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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff entered into an agreement of sale dated 24/09/2007 with the first defendant for an extent of 42 Ares 35 centiares of land at Rs. 3,550 per kuzhie, paying an advance of Rs. 5 lakhs out of the total consideration of Rs. 11,22,965. The agreement fixed 15 days for performance, requiring the defendant to produce the original sale deed before execution.

The defendant had acquired the property under a sale deed dated 28/08/2000, but discrepancies existed between the survey numbers and property extent stated in the agreement and the sale deed. The defendant appointed the third defendant as power of attorney on 20/08/2008, but later cancelled this power on 13/10/2008. The plaintiff alleged that the third defendant sold the property to the second defendant on 14/10/2008 after cancellation of the power, with an allegedly ante-dated sale deed.

The plaintiff issued a notice demanding performance on 19/08/2009; the first defendant replied that time was the essence of the contract and the plaintiff failed to perform within the stipulated period, denying entitlement to specific performance and asserting continued ownership. The plaintiff filed suit on 05/09/2009 seeking specific performance or alternatively refund of advance.

The first defendant resisted the suit, claiming the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform, emphasizing the contractual importance of time due to his limited stay in Karaikal, and sought forfeiture of the advance. He also alleged fraud by the third defendant in executing the sale deed to the second defendant. The second defendant claimed to be a bona fide purchaser without notice and contended the plaintiff abandoned the agreement. The third defendant denied knowledge of the agreement and claimed no consideration was received for the sale deed executed by him.

The trial court framed multiple issues including whether time was the essence of the contract, readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, bona fide purchaser status of the second defendant, and entitlement to specific performance or refund with interest. The trial court held that time was not the essence of the contract but found the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform and thus not entitled to specific performance. The suit was decreed for refund of advance with interest. The plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff can be said to have been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in terms of section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act?
  2. Whether the first defendant is guilty of attempting to mislead the Court by producing exhibit-B2 series as if they are acknowledgements for the receipt of exhibit-B1 dated 13/10/2008?
  3. Whether the second defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the suit agreement?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Time was not the essence of the contract; the trial court erred in dismissing the suit on the ground of lack of readiness and willingness.
  • The delay was caused by a mistake in the defendant’s sale deed which the defendant agreed to rectify.
  • The second defendant cannot be a bona fide purchaser without notice since the same document writer prepared both the sale agreement and the cancellation deed; the second defendant’s husband admitted knowledge of the agreement.
  • The sale deed in favor of the second defendant was brought about by the first defendant to defeat the plaintiff’s claim.
  • The first defendant attempted to mislead the court by producing acknowledgement cards (Exhibit B2) as if related to a different notice (Exhibit B1).
  • The plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations.
  • The conduct of the first defendant should be considered in granting discretionary relief.

First Defendant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance due to the huge delay in making a demand and filing suit, nearly two years after the agreement.
  • Time was the essence of the contract due to the defendant’s limited stay in Karaikal.
  • The first defendant denied readiness and willingness of the plaintiff and justified forfeiture of the advance.
  • The sale deed in favor of the second defendant is invalid; however, the defendant did not respond to the appellant’s challenge regarding the rejection of his counterclaim on this point.
  • The acknowledgements (Exhibit B2) produced relate to a different notice and not the cancellation notice (Exhibit B1).

Second Defendant's Arguments

  • The second defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the earlier agreement.
  • The delay in filing the suit and abandonment of the agreement by the plaintiff defeats the claim for specific performance.
  • The portions of cross-examination relied upon by the appellant should be read in context and not piecemeal.
  • Relied on Supreme Court precedents to argue that the plaintiff’s delay is fatal to his claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011) 2 SCC 18 Significance of readiness and willingness in suits for specific performance and the effect of delay. The court relied on this precedent to emphasize the importance of plaintiff’s readiness and willingness and to support the conclusion that delay disentitles the plaintiff from specific performance.
Padmakumari v. Dasayyan (2015) 8 SCC 695 Reinforcement of principles regarding readiness and willingness and the effect of delay in specific performance suits. Used to affirm the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff was not ready and willing and to confirm the dismissal of the specific performance claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness in light of the Specific Relief Act, particularly section 16(c), and Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the critical nature of this element in suits for specific performance. The court noted the 15-day performance period in the agreement and the plaintiff’s first demand for performance only after nearly two years, with a weak explanation for the delay based on alleged defects in the defendant’s title documents.

