AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an order dated 26.8.2010 (Annexure P/18) by which the petitioner was declared a willful defaulter and his One-Time Settlement (OTS) application under the SME OTS Scheme 2010 (application dated 31.07.2010; Annexure P/16/P/17) was rejected. The petitioner sought multiple reliefs including quashing the declaration of willful defaulter, restraining dissemination of the petitioner's name as a willful defaulter, a quo warranto against Respondent No.1, directions to decide issues de novo after hearing, and directions to accept the petitioner's OTS proposal under the SME OTS Scheme 2010.

The respondents opposed the petition. They relied on scheme time-limits (last date for receipt 31.07.2010; processing by 31.08.2010) and noted that the deposit (5% required under clause 3.2) was via a cheque dated 1.9.2010, after the cut-off; this was relied upon as reason (ii) in the rejection order. Respondents also alleged that the petitioner did not approach the Court with clean hands because he had filed SA No.40/2011 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) at Jabalpur (containing similar reliefs including a prayer to direct the bank to accept OTS Scheme 2010) but had not properly disclosed that filing in the writ petition.

The Court considered whether non-disclosure of the pending Securitization Application (SA No.40/2011) before the DRT was a suppression of a material fact. The Court concluded that the petitioner had failed to disclose the pendency of that proceeding in the appropriate part of the writ petition and that the reliefs in the DRT and the writ petition overlapped (both sought acceptance of OTS). Applying established authorities on the duty of disclosure, the Court found suppression of material facts, dismissed the petition and awarded costs of Rs.10,000/-.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the rejection dated 26.8.2010 (Annexure P/18) which declared the petitioner a willful defaulter and denied him benefit under the SME OTS Scheme 2010 was legally sustainable, including whether RBI-prescribed procedures and scheme clauses for declaring a willful defaulter were complied with.
  2. Whether the petitioner was obliged to disclose the pendency of SA No.40/2011 before the DRT in the writ petition and whether failure to disclose that pending proceeding amounted to suppression of a material fact warranting dismissal of the writ petition without adjudication on merits.
  3. Whether, on the facts (including timing of deposit/cheque and scheme deadlines), the petitioner's OTS application was rightly rejected under the scheme provisions (including clause 3.2 and cut-off dates).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Shri Akshat Agarwal)

  • The petitioner submitted an OTS application on 31.07.2010 which was rejected by the respondent by order dated 26.8.2010; that rejection also declared the petitioner a willful defaulter.
  • Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued statutory guidelines (circulated by covering letter dated 1.7.2010) prescribing a specific, transparent procedure for declaring someone a willful defaulter; the definition and procedural safeguards (including grievance redressal and clauses 3(i)–(v) and clause 2.9) were not complied with by the Bank/FIs.
  • Because mandatory procedural clauses (including clauses 2.3(i)–(v), clause 2.9 and clauses 1.6/1.7 of Annexure P/16) were not followed, the declaration of the petitioner as a willful defaulter was contrary to those statutory guidelines and therefore invalid; the petitioner was entitled to OTS unless he fell within the limited ambit of exclusion in the scheme.
  • Reliance was placed on Sardar Associates v. Punjab & Sind Bank and ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Official Liquidator of APS Star Industries Ltd. to show that the guidelines are binding/statutory in nature and that the Bank's discretion must be exercised transparently and non-arbitrarily.
  • In response to the non-disclosure objection, counsel asserted that the DRT decided SA No.40/2011 after the writ petition was filed (the petition was filed on 19.3.2012; DRT decision dated 26.9.2012) and therefore there was no occasion to disclose the later DRT decision; counsel also contended that the reliefs before the DRT and before the High Court were different.

Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by Shri Raju Sharma and Shri A.V. Bharadwaj)

  • The OTS scheme had fixed last dates: applications to be received by 31.07.2010 and processed by 31.08.2010. Clause 3.2 required deposit of 5% of eligible amount with the application as a sign of willingness to settle.
  • The petitioner enclosed a cheque dated 1.9.2010 (Annexure P/17), which was after the scheme cut-off; reliance was placed on reason (ii) of the rejection order dated 26.8.2010 to justify rejection.
  • As per the statute under which Respondent No.3 is formed, the petitioner had alternative remedies including arbitration/conciliation.
  • The petitioner had filed SA No.40/2011 before the DRT and claimed similar reliefs there (including seeking direction to accept OTS Scheme 2010). The petitioner did not disclose the filing of SA in the writ petition (or did not disclose it properly), which amounted to suppression of a material fact and deprived respondents of a right of hearing about that omission.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sardar Associates v. Punjab & Sind Bank, (2009) 8 SCC 257 Authority relied upon by petitioner to show RBI guidelines/statutory directions are binding and procedural safeguards are mandatory. Cited by petitioner to argue that the Bank’s action must conform to RBI guidelines; noted by Court as part of petitioner’s reliance but the Court dismissed petition on suppression grounds without adjudicating the merits of that contention.
ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Official Liquidator of APS Star Industries Limited, (2010) 10 SCC 1 Authority relied upon by petitioner to support contention that guidelines are binding and scheme must be non-discriminatory/non-discretionary. Cited by petitioner; Court recorded reliance but did not decide the substantive issue in view of suppression of material facts and dismissal of the writ petition.
Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society, AIR 2013 SCW 34 Litigant's obligation to disclose all material facts; mere en passant reference does not suffice; Court need not fish out facts from pleadings/annexures. Applied by the Court to reinforce the requirement that the petitioner should have disclosed the pendency of SA before the DRT in the specified columns; used as authority for rejecting non-disclosure as acceptable.
Vijay Syal v. State of Punjab, (2003) 9 SCC 401 Parties must not make false or inaccurate statements or conceal material facts; consequences flow from such conduct. Cited to support the proposition that suppression of material facts can justify dismissing a petition and imposing consequences; relied upon in reasoning to dismiss the petition.
Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India, (2007) 8 SCC 449 Writ jurisdiction is extraordinary; conduct of the party is relevant; failure to disclose may lead to dismissal without adjudication on merits. Relied upon as authority for the principle that a writ court may dismiss a petition when material facts are suppressed; used by the Court to justify dismissal.
Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha v. State of U.P., (2008) 1 SCC 560 Writ remedy is equitable; petitioner must come with clean hands and not suppress material facts. Cited repeatedly to emphasize equitable nature of writ jurisdiction and to support dismissal due to suppression of material facts.
K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481 Requirement of full disclosure; petitioners should approach with clean hands; failure to do so can lead to dismissal. Used to reinforce the principle that non-disclosure or misleading the Court justifies refusing relief; applied to hold petitioner guilty of suppression.
R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (English authority, cited) When an ex parte application is made, applicant must make a full and fair disclosure of all material facts; omission to do so permits the Court to refuse further relief. Quoted and applied as foundational principle for full and fair disclosure; formed part of the Court's reasoning to dismiss the petition for suppression.
Dalip Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 2 SCC 114 Reiterates that a litigant invoking extraordinary jurisdiction must place all facts before the Court; suppression justifies refusal to entertain petition. Applied to support the proposition that suppression of material facts can lead to dismissal and possibly contempt proceedings; cited in reasoning.
Rajendra Singh Rawat v. State of M.P., (I.L.R. 2012 MP 2660) Summarised principles: equitable nature of writ remedy, necessity of clean hands, nondisclosure is jugglery, court's power to refuse to proceed, potential contempt consequences, need to maintain purity in administration of justice. Cited by the Court and its enumerated principles were applied directly in concluding that the petitioner suppressed material facts and thus the writ petition could be dismissed.
Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69 Reaffirmed that a litigant must come with clean hands and should not take inconsistent positions; suppression of material facts is serious. Relied upon to underline that suppression of material facts in a writ petition is a grave matter and supports dismissal.
