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  • Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963, (ii) the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, and (iii) the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993,
  • Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961,
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  • Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963, (ii) the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, and (iii) the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993,
  • Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This Letters Patent Appeal was filed by Shri Vipulbhai M. Chandhary (the appellant) challenging the order of the learned Single Judge in Civil Application No. 13220 of 2013 dated 06.01.2014 (Annexure‑E). The Single Judge had also dealt with Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013 (the main petition), and in the course of that judgment referred a pure question of law to the Division Bench while addressing other aspects of the matter on merits. The appellant contended that once SCA No. 16515 of 2013 was referred to the Division Bench, the learned Single Judge became functus officio and therefore had no jurisdiction to decide CA No. 13220 of 2013 or to direct the Registry to place SCA papers before the Division Bench. The Single Judge, relying in part on directions and observations contained in an order of the Hon'ble Apex Court in connected Special Leave Petitions, both referred a legal question to the Division Bench and decided aspects of the SCA and CA on merits. The Division Bench (this Court) reviewed the Single Judge's approach and concluded that the Single Judge had not erred; the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Single Judge erred in deciding Civil Application No. 13220 of 2013 after referring Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013 to the Division Bench — i.e., whether the Single Judge became functus officio once the question of law was referred.
  2. Whether directing the Registry to place the papers of SCA No. 16515 of 2013 before the Chief Justice/Division Bench also precluded the Single Judge from deciding CA No. 13220 of 2013.
  3. Whether, on the merits, the no‑confidence motion against the Chairperson was invalid in the absence of an express provision in the Gujarat Co‑operative Societies Act, 1961 (the question of law referred to the Division Bench).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • The learned Single Judge committed an error in deciding Civil Application No. 13220 of 2013 after referring SCA No. 16515 of 2013 to the Division Bench; once the main SCA was referred, the Single Judge became functus officio and could not decide the CA.
  • The Single Judge's direction to the Registry to place the papers of the SCA before the Division Bench meant that the papers of all applications filed in the SCA (including CA No. 13220 of 2013) would be placed before the Division Bench; consequently the Single Judge could not validly pass orders in the CA after issuing that direction.
  • The act of deciding the CA after referring the main matter amounted to an arbitrary exercise of power meriting quashing of the order allowing CA No. 13220 of 2013.