The court found that the plaintiff’s complaint to the Judicial Magistrate did not mention any defect in the defendant’s title, indicating that the claim was an afterthought. Evidence supporting the plaintiff’s claim of title defects was weak and contradicted by admissions of witnesses.

Regarding the alleged cancellation of power of attorney, the court examined the documentary evidence and postal seals, concluding the first defendant attempted to mislead the court by producing acknowledgements purportedly relating to a cancellation notice which in fact related to a different notice. This conduct was deemed an attempt to interfere with the course of justice, though no contempt action was initiated.

The court further found that the second defendant could not be considered a bona fide purchaser without notice due to admissions that she had knowledge of the prior agreement and the involvement of the same document writer in related transactions.

While the trial court had granted interest on the refunded advance at a lower rate, the appellate court considered the first defendant’s conduct deserving of a stiffer penalty and thus increased the interest rate to 12% per annum from the date of the agreement until repayment.

Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s rejection of specific performance but modified the decree on the quantum of interest payable on the refunded advance.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is partly allowed. The court confirmed the rejection of the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance but allowed the alternative relief of refund of the advance amount with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the agreement (24.09.2007) until repayment. The first respondent (defendant) is directed to pay costs of the appeal to the appellant (plaintiff).

The decision directly affects the parties by denying specific performance but enhancing the interest payable on the refunded advance. No new legal precedent is established beyond the application of existing principles regarding readiness and willingness, bona fide purchaser status, and procedural propriety in evidentiary matters.

    Ravindran v. Danton Shanmugam

    R. Subramanian, J.:— The plaintiff whose suit for specific performance or in the alternative for refund of advance was decreed for the alternative relief, is the appellant. Specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 24/09/2007 was sought for by the plaintiff.

    2. According to the plaintiff the 1 defendant agreed to sell an extent of 42 Ares 35 centiares equivalent to 316 kuzhies and 21/64 veesams at the rate of Rs. 3,550/- per kuzhie. The said agreement was reduced to writing. The plaintiff had paid an advance of Rs. 5 lakhs on the date of the agreement out of the total consideration of Rs. 11,22,965/-. A period of 15 days was fixed for performance of the agreement. According to the plaintiff, as per the agreement, the orginal sale deed is to be produced by the defendant before execution of the sale deed.

    3. The defendant had purchased the suit property under the sale deed dated 28/08/2000. As opposed to the recitals in the sale agreement, in the sale deed it was found that the suit property namely, an extent of 42 Ares and 35 centiares having in O.S No:359/6B is actually covered by two resurvey numbers namely R.S No:301/1 and 300/1B1. The sale deed dated 28.08.2000 under which the 1 defendant had purchased the suit property refers only to R.S.301/1. The extent of property in survey number 301/1 was only 15 Ares. At the request of the plaintiff, the defendant had agreed to get the sale deed dated 28/08/2000 rectified.

    4. The 1 defendant also appointed the 3 defendant as his power attorney agent on 20/08/2008. The plaintiff would contend that the defendant neither took steps to rectify the sale deed nor came forward to execute the sale deed pursuant to the agreement dated 24/09/2007. The plaintiff also came to know that the 1 defendant had cancelled the power executed in favour of the 3 defendant on 13/10/2008. It is also alleged by the plaintiff that the 3 defendant had sold the property to the 2 defendant on 14/10/2008, after the cancellation of the power. The plaintiff would contend the sale deed was ante-dated as if it was executed on 10/10/2008 and was registered on 14/10/2008.

    5. The plaintiff had issued a notice demanding performance 19/8/2009. The first defendant sent a reply claiming that the time was the essence of the contract and the plaintiff having failed to perform his part of the contract within the time stipulated under the agreement dated 24/09/2007, is not entitled to demand specific performance. It is also further claimed that the sale deed in favour of the 2 defendant is not valid. The 1 defendant would claim that he continues to be in possession of the property as the owner. Upon receipt of the said reply the plaintiff filed the suit on 05/09/2009 seeking specific performance or in the alternative for refund of advance.