Manohar Lal (Dead) By Lrs. v. Ugrasen, (2010) 11 SCC 557 When approaching courts under Articles 226/227, parties must come with clean hands; equitable jurisdiction demands full disclosure. Referred to for the broader principle that equitable relief requires full candour; used to justify dismissal for non-disclosure.
Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra (cited) Exercise of discretionary powers (Article 226) must be in furtherance of justice; public interest and private interest must be weighed; discretionary powers are not to be used mechanically. Cited for context about discretionary jurisdiction; supported Court's emphasis on conduct and public interest when exercising writ jurisdiction.
Dalglish v. Jarvie (English authority) Applicant for injunction must bring all material facts to the Court; omission is not excusable. Quoted to show longstanding authority that full disclosure is required when seeking equitable relief; applied to support dismissal.
Castelli v. Cook (Vice-Chancellor Wigram) (English authority) Ex parte applicants contractually oblige themselves to state whole case fully and fairly; failure leads to loss of relief. Used to buttress the principle of full disclosure for equitable relief and support the Court's decision to dismiss.
Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co. Kay (English authority) Court will discharge an order if important misstatements are discovered; to impress importance of good faith in ex parte applications. Cited for the same fundamental proposition regarding the consequences of misleading statements; applied to reinforce dismissal.
Hari Narain v. Badri Das; Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P.; G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka; S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath; A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.; Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India; G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel Collectively cited as authorities reiterating the necessity of full and true disclosure and that writ jurisdiction is discretionary/equitable and requires candour. Grouped by the Court as cases that repeatedly emphasize the "clean hands" doctrine; relied upon to demonstrate settled law and to support dismissal for suppression of material facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. The Court first examined the objection that the petitioner had not disclosed the filing and pendency of SA No.40/2011 before the DRT. The Court observed that although the DRT decision came after the writ petition was filed, the SA itself was pending at the time the writ petition was filed, and thus the petitioner had an obligation to disclose its pendency.
  2. The Court compared the reliefs claimed in the DRT application (which specifically sought directions to accept compromise settlement as per OTS Scheme 2010 — prayer (vi) before the Tribunal) with the relief sought in the writ petition (including prayer v to direct respondent to accept the OTS proposal). The Court found that the reliefs were closely connected: ultimately both sought acceptance of the OTS application.
  3. The Court referred to the High Court Rules which prescribe formats and columns in a writ petition for disclosure of limitation, availability of alternative remedy, and previous/pending proceedings. The Court stressed that these formats are intended to place material facts on the face of the petition for the Bench’s immediate attention.
  4. The Court recapitulated settled legal principles (drawing on multiple Supreme Court and other authorities) that a litigant invoking extraordinary equitable jurisdiction must come with clean hands and fully disclose all material facts; mere passing references in unrelated parts of pleadings or annexures are insufficient. The Court emphasized that suppression or concealment of material facts permits dismissal of a petition without adjudication on merits and may amount to an abuse of process or even contempt.
  5. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the petitioner made a "calculated attempt" to obtain relief by not properly disclosing the pendency of SA No.40/2011 and the similar relief sought therein. The Court found this conduct to be suppression of a material fact.
  6. In consequence, the Court refused to enter into the merits of the challenge to the willful defaulter declaration or the substantive compliance with RBI guidelines and disposed of the matter on the threshold for non-disclosure.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The writ petition was dismissed for suppression of material facts.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petition is dismissed and the petitioner is ordered to pay costs of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) to the respondents.
  • The Court declined to adjudicate the substantive merits of the petitioner's challenge to the willful defaulter declaration or to the Bank's compliance with RBI guidelines because the petition was dismissed at the threshold for suppression of material facts.
  • The opinion reiterates settled law about the equitable nature of writ jurisdiction and the mandatory duty to disclose all material facts; however, the Court did not purport to lay down any new legal precedent beyond applying established authorities to the facts of this case.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text were added.