Respondents' Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • Respondent No.1 (Federation) contended that the learned Single Judge had not committed any error. The Single Judge acted within his jurisdiction and in consonance with directions/observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in connected Special Leave Petitions, which permitted the Federation to make an application for implementation before the Single Judge and left it open to the Single Judge to either consider the implementation application or hear SCA No. 16515 of 2013 finally.
  • Respondent No.1 relied on the Apex Court's order (Special Leave to Appeal Nos. 37057‑37059 of 2013) and subsequent observations to show that the Single Judge had the discretion to decide the matter or the application despite a Division Bench reference on a pure question of law.
  • Respondents also relied on prior decisions of this Court and a Division Bench (e.g., Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya; Motibhai R. Chaudhary) to support the proposition that a no‑confidence motion may be valid even without an express statutory provision to the contrary (i.e., that such democratic remedial mechanisms can be available unless statute/bye‑laws indicate otherwise).
  • Respondents argued that the Single Judge conscientiously adhered to judicial discipline (referred pure question of law to the Division Bench) but nonetheless decided other aspects on merit, including rejecting the appellant's principal contention and rejecting the specific prayers which had been advanced.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Order of Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos. 37057‑37059 of 2013 (connected to SCA No. 16515 of 2013) Permission granted to the Federation to make an appropriate application for implementation before the Single Judge; left it open to the Single Judge to consider the implementation application or hear the SCA finally. The Division Bench regarded this order as the primary basis for the Single Judge's jurisdiction to decide the SCA and related applications despite the referral of a pure question of law to the Division Bench. The Court relied on the Apex Court's liberty to the Single Judge to justify the Single Judge's actions.
K. Sahadev v. Suresh Bir, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 668 Invoked to demonstrate the importance of judicial discipline and adherence to the approach of the Apex Court. Referred by the Single Judge (and noted by the Division Bench) to support the proposition that lower courts should not act inconsistently with the Apex Court's approach; used to justify reference of the pure question of law to the Division Bench and caution in adjudication.
State of U.P. v. C.L. Agrawal, (1997) 5 SCC 1 : AIR 1997 SC 2431 Invoked alongside K. Sahadev to show consistent Apex Court jurisprudence on judicial discipline. Used by the Single Judge (and recognized by this Court) as authority for exercising caution and following the Apex Court's established views when dealing with perceived conflicts in local precedents.
Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1 (para 79) Shows a consistent view followed by the Apex Court; cited in context of judicial discipline. Referred by the Single Judge to emphasise that earlier conflicting local decisions should be reconciled with Apex Court guidance; recognised by this Court in approving the Single Judge's approach.
Babubhai Kalidas Patel (case referred to in the Single Judge's judgment) The Single Judge observed that the decision in Babubhai Kalidas Patel appeared procedurally in conflict with the Apex Court's view as narrated in other authorities. The Single Judge examined whether Babubhai Kalidas Patel had impliedly overruled other decisions of this Court; because of the perceived conflict, the Single Judge referred the pure question of law to the Division Bench and examined merits cautiously. (The provided opinion does not give further citation details for this case.)
Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya v. Director of Agriculture Marketing & Rural Finance, 2002 (2) GLR 1132 Principle: it is the inherent right of members of a democratic body to move a no‑confidence motion against their elected leader; a no‑confidence motion can be passed by simple majority unless statute or bye‑laws indicate a contrary intention. Relied upon by respondents and cited by the Division Bench (and earlier courts) to support the proposition that the Chairperson elected by the Board can be removed by a no‑confidence motion passed by the Board. The Single Judge referred the question whether this view was impliedly overruled to the Division Bench.
Motibhai R. Chaudhary v. Registrar, Co‑operative Societies, 2004 (3) GLR 2251 Applied the principle (from Nandlal Posiya) regarding no‑confidence motions against Chairmen/Vice‑Chairmen — i.e., that such a removal is permissible absent contrary statutory/bye‑law provisions. Invoked by counsel and cited by the Court as a supporting Division Bench decision applying the democratic‑right principle to cooperative bodies; the Single Judge treated it as one of the decisions to consider for possible reconciliation with Babubhai Kalidas Patel.
Narmadaben V. Parmar (Single Judge decision — cited) This decision was listed among earlier decisions which the Single Judge considered might have been impliedly overruled by other local precedent(s). The Single Judge included this case in the set of authorities to be examined by the Division Bench on the referred question of law. The opinion does not expound the rule in detail.
State of Rajasthan v. R.S. Sharma & Company, (1988) 4 SCC 353 Principle cited: Unless there is an error of law apparent on the face of an award, the award cannot be challenged merely on the ground of absence of reasons; final adjudication should not be delayed solely because a larger bench may consider related questions. Relied upon by respondent No.1 to support the proposition that final adjudication on the controversy should not be kept away merely because a larger bench (or Division Bench) may be considering a related question; used to justify the Single Judge's decision on merits while a pure question of law was referred.
Atulbhai Patel, Director, Baroda District Co‑op. Milk Producers Union v. State of Gujarat, 2009 (1) GLR 623 Discusses elections, bye‑laws and the principle that a no‑confidence motion is an inherent democratic right; supports the view that bye‑laws (e.g., Bye‑law No. 18.1) are not necessarily arbitrary for staggered election terms and that no‑confidence motion remains available. Relied upon by respondents (specifically respondent Nos. 4, 6 & 7) to show consistent local authority supporting the validity of no‑confidence motions and to reinforce the Single Judge's approach in rejecting the petitioner's main contention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench undertook a close reading of the Single Judge's judgment and the surrounding circumstances. The Court's analytical steps, as recorded in the opinion, were:

