Sudhir Agarwal, J.:— Petitioner has been dismissed by means of impugned order from service having been found guilty of violating Section 29 of U.P Government Servant Conduct Rules, 1956 entering in second marriage during life time of first wife. The ground of challenge is that the first marriage took place in 1980 but the petitioner divorced first wife in 1999 and, thereafter, married with second wife in 2005, hence, Rule 29 has no application.
2. Learned counsel for petitioner drew my attention to Annexure 1 to the writ petition which is said to be an affidavit signed by petitioner's first wife, i.e, respondent no. 5 stating that divorce took place in the year 1999.
3. Respondent no. 5 herself along with respondent no. 4 has filed a counter affidavit before this Court wherein para 5, while denying averments made in para 4, 5 and 6 of writ petition, she has said as under:
“5. That Paragraph No. 4, 5 and 6 of the writ Petition are incorrect, baseless hence denied and in reply thereof, it is submitted that the petitioner has not divorced the respondent no. 5 till date and this fact has clearly been admitted in his statement before the Enquiry Officer on dated 03/12/2006, and has stated that both the wives are living together happily and he is ready to keep Smt. Sahiha Begum with him. The copy of the statement dated 03/12/2006 of the petitioner is being filed herewith and is marked as Annexure No. C.A.1 to this affidavit. It is further submitted that on the legal advise of the counsel, petitioner came to Sambhal and brought Smt. Sahiba Begum at Meerut where he obtained the Photograph and Signature on blank papers and petitioner got manipulated a Notary affidavit showing therein the divorce on 19/01/99, after coming into the knowledge the aforesaid act of the petitioner, regarding divorce vide affidavit dated 18/09/07 Smt. Sabiha Begum filed another affidavit on dated 04/04/2008 before Superintending Engineer, Tube Well, Moradabad clearly mentioning therein that the affidavit dated 18/09/2007 was a fabricated one and the signature on it was obtained by the petitioner by mis-representation.”
4. The Statement of petitioner dated 3.12.2006, copy whereof has been filed as Annexure CA-1, reads as under:
5. Moreover, in reply to a question as to why he married again, petitioner said that second marriage took place with the consent of first wife. Petitioner has not disputed the above statement, but has tried to explain the same in paras 5 and 6 of his rejoinder affidavit as under:
“5. …. Since Mohammadan law permits a husband to perform second marriage, therefore, petitioner under the said impression and on account of ill advice could not informed the department, otherwise, he had not committed any misconduct.
6. That the contents of paragraph no. 5 of the counter affidavit is incorrect and denied. It is submitted that the petitioner had already divorced the respondent no. 5 and after the divorce he had performed second marriage with Smt. Anjum Begum in the year 2000 and since then they are living happily. It is further submitted that the deponent on account of ill advise and the pressure of the officers of the department had stated before the Inquiry Officer that they are living together happily and he is ready to keep Smt. Shabiha Begum. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 5 had voluntarily given affidavit stating therein that she had been divorced by the petitioner on 19.1.1999 The said affidavit was neither obtained by mis-representation nor under duress or threat. Since Smt. Shabiha Begum was already divorced by the petitioner in the year 1999, therefore, she had given affidavit before the department on 18.9.2007 but unfortunately respondent no. 4 who is happened to be the sister of the respondent no. 5 is harassing the petitioner for the purpose of extracting money from him otherwise till date the respondent no. 5 did not file any separate reply in the aforesaid petition and even she had not signed any Vakalatnama for filing the same in the aforesaid petition. The respondent no. 4 on her own had filed counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent no. 5, therefore, no reliance can be placed on the same.”
6. In view of above, this Court has no reason to believe the defence of petitioner which has already been disbelieved by the departmental authorities and they have found petitioner guilty. It is admitted that petitioner never informed the department about divorce of the first wife so as to remove her name from the record of department where she was nominated and also did not inform anything about second marriage. The petitioner, in my view, has rightly been held guilty of charge levelled against him. Finding of bigamy recorded by authorities concerned are based on petitioner's own admission and explanation and having not been shown perverse or contrary to record, I find no reason to interfere with such finding of fact.
7. So far as question of disproportionate punishment is concerned, time and again, the Apex Court has considered the scope of judicial review in the matter of quantum of punishment. Such power of judicial review is limited. It cannot be done in a routine manner. In Chairman and M.D Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. T.K Raju, (2006) 3 SCC 143 referring to earlier decisions in V. Ramanna v. APSRTC, (2001) 5 ALD 427 and State of Rajasthan v. Mohammad Ayub Naz, JT 2006 (1) SC 162, the Apex Court said that interference with the quantum of punishment should not be done in a routine manner.
8. In Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli v. Gulabhia M. Lad, (2010) 5 SCC 775, the court held:
“In the matter of imposing of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons there for. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review.”
9. In Charanjit Lamba v. Commanding Officer, Southern Command, (2010) 11 SCC 314 : AIR 2010 SC 2462, the Court held:—
“… the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is something that rests primarily with the disciplinary authority. The jurisdiction of a Writ Court or the Administrative Tribunal for that matter is limited to finding out whether the punishment is so outrageously disproportionate as to be suggestive of lack of good faith. What is clear is that while judicially reviewing an order of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee the Writ Court would not assume the role of an appellate authority. It would not impose a lesser punishment merely because it considers the same to be more reasonable that what the disciplinary authority has imposed. It is only in cases where the punishment is so disproportionate to the gravity of charge that no reasonable person placed in the position of the disciplinary authority could have imposed such a punishment that a Writ Court may step in to interfere with the same.”
10. In the above caution, restriction and limitation, as also the expositions of law, it is clear that the Court can have judicial review on the quantum of punishment which it is so outrageous and so excessive as to shock the conscience of a person of ordinary prudence. In my view, in the case in hand, conduct of the petitioner cannot be said so as to make punishment disproportionate to the charges proved against him. It has been held repeatedly by the Apex Court that if the quantum of punishment is found to be shocking or so disproportionate as to no person of ordinary prudence would have come to such conclusion, only then the Court may interfere and not otherwise. This Court in Veerpal Singh v. Senior Superintendent Of Police, Agra & Ors. of Police, Agra, 2006 (5) ADJ 318 has held as under:
“Lastly the petitioner contended that the punishment is harsh and not commensurating to the offence and therefore, is liable to be set aside. Once the misconduct of the petitioner has been found proved, the scope of interference in the matter of punishment is extremely limited. It is only when the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the act or omission constituting misconduct that it shocks the conscience of the court or a person of ordinary prudence, only then the court may interfere and not otherwise. In any country where bigamy is an offence, a government servant guilty of committing an offence cannot ask to continue in service after award of minor or lesser punishment. Therefore, I do not find any reason to hold that the punishment imposed in the present case is arbitrary or so disproportionate to the act of misconduct so so as to warrant interference by the Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the constitution.”
11. No other point has been argued. I, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned order.
12. Dismissed.