JUDGMENT

2. Common questions of law arise for consideration in these writ appeals and the accompanying writ petitions which shall stand disposed of by this common Order. The questions primarily relate to the validity of the Notifications issued by the Land Acquisition Officer under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The challenge arises in the following backdrop:

3. A large extent of land measuring 92 acres 38 guntas situated in different survey numbers of villages Avalahalli and Harohalli, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk were notified for acquisition in terms of a Preliminary Notification dated, 30-5-1988 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The proposed acquisition was for the benefit of the appellant Trinity House Building Co-operative Society who intended to establish a residential layout for its Members in the same. The land owners filed their objections to the acquisition which were considered and over ruled by the Land Acquisition Officer culminating in the issue of a final declaration under section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 18-3-1989. Aggrieved by the said Notifications, some of the land owners filed a batch of writ petitions which came up before our esteemed brother Chandrashekaraiah, J., who by a common order dated. 11-7-1996 allowed the said petitions and quashed the acquisition proceedings. The learned Single Judge found that the facts of the case before him were identical to those in ‘H.M.T HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY v. SYED KHADER (ILR 1995 KAR 1962) in which the Supreme Court had quashed the acquisition proceedings for want of an approval for the housing scheme formulated by the beneficiary Society as required under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act, and on the ground that the power under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act had been exercised for extraneous considerations and at the instance of persons who had no role to play in the decision making process. The learned Single Judge further held that since the Government had not followed the procedure prescribed in Chapter-VII of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquisition was bad in law. The writ petitions were accordingly allowed and the Notifications impugned in the same quashed. Writ Appeals No. 7543-7557/1996 and 7558-7571/1996 assail the correctness of the said Judgment In accompanying writ petitions No. 24668-675/1996 and 30240/1996, the petitioner-owners have on similar grounds assailed the validity, of the preliminary and final notifications referred to earlier, no matter after a lapse of nearly eight years after the issue of the Preliminary Notification.

4. Appearing for the appellant-Society, Mr. Manjunath argued that the learned Single Judge had fallen in error in holding that the scheme underlying the acquisition had not been approved by the State Government in terms of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in KANAKA GRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANGHA v. SMT. NARAYANAMMA (SINCE DECEASED) BY LRs’ (AIR 2002 SC 3659), he argued that the approval for acquisition of the land was tantamount to an approval of the scheme within the meaning of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act. He further argued that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that the acquisition in the instant case was vitiated by reason of the influence exercised or the role played by M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises, the agent engaged by the Society for among other things establishing the proposed layout. He urged that there was no material whatsoever in the instant case to show that the acquisition proceedings had been influenced or in any way affected by the association or involvement of any outside agent. The view taken by the learned Single Judge regarding the applicability of Chapter-VII of the Land Acquisition Act was also assailed. It was submitted that since the acquisition in the instant case was for a public purpose as defined by Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, there was no need for taking resort to provisions of Chapter-VII nor had the proceedings been initiated under the said chapter. Writ petitions No. 24668-675/1996 were according to Mr. Manjunath barred by unexplained delay and hence liable to be dismissed.

5. Mr. C.B Srinivsasan, learned Counsel for the writ petitioners-respondents in these appeals on the other hand submitted that the challenge to the acquisition proceedings had in the light of the subsequent developments become academic and stood withdrawn in terms of a compromise petition filed by the appellant-Society and the respondent land owners. By reference to the compromise petition, he pointed out that in view of the all round developments in the area, it was no longer possible to use the land under acquisition for agricultural purposes especially when the owners had not cultivated the same ever since the issue of the preliminary notification in the year 1987. He prayed for the disposal of the writ appeals in terms of Para-9 of the Compromise Petition which runs as under:

“In the circumstances, the Respondents and the appellant have mutually agreed thai this Hon'ble Court be pleased to record the compromise and allow the Writ Appeals filed by the appellant, subject to the following conditions:

a) Order dated: 11.07.1996 of the learned Single Judge shall be set aside and, all challenge to the acquisition shall be deemed to be withdrawn by the respondents.

b) Appellant shall deposit with the Special LAO all further sums towards the compensation to be determined by the Special LAO by the time of preparation of the Award and that the respondents are entitled to withdraw the amount already in deposit and also all further amounts that would be deposited with the Special L.A.O by the appellant Society pursuant to the Award that may be passed by the Special L.A.O

c) That the appellant shall allot the respondents together a site measuring 30 Ft. × 40 Ft. per acre in the layout that would be formed by the appellant society as the land acquired from the respondents even it is less than one acre.

d) Each party has agreed that they shall bear their respective costs of litigation by them before the Learned Single Judge and in these appeals.”

6. Mr. Tajuddin, learned Counsel appearing for the State Government remained aloof and did no more than producing the relevant record. The absence of any specific stand on the issues that fall for consideration sufficiently shows that the Government have chosen to remain totally non-committal in the proceedings.

7. The Compromise Petition filed on behalf of the appellant Society and the land owners-respondents in these appeals could have been in the ordinary course accepted and the appeals disposed of in terms of what appears to be a mutually agreed formula, but for the fact that certain developments that have taken place after the disposal of the writ petitions by the learned Single Judge, have given rise to certain incidental questions that need to be addressed before the matter can be finally disposed of.

8. In Writ Appeals No. 7543-57/1996, I.As No. 13 to 19 seek addition of the applicants as party-respondents to the said appeals. The applications point out that the owners have in terms of different Sale Deeds registered in their favour transferred different parcels of land referred to therein subsequent to the pronouncement of the impugned Judgment of the learned Single Judge. I.As No. 2 to 4/2004 filed in the said appeals similarly seek addition of the applicants therein as parties to the appeals on the basis of Sale Deeds executed in fevour of the applicants in those IAs. The only difference between the applicants in I.As No. 13 to 19 on the one hand and I.As No. 2 to 4 on the other, is that while the former have been filed by those who have purchased different extents of land from the owners themselves, applicants in IAs No. 2 to 4 have purchased different extents of land from the owners acting through their Attorney Sri. S. Rangarajan.

9. In Writ Appeals No. 7558-71/1996 also, IAs No. 1 to 4/2004 have been filed by the applicants for addition, as parties on the basis of Sale Deeds executed by the owners through their Attorney Sri. S. Rangarajan.