  1. Examination of the Single Judge's procedural stance: The Single Judge had identified a "pure question of law" arising from the petitioner's principal contention (whether, in absence of a provision in the Gujarat Co‑operative Societies Act, 1961, a no‑confidence motion could be moved/considered) and explicitly referred that question to the Division Bench for final adjudication.
  2. Assessment of Apex Court directions: The Division Bench noted that the Apex Court's order in connected Special Leave Petitions expressly permitted respondent No.1 to move an application for implementation before the Single Judge and left it open to the Single Judge to either consider that application or hear SCA No. 16515 of 2013 itself finally. The Division Bench treated that liberty as authorising the Single Judge's decision on merits while still referring the pure question of law.
  3. Consideration of judicial discipline: The Single Judge had referred the question of law to the Division Bench out of deference to the need for consistency with Apex Court authority and to avoid conflicting local precedents. The Division Bench accepted that approach as demonstrating adherence to judicial discipline.
  4. Review of merits as decided by the Single Judge: The Single Judge had examined the merits (para 10.3) and found that the petitioner (the Chairperson) had been present at the relevant meeting, tried to adjourn it unsuccessfully, and then walked out with a lone supporter. The Single Judge described the petitioner's contention as arising more from frustration than from an established procedural irregularity and rejected it. The Division Bench accepted this factual assessment as recorded by the Single Judge.
  5. Evaluation of the scope of the Registry direction: The appellant's contention that directing the Registry to place the SCA papers before the Chief Justice necessarily prevented the Single Judge from deciding CA No. 13220 of 2013 was not accepted. The Division Bench reasoned that the Apex Court's liberty to the Single Judge to decide the matter or the application allowed the Single Judge to proceed to decide the SCA and CA on the merits while referring only the stated question of law to the Division Bench.
  6. Reliance on authorities: The Court observed that various authorities (both Apex Court and local benches) were cited to justify the Single Judge's approach. The Division Bench found that those authorities supported the proposition that it was open to the Single Judge to decide aspects of the case notwithstanding referral of a pure question of law, and that where there was a conflict in local precedents the question was properly referred to the Division Bench for resolution.
  7. Conclusion on correctness: In light of the Apex Court order, the Single Judge's recorded reasoning, and the findings on merit, the Division Bench concluded that the Single Judge had not committed an error in deciding CA No. 13220 of 2013 and had observed judicial discipline by referring the pure question of law to the Division Bench.

Holding and Implications

Holding: This Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. The Division Bench held that the learned Single Judge did not commit any error in adjudicating CA No. 13220 of 2013; the Single Judge was within jurisdiction in view of the Apex Court's order that left it open to the Single Judge to consider the application for implementation or to hear SCA No. 16515 of 2013 finally. The Single Judge referred the pure question of law to the Division Bench while deciding other issues on the merits.

Implications:

  • The Single Judge's order (including allowance of CA No. 13220 of 2013 and the adjudication of aspects of SCA No. 16515 of 2013, except for the referred question of law) stands upheld by the Division Bench.
  • The pure question of law identified by the Single Judge (concerning the validity of a no‑confidence motion in the absence of an express provision in the Gujarat Co‑operative Societies Act, 1961 and whether certain local precedents were impliedly overruled) was properly referred to the Division Bench for consideration; that referral remains in place.
  • The appellant's request to extend non‑implementation of the no‑confidence motion for 10 days (on condition the appellant would not preside over meetings) was rejected; the Court observed that a Chairperson unanimously voted out by a majority of the Board cannot seek that relief.
  • No broader precedent beyond the reasoning set out in the opinion is expressly stated to be laid down by this Division Bench; the immediate and direct effect is that the Single Judge's adjudication is sustained and the appeal fails.

Note: This summary is strictly limited to and derived from the information contained in the provided opinion. No information has been invented or inferred beyond the text of the opinion.

    Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary - Chairman (S) v. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited & 6 (S)

    Ravi R. Tripathi, J.:— The present Letters Patent Appeal is filed by Shri Vipulbhai M. Chandhary-appellant-petitioner being aggrieved by order passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Application No. 13220 of 2013 dated 06.01.2014, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-E to this appeal. The order runs from page No. Z-43 to Z-66.

    2. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. N.D Nanavati appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge has committed an error in deciding Civil Application No. 13220 of 2013, more particularly when Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013, in which this CA was filed, is referred to by the learned Single Judge to the Division Bench. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that once the SCA is referred to the Division Bench, according to him, the learned Single Judge becomes functus officio and he could not have taken up the task of deciding CA No. 13220 of 2013.

    2.1 Besides that, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge directed the Registry to place papers of SCA before the Division Bench. He submitted that the papers of SCA will include the papers of all applications filed in the said SCA. Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that passing an order in CA, after referring the main matter, i.e SCA No. 16515 of 2013, is nothing but an arbitrary exercise of power which is required to be remedied by the Division Bench by entertaining this appeal and quashing the order allowing CA No. 13220 of 2013.

    3. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. S.N Shelat appears for respondent No. 1 Federation, learned AGP Mr. Rindani appears for respondent Nos. 2 and 3, learned Advocate Mr. B.S Patel appears for respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 7 and learned Advocate Mr. Amit M. Panchal appears for respondent No. 5.

    4. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shelat for respondent No. 1 submitted that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in adjudicating upon CA No. 13220 of 2013. He submitted that the learned Single Judge was well within his rights in law in view of observations made by the Hon'ble the Apex Court which passed order in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 37057-37059 of 2013 (from the judgment and order dated 04.12.2013 in CA No. 12770 of 2013 in LPA No. 1413 of 2013 in SCA No. 16515 of 2013, CA No. 12775 of 2013 in LPA No. 1414 2013 in SCA No. 16515 of 2013 and CA No. 12778 of 2013 in LPA No. 1416 of 2013 in SCA No. 16515 of 2013). Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 1 invited attention of the Court to the order passed by the Hon'ble the Apex Court, a copy of which is produced at page Nos. 116 to 118 of the compilation. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 1 invited attention of the Court to the observations made by the Hon'ble the Apex Court in para-4 onwards, which read as under:—

    “4. Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1 - Gujarat Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. (for short, ‘Federation’) submits that the Federation shall make an appropriate application for implementation of the above Resolution before the single Judge, if permitted by this Court.

    5. We think that the prayer made on behalf of the respondent No. 1 is reasonable. Instead of making an application for implementation of the Resolution dated 05.12.2013 before the Division Bench, we thing that it will be appropriate if such application is made before the single Judge. We order accordingly.

    6. It will be open to the petitioner to oppose such application on all available grounds. We leave it open to the single Judge to either consider the application for implementation of the Resolution dated 05.12.2013 or hear the Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013 itself finally for which date has already been fixed on 23.12.2013 or any other date which may be fixed by the Court.

    (emphasis supplied)

    4.1 Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 1 submitted that the Hon'ble the Apex Court in its wisdom deemed it proper not only to permit respondent No. 1 to file application for implementation of Resolution No. 3 which was passed on 05.12.2013, which itself is part of the order of the Hon'ble the Apex Court, but the Hon'ble the Apex Court went ahead stating that, “We leave it open to the single Judge to either consider the application for implementation of the Resolution dated 05.12.2013 or hear the Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013 itself finally …..”.

    4.2 Citing the aforesaid observations of the Hon'ble the Apex Court, learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 1 submitted that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in deciding CA No. 13220 of 2013, while referring the main petition on a very specific question of law.

    4.3 In this regard, in addition to the relevant paras of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, which were invited attention to by learned Senior Advocate Mr. N.D Nanavati for the appellant, learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 1 invited attention of the Court to the following paras:—

    “5.3 So far the question of maintainability of the petition is concerned, generally, that question is gone into first, by the Court and in the event, the contention of the respondent is upheld in this regard, the matter may not be required to be examined on merits at all. Though, being conscious of this course to be adopted, this Court has, for the reasons and in the circumstances narrated hereinafter, thought it fit to first consider the bone contention on merits of the matter, and the maintainability aspect is gone into in para 9 of this order.