    6. The 1 defendant resisted the suit contending that the plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. It was agreed between the parties that time should be the essence of the contract inasmuch as the 1 defendant is a French National and his stay at Karaikal can only be for a limited period. The 1 defendant would also claim that since the plaintiff was not ready and willing he is entitled to forfeit the advance.

    7. Apart from denying the claim of the plaintiff for specific performance, the 1 defendant would also allege that he was betrayed by the 3 defendant. According to him the sale deed in favour of the 2 defendant executed by the 3 defendant is a fraudulent document and the same will not confer any title on the 2 defendant. Apart from filing a written statement, the 1 defendant also filed a counterclaim challenging the validity of the sale deed dated 10/10/2008 registered on 14/10/2008. The said counterclaim was rejected by the trial court and the 1 defendant did not challenge the said order of rejection.

    8. The 2 defendant would contend that she is bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the earlier agreement of sale. She would also claim that the plaintiff had in fact abandoned the agreement. The delay in filing the suit was set up as a defence to the claim for specific performance.

    9. The 3 defendant filed a separate written statement. He would plead that the 2 defendant's husband who is known to them promised to pay the sale consideration to the 1 defendant. On the strength of the said promise he executed a sale deed without receiving any consideration. He would further contend that he was unaware of the agreement between the plaintiff and the 1 defendant. He would also deny the claim of the plaintiff that there is a flaw in the title of the 1 defendant. The 3 defendant also claimed that the 1 defendant did not take any action against him for his wrongful act out of magnanimity.

    10. On the above pleadings the Learned District Judge, Karaikal framed the following issues:

    “1. Whether time is the essence of the contract?

    2. Whether the suit is hit by the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, as alleged by the first defendant?

    3. Whether the first defendant had rescinded the sale agreement as alleged in his written statement?

    4. Whether the plaintiff was always willing and ready to perform his part of the contract?

    5. Whether the second defendant is a bone fide purchaser of the suit property?

    6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of specific performance as prayed for or in the alternative a decree for Rs. 5 Lakhs with 24% interest till date of suit with future interest until repayment and compensation of rupees 2 Lakhs with costs?

    11. The following additional issue was also framed:

    Whether the first defendant is entitled for decree of prohibitory injunction restraining the plaintiff, his men and agents from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property?

    12. Upon a consideration of the pleadings and evidence on record, the learned Trial Judge concluded that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. He however found that time is not the essence of the contract. On the claim of the 1 defendant that he has rescinded the contract, the learned Trial Judge rejected the said claim and held that that was no recession of the contract on the part of the 1 defendant.

    13. The learned Trial Judge, however, concluded that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and therefore, he is not entitled to the relief of specific performance. Considering the defence, the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit for the alternative relief of refund of advance and directed the 1 defendant to refund the advance amount of Rs. 5 Lakhs with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the agreement till date of the suit and at 6% per annum from the date of suit till date of realisation.

    14. Aggrieved by the said decree the plaintiff is on appeal.

    15. I have heard Mr. T.M Hariharan learned counsel appearing for Mr. B.K Srinivasan, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. S. Sounthar, learned counsel appearing for the 1 respondent and Mr. S. Venkatesh, learned counsel appearing for the 2 respondent. The 3 respondent though served has not appeared either in person or through counsel.

    16. The following points arise for determination in this appeal:—

    1. Whether the plaintiff can be said to have been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in terms of section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act?

    2. Whether the first defendant is guilty of attempting to mislead the Court by producing exhibit-B2 series as if they are acknowledgements for the receipt of exhibit-B1 dated 13/10/2008?

    3. Whether the second defendant is a bonefide purchaser for value without notice of the suit agreement?

    POINT No. 1

    17. Mr. T.M Hariharan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that time cannot be said to be the essence of the contract and the Trial Court having held that time is not the essence of the contract, has erred in non-suiting the plaintiff on the ground of absence of readiness and willingness. Inviting my attention to the evidence of DW-3 husband of the 2 defendant, the learned counsel would contend that the fact that there was a mistake in the sale deed dated 28/08/2000 has been admitted by the said witness. He would further contend that the delay was due to the mistake in the sale deed and the failure is on the part of the 1 defendant to get it rectified. The learned counsel would further contend that the 2 defendant cannot be said to be a bonafide purchaser for value without notice, since DW-4 had admitted that he had also engaged the same document writer and that he knew about the agreement between the plaintiff and the 1 defendant.