    Kanoongo Filling Station And Another v. State Bank Of India And Others

    ORDER

    By filing this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:-

    “(i) By issuance of appropriate writ quashing declaration of petitioners as willful defaulters and inclusion of names in the list of willful defaulters and for inclusion of name respectively;

    (ii) By writ of prohibition by restraining and injuncting respondent nos. 2 and 3 from dissemination, publication, display of the names of the petitioners or its directors, guarantors as willful defaulters;

    (iii) By issuance of appropriate writ in the nature of quo warranto directing the respondent no. 1 to show the authority to decide the issue of declaration of petitioners as willful defaulters;

    (iv) By issuing direction to Respondent No. 1 to decide the issues raised by petitioners de novo after affording an opportunity of hearing to petitioners and by assigning reasonable reasons and;

    (v) By issuing direction to respondent no. 1 to accept the proposal submitted by the petitioners under SME OTS Scheme 2010 after quashing declaration of petitioners as willful defaulters;

    (vi) Cost of this petition with any other appropriate relief may kindly be granted to the petitioner.

    (vii) Pass any other or further order(s) deemed fit and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the matter.”

    2. The facts as canvassed by Shri Akshat Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioners are as under:-

    The petitioner submitted his application for One-Time Settlement as per the scheme, Annexure P/16. The application was preferred on 31st July, 2010. The said application was rejected by the respondent by order dated 26.8.2010 (Annexure P/18). This rejection order (Annexure P/18) is also called in question because the petitioner has been declared as willful defaulter by the said order and, accordingly, the benefit of SME-OTS-2009-2010 was not extended in his favour.

    3. Criticizing this rejection order, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued statutory guideline, which was circulated by covering letter dated July 1, 2010 filed with covering memo dated 18.4.2013 By taking this Court to various clauses of this guideline, it is contended that there is a specific procedure prescribed for declaring somebody as willful defaulter. It is contended that the willful defaulter is also defined in clause 2.1 of the said scheme. It is contended that it is imperative on the part of the Bank and Financial Institutions (FI) to put in place a transparent mechanism for the entire process so that the penal provisions are not misused and the scope of such discretionary powers are kept to the barest minimum. To ensure the transparency, it is contended that the Grievances Redressal Mechanism is prescribed and before declaring somebody as willful defaulter, clauses 3(i) to (v) are required to be fulfilled. In absence thereto any declaration as willful defaulter runs contrary to the statutory guidelines of the RBI. In addition, it is contended that Credit Information Company can record the list of willful defaulters when it is furnished by the Bank/FIs in the manner prescribed in clause 2.9 of the scheme. Shri Agarwal submits that the aforesaid statutory guideline issued by RBI has not been fulfilled and the conditions mentioned in clause 2.3 from (i) to (v) are not fulfilled and, therefore, by no stretch of imagination the petitioner can be said to be a willful defaulter. In support of the contention that the said guidelines are binding and statutory in nature, he relied on (2009) 8 SCC 257 (Sardar Associates v. Punjab & Sind Bank) and (2010) 10 SCC 1 (ICICI Bank Limited v. Official Liquidator of APS Star Industries Limited). It is contended that the basic policy was non-discretionary and non-discriminatory. Unless the petitioner's case falls within the ambit of clauses 1.6 and 1.7 of Annexure P/16, the respondent had no option but to treat him eligible and give him benefit of OTS.

    4. Per Contra, Shri Raju Sharma and Shri A.V Bharadwaj, learned counsel for the other side supported the order impugned. By placing reliance on the main scheme, it is contended that the last date for receiving the application under scheme was 31 July, 2010 and last date for processing the application was 31 August, 2010. By placing reliance on clause 3.2 of the scheme, it is contended that along with the application, the applicant was required to deposit 5% of the eligible amount to indicate the borrower's willingness. By placing reliance on the application of the petitioner (Annexure P/17), it is contended that the applicant has enclosed a cheque dated 1.9.2010, which is after the cut off date (31 July/August, 2010), therefore, his claim was rightly rejected. Reliance for this purpose is placed on reason (ii) of the rejection order dated 26.8.2010

    5. Shri Anand V. Bharadwaj, learned counsel borrowed the same argument and in addition submits that as per the statute, by which the respondent No. 3 is formed, the petitioner has a remedy of raising dispute in arbitration/conciliation.

    6. Learned counsel for the respondents submit that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands. It is contended that after rejection order dated 26.8.2010, the petitioner filed Securitization Application (SA) No. 40/2011 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) at Jabalpur. In the said application the petitioner had disclosed about his grievance of non-settling the claim under the SBI OTS Scheme 2010 in paragraph 5.11 of SA. Petitioner has also prayed for a relief in this regard in relief clause before the DRT. The Tribunal rejected his SA on 26.9.2012, against which he preferred the appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT). Before the Appellate Tribunal the petitioner contended that she will try for settlement with the Bank and, therefore, the appeal was also disposed of. The petitioner has not disclosed about factum of filing of said SA before the DRT and, therefore, they do not have right of hearing before this Court.

    To this objection, Shri Akshat Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that if the relief of the petitioner claimed before the DRAT is examined in juxtaposition to the relief before this Court, it will be clear that the reliefs are not common and petitioner cannot be said to be guilty of any misrepresentation of fact or non-disclosure of fact before this Court.