    4.4 It is thereafter that the learned Single Judge examined the bone contention in para-6.1, which reads as under:—

    “6.1 The bone contention on behalf of the petitioner, on merits, is that the petitioner was elected as Chairperson of the Federation by the Board for the term of three years and he has right to hold this office for three years, which is yet not over, and in absence of any provision in the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, No Confidence Motion could not have been moved against him at all by the Directors who had elected the petitioner as Chairperson, and therefore all subsequent actions in that regard i.e from the stage of calling of the meeting of the Board of Directors to consider the no confidence motion, till passing of the said no confidence motion, are nullity and the same needs to be quashed and set aside …..”.

    4.5 After setting out the bone contention, the learned Single Judge has considered in para-6.2 various decisions cited before him. After citation of the judgment, the learned Single Judge has observed as under:—

    Thus, under (i) the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963, (ii) the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, and (iii) the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, respectively, consistent view of this Court has been, that even in absence of any specific provision in the principal statute, No Confidence Motion can be brought and considered to remove any elected office bearer.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    4.6 The learned Single Judge then proceeded to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of K. Sahadev v. Suresh Bir. reported in 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 668, and in the case of State of U.P v. C.L Agrawal reported in (1997) 5 SCC 1 : AIR 1997 SC 2431 (1).

    4.7 The aforesaid two decisions are referred to by the learned Single Judge to bring home the point that he does not want to act in any manner which may not be in accordance with judicial discipline and therefore, the learned Single Judge observed in para-7.1.4 as under:—

    “7.1.4 The above view is consistently followed by the Apex Court and reference can be made to the decision in the case of Official Liquidator v. Dayanand reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1 (Para 79 thereof).”

    4.8 The learned Single Judge then observed as under:—

    “7.1.5 The above course does not appear to have been adopted while rendering the decision in the case of Babubhai Kalidas Patel (supra). Thus, the decision in the case of Babubhai Kalidas Patel (supra), in my view, is arrived at, procedurally in conflict with the view expressed by the Apex Court in the above referred decisions and therefore, I have considered it necessary to examine the issue on merits, as to whether the above referred three decisions of our Court can be said to have stood impliedly overruled for any reason and if yes, then it is only the procedural aspect which needs to be reconciled.”

    4.9 The learned Single Judge then examined the matter on merits and after posing question to himself, observed in para-8.1 as under:—

    “8.1 The next question is, as to under these circumstances, which course should I adopt. When, in substance as well as in procedure, both, according to me, the decision in the case of Babubhai Kalidas Patel (supra) is in conflict with the law laid down by the Apex Court as narrated above, without referring the matter to the Division Bench, I could have proceeded to adjudicate the petition in accordance with law, however judicial discipline and propriety demands that our Court should not appear to be heard in different voices to the society, on broad proposition of law. Keeping this obligation in view, I consider it prudent to refer the matter to the Division Bench on the issue, as to whether the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya (supra), and that of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Motibhai R. Chaudhary (supra) and that of Single Judge in the case of Narmadaben V. Parmar (supra) can be said to have stood impliedly overruled, as perceived by this Court in the case of Babubhai Kalidas Patel (supra).”

    (emphasis supplied)

    4.10 In para-8.2, the learned Single Judge makes it clear that:—

    “8.2 ….. Thus, the question of law, which is being referred to the Division Bench by this order, was already admitted for consideration by the Division Bench.”

    4.11 Learned Single Judge then recording finding on merits in para-10.3, which reads as under:—

    “10.3 Having heard learned advocates and having gone through the material on record on this point, I find that the petitioner had remained present as Chairman in the said meeting and he unsuccessfully attempted to adjourn it without transacting any business, and then he walked out with his lone supporter Mr. Ramsingh Parmar. When the dispute is with regard to the consideration of No Confidence Motion against the Chairman of the said meeting itself, the say of said Chairman needs closer scrutiny. On going through the documents on record, this Court finds that this contention, though not unknown to law, is more out of frustration. If the petitioner succeeds on the bone contention, he need not bank upon this, but the petitioner can not salvage the situation only on the alleged procedural irregularity, which this Court finds none. This contention is rejected.”