    18. The learned counsel would further contend that the very sale deed in favour of the 2 defendant had been brought about by the 1 defendant only with a view to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. He would also point out that the 1 defendant in fact attempted to mislead the Court by producing the acknowledgement cards relating to the reply notice dated 03/09/2009 as if they relate to the notice dated 13/10/2008 marked as Exhibit B-1.

    19. He would refer to the evidence of DW-1 particularly in cross-examination, where he had denied the suggestion that exhibit B-2 series, acknowledgement cards, do not relate to Exhibit B-1. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the Trial Court has erroneously concluded that the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance because of lack of readiness and willingness. He would further plead that the conduct of the 1 defendant should be taken into account while considering the grant of discretionary relief.

    20. Mr. S. Sounthar the learned counsel appearing for the 1 defendant would contend that the plaintiff is not entitled to specific performance because of the huge delay even in making a demand for performance. The learned counsel would point out that the agreement provides for a period of 15 days for performance and the first demand was made by the plaintiff only on 19/08/2009 that is nearly after the expiry of two years from the date of the agreement. The suit came to be filed on 12/10/2009. According to the learned counsel, this inordinate delay would disentitle the plaintiff from seeking a decree for specific performance. It must be pointed out here that the learned counsel has no answer for the conduct of his client in attempting to mislead the Court by producing Exhibit B-2 series namely, the acknowledgement cards evidencing the receipt of the notice dated 19/08/2009, while the acknowledgements actually relate to the notice said to have been issued by his counsel on 13/10/2008.

    21. Mr. S. Ventatesh, learned counsel appearing for the 2 respondent would contend that the Trial Court has found that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract apart from rendering a finding that the 2 respondent is a bonefide purchaser for value without notice. According to the learned counsel the portions of cross-examination relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be read in piecemeal. He would submit that the entire cross-examination must be read so as to find out the intention of the witness. The learned counsel would also rely upon the following judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in support of his contention that the delay of nearly 2 years in filing the suit is fatal to the claim of the plaintiff.

    1. d reported in (1997) 3 SCC 1

    2. Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi reported in (2011) 2 SCC 18

    3. Padmakumari v. Dasayyan reported in 2015 8 SCC 695

    22. I have considered the rival submissions.

    23. In view of the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in a series of recent decisions, the question of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance assumes greater significance. No doubt true, the Honourable Supreme Court has pointed out that the conduct of the defendant would also be a factor while considering the excise of discretion in granting or refusing the relief of specific performance, that would arise only when the Court concludes that the plaintiff was always ready and willing. If the plaintiff falls, short of the required parameters when his readiness and willingness is tested by the court, the fact that the defendant/defendants have come up with a false case, may not help the plaintiff in succeeding in a suit for specific performance.

    24. If we are to analyse the case on hand in the above backdrop, I am afraid that I will have to necessarily conclude against the plaintiff. As already stated the suit agreement was entered into on 24/09/2007 and a period of 15 days was fixed for performance. The plaintiff had first demanded specific performance through his notice dated 19/08/2009. The explanation of the plaintiff for the delay is that there were some mistakes in the sale deed dated 28/08/2000 under which the 1 defendant had purchased the suit property. He would further claim that the 1 defendant agreed to get the sale deed rectified. It should immediately be pointed out that the evidence in support of the above version of the plaintiff is very weak.

    25. In fact the plaintiff had filed a complaint before the Judicial Magistrate No:II, Karaikal claiming that the 1 and 3 defendants are attempting to cheat him by arranging for sale of the property to the 2 defendant. This complaint is dated 19/05/2009. There is no reference whatsoever to the alleged defect in title of the 1 defendant in the said complaint. Therefore, it is clear that the allegations made with regard to the defect in title of the 1 defendant, for the first time, in the suit notice are afterthought with a view to justify the inaction on the part of the plaintiff.