10. Objections to all the impleading applications have been filed by the appellant-society and the land owners-respondents in the appeals. In so far as IAs No. 13 to 19 are concerned, Mr. C.B Srinivasan, Counsel appearing for the owners and Mr. Manjunath, learned Counsel for the appellant-Society did not have any objection to the applicants in the said applications being added as party-respondents to the appeals. It was submitted by learned counsel for the land owners that a part of the land notified for acquisition having been sold to the applicants in the said I.As, the purchasers could be added as parties subject to the condition that they did not take a stand contrary to the one taken by the owners who continued as parties to the case, it was also submitted by Mr. Srinivasan that respondents-owners would have no objection to the substitution of the purchasers in place of the owners so that the compensation payable for the acquisition of the land could be claimed and paid to the respective owners who could even ask for a reference to the Civil Court for enhancement of the said amount in case the same was not acceptable to them.

11. In so far as applicants in I.As No. 2 to 4/2004 in W.As No. 7543-57/1996 and I.As No. 1 to 4/2004 in W.As No. 7558-7571/1996 were concerned, the said applicants could not according to M/s. Manjunath and Srinivasan claim addition as parties to the appeals as the Sale Deeds executed in their favour were fraudulent and totally unauthorised. It was submitted that the applicants in the said applications were none other than the family members of Sri. S. Rangarajan, the agent appointed by the Society for establishing the layout and for assisting the Society in the matter of getting the lands acquired for that purpose. The agent had obtained a Power of Attorney from the land owners which document was intended to be used for the solitary purpose of transferring ownership of the land in question from the owners to the society. Contrary to that purpose, the Attorney had fraudulently executed Sale Deeds in respect of different portions of land in favour of his close relatives thereby betraying the trust reposed in him by the owners as also the society. Such documents could not it was contended be relied upon by the beneficiaries of such fraudulent acts for seeking addition as party-respondents in the appeals.

12. Appearing for the impleading applicants in I.As No. 1 to 4/2004 to W.As No. 7543-57/1996, Mr. Visveswara, learned Senior Counsel strenuously argued that the documents executed in favour of the applicants in those IAs could not be said to be fraudulent. He referred to us the contents of the Power of Attorney to canvass that while the transfer of the land in favour of the society may have been the predominant purpose underlying the execution of the said document, yet in the absence of such transfer by acquisition or otherwise, the Attorney had been given the power to transfer the lands in favour of anyone else. The Sale Deeds executed by the Attorney in favour of the applicants in the above applications could not therefore be treated to be non-est, fraudulent or invalid so as to deny to the applicants the right to defend the Judgment delivered in favour of the erstwnile owners by the learned Single Judge, which Judgment must now enure to the benefit of the Purchasers from them. It was further argued that the learned Single Judge was justified in holding that the acquisition proceedings had in the instant case been vitiated because of the involvement of an outside agency with the same. It was submitted that the Committees appointed by the Government from time to time especially the G.V.K Rao Committee appointed to examine the genuineness of the membership of the Societies had pointed out several irregularities which if taken proper note of would have resulted in the request for acquisition being turned down. Since however the agent appointed by the Society was pro-active, a decision to acquire the lands was taken despite the irregularities only because the agent had influenced the said decision.

13. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. The following questions arise for consideration:

1) Whether the purchasers from the land owners pendente lite are entitled to be added as party respondents to the appeals.

2) Whether the acquisition proceedings were initiated without a public purpose and/or for extraneous considerations,

3) Whether the acquisition proceedings were vitiated on account of the association of any outside agency with the same.

4) Whether connected writ petitions No. 24668-24675/1996, 30240/1996 are barred by delay and laches or otherwise make cut a case for interference with the acquisition proceedings, and

5) Whether the compromise arrived at between the owners on the one hand and the society on the other can be made a basis for disposal, of the appeals.

Re: Question No. 1: -

14. There are two categories of purchasers seeking addition as parties to these proceedings. Those who have purchased the property from the owners and are represented by Mr. Chalapathy and those who have purchased the property from Sri. S. Rangarajan the attorney appointed by the owners. According to the appellant-Society and the owners the former can be added as parties subject to the condition that they claim only such rights as are available to the owners in so for as payment of compensation and reference of the matters to the Civil Court for enhancement is concerned. They cannot according to the learned counsel take up the challenge to the validity of the notifications which the owners have now given up. The compromise between the appellant society and the respondent owners is accordmg to them binding on their transferees pendente lite. We do not however think that the owners who have sold the property to the impleading applicants can impose any condition as to the addition of the applicants as parties. Once it is admitted that the owners have sold the disputed property or a portions thereof to the impleading applicants in terms of sale deeds executed in their favour such persons will be entitled to step into the shoes of the original owners and to continue the pending litigation. The argument that the purchasers must be deemed to have purchased the property subject to the condition that they will not in the event of a compromise between the owners and the Society, assail the validity of any such settlement has not impressed us. The original owners in our opinion cease to have any interest in the property or the litigation regarding the same no sooner they transfer their interest in favour of a third party. They cannot after such a transfer enter into any compromise or settlement which may jeopardize the interest of the purchaser leave alone bind the purchaser with any such compromise. In law and equity, the seller has in any such pending litigation only one obligation and that is to do everything legally possible to make good the title of the purchaser. That is not however what the owners intend to do in this case by insisting that the transfer in favem of the impleading applicants must remain subject to their right to enter into a settlement. The owners are by saying so trying to prevent the purchasers from retaining the property on all such grounds as may be legally available to them including the right to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on grounds already urged in the writ petitions filed by the sellers. The correct position in law therefore appears to us to be that once a sale has taken place the purchaser pendente lite would be entitled to step into the shoes of the seller and continue the litigation to assert his right to hold the property including the right to assail the proceedings for acquisition of the same if any. The purchasers would from the date of the purchase be entitled to insist on their addition as parties and to urge all such grounds as were available in the pending litigation instituted by the original writ petitioners from whom they have purchased the property. We therefore see no justification for directing a qualified addition of the applicants as parties to these proceedings. The property having been sold ‘pendente lite’ which expression it was common ground would include sales/transfers made at any time before the expiry of period of limitation for filing an appeal, the purchasers must be added as party respondents to the appeals and given an opportunity to urge whatever grounds were available or may have been available to the original writ petitioners in the petitions filed by them.

15. Even in regard to the impleading applicants who have purchased the property from the attorney holder of the owners, we do not find any ground to decline the prayer for their addition as party respondents. Learned counsel for the parties argued at considerable length that the power of attorney executed in favour of Sri. Rangarajan did not authorise him to execute a sale inf avour of his own son or daughter. The primary purpose of the power of attorney was to transfer the property in favour of the Society which purpose has according to the Society and the owners been frustrated by the attorney executing a sale in favour of his close relations for consideration wholly in commensurate with the value of the market value.