    7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

    8. I deem it proper to first deal with the last objection of the learned counsel for the other side regarding non-disclosure of the relevant fact. It is to be seen whether non-disclosure of filing of SA No. 40/2011 was suppression of a “material fact”. Whether the petitioner was required to disclose the said fact in the present petition.

    9. Shri Agarwal submits that the DRT decided SA No. 40/2011 on 26.9.2012 and this petition was filed on 19.3.2012 and, therefore, the petitioner had no occasion to disclose this fact. In addition, it is contended that the petitioner's reliefs before the DRT and before this Court are different. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that although in the relief column of the writ petition (para 2), it is not disclosed about filing of the matter before the DRT, it is mentioned in the body of the petition. However, despite repeated query, learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to show the pleading where it has been even remotely disclosed about the matter filed before the DRT.

    10. Thus, the first question is whether the relief claimed before the Tribunal has any nexus/relevance with the present matter and whether the petitioner should have disclosed the factum of filing of SA before this Court. I am not impressed with the contention of Shri Agarwal that since the Tribunal decided the matter on 26.9.2012 after filing of this writ petition, the factum of filing of SA was not required to be disclosed. Even if the judgment of DRT came lateron, it is admitted position that when this writ petition was filed, the SA was already pending before the DRT.

    11. Paragraphs 5.11 and 5.12 of the SA aforesaid are reproduced as under:-

    “5.11 That, the respondent Bank yet again came out with a SBI OTS Scheme 2010, copy of which is annexed herewith as Annexure A/17. The applicant no. 1 yet again submitted a proposal under the said Scheme dated 31.7.2010 Annexure A/18. Under the said Scheme the applicant no. 1 was required to deposit 70% of the outstanding dues as on the date when the account was classified as doubtful provided the said amount is deposited within a period of one month. The applicant no. 1 proposed to pay the settlement amount within a period of one month. However, it was again with a condition that proper investigation in respect of the earlier transactions shall be made by the Bank. Shockingly and surprisingly the respondent Bank issued letter dated 16.09.2010 (Annexure A/19) thereby mentioning the two earlier correspondences made by the respondent Bank in relation to the OTS proposal. It was informed that the OTS proposal of the applicant no. 1 under the OTS Scheme of 2009 and OTS Scheme of 2010 is not accepted by the Bank. The applicant no. 1 gave a detailed reply to the said letter dated 15.01.2011 (Annexure A/20) thereby informing that the Bank has not assigned any reason for not accepting the OTS proposal submitted by the applicant no. 1. The irregularities which were committed by the respondent Bank was again reiterated and request for proper investigation of the account was made. The applicant no. 1 again proposed to settle the accounts as per the OTS Scheme 2010.

    5.12 That, the respondent Bank in response to the letter written by the applicant vide letter dated 01.02.2011 (Annexure A/21) replied that two debit entries were made in the account in respect of the Demand Draft which were issued earlier. Along with the said letter the respondent Bank annexed the earlier letters written as regards the OTS proposal submitted by the applicant no. 1, which letters were never served on the applicant. It was for the first time the applicant no. 1 came to know that the OTS proposal under OTS Scheme 2009 was not accepted by the Bank because the outstanding dues in the accounts were more than Rs. 25.00 lac. Thus, absolutely contrary stand was taken by the respondent Bank. In addition to the aforesaid the outstanding dues were never over and above Rs. 26.00 lac as in the Cash Credit Limit account the respondent Bank was charging interest despite the fact that the same was classified as NPA. If that interest is removed from the outstanding dues then the outstanding dues in both the loan accounts shall be less than Rs. 25.00 lac and the proposal of the applicant no. 1 could be considered under the OTS Scheme 2009. The respondent Bank also made efforts to deliver the Banker's cheque of Rs. 1,31,409/- to the applicant no. 1. This fact came into the knowledge of the applicant no. 1 from the correspondences which were annexed along with the letter dated 01.02.2011”

    The relief claimed before the DRT also reads as under:-

    “In view of the facts and grounds as mentioned above, the applicants pray for the following reliefs:-

    (i) Set aside the demand notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Act of 2002 dated 21.05.2007 (Annexure A/4) issued by th respondent Bank;

    (ii) Set aside the possession notice dated 15.02.2011 issued under Section 13(4) of the Act of 2002 (Annexure A/24) by the respondent Bank;

    (iii) Set aside the Possession Notice published in daily newspaper dated 17.02.2011 (Annexure A/25);

    (iv) Set aside the entire proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank under the provisions of the Act of 2002 and which shall be initiated in pursuance to the possession notice dated 15.02.2011;

    (v) Declare that the entire action of the respondent Bank under the Act of 2002 and the Rules framed thereunder as illegal and liable to be set aside.