    5. On perusal of the judgment and order rendered by the learned Single Judge in all depth and with all possible closure scrutiny, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Single Judge, being bound by the judicial discipline, deemed it proper to make a reference of ‘a pure question of law to the Division Bench’. So far as merits are concerned, learned Single Judge, pursuant to directions issued by the Hon'ble the Apex Court (in the form of permission to the learned Single Judge to decide the main petition or the application), proceeded to decide CA. In para-11.2, the learned Single Judge has observed as under:—

    “11.2 The above prayer, in the circumstances narrated above, can not be considered at this stage. Even after the decision is rendered by the Division Bench on the question of law which is being referred to by this order, it is not necessary that this prayer be accepted. At the most, it is a proposition of law, which a party aggrieved can press into service in appropriate proceedings, as is done in this case. This prayer therefore is rejected.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    6. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shelat for respondent No. 1 rightly invited the attention of the Court to the observations made by the learned Single Judge in para-12 to bring home the submission that the learned Single Judge was conscious of the course adopted by him. Para-12 reads as under:—

    “12. Now coming to the next question, that pending further consideration of this petition by the Division Bench on the question of law which is recorded above, which course should be adopted ……”

    (emphasis supplied)

    6.1 Learned Single Judge has then discussed in para-13 about SCA No. 16594 of 2013 and after careful consideration has come to the following conclusion:—

    “During the course of hearing, it was specifically inquired by this Court as to who is appearing for respondent No. 3 of Special Civil Application No. 16594 of 2013, and everybody is silent, even Mr. Chapaneri, learned advocate for petitioners of both the petitions, has also stated that he is not appearing for respondent No. 3 of Special Civil Application No. 16594 of 2013. The petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 16594 of 2013 can not have any locus to agitate about the no confidence motion being considered by the Federation against its Chairperson. It appears that, the Mehsana District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Limited has treated it to be Mr. Vipulbhai Chaurdhary. Said person is already agitating his grievance in Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013. This petition, therefore, needs to be dismissed.

    6.2 Finally, learned Single Judge has allowed the CA, but before that the learned Single Judge has taken pains to decide SCA No. 16515 of 2013 and observed in para-14. As under:—

    “14.2 Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013

    (i) This petition is entertained on merits. The preliminary objection of the respondents about its maintainability is rejected, for the reasons and circumstances recorded in Para 9 above.

    (ii) On the principal contention of the petitioner, that in absence of any provision in the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, No Confidence Motion could not have been considered and passed against him, the matter is referred to the Division Bench to consider the question as to whether, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya (supra), and that of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Motibhai R. Chaudhary (supra) and that of Single Judge in the case of Narmadaben V. Parmar (supra), can be said to have stood impliedly overruled, as perceived by this Court in the case of Babubhai Kalidas Patel (supra), on the face of the reasons recorded in Para 7 above.

    (iii) The alternative submission of the petitioner as recorded in Para 10 is rejected.

    (iv) The prayer clause 15(AA) is rejected.”

    7. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. N.D Nanavati invited attention of the Court to para-15, while submitting that the learned Single Judge directed the Registry to place papers of SCA No. 16515 of 2013 before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to consider for placing it before the Division Bench, to consider the question as to whether, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya (supra), and that of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Motibhai R. Chaudhary (supra) and that of Single Judge in the case of Narmadaben V. Parmar (supra) can be said to have stood impliedly overruled. He submitted that the papers of SCA No. 16515 of 2013 were ordered to be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, which could be construed to mean that papers of CA No. 13220 of 2013 are also required to be placed and learned Single Judge cannot decide CA No. 13220 of 2013 once the aforesaid direction is issued.