16. There is no manner of doubt that the dominant object behind the execution of the power of attorney was to ensure transfer of title qua the property in favour of the Society. There is also no doubt that the power of attorney authorises the attorney to sell the property in question for the benefit of the Society or as desired by him. This is evident from para 1 of the power of attorney which reads as under:

“To negotiate and sell or get acquired the schedule property or part thereof and to sign the agreement, sale deeds, conveyances and to present the same before Sub-Registrars and to receive consideration thereof either before Sub-Registrars or otherwise as per terms and conditions of the agreement already entered into by me/us for the benefit of the said Society or as desired by my/our attorney, “(emphasis supplied).

17. The expression “as desired by my/our attorney” empowers the attorney to make a sale at his discretion. Whether or not the said expression could in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case be invoked by the attorney to make a sale in favour of his own relations and at a price at which the same was made are matters which we need not examine at length, in the present proceedings. Those issues do not directly fell for consideration before us in the appeals. What is significant is that the sale deeds in favour of the impleading applicants purport to transfer title over the properly in their favour for valuable consideration. For the limited purpose of determining whether the purchasers are entitled to be added as parties, all that need be said is that so long as the instruments of sale remain unchallenged in proper civil actions before the competent court, the purchasers under the same are entitled to be added as party-respondents in any proceedings relating to the property purchased by them under such instruments. The decision of the Supreme Court in KHEMCHAND SHANKAR CHOUDHARI v. VISHNU HARI PATIL, ((1983) 1 SCC 18) relied upon by Mr. Vishweswara lends considerable support to his submission that a transferee pendente lite is entitled to be added as party to the proceedings under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC. The following passage is in this regard apposite:-

“6. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act no. doubt lays down that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in an immovable property which is the subject matter of a suit from any of the parties to the suit will be bound in so far as that interest is concerned by the proceedings in the suit. Such a transferee is a representative in interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest Rule 10 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly recognises the right of a transfer to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and to be heard before any order is made, it may be that if he does not apply to be impleaded, he may suffer by default on account of any order passed in the proceedings. But if he applies to be impleaded as a party and to be heard, he has got to be so impleaded and heard. He can also prefer an appeal against an order made in the said proceedings but with the leave of the appellate court where he is not already brought on record. The position of a person on whom any interest has devolved on account of a transfer during the pendency of any suit or a proceeding is somewhat similar to the position of an heir or a legatee of a party who dies during the pendency of a suit or a proceeding, or an Official Receiver who takes over the assets of such a party on his insalvency. An heir or a legatee or an Official Receiver or a transferee can participate in the execution proceedings even though their names may not havs been shown in the decree, preliminary or final. If they apply to the court to be impleaded as parties they cannot be turned out.”

18. To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in SHEW BUX MOHATA v. BENGAL BREWERIES LTD., (AIR 1961 SC 137) and SAILA BALA DASSI v. NIRMALA SUNDARI DASSI (AIR 1958 SC 394). In the totality of the above circumstances, the impleading applications shall have to be allowed and the impleading applicants added as party respondents to the appeals. Question No. 1 is accordingly answered in the affirmative; and the impleading applicants added as party respondents in the appeals.

Re: Question No. 2:

19. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act envisages issue of a preliminary notification whenever any land is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company. Section 6 on the other hand provides for a decimation to be made after a report under Section 5-A is submitted, that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. The scheme of the enactment thus provides for acquisition for a public purpose or for companies. In the case of acquisitions for companies, the procedure to be followed is set out in Chapter-VII of the Act whereas acquisitions for a public purpose have to be made under Chapter-II of the Act. It is not in dispute that the acquisition in the instant case purported to be for a public purpose. The expression “public purpose” has been defined in Section - 3(f) of the Act. Acquisitions for carrying out any housing scheme by a co-operative society, are also considered to be for a public purpose in terms of Section 3(f)(vi) which reads as under.

“The provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or shim clearance scheme sponsored by Government or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority, or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, or a co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State.”

20. A closer examination of the above would show that the land requirement of a Co-operative Society con be considered to be a public purpose only if the same its preceded by approval of the appropriate Government In ‘NARAYANA RAJU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA’ (ILR 1989 KAR 406) the question whether the acquisition for purposes of carrying out a housing scheme by the Co-operative Society would constitute a public purpose fell for consideration of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and was answered in the affirmative in the following paragraph:

“After hearing Counsel, we are satisfied that no question of law any substantial importance arises in these appeals which requires to be determined by us. The facts found show that, the acquisition was for the purpose of carrying out a housing scheme by a co-operative society within the meaning of the law relating to the co-operative societies in force in the State of Karnataka. That purpose was a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, before its amendment in 1984 as well as after that amendment. Hence, the question whether the purpose of acquisition in this case was a public purpose is a simple question answer to which is quite clear and it must be in the affirmative. This question therefore cannot be said to be a substantial question of law at all.”

21. What then remains to be examined is whether there was an approval by the appropriate Government to the scheme formulated by the Co-operative Society concerned. Even that aspect stands concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in ‘KANAKA GRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANGHA v. SMT. NARAYANAMMA (SINCE DEGEASED) BY LRs’ [AIR 2002 SC 3669]. Their Lordships were in that case examining whether the approval of the State Government in terms of a letter addressed to the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, constituted an approval within the contemplation of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act. The communication relied upon by the society in that case was in the following words:

“Dated 14-11-1985

The Revenue Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Bangalore. The Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore.

Sub: Acquisition of Land in Sy. Nos. 19/2, 26, 29 of Kadirenahalli village and Sy. No. 29/3 of Konanakunt village Bangalore South Taluk in favour of Kanaka Gruhaniramana Sahakara Sangha, Bangalore.

I am directed to convey the approval of Government to initiate acquisition proceedings by issuing 4(1) notification in respect of lands measuring 8 acres 03 guntas as recommended by the Official Committee in Sy. Nos. 19/2, 26, 29 of Kadirertahall village and Sy. No. 29/3 of Kenanakunte village, Bangalore South Taluk in favour of Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara Sangha, Bangalore.

Yours faithfully,

(Mandi Hussain)

Under Secretary to Government

Revenue Department.

Copy to the President, Kanaka Gruha Nirmana Sahakara No. 435 Middle School Road, V.V Puram, Bangalore-4.”