    (vi) Direct the respondent Bank to accept the compromise settlement of the applicant as per OTS Scheme 2010.”

    A bare perusal of the pleadings and the reliefs claimed by the petitioner clearly shows that the petitioner has assailed the action of the respondents in not accepting the compromise settlement as per OTS Scheme 2010. Pleading and prayer in this regard was specifically made by the petitioner before the Tribunal. If the prayer (vi) before the Tribunal is examined with the prayer and pleading made in the present writ petition at (v), it will be crystal clear that ultimately the net relief which the petitioner is claiming is acceptance of his OTS application 2010. The petitioner has prayed for this relief before the Tribunal. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, even if the relief claimed in the present writ petition has a thread relation with the relief claimed in the DRT, in all fairness the petitioner should have disclosed it in the body of the petition.

    12. In the High Court Rules a formate of writ petition is prescribed. The different columns/paragraphs are devoted for different purposes which deals with the question of limitation/delay, availability of alternative remedy, declaration whether such remedy is exhausted and whether matter was previously filed or pending before any forum. These paragraphs were mentioned in the beginning in the petition with a view to facilitate the Benches to lay their hands on the relevant facts on the face of it.

    13. Recently, in AIR 2013 SCW 34 (Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society), the Apex Court opined that it is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision on the Court. Merely en passant reference to some fact in order does not serve the requirement of disclosure. It is not for the Court to look into every word of pleadings, documents and annexures to fish out a fact. Considering the aforesaid, it is the duty of a litigant to mention every fact in the columns provided for this purpose.

    14. This is also settled in law that litigation before a court of law is not a game of chess. One has to approach the court with clean hands, clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. If material facts are not disclosed, the court is bound to dismiss the petition without entering into the merits of the matter. In other words, the conduct of the litigant in non-disclosure or suppression of material fact is itself a good reason for dismissing the petition.

    15. On the basis of aforesaid factual backdrop, it is crystal clear that the petitioner is guilty of suppression of material fact from this Court in the present writ petition. The Apex Court in catena of judgments has dealt with the question of suppression of material facts. It is apt to quote relevant portion of relevant judgments as under:-

    In Vijay Syal v. State of Punjab, ((2003) 9 SCC 401) this Court stated:

    “24. In order to sustain and maintain the sanctity and solemnity of the proceedings in law courts it is necessary that parties should not make false or knowingly, inaccurate statements or misrepresentation and/or should not conceal material facts with a design to gain some advantage or benefit at the hands of the court, when a court is considered as a place where truth and justice are the solemn pursuits. If any party attempts to pollute such a place by adopting recourse to make misrepresentation and is concealing material facts it does so at its risk and cost. Such party must be ready to take the consequences that follow on account of its own making. At times lenient or liberal or generous treatment by courts in dealing with such matters is either mistaken or lightly taken instead of learning a proper lesson. Hence there is a compelling need to take a serious view in such matters to ensure expected purity and grace in the administration of justice.”

    In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank Of India., (2007) 8 SCC 449, the Apex Court held in para 35 as under:-

    “35. It is well settled that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. In exercising extraordinary power, therefore, a writ court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.”

    In Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 1 SCC 560, the Apex Court held as under in para 16:-

    “16. A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person approaching a superior court must come with a pair of clean hands. It not only should not suppress any material fact, but also should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of law. In Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P Khair Industries this Court was of the opinion that such a repeated filing of writ petitions amounts to criminal contempt.”

