ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard learned advocate Mr. U.M Shastri for the appellant and learned advocate Mr. Ravi Karnavat for the respondent-Union of India, through the General Manager, Western Railway, Churchgate, Mumbai, who waives service of notice of admission on behalf of the respondent in both these appeals.
2. By way of filing these appeals, appellant of First Appeal No. 996 of 2013, who has preferred claim application being O.A No. 138 of 2004 and appellant of First Appeal No. 997 of 2013, who has preferred claim application being O.A No. 122 of 2004, have challenged the order passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal (Ahmedabad Bench) at Ahmedabad in Misc. Application filed by the appellants herein (original claimants) for condonation of delay in filing application for restoration of claim application which was dismissed for default in view of the provisions of Rule 18(1) of the Railways Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989 (for short, the ‘said Rules’). Such application is governed by the provisions of Rule 18(2) of the said Rules.
3. The Railway Claims Tribunal (Ahmedabad Bench) at Ahmedabad has dismissed the claim applications filed by the original claimants on account of non-payment of cost and for non-prosecution. The appellants (original claimants), therefore, filed restoration application with an application for condonation of delay caused in filing restoration application within 30 days as contemplated by Rule 18(1) of the said Rules.
4. Such applications were resisted by the respondent by filing reply contending that the original claimants have no right to file application for condonation of delay under Section 17(2) of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Act. It was contended that that the restoration application intentionally has not been filed within the period of limitation as contemplated by Rule 18(2) of the said Rules. It was also contended that the original claimants have not filed copy of order along with the Misc. Application and, therefore, it was difficult to understand the order since it was not placed on record. Still however, the claimants have contended in the Misc. Application that the order was passed dismissing the claim applications on account of non-payment of cost and for non-prosecution. Therefore, it was observed by the Railway Claims Tribunal that considering the said fact the order is undisputedly passed dismissing the claim applications in view of the provisions of Rule 18(1) of the said Rules and, therefore, such Misc. Application filed for restoration of claim applications is governed by the provisions of Rule 18(2) of the said Rules. It was observed that there is no dispute of the either parties in respect of this position. It is also undisputed fact that the Misc. Application is filed beyond the period of 30 days from the date of order of dismissal and, therefore, the question involved for determination in the Misc. Application is whether the application for restoration can be filed after 30 days from the date of order of dismissal for default as contemplated by Rule 18(1) of the said Rules. Therefore, the Railway Claims Tribunal did not go into the merits of the case since primarily, jurisdiction with the Tribunal was to be decided which has effect on the determination of the application.
5. Learned advocate Mr. Shastri for the appellants relied upon the decision of Division Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of K.K Pushpakaran v. Union Of India reported in 2008 ACJ 2469 and submitted that in the said decision identical question has been examined by the Division Bench of Kerala High Court. In the said decision, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court considered various provisions of Railways Act, Railway Claims Tribunal Act and Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules as well as Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was held by the Division Bench of Kerala High Court that since the Railway Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court, it has no power to condone delay beyond the time fixed in the Rules. Then, it is also held that the Railway Claims Tribunal can condone delay on sufficient reasons by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After examining the provisions of the various Acts, the delay was condoned as the claimants have given sufficient reasons for not filing application for restoration of claim application within 30 days and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for adjudication on merits. Suffice it to refer to the observations made by the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in paragraph Nos. 3 to 7 of the said decision which read as under:
“3. In Mukri Gopalan v. C.P Aboobacker, AIR 1995 SC 2272, it was held by the Supreme Court that appellate authority constituted under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act has got the power to condone the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act as appellate authority is not a persona designata. Even though it is not a civil Court, it has got all the powers of the civil Court and in functioning as a Court. It is also observed that there may be situations, wherein even Courts constituted under special or local law which are governed by Civil Procedure Code may have prescribed period of limitation for application under such acts and In the absence of any specific exclusions, In such cases also Limitation Act will apply. It was held as follows:
“There may be situations, wherein even Courts constituted under special or local law which are governed by Civil Procedure Code may have prescribed period of limitation for suit, appeal or application under such special or local law and for which provision might not have been made under schedule to the Limitation Act and only for such Courts an express provision has to be made for applying Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act as found in second part of Section 29(2) but for which such a machinery may not be available for computing such periods of limitation even though by a legal fiction Section 3 of Limitation Act would apply. It is difficult to countenance this submission. The express language of Section 29(2) clearly Indicates that such special or local law must provide for period of limitation for suit, appeal or application entertainable under such laws and for computing period of limitation under such special or local law the Legislature has made available the machinery of Sections 4 to 24 inclusive as found in Limitation Act. Nowhere it is indicated that as per Section 29(2) the Courts functioning under such special or local law must be governed whole by Civil Procedure Code.”