22. Their Lordships noted that the State Government had issued the approval after having the requirement of the society assessed by the Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Societies and after the matter was placed before the three member committee for scrutiny. The approval for acquisition granted in that background was construed by the court as an approval within the meaning of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court observed:

“17. Considering the fact that State Government directed the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies of Bangalore to verify the requirement of the members of the Society and also the fact that the matter was placed before the Committee of three Members for scrutiny and thereafter the State Government has conveyed its approval for initiating the proceedings for acquisition of the land in question by letter dated 14-11-1985. It cannot be said that there is lapse in observing the procedure prescritesd under Section 3(f)(vi). Prior approval is granted after due verification and scrutiny.”

23. The approval granted in the instant case is exacuy on the same lines as was granted in Kana Gruha's case. The letter granting approval in favour of the appellant-Society was as under:

“GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA

Karnataka Government Secretariat,

Vidhana Soudha,

Bangalore, dated 26.11.1987

No. RD 77 AQB 86

The Revenue Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, Bangalore.

The Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore.

Sub: Acquisition of land in favour of Trinity House Building Co-op. Society.

I am directed to convey the approval of Government for initiating the acquisition proceedings for an extent of 94-18 acres of land in Avalahalli and Herohalli village in favour of Trinity House Building Co-op. Society as recommended by the 3 men Committee and the State Level Co-ordination Committee.

The extent of land to be notified under Section 4(1) may be selected out of the list of Sy. No. furnished by the 3 men committee.

Action taken in the matter may be reported to Government early.

Yours faithfully,

Sd/- Mandi Hussain,

Under Secretary to Government,

Revenue Department.

Copy to the Secretary, Trinity House Building Co-operative Society Ltd., C/o Diocesan Office, No. 20, 3 Cross, CSI Compound, Mission Road, Bangalore-27”

24. As in the case of Kanaka Gruna supra, so also in the present case, the approval order was issued by the State Government after the Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Societies had verified the requirement of the members of the Society and the Committee of three members had scrutinized the same. On the analogy of what was held by the Supreme Court in Kanaka Gruha's case, we have no difficulty in holding that the approval granted in the instant case also sufficiently satisfied the requirements of Section 3(i)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act, Question No. 2 is in the light of the above answered in the negative.

Re: Question No. 3:

25. The Writ Petitions did not lay any foundation for the contention that the land acquisition proceedings were vitiated on account of association of an outside agency with the same. The petitions did not contain any allegation to the effect that an outside agency irrespective of who that agency was had influenced the statutory authorities in the matter of initiation and/or completion of the said proceedings. A contention to the effect that the involvement of outside agencies in the proceedings had vitiated the same was for the first time raised in the rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioners-owners. In the opinion of the learned Single Judge, a ground raised in the rejoinder could also be urged by the petitioner if no prejudice was caused to the respondents. The learned Single Judge offered the following reasoning in support of that conclusion:

“Firsily, I propose to consider the objections of the 4 respondent regarding the additional grounds raised in the rejoinder. What has been raised in the rejoinder is on the basis of the Annexures produced by the 4 respondent along with its statement of objacticns. When such being the case, there is no prejudice or harm that will be caused to the 4 respondent if it is allowed to raise the same, on the basis of the materials produced by the 4 respondent. Therefore, the said contention of 4 respondent is rejected and petitioners are permitted to raise the ground as stated in the Rejoinder.”

26. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions made at the bar, we find it difficult to subscribe to the view expressed by the learned Single Judge. The question whether there was an outside agency and if so, whether any such agency had influenced the statutory authorities concerned in the matter of imitation and/or completion of the acquisition proceedings was a pure and simple question of fact. Any such question could have been raised and examined by the Court only in case a proper foundation for the same had been laid by the petitioners-owners in the writ petitions filed by them. The feet that the Society had filed a statement of objections and made a reference to the agreement executed by it with M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises did not relieve the petitioners of the obligation to make proper factual averments in the writ petitions Prejudice to the respondents by reason of the absence of any such averments was implicit and need not have been additionally demonstrated. In the absence of a specific plea in the writ petitions, the respondents had no occasion to show that there was dither no outside agency engaged for purposes of influencing the statutory authorities or that even if any outside agency had been engaged, the same had not in fact influenced the said authorities. The learned Single Judge was in our view in error in holding that the contention raised in the rejoinder could be allowed to be urged even in the absence of a specific plea in the writ petition to that effect. It is true that the petitioners had made an application for urging certain additional grounds in support of the petition but the record does not bear any evidence of the fact that the said request was allowed and the additional grounds permitted to be raised. That being the state of the pleadings, the question whether there was an outside agency and if so whether it had influenced the statutory authorities did not truly arise for consideration before the learned Single Judge.

27. Even otherwise the facts as available on record fell short of making out a case for quashing the acquisition proceedings on the ground that the so called outside agency had influenced the acquisition proceedings. The appellant-Society had entered into an agreement with M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises represented by Sri. S. Rangarajan, its proprietor on 12.3.1985 M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises were according to the said agreement working as contractors, representatives, estate agents and builders who had it appears entered into different sale agreements with owners of the lands situated in different survey numbers of Harohalli and Avalahalli of Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The agreement executed between the Society and the agent interalia stated that M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises had offered its services to the Society in the matter of securing sale of the said lands in favour of the Society from the owners thereof free from any encumbrances. The agreement interalia provided that M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises would secure in the name of the first party the lands in question by way of acquisition and that it will arrange to initiate land acquisition proceedings as per the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act. The agreement also envisaged preparation of the layout plan as per the Regulations of the BDA or Town Planning Authority and its sanction by the authority competent to do so. M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises was in terms of the agreement required to execute the layout in accordance with the sanctioned layout plans under the overall supervision of the BDA and to get the sites released from the said authority in favour of the Society, The layout work included leveling of lands, laying of roads, metalling, forming road side open drains, culverts, getting water connection from the BWSSB. In consideration of the Services to be rendered by Srioivasa Enterprises, the Society had agreed to pay a sum at the rate of 160 per sq. yard in respect of the actual sital area after getting the approval of the lay out plan inclusive of the cost of the entire land purchased, layout charges payable to BDA for supervision and towards water supply, sanitary and electrical facilities etc., The agreement also set out the mode of payment to be made to the contractor-Srinivasa Enterprises.