    8. As observed hereinabove, this Court is not able to accept that contention. This Court is of the opinion that in view of the liberty granted by the Hon'ble the Apex Court to the learned Single Judge by saying that, “We leave it open to the single Judge to either consider the application for implementation of the Resolution dated 05.12.2013 or hear the Special Civil Application No. 16515 of 2013 itself finally”, the learned Single Judge has considered the SCA finally and only the question of law is referred to the Division Bench by directing the Registry to place the papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice.

    9. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shelat for respondent No. 1 invited attention of the Court to a decision of the Hon'ble the Apex Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan v. R.S Sharma and Company, reported in (1988) 4 SCC 353. Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 1 invited attention of the Court to para-8 of the judgment, relevant part of which reads as under:—

    “8. The law as it stands today is clear that unless there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award, the award, cannot be challenged merely on the ground of absence of reasons. This is settled law by a long series of decisions. Interests of justice and administration of justice would not be served by keeping at bay final adjudication of the controversy in this case on the plea that the question whether an unreasoned award is bad or not, is pending adjudication by a larger bench …..”

    9.1 Learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 1 relied upon the aforesaid observations and submitted that question of law as set out by the learned Single Judge is referred to the Division Bench, assuming for the sake of argument that, that question which is referred to is required to be referred by the learned Single Judge. He submitted that this is all without admission on the part of his client that adjudication of CA was not required to be kept pending along with other points, which could have been decided and are decided by the learned Single Judge in SCA No. 16515 of 2013.

    10. Learned Advocate Mr. B.S Patel appearing for respondent Nos. 4, 6 and 7 invited attention of this Court to a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Atulbhai Patel, Director, Baroda District Co-op. Milk Producers Union v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2009 (1) GLR 623. Learned Advocate invited attention of the Court to para-21 of the judgment, which reads as under:—

    “21. As regards the submission of Mr. Mehta that under the present scheme, elections of the Chairmen of the different District dairies are held on different dates, and therefore, the term of the directors on the Board of Directors of the respondent Federation commences and ends on different dates, we do not think that for that reason alone, the Bye-laws of the respondent Federation, particularly Bye-law No. 18.1 can be regarded as arbitrary and unreasonable. As regards the hypothetical illustration and the apprehension about the possibility of the Chairman of the Federation continuing as Chairman, though he does not enjoy majority support, the apprehension is thoroughly misconceived. A Full Bench of this Court has already held in Nandlal Bavanjibhai Posiya v. Director of Agriculture Marketing & Rural Finance, 2002 (2) GLR 1132 that it is the inherent right of a member of a democratic body to move the no-confidence motion against their elected leader, which is a concomitant of the right to elect a leader, that a no confidence motion can be passed by simple majority, unless the statute or Bye-law indicates a contrary intention. In Motibhai R. Chaudhary, Chairman, Mehsana District Milk District Producers Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, 2004 (3) GLR 2251 a Division Bench of this Court has applied the above principle in the matter of no-confidence motion against the Chairman/Vice-Chairman of the Managing Committee of the Federal Society or any Co-operative Society registered under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act.

    Hence, the Chairman of the respondent Federation, who is elected by the Board of Directors of the Federation can be removed by the Board of Directors at any time by passing a no-confidence motion, as there is nothing in the statute or the Bye-laws of the Society of the Federation to take away the said democratic right.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any error in deciding CA No. 13220 of 2013. This Court deems it proper to put a note of appreciation that the learned Single Judge has consciously made all attempts to adhere to judicial discipline.

    12. In the result, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

    13. At this juncture, learned Senior Advocate Mr. N.D Nanavati for the appellant requested that non-implementation of No Confidence Motion be extended atleast for a period of 10 days, on condition that the appellant-original petitioner will not preside over the meetings.

    14. This Court would have readily accepted such a request made by the learned Senior Advocate in any other matter, but in the present case, this Court is of the opinion that once a Chairperson, who is unanimously voted out by majority of Board of Directors, this request cannot be accepted. The request is rejected.

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