In that case, Supreme Court also rejected the contention that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is applicable only if special law permits the filing of application before Civil Court and not to the authority or Tribunal constituted under the special law. It was held as follows:
“…Before parting with the discussion on this question we may also refer to one submission of Mr. Nariman. He submitted that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply to Civil Courts as duly constituted under the Civil Procedure Code and if that is so even if they are to be made applicable to suit, appeal or application governed by periods of limitation prescribed by any special or local law, they necessarily require such suit, appeal or application to be filed under special or local law before full-fledged Civil Courts as otherwise Sections 4 to 24 by themselves would not apply to them. It is difficult to agree. It has to be kept in view that Section 29(2) gets attracted for computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application to be filed before authorities under special or local law if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied and once they get satisfied the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply to such proceedings meaning thereby the procedural scheme contemplated by these Sections of the Limitation Act would get telescoped into such provisions of special or local law. It amounts to a legislative shorthand. Consequently, even this contention of Mr. Nariman cannot be countenanced.
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows:
“29. Savings.- (1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
It is clear that for attracting Section 29(2), three conditions are to be fulfilled:
(1) There must be a provision for the period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application.
(2) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
(3) There should not be any express provision in the special or local law contrary to the provisions in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.
If these three conditions are satisfied, Sections 4 to 24 will be applicable in view of Section 29(2). In this case, period of limitation is provided under the special law. Time fixed for filing an application for setting aside an order dismissing an application for default is 30 days. The above period Is different from the period prescribed under the Schedule to the Limitation Act and there is no provision in the special law against application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act or against condonation of delay. Therefore, applying the principles laid down in Mukri Gopalan's case AIR 1995 SC 2272, in view of Section 29(2), Section 5 of the Limitation Act enables the Tribunal constituted under special law to condone the delay.
4. Apex Court in P. Sarathy v. State Bank Of India, (2000) 5 SCC 355, it was held that for application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, Court need not be a civil Court, but it will be sufficient if the authority or tribunal has trappings of Court. Apex Court has considered the question regarding application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in a proceeding before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour who is notified as appellate authority under the Shops and Establishments Act. It was held that the time spent before Shop Appellate Authority can be excluded for computing the period of limitation in view of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. We quote Paras 12 & 13 of the above judgment herein below:
“12. It will be noticed that Section 14 of Limitation Act does not speak of a “Civil Court” but speaks only of a “Court”. It is not necessary that the Court spoken of in Section 14 should be a “Civil Court”. Any authority or tribunal having the trappings of a Court would be a “Court” within the meaning of this section.
13. In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op. Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1494, this Court, while considering the question under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 held that the Registrar under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act was a Court. It was held that the Registrar had not merely the trappings of a Court but in many respects he was given the same powers as were given to an ordinary civil Court by the Code of Civil Procedure including the powers to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents and to hear the parties. The Court referred to the earlier decisions in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees, AIR 1950 SC 188, Magbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 and Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66. The Court approved the rule laid down in these cases that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has Finality and Authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
5. In Shaik Saidulu v. Chukka Yesu Ratnam, AIR 2002 SC 749, it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply in an application before the Election Tribunal as there is no specific exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. A Full Bench of this Court as early as in 1980 in State Of Kerala v. Syamala Thamburatti, 1980 KLT 34, held as follows:
“4. In the light of the above discussion it has to be held, and we hold, that Sections 4 to 24 (Inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall, to the extent to which these provisions have not been expressly excluded by a special or local law, apply for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by such special or local law. There is no provision in the Act which expressly excludes any of the provisions, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and so, the period of 60 days limitation prescribed in Section 8A has to be computed by applying Sections 4 to 24 (Inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963.”
In Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66, it was held that in order to constitute a ‘Court’ in the strict sense of the term, essential condition is that apart from the trappings of a Court, it has power to give a decision or definite finding which is authoritatively equivalent to a judgment pronounced. Orders passed by the Railway Tribunal is equivalent to judgments pronounced. In Sathish Babu v. State of Kerala, 2000 (3) KLT 551, this Court held that Forest Tribunal is a Court and in view of Section 29(2), Sections 2 to 24 of the Limitation Act will be applicable. In Duroflex Ltd. v. Johny Mathew2007 (1) KLT 865, it was held by this Court that when disposing the application under Section 111 of the Companies Act, Company Law Board has to make a judicial decision and hence it is a Court and Section 5 of the Limitation Act will apply.
6. Rule 18 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules prescribe the time limit of 30 days in filing an application for setting aside an order dismissing the application for default. But, there is no specific exclusion or prohibition in the Section for extending the time. Hence, considering the mandate of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable. It is true that before Mukri Gopalan's case, AIR 1995 SC 2272, there were a large number of decisions to the effect that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to a civil Court and not to the Courts or tribunals or quasi judicial authorities which have though all trappings of the Court but not being a Civil Court. Now it has been consistently held that in the absence of specific exclusion or prohibition, if limitation is prescribed in a special law for filing an application, by virtue of Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, tribunal which has all the trappings of Court can condone delay on sufficient reasons. This is all the more applicable to the Railway Claims Tribunal in setting aside any order of dismissal for default of the applicant in view of Section 18(3) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
7. In view of the above discussions, we are of the opinion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable and Tribunal should have condoned the delay as sufficient reasons are given for condoning the delay. Here, the son of the claimants died in an accident and application was filed for compensation before the Tribunal. It is true that on one day the claimants were absent and the application was dismissed for default. By filing an application for setting aside the order dismissing the application in default and for restoring the matter, the provisions of the Limitation Act for filing application will not be applicable. There is a time limit of 30 days in filing the application. Therefore, it has to be filed within 30 days. If sufficient cause is made out, Tribunal has got power to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and liberal approach has to be adopted by the Tribunal. Here, adequate reasons are given by the appellants for condoning the delay. Therefore, the Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay. Therefore, we condone the delay in filing the application for setting aside the order dismissing the application for default and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for deciding the question on merits. We are not expressing any opinion regarding the merits of the matter. Parties shall appear before the Tribunal on 14.1.2008 The appeal is allowed.”
6. Considering the ratio laid down in case of Pushpakaran (supra), it is evident that in absence of specific exclusion or prohibition, if limitation is prescribed in a special law for filing an application, by virtue of Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Tribunal which has all the trappings of the Civil Court can condone delay on sufficient reasons.
7. Under the circumstances, orders passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal rejecting Misc. Application filed by the appellants in these appeals for condonation of delay in filing of restoration application and dismissing the restoration application are hereby quashed and set aside and delay in filing such application for restoration of claim applications is hereby condoned, means, delay in filing of such restoration application is condoned by this Court in the interest of justice.
8. Both these appeals are hereby allowed. Impugned orders dated 27.03.2009 passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal (Ahmedabad Bench) at Ahmedabad are quashed and set aside. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Railway Claims Tribunal is directed to restore and expedite the claim applications filed by the appellants of both these Appeals and to decide the same preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment in accordance with law and on merits after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the parties. No order as to costs. Direct service is permitted.