28. The above agreement was followed by a supplementary agreement dt. 5.3.1992 by which the original agreement as levised by the said supplementary agreement was to remain in force for a period of 5 years for completion and fulfillment of the terms and conditions stipulated therein. The supplementary agreement envisaged payment to Srinivasa Enterprises at the rate of Rs. 170 per sq. yard based on the sital area excluding the layout charges which was to be fixed at the time of taking up of the execution of the layout work by the contractor. It is common ground that the parties had by mutual consent extended the life of the agreement upto 30.6.1990

29. The execution of the above agreements was it appears made a basis for holding that the initiation and the continuance of the acquisition proceedings had been influenced by an outside agency which according to the learned Single Judge vitiated the said proceedings. It was according to the learned Single Judge these agreements which brought the case of the appellant-Society at par with the case of the H.M.T Employee's House Building Co-operative Society dealt with by the Supreme Court in H.M.T HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY v. SYED KHADER (ILR 1995 KAR 1962].

30. Before we advert to HMT's case supra, it is necessary to briefly recall the background in which the entire controversy surrounding acquisition of lands for House Building Societies had arisen. In the mid 1980s, a large number of House Building Co-operative Societies in Bangalore were seen purchasing lands from the land owners or under the Land Acquisition Act for formation of Housing Layouts, This uncontrolled process of acquisition was in the opinion of the Authorities resulting in unplanned and haphazard expansion of the City of Bangalore creating acute problems for an orderly development of the growing metropolis. It was in that background that the Government issued an Order on 18-6-1985 freezing the acquisition of land in Bangalore House Building Societies in Bangalore Metropolitan Area. The acquisition of land for 75 House Building Societies was however allowed to continue subject to the clearance of a three Member Committee appointed by the Government for scrutiny of such proposals. The guidelines given by the Government were reviewed and the three Member Committee reconstituted in terms of another Government Order dated. 23-6-1986. By the said Order, apart from reconstituting the three Member Committee, the Government referred to the said Committee, 49 additional cases of acquisitions for House Building Societies as detailed in the annexure to the said order. The appellant-Trinity House Building Society was one of those mentioned in the said list. The Government however did not alter the cut off date earlier prescribed for registration of societies or for enrollment of the Members in the same. The result was that in all cases except the cases of Employees' House Building Co-operative Societies, the acquisition proceedings were allowed to go on subject to verification of claims and requirements of the society only in case the Society had been registered before 30-6-1984. The allotment of sites was also permissible only in favour of such Members as had been admitted before the 30-6-1984.

31. By another Order dated. 30-4-1987, the Government disposed of the representations received from various Housing Societies seeking relaxation of cut off date for registration of the societies and enrollment of members in the same. While declining the request for extension of time for registration of societies beyond 30-6-1984, the Government directed that the Societies registered subsequent to that date will have to approach the Bangalore Development Authority for bulk allotment of land as provided for in the earlier Government Order dated. 18-6-1985. In respect of 128 Societies already approved by the Government i.e, 79 societies originally approved and 49 added in terms of Government Order dated. 23-6-1986, fresh membership was allowed to the extent of the lands already available with the societies subject to certain conditions stipulated in that regard. More significantly, the Government constituted a State Level Co-ordination Committee comprising six members including the Revenue Commissioner as its Chairman to examine the recommendations of the three Member Committee which was by the said order reconstituted with the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore as its Convenor. The Order laid down certain guidelines for the State level Co-ordination Committee to follow while clearing cases for acquisition in favour of the societies that had been approved.

32. It is evident from the material placed on record that the case of the appellant-society was considered by the State Level Co-ordination Committee in its Meeting held on 25-9-1987 and based on the verification of the Membership of the society as reported by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies as also audit reports of the said society, the State Level Co-ordination Committee approved acquisition of a total extent of 94 acres and 18 guntas of land in villages of Harohalli and Avalahalli in Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. It was on the basis of the clearance thus granted by the Committees that the State Government had issued an approval in terms of its communication dated. 26-11-1987 extracted in the earlier part of this Judgment.

33. Barely four months after the issue of the aforementioned approval, allegations regarding bogus membership of the societies and execution of what was described as bogus agreement with land owners and estate agents and such other irregularities led to the appointment of Sri. G.V.K Rao, Controller of Weights and Measures as an Enquiry Officer in terms of an Order passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under section 64 of the Kamataka Co-operative Societies Act, Upon the receipt of the report from Sri. G.V.K Rao, the Government appears to have constituted a Cabinet Sub-Committee to take a final decision in the matter. This Sub-Committee was expected to propose the contours of the policy which will cover all the existing cases of House Building Co-operative Societies as well as the action to be taken by the authorities concerned in future. In the meantime, since the issue of declarations under Section 6 of the Act were getting time barred, such declarations were allowed to be made. The Government had also it appears taken a decision not to hand over the possession of the lands acquired in favour of these societies pending consideration of the matter by the Cabinet Sub-committee and the decision of the Government in the light of the recommendations of the said Sub-Committee. Directions were also issued by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies prohibiting the Societies from allotting any site to any one within the Bangalore Development Authority limits. It was at that stage that the first batch of the writ petitions filed in this Court by Narayana Reddy were heard by a Division Bench of this Court and allowed in terms of an Order reported in ILR 1991 KAR 2248. Several contentions were urged on behalf of the petitions in the said case. Among others, it was contended that the clearance of the acquisition proposals by the three member committee was stage managed by the Government as the agents had influenced the authorities to acquire the land for the Societies because of which the Committee was not interested in finding out the genuineness of the scheme proposed by such Societies, Relying upon the report submitted by G.V.K Rao, it was argued that acquisition for the Societies was not supported by any public purpose especially when the Societies were found to have committed irregularities in granting membership and in engaging middlemen for acquiring the land. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in SMT. SOMAWANTI v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB (AIR 1963 SC 151) and THE COLLECTOR (DISTT. MAGISTRATE), ALLAHABAD v. RAJA RAM JAISWAL (AIR 1985 SC 1622), the Court held that the final declaration issued by the authorities u/s 6 of the Act was liable to be struck down if the Court came to the conclusion that the exercise of power was not bonafide. In support of that finding, the Court held that the agreements entered into between Societies and the agents and the huge amounts advanced to the agents in order to procure the preliminary and final notifications were opposed to public policy and totally exposed the want of bonafides on the part of the Societies, The preliminary and final notifications were accordingly held to have been issued only because the agents had been engaged to influence the government and procure the preliminary and final notifications under the Land Acquisition Act in which purpose the agents were successful despite want of bonifies on the part of the Societies concerned. The writ petitions were in that view allowed and the notifications quashed.