    26. The learned counsel for the appellant would point out certain portions of cross-examination of DW-3, the husband of the 2 defendant, and contend that the said witness had in fact admitted the correctness of the claim of the plaintiff that there are certain mistakes in the sale deed dated 28/08/2000. The witness has deposed that he came to know about the fact that there are two re-survey numbers for the suit property namely, 301/1 and 300/1B1 which correlates to the old survey number 359/6B only after the filing of the suit. The sale deed in favour of the 2 defendant is dated 10/10/2008 and the same has been registered on 14/10/2008.

    27. Of course it is claimed by the plaintiff that the sale deed is ante-dated and has been registered in order to get over the cancellation of the power of attorney effected on 13/10/2008. The validity or otherwise of the sale deed in favour of the 2 defendant cannot be gone into in the present proceedings. The attempted counterclaim by the 1 defendant has been rejected by the Court and the 1 defendant has not come up on appeal against the said rejection of the counter claim. The plaintiff has to stand or fall on his own legs and he cannot attempt to encash on the dispute between the 1 and 2 defendants.

    28. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the Trial Court having concluded that the time is not the essence of the contract should not have dismissed the suit, more so, when the suit has been filed within the period prescribed under Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel would also submit that the question of plaintiff being not ready and willing should be tested in comparison with the conduct of the defendants. The plaintiff as PW-1 in his cross-examination would admit that a reading of the agreement would show that importance has been assigned to the period fixed under the agreement. He would also further depose that he had obtained a copy of the sale deed, from the Sub-Registrar's office. The copy of the sale deed dated 28.08.2000 has been produced as Ex.A2 by the plaintiff. He has applied for the copy on 27.08.2009 and a copy has been issued on 19.10.2009

    29. I already pointed out that the plaintiff has not wishpered about the alleged defect/mistake in the sale deed dated 28.08.2000, in the complaint filed by him before the Judicial Magistrate-II, Karaikal on 19.05.2009 A copy of the said complaint is marked as Ex.A5 Though the defendant has sent a reply notice indicating that he will not be able to comply with the demand of the plaintiff made in the notice dated 19.08.2009, on 03.09.2009 itself, the plaintiff has filed the above suit on 12.10.2009, that is almost a month thereafter. In his evidence during cross-examination, the plaintiff would claim that he had the balance sale consideration ready in cash and would admit that he is an income tax assesee. He would claim that he had shown the balance consideration namely, Rs. 6,36,000/- in his income tax return for the year 2009. But he has not chosen to produce the said document. It could therefore, be seen that the plaintiff has not established his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract within the period stipulated in the agreement.

    30. Admittedly, the notice calling upon the defendants to execute the sale deed was issued only on 19.08.2009 i.e almost two years after the agreement. There is no explanation for the delay on the part of the plaintiff except the bald claim that the 1 defendant had agreed to get the sale deed rectified. In the above circumstances, I am constrained to conclude that the Trial Court was right in rejecting the relief of specific performance on the ground that the plaintiff was not ready asnd willing to perform his part of the contract. I am supported to the view of mine by the recent pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme in:

    1. Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi reported in (2011) 2 SCC 18

    2. Padmakumari v. Dasayyan reported in 2015 8 SCC 695

    Point No. 2

    31. The 1 defendant claimed to have cancelled the power of attorney dated 20.08.2008, in favour of the 3 defendant, marked as Ex.A7 by a registered document of cancellation deed dated 13.10.2008 The said deed of cancellation has been produced as Ex.A3 The 1 defendant would also claim that he had informed the 3 defendant regarding the said cancellation deed on 13.10.2008 itself under Ex.B1 Ex.B1 is dated 13.10.2008 and has been issued by the counsel for the 1 defendant, a copy of which is also marked to the Sub-Registrar, Karaikal. The 1 defendant would claim that Ex.B2 series which are the three acknowlegements relate to the receipt of Ex.B1 by the addressees.