    In K.D Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Limited, (2008) 12 SCC 481, the Apex Court held as under:-

    “33. The learned counsel for SAIL is also right in urging that the appellant has not approached the Court with clean hands by disclosing all facts. An impression is sought to be created as if no notice was ever given to him nor was he informed about the consideration of cases of eligible and qualified bidders in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court in review and confirmed by this Court. The true facts, however, were just contrary to what was sought to be placed before the Court. A notice was issued by SAIL to the appellant, he received the notice, intimated in writing to SAIL that he had authorised Ramesh of Rithwik Projects to appear on his behalf. Ramesh duly appeared at the time of consideration of bids. Bid of Respondent 2 was found to be lowest and was accepted and the contract was given to him (under Tender Notice 4). The said contract had nothing to do with Tender Notice 5 and the contract thereunder had been given to the appellant herein and he had completed the work. Thus, it is clear that the appellant had not placed all the facts before the Court clearly, candidly and frankly.

    34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the writ court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.

    35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J, in the leading case of R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commrs in the following words: (KB p. 514)

    “… it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts- it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it-the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty Udyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 1 SCC 560 by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a writ court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the court, the court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating, “We will not listen to your application because of what you have done.” The rule has been evolved in the larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it.”

    In Kensington Income Tax Commrs. Viscount Reading, C.J observed: (KB pp. 495-96)

    “… Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the application was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, but stated them in such a way as to mislead the Court as to the true facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that the Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from tUdyami Evam Khadi Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 1 SCC 560 he applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of writ courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because “the court knows law but not facts”.

    39. If the primary object as highlighted in Kensington Income Tax Commrs. is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and “clean breast” cannot hold a writ of the court with “soiled hands”. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the court, the court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the court does not reject the petition on that ground, the court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for contempt of court for abusing the process of the court.”

    In Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 114, the Apex Court held in para 7 as under:-

    “7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI5 it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, and observed: (Prestige Lights Ltd. case, SCC p. 462, para 35)

    In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.”

    In Manohar Lal (Dead) By Lrs. v. Ugrasen, (2010) 11 SCC 557, the Apex Court held in para 48 as under:-

    “48. The present appellants had also not disclosed that land allotted to them falls in commercial area. When a person approaches a court of equity in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, he should approach the court not only with clean hands but also with clean mind, clean heart and clean objective. “Equally, the judicial process should never become an instrument of oppression or abuse or a means in the process of the court to subvert justice.” Who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim “Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem”, means that it is a law of nature that one should not be enriched by the loss or injury to another. (Vide Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, K.R Srinivas v. R.M Premchand and Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L Anand at SCC p. 249, para 9.)

    49. Similarly, in Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra this Court observed as under:(SCCp. 140, para 10).

    “10…….The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point ….the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same …. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising….. any of their discretionary powers.” (emphasis added).

    50. In Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B Munshi, State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. and Sabia Khan v. State of U.P, this Court held that filing a totally misconceived petition amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Such a litigant is not required to be dealt with lightly, as a petition containing misleading and inaccurate statement, if filed, to achieve an ulterior purpose amounts to abuse of the process of the court. A litigant is bound to made “full and true disclosure of facts”.

    51. In Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai, S.J.S Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd. v. Comnr. (Admn.) this Court held that whenever the court comes to the conclusion that the process of the court is being abused, the court would be justified in refusing to proceed further and refuse relief to the party. This rule has been evolved out of need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the court by deceiving it.

    (emphasis supplied)

    In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639, the Apex Court in para 164 held that it is a settled proposition of law that a false statement made in the Court or in the pleadings intentionally to mislead the Court and obtains favourable order amounts to criminal contempt.

    This Court in Rajendra Singh Rawat v. State Of M.P. (I.L.R 2012 MP 2660) after considering the aforesaid Supreme Court judgment, culled out the principles as under:-

    “1. A writ remedy is an equitable one. While exercising extraordinary power a Writ Court certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court.

    2. Litigant before the Writ Court must come with clean hands, clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. He should disclose all facts without suppressing anything. Litigant cannot be allowed to play “hide and seek” or to “pick and choose” the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back)/conceal other facts.

    3. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or mis representation which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction.

    4. If litigant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly or states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power to refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty.

    5. Such a litigant requires to be dealt with for Contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court.

    6. There is a compelling need to take a serious view in such matters to ensure purity and grace in the administration of justice.

    7. The litigation in the Court of law is not a game of chess. The Court is bound to see the conduct of party who is invoking such jurisdiction.”