34. The correctness of the above decision was tested before the Supreme Court in an appeal filed by H.M.T House Building Co-operative Society, One of the questions that was argued before their Lordships was whether the acquisition proceedings were supported by a public purpose as defined u/s 3(f)(vi) of the Land Acquisition Act. The said question was formulated by their Lordships in the following words.

“18. Now the question which is to be answered is as in whether in view of the definition of “public purpose” introduced by the aforesaid amending Act 68 of 1984 in Section 3(f)(vi) is it open to the appropriate Government to acquire land for co-operative society for Housing Scheme without making proper enquiry about the members of the Society and without putting such Housing Co-operative Society to term in respect of nature of construction the area to be allotted to the members and restrictions on transfer thereof?”

35. Answering the above in the negative, the Apex Court held that prior approval of the appropriate government as required u/s 3(f)(vi) was not just a formality but a condition precedent for the exercise of the power of acquisition by the appropriate government. The Court observed:

“In spite of the repeated query, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant Society could not point out or produce any order of the State Government under Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act granting prior approval and prescribing conditions and restrictions in respect of the use of the lands which were to be acquired for a public purpose. Them is no restriction or bar on the part of the appelant Society on carving out the size of the plots or the manner of allotment or in respect of construction over the same. That is why the framers of the Act. have requited the appropriate Government to grant prior approval of any Housing Scheme presented by any co-operative society before the lands are acquired treating such requirement and acquisition for public purpose. It is incumbent on part of the appropriate Government while granting approval to examine different aspects of the matter so that it may serve the public interest and not the interest of few ho can as well afford to acquire such lands by negotiation in open market. According to us. the State Government has not granted the prior approval in terms of Section S(f)(vi) of the Act to the Housing Scheme in question. The power under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act has been exercised for extraneous consideration and at the instance of the persons, who had no role in the decision making process - whether the acquisition of the lands in question shall be for a public purpose. This itself is enough to vitiate the whole acquisition proceeding and render the same as invalid.”

36. The Court also affirmed the finding recorded by this High Court that the notifications u/s 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act had been issued because of the role played by M/s. S.R Constructions engaged by the Societies in that case and observed:

“On the materials on record, High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been initiated because the State Government was satisfied about the existence of the public purpose but at the instance of agent who had collected more than a Crore of Rupees for getting the lands acquired by the State Government.”

37. Two aspects clearly stand, out from the decision of the Supreme Court in HMT's case. The first is that the acquisition proceedings were held to be legally bad for want of a proper approval of the Housing Scheme being promoted by the Co-operative Society as required u/s 3(f)(vi) of the Act The second aspect is that the material on record was found to sufficiently establish that the acquisition proceedings had been initiated not because the government was satisfied about the existence of the public purpose but because the agents appointed by the Societies had influenced the initiation of such proceedings having collected more than a crore of rupees for doing so.

38. What remains to be examined in the present cases is whether the principles enumerated by the Supreme Court in HMT's case have any application here. Two distinct principles which the decision of the Supreme Court in HMT's case lays down are i) that before the requirement of the Co-operative Society for land acquisition can constitute a public purpose, it must be shown that the government had approved the Housing Scheme being promoted by the Society, Abssence of any such scheme or approval there of would vitiate any acquisition proceedings if the beneficiary happens to be a Co-operative Society and ii) if the land acquisition proceedings are influenced by any outside agent or extraneous consideration, the same would stand vitiated on that account also.

39. In so far as the approval of the Scheme by the appropriate government is concerned, the issue has been examined independentiy while dealing with question No. 2 above. The approval granted by the Government to the Housing Scheme has as observed earlier been found to satisfy the requirements of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act on the authority of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Kanaka Gruha's case supra. We need not therefore examine that aspect over again.

40. That leaves us with the question whether the acquisition proceedings in the instant cases were like those in HMT's case influenced by any outside agent or extraneous consideration. Apart from the fact that the writ petitions had not laid any foundation in the petitions for advancing any such argument, the burden of proving that any outside agent had influenced the concerned statutory authorities to initiate the acquisition proceedings or to continue with the same would undoubtedly lie with the party who alleges that any such influence was brought to bear upon any such decision making process. That burden may be discharged by direct or even by circumstantial evidence. What is however significant is that the burden to prove that statutory authorities were influenced in taking a particular decision by extraneous reasons is heavy and would call for cogent and reliable material to discharge the same. The evidence must inspire the confidence of the Court and if tile same is circumstantial in nature, it must unerringly lead to the conclusion that the decision to initiate acquisition proceedings could not have been taken except for the reason that the authority taking the decision had been influenced by an outside agent or corrupted by any extraneous consideration.

41. Mr. Vishweswara, learned senior counsel appearing for the transferees pendente lite, argued that the authorities had been influenced to take steps for acquisition of the lands by bribing them with the help of money which the agent had collected from the Society. Mr. Chalapathy, also adopted that line of argument in an attempt to show that the proceedings in the instant case had indeed been vitiated because of the involvement of an outside agent and the influence that he managed to weild over the statutory authorities. That being the basis on which influence is alleged to have worked on the authorities, any finding to the effect that the authorities had indeed been influenced by the agent appointed by the Societies would in essence amount to indicting the authorities at different levels for corruption and bribery. A finding from this Court to the effect that an outside agents had for extraneous considerations influenced the authorities in taking decisions which they were supposed to take objectively and fairly may even provide a basis for appropriate criminal proceedings against the authorities concerned for it would go without saying that any such finding would clearly suggest abuse of power by the authorities for extraneous reasons. Suffice it to say that the standard of proof of the alleged influence is much highet having regard to the nature of the allegations and the implications that the same will have.

42. We also need to keep in mind the fact that the allegations of bribery or submission to extraneous influence by the concerned authorities are being made without impleading the individuals against whom the said allegations are made. Neither the agent who is said to have bribed the authorities nor the individuals who exercised the authority at the relevant point of time have been impleaded as parties to these proceedings. A finding regarding bribe having been paid and received in order to initiate or continue the acquisition proceedings for the benefit of the Societies would therefore be a finding recorded in the absence of the alleged giver or the alleged taker of the bribe.