    32. From the postal seal, it is seen that the three acknolwedgements do not relate to Ex.B1 In all of them, the sender's address is that of the 1 defendant and not that of the counsel. They have been acknowledged by the addressees on 12.09.2009 and 14.09.2009 The reply notice issued by the 1 defendant is dated 03.09.2009, the same has been issued by the 1 defendant and not by his counsel. Therefore, it is clear that Ex.B2 series, acknowlegements relate to the reply notice dated 03.09.2009 and not to the Ex.B1 dated 13.10.2008 It is therefore, clear that the 1 defendant had not communicated the cancellation of power to the agent namely, the 3 defendant. As per Section 208 of the Contract Act, termination of power comes to effect only after the agent comes to know of it. Only with a view to get over the above legal hurdle, the 1 defendant had claimed Ex.B3 series acknowlegements relate to Ex.B1 In his evidence regarding the said acknowledgements, the 1 defendant as DW1 would depose as follows:

    Text in vernacular

    33. The above oral evidence of the 1 defendant coupled with the postal seals in Ex.B2 series would show that the 1 defendant had attempted to mislead the Court by producing Ex.B2 series, as if they relate to the notice issued by his counsel on 13.10.2008 Therefore, the conduct of the 1 defendant in attempting to mislead and make the Court to believe that he had informed the agent about the cancellation of the power, in my opinion, is an attempt to interfere with the course of justice. However, I refrain from initiating any action either under Contempt of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, considering the fact that the said attempt has not, fortunately, derailed the Course of Justice in the case on hand.

    POINT No. 3

    34. It remains to be considered as to whether, the 2 defendant is a bonafide purchaer for value without notice of the existing contract. The learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the scribe of the sale agreement marked as Ex.A1, namely, Senthilnathan is also the scribe of the deed of cancellantion dated 13.10.2008 marked as Ex.A3 Pointing out the fact that DW3, husband of the 2 defendant has admitted that he had engaged Senthinathan to prepare the document and he is aware of the sale agreement dated 24.09.2007, he would also invite my attention to the following statement of DW3 in his cross-examination:

    Text in vernacular

    35. Relying upon the above said evidence, the learned counsel would contend that the 2 defendant cannot be said to be a bonafide purchaser for value without notice. The learned Trial Judge had concluded that the 2 defendant is a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the earlier agreement. Unfortunately the learned Trial Judge has not adverted to the evidence of DW3, the husband of the 2 defendant. A perusal of the proof affidavit itself would show that the said witness was aware of the agreement between the plaintiff and the 1 defendant. The following statement in his proof affidavit would show that he had knowledge of the agreement:

    Text in vernacular

    36. In the light of the above statement in the proof affidavit and the admissions in the cross-examination, I find that the 2 defendant cannot be said to be a bonafide purchaser for value without notice of the prior agreement.

    37. The Trial Court has while rejecting the claim for specific performance directed the 1 defendant to repay the advance with interest at 12% per annum from the date of agreement till the date of claim and at 6% per annum from the date of plaint till date of realisation. While exercising the power of granting alternative relief, the Court should be alive to the fact that the agreement vendor had in fact enjoyed the fruits of the advance amount and by the dismissal of the suit for specific performance, stands to gain further. Therefore, I find that the grant of interest on the advance amount at the rate of 6% from the date of the suit till date of realisation is really on the lower side. Granting of interest at 6% per annum is not a statutory obligation imposed upon the Court.

    38. The conduct of the 1 defendant in this case would require a stiff penalty. The 1 defendant should atleast be mulcted with interest at a higher rate. I am therefore, of the considered opinion that the interest of justice will be better served by directing the 1 defendant to pay interest on the advance amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- at 12% per annum from 24.09.2007 namely, the date of the agreement till date of realisation.

    39. I am aware that the plaintiff who is the appellant has come forward with this appeal against the rejection of the main relief of specific performanace and he has been found to be dis-entitled to the main relief and the same need not stand in the way of plaintiff being granted interest at a higher rate. Moreso, when the 1 defendant has been found to be guilty of attempt to mislead the Court by producing Ex.B2 series, acknowledgements as if they relate to Ex.B1

    40. In fine, the appeal is partly allowed. While confirming the rejection of the main prayer for specific performance, granting alternatilve prayer for refund of advance amount, the decree of the Trial Court will stand modified and the plaintiff would be entitled to decree for refund of advance amount with interest at 12% per annum from 24.09.2007 (date of the suit agreement) till date of repayment. The 1 respondent will pay costs of this appeal to the appellant. Consequently the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

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