    The Apex Court in (2011) 7 SCC 69 (Amar Singh v. Union of India) held as under:-

    “50. This Court wants to make it clear that an action at law is not a game of chess. A litigant who comes to Court and invokes its writ jurisdiction must come with clean hands. He cannot prevaricate and take inconsistent positions.

    51. Apart from the aforesaid, in the writ petition which was filed on 21-1-2006, there is no mention of the fact that the petitioner gave a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with the investigation arising out of FIR lodged on 30-12-2005. From the records of the case it appears the petitioner gave Section 161 statement on 13-1-2006. In the writ petition there is a complete suppression of the aforesaid fact. A statement under Section 161 is certainly a material fact in a police investigation in connection with an FIR. The investigation is to find out the genuineness of those very documents on the basis of which the writ petition was moved. In that factual context, total suppression in the writ petition of the fact that the petitioner gave a Section 161 statement in that investigation is, in our judgment, suppression of a very material fact.

    53. Courts have, over the centuries, frowned upon litigants who, with intent to deceive and mislead the courts, initiated proceedings without full disclosure of facts. Courts held that such litigants have come with “unclean hands” and are not entitled to be heard on the merits of their case.

    54. In Dalglish v. Jarvie the Court, speaking through Lord Langdale and Rolfe B., laid down: (Mac & G p. 231: ER p. 89)

    “It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any facts which he has omitted to bring forward.”

    55. In Castelli v. Cook Vice-Chancellor Wigram, formulated the same principles as follows: (Hare p. 94: ER p. 38)

    “… a plaintiff applying ex parte comes (as it has been expressed) under a contract with the Court that he will state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when the other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material fact has been suppressed or not properly brought forward, the plaintiff is told that the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go.”

    56. In Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Bros. & Co. Kay, J. reminded us of the same position by holding: (LT p. 803)

    “…If there is an important misstatement, speaking for myself, I have never hesitated, and never shall hesitate until the rule is altered, to discharge the order at once, so as to impress upon all persons who are suitors in this Court the importance of dealing in good faith with the Court when ex parte applications are made.”

    57. In one of the most celebrated cases upholding this principle, in the Court of Appeal in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commr., ex p Princess de Polignac K.B Scrutton, L.J formulated as under: (KB p. 514)

    “… and it has been for many years the rule of the court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts-facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it-the court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.”

    58. It is one of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence that litigants must observe total clarity and candour in their pleadings and especially when it contains a prayer for injunction. A prayer for injunction, which is an equitable remedy, must be governed by the principles of “uberrima fides”.

    59. The aforesaid requirement of coming to court with clean hands has been repeatedly reiterated by this Court in a large number of cases. Some of which may be noted, they are: Hari Narain v. Badri Das, Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka, S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, A.V Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P, Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI, Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India, K.D Sharma v. SAIL, G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.

    60. In the last noted case of Dalip Singh, this Court has given this concept a new dimension which has a far-reaching effect. We, therefore, repeat those principles here again: (SCC pp. 116-17, paras 1-2)

    “1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e ‘satya’ (truth) and ‘ahimsa’ (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.

    2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.”

    However, this Court is constrained to observe that those principles are honoured more in breach than in their observance. (emphasis supplied)

    Recently, the Apex Court in AIR 2013 SCW 34 (Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society) held as under:-

    “In an application for special leave it is for the litigant to come up-front and clean with all material facts and then, on the basis of the submissions made by learned counsel, leave it to the Court to determine whether or not a particular fact is relevant for arriving at a decision. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision making to the Court. Mere en passant reference to some fact in order does not serve the requirement of disclosure. It is not for the Court to look into every word of the pleadings, documents and annexures to fish out a fact. (Paras 46, 49).

    16. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, in my opinion, the petitioner does not deserve hearing or adjudication on merits because of his conduct. In the opinion of this Court, the petitioner has made a calculated attempt to obtain relief from this Court by suppressing the material fact of filing SA before the DRT. This conduct of the litigant cannot be appreciated and liable to be deprecated. Petitioners are unscrupulous litigants and their writ petition cannot be entertained. Accordingly, I deem it proper to dismissed this petition.

    17. Resultantly, the petition is dismissed for suppression of material facts with Rs. 10,000/-(Rupees Ten Thousand) as costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kanoongo Filling Station And Another v. State Bank Of India And Others
    (Aug 22, 2013)