43. Time now to examine the basis on which the allegation that the authorities had been influenced is sought to be substantiated. The first and foremost reason why the proceedings must according to M/s. Visweswara and Chalapathy be said to be vitiated by influence or extraneous considerations is that the report submitted by Sri. GVK Rao had pointed out irregularities committed by the Society in granting membership. These irregularities were sufficient according to the learned counsel to decline the request for compulsory acquisition of land, if only the authorities had applied their mind and taken an objective decision. The final declaration issued in the teeth of the report of G.V.K Rao, can only mean that the same was issued for extraneous considerations.

44. There is in our opinion no merit in that contention. The Preliminary Notification is admittedly issued long before the submission of the report by Sri. G.V.K Rao. Even the final declaration under section 6 of the Act was preceded by the scrutiny of the appellant's case by the three Member Committee and the State Level Co-ordination Committee, The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies had on the basis of the audit reports of the Society and his own inspection of the records verified the membership of the Society. The State Level Committee had thereafter cleared appellant's case for acquisition of land. The Government had in turn acting on the basis of the said clearance granted its approval for continuance of the acquisition proceedings in terms of its communication dated. 26-11-1987. The fact that Sri. G.V.K Rao was asked to look into the allegations of bogus membership of over one hundred societies also goes to show that the authorities were not making any attempt to ignore or sweep under the carpet such allegations. Upon submission of the report by Sri. G.V.K Rao, a Cabinet Sub-Committee to examine the issue had been constituted which was to address itself to all pending cases and recommend the adoption of a proper policy in regard to similar matters in future. The issue of a final declarations subject to any such further scrutiny by the Government because of the constraints of time within which such declarations had to be made could not therefore be said to be unwarranted or motivated by any corrupt design. The inference sought to be drawn by learned counsel for the purchasers from the report submitted by Sri. G.V.K Rao and the issue of a final declaration does not therefore bear closer scrutiny.

45. The fact that the authorities had while permitting the issue of final declarations taken care to ensure that the societies would not allot any site to any member is also a material circumstance to show that the authorities were alive to the possibility of undeserving persons getting sites allotted in their favour and had taken care to prevent such allotments. The report submitted by Sri. G.V.K Rao in regard to different societies including the appellant herein primarily dealt with the alleged irregularities in the admission of members into the same. The appellant Society does appear to have explained the circumstances in which the irregularities pointed out by Sri, G.V.K Rao had occurred. It had it appears obtained affidavits from all the members who had made deposits for allotment of sites to the effect that neither the member nor any one out of his family owned a site or house in Bangalore. The report does not however deal with the tenability of the explanation except saying that the explanation that the irregularities were caused by inexperience and ignorance did not carry conviction as some of the senior Government Officers were also members of the society. While dealing with the relationship of M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises with the society, the report far from alleging that the money collected by the agent had been used to influence the authorities for initiating the acquisition proceedings, found fault with the society in making such advances to the agent without taking proper security from him. The report points an accusing finger against the management of the Society rather than the authorities who are said to have been bribed by the agent employed by it.

46. Suffice it to say that the nature of the irregularities pointed out cannot possibly support the conclusion that the issue of the final declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was vitiated by extraneous influence or corrupt motives on the part of the authorities handling the acquisition proceedings. Even assuming that the regularities found in the membership of the society or the imprudence of the advance made to the agent in connection with the proposed layout are conclusions which are justified on the material placed before the reporting authority, the very fact that such irregularities had been noticed did not and cannot possibly lead to the inference that the issue of final declaration was influenced by the agent or that the same was vitiated by any extraneous considerations. To hold otherwise would tantamount to saying that every erroneous order must be presumed to have been passed for a corrupt motive or under the influence of an outside agent. There is in our view no warrant for drawing any such inference nor does experience show that every error or defect in legal proceedings is induced by some extraneous consideration.

47. It was next contended by M/s. Visweswara and Chalapathy that the execution of agreements between the appellant-Society and M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises itself signified that the purpose underlying the said agreement was illegal and contrary to public policy and that the agent had indeed influenced the authorities, while initiating and continuing the acquisition proceedings.

48. There are two reasons why that contention cannot be accepted. In the first place, the Agreements executed between the appellant-Society and M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises did not envisage leave alone oblige the agent to influence either the Government or any other statutory authority, to do something which is not legally permissible The submission made by the learned Counsel proceeds on an assumption that just because M/s. Srinivasa Enterprises was required to approach the authorities for initiating the proceedings for acquisition of the land required by the society, it meant that the agent was supposed to influence the decision making process by either bribing the authorities or using other means. There is in our opinion no real basis for that contention. It is no doubt true that the Society had engaged the services of an agent who had struck a composite deal with the Society including the construction of roads, drainages etc, besides lending assistance in pursuing the acquisition proceedings, but, while pursuing that object before the authorities, the agent was not required or supposed to use any corrupt means. The agent was required to represent the Society's case before the Authorities. It is nobody's case that the society could net have appointed an Attorney or an agent with or without a remunerative angle to such allotment for acting on behalf of the Principal in the matter of pursuing what was and could indeed be a legitimate exercise involving acquisition of lands in accordance with law. That is all the more true in a case where the agent was not only meant to pursue the matter with the Government and other agencies on behalf of the society but was in terms of the agreement executed by him, supposed to establish the layout for a price stipulated in the agreement We are not here concerned with the terms under which the agent had to execute the layout or the margin of his profit or the nature of the incidental expenses or the remuneration he was earning for the time that he was supposed to devote in ensuring the acquisition of land. What we are concerned with is Whether or not the creation of an agency by the society for the purpose of pursuing its claim with the authorities was a legitimate and legally permissible act. We have no manner of doubt that creation of an agency which is not aimed at achieving or performing an act that is illegal in itself was legally permissible especially when it was not just on agency but an agency that was coupled with a contract under which the agent was to construct a layout on behalf of the society for a consideration that was mutually settled.

49. There is yet another angle from which the issue can be examined. The report submitted by Sri. G.V.K Rao, a copy whereof has been produced by Mr. Tajuddin for perusal deals with as many as 86 different Co-operative House Building Societies including the Employees, House Building Societies interested in setting up housing layouts for their members. In majority of these cases, the report submitted by Mr. Rao found irregularities in the admission of members and matters connected therewith. So also in a fairly large number of such Societies, the services of agents were engaged at one stage or the other for assisting the societies in getting the required extent of land acquired with the help of the State machinery. An equally large number of cases were brought to the Court by the land owners challenging the acquisition proceedings which challenges failed either at the High Court level or eventually at the hands of the Supreme Court. In Karnataka State Judicial Employees' House Building Co-operative Society Ltd., also the services of an agent had been employed for purposes of helping in the acquisition proceedings. A challenge to the acquisition proceedings for the said, society however failed and was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court in SUBRAMANI v. UNION OF INDIA (ILR 1995 KAR 3139). Similarly, the services of an agent were employed even in the cases of acquisition for LRDE Employees' Housing Co-operative Society Ltd.,. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings in that case also failed before this Court in ‘SMT. SUMITRAMMA v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA’ (Writ Appeal No. 5081/1995 DD. 1-1-1996) and at the hands of the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 10270/1996 DD. 4-10-1996.

