration under an endorsement on the reverse of the agreement of sale. She was ready and willing to perform her contract but respondents 2 to 6 were delaying execution of the sale deed. So, she got issued a registered notice dated 18.7.1975 calling upon them to execute and register a sale deed in her favour after receiving the balance amount due from her. Having received the said notice they did not either send a reply or comply with her demand; but on the other hand executed a sale deed in favour of the appellants in respect of the suit property. The alleged sale in favour of appellants is not binding on her since appellants have knowledge of the agreement of sale in her favour. Hence, the suit. Respondents 2 to 6 filed their written statement admitting their executing the agreement of sale dated 28.8.1974 in respect of the suit property in favour of the 1st respondent, and, contending that the said agreement was executed as a collateral security for the amount borrowed from Merla Manikyam mother of the 1st respondent under a registered mortgage deed dated 23.5.1971, and denied their having received Rs. 1,000/- on 10.1.1975, and they further alleged that they, in good faith, sold the suit property to the appellants in December 1974 for Rs. 30,000/- under an oral agreement to discharge of the mortgage debt due to the mother of the 1st respondent and for discharging the promissory note debts due to M. Satyanarayana and Jammula Venkaiah and informed the said fact to the 1st respondent by registered notice dated 17.1.1975 through her father, but he refused to receive the same and so the 1st respondent is not entitled to any relief in the suit.
3. Appellants filed a separate written statement denying knowledge of the agreement in respect of the suit property in favour of the 1st respondent and contending that they purchased the suit property under an oral agreement in December, 1974 for Rs. 30,000/- and discharged several debts due from respondents 2 to 6 to various persons and kept those discharged debt documents as vouchers and as they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the prior agreement in favour of the 1st respondent, 1st respondent is not entitled to enforce the agreement in her favour against them.
4. In support of her case, 1st respondent examined herself as P.W 1 and three other witnesses as P.Ws 2 to 4 and marked Exs. A-1 to A-24. No witnesses were examined on behalf of respondents 2 to 6. On behalf of the appellants, five witnesses were examined as D.Ws 1 to 5 and Exs. B-1 to B-19 were marked. The trial Court, disbelieving the contention of the appellants that they are bona fide purchasers for value, and holding that the vouchers for the sale deed relied on by them are all brought into existence, decreed the suit. Hence this appeal by defendants 6 and 7 in the suit.
5. The point for consideration is, whether the 1st respondent is entitled to enforce the agreement dated 28.8.1974 against the appellants also?
6. The agreement on the basis of which the suit is filed is admittedly long prior to the sale deed in favour of appellants. So it is clear that appellants are subsequent purchasers of the suit property. As per Sec. 19(b), of Specific Relief Act, 1963 a contract can be enforced against a person deriving title through the executants of the contract except a transferee for value, who has paid money in good faith, without notice of the original contract. In para 6 of the written statement filed by respondents 2 to 6, they specifically alleged that they sold the suit property to the appellants for discharging the mortgage debt due to Merla Ramanna and the promissory note debts due to Medikonda Satyanarayana and Jammula Venkaiah, after informing them [the appellants] that Merla Ramanna [father of 1st respondent] obtained the suit agreement as a collateral security. So it is clear that even before the appellants obtained the sale deed in respect of the suit property they were made aware of the agreement of sale in favour of 1st respondent.
7. In view of the language employed in Sec. 19(b) of Specific Relief Act, the subsequent purchaser has to establish that he paid money in good faith, without notice of the original contract. Since ‘good faith’ is not defined in Specific Relief Act, its meaning has to be understood from the definition of ‘good faith’ in General Clauses Act, 1897, Sub-sec. 22 of Sec. 3 of General Clauses Act, defined ‘good faith’ as “a thing shall be deemed to be done in ‘good faith’ if it is done honestly”. So, honesty is the essential condition in ‘good faith’. When appellants, were informed about the existence of the suit agreement in favour of the 1st respondent, appellants should have made enquiries from the 1st respondent to satisfy themselves whether the agreement in favour of 1st respondent is only a nominal one, as alleged by respondents 2 to 5. If they have not done so, it cannot be said that they acted honestly, and consequently it cannot be said that appellants acted in good faith.
8. The trial Court rightly disbelieved the contention that the suit agreement was executed as a collateral security for the mortgage transaction between respondents 2 to 5 and the mother of the 1st respondent, on the ground when there is a registered mortgage in respect of the very same property, question of obtaining an agreement of sale as a collateral security for securing repayment of the debt would be redundant.
9. The recitals in Ex. A.16, the original of which is Ex. B.7, the sale deed executed by respondents 2 to 5 in favour of the appellants, show that the sale was made for discharge of the mortgage debt due to Merla Manikyam, W/o. Ramanna of Kalijolla and Goli Ramu, S/o. Ammiraju of Visakhapatnam, Dated 23-1-1971, and for discharge of the debt due under promissory note dated 1-1-1971 in favour of Medikonda Satyanarayana, S/o. Narasanna of Mallavaram and the promissory note debt dated 1-1-1974 due to Jammula Venkaiah. When a property is sold to discharge a mortgage debt, any ordinary prudent purchaser would pay the amount due under the mortgage bond to the mortgagee and get an endorsement of payment made thereon and keep it as an voucher to his sale deed. Appellants did not produce the discharged mortgage bond but on the other hand 1st respondent produced the mortgage bond with an endorsement of payment made thereon, which shows that she paid the amount to the mortgagee in discharge of the said loan. Appellants produced Ex. B.12, promissory note dated 1-1-1971 said to have been executed by the respondent 2 and 3 in favour of Medikonda Satyanarayana, S/o. Narasanna of Mallavaram for Rs. 12,000/-. Ex. B.13 endorsement thereon shows that an amount of Rs. 500/- was paid on 15-12-1973 in partial discharge of the said debt. Ex. B.14 endorsement thereon shows that on 15-6-1975 an amount of Rs. 13,077/- was paid by appellants towards discharge of Ex. B.12 promissory note debt. If Ex. B.7 sale is made towards discharge of Ex. B.12 a recital should have been there in Ex. B.7 that the sale is being made towards discharge of Ex. B.12 The fact that the appellants instead discharging the mortgage debt referred to in Ex. B.7 produced Exs. B.12 promissory note establishes that it must have been brought into existence for the purpose of creating evidence to give a colour of reality to Ex. B.7 Similar is the case with Ex. B.8 and Ex. B.10 promissory notes. If Ex. B.8, B.9 and B.12 promissory notes are disbelieved, it means that the appellants have not paid the consideration to the respondents 2 to 6 under Ex. B.7 Thus both the ingredients of the appellants having paid the consideration and acting in good faith are lacking. Therefore, I held that 1st respondent can enforce the suit agreement against appellants also. The point is answered accordingly.
10. In view of my finding on the point for consideration, I find, no grounds to interfere with the decree of the trial court granting a decree for specific performance against the appellants also.
11. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.