50. In the case of U.A.S Employees' House Building Co-operative Society Ltd., also the report submitted by Mr. Rao had reported serious irregularities to admission of members. But, the challenge to the acquisition of land for the said society failed before this Court in ‘SMT. AKKAYAMMA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA’ (W.As No. 7057-72/1996 DD. 12-8-1996) as also at the hands of the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 18239-54/1996 DD.20-9-1996. This is true even in regard to BEML Employees' Co-operative Society Ltd.,. who too had employed the services of an agent and was found to have committed irregularities in the admission of members by Sri. G.V.K Rao. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings for the benefit of the said society had failed in this Court in ‘MUNIYAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA’ (W.A No. 281/1995 DD 14-2-1995) and also in the Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 14681/1995 DD. 4-10-1996. Reference may also be made to Kanaka Gruhe House Building Co-operative Society Ltd., in which also the report submitted by Mr. Rao had pointed out irregularities, but, the acquisition proceedings were held to be valid by the Supreme Court in KANAKAGRUHA NIRMAN SAHAKARA SANGHA v. SMT. NARAYANAMMA (SINCE DECEASED) BY LRS.’ (AIR 2002 SC 3659].

51. It is evident from the above that the existence of irregularities has not by itself led this Court or the Apex Court to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings of the society were vitiated by any corrupt or other motive. The engagement of an agent by the society for helping them in pursuing the acquisition proceedings has also not led the Courts to hold that the agent was meant only to bribe the authorities or influence their decisions. In the absence of any cogent material or other circumstance to establish that the agent had indeed played a role in influencing the decisions of the statutory or other Governmental authorities, it is difficult to jump to any conclusion especially one which may suggest that the agent had paid or the authorities had received any bribe for initiation or continuance of proceedings that were otherwise legally permissible.

52. When we look at the proceedings from the point of view of the State Government, We find the theory of bribery or influence so much more difficult to accept. The appointment of a three Member Committee comprising responsible Officers of the State Government and the appointment of a State Level Co-ordination Committee comprising five high ranking Officers of the State Government for purposes of screening the societies and their requirement before lending the State assistance in the nature of acquisition proceedings prima facie shows that the decisions to acquire the land were not taken by any single individual for any extraneous consideration, but by multi member bodies constituted for that purpose at different levels. The constitution of a Cabinet Sub-Committee also goes to show that nothing wrong was noticed with the decision to acquire for otherwise the Government could have at the appropriate stage chosen to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings under section 48-A of the Act.

53. In the totality of the above circumstances, therefore and in the absence of say reliable material suggesting exercise of influence or corrupt motive or indicating abdication on the part of the authorities concerned in favour of any such outside agency, we have no option but to hold that neither the irregularities reported in the membership nor the engagement of an outside agent has in the instant case affected the validity of the acquisition proceedings. Since the proceedings were supported by public purpose on the strength of an approved housing scheme promoted by the appellant-society, the allegation that the exercise of that power was colorable must fail. Question No. 3 is accordingly answered in the negative.

Re: Question No. 4:

54. The acquisition proceedings in the instant ease were initiated in the year 1988. The present writ petitions have been filed almost eight years later i.e, in the year 1996. The legal position regarding the timeframe within which such proceedings must be assailed is well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court including that rendered in ‘HARI SINGH v. STATE OF U.P (AIR 1984 SC 1020) and LARSEN & TOUBRO v. STATE OF GUJARAT ((1998) 4 SCC 387). In Hari Singh's case, their Lordships observed:

“xxx xxx xxx xxx

It should be presumed thai official acts would have, been performed duly as required by law. It is significant that a arge number of persons who own the remaining plots hove not challenged the acquisition proceedings. The only other petition in which these proceedings are challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 11476 of 1982 on the file of the High Court filed subsequently by Amar Singh and four others. Moreover in a small place like Kheragarh where these plots are situate, the acquisition of these lands would be the talk of the town in a short while and it is difficult to believe that the appellants who are residents of thai place would not have known till July, 1982 that the impugned notification had been published in 1980.”

55. The delay in the instant case is nearly eight years which is not satisfactorily explained and should therefore prove fetal to the maintainability of these petitions. Even otherwise, the points urged in the writ petitions have been dealt with by.us and need not therefore be examined over again. Question No. 4 is answered accordingly.

Re: Question No. 5:

56. The appellant and respondents-land owners have agreed to the withdrawal of the challenge to the acquisition proceedings and the disposal of the appeals with certain directions. In so far as merit of the challenge are concerned, the same have already been examined by us above and rejected. The result would therefore be that the acquisition proceedings can be taken to their logical conclusion in accordance with law. This would imply that the land owners would be entitled to claim compensation for the lands acquired from them. The society may also while discharging its liability towards payment of compensation be entitled to claim adjustment of the amounts already paid by it to the owners. We do not wish to enter into the controversy as to what amounts the land owners have already received towards the cost of their lands. That is a matter which the Land Acquisition Officer shall be free to examine while making the award. All that we need say is that if there are any amounts acknowledged by the owners, the Land Acquisition Officer shall in keeping with the agreed terms of the compromise petition give adjustment of such amounts to the society. Needless to say that the purchasers pendente lite shall also be entitled to seek such redress in accordance with law as may be legally open to them for the enforcement of their rights if any flowing from the transfers made in their favour. The Society shall also be free to allot one site each in terms of the compromise petition in favour of each of the land owners, on usual terms of payment prescribed for the same. Question No. 5 is answered accordingly.

57. In the light of the our findings on the questions framed earlier, these appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The Order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petitions diseased leaving parties to bear their own costs.

58. Needless to say that the appellant Society shall be free to take the acquisition proceedings to their logical conclusion in which event the land owners shall be entitled to claim compensation for the lands acquired from them in accordance with law keeping in view the osbservations made in the body of this order. The writ petitioner (land owners) shall also be entitled to the allotment of one house site each on payment of the price fixed for the same.