COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Draft Amendment in Special Criminal Application No. 1725 of 2014 is allowed.
2. Since the common questions of law and facts are involved, the petitions are heard together.
3. The petitioners in these petitions question the investigation carried out by the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement as also the orders passed by the said authority freezing the accounts of the petitioners. A Search Warrant No. 1 of 2014 in Special Criminal Application No. 1725 of 2014 and Search Warrant No. 3 of 2014 in other petition issued by the Joint Director, Enforcement Directorate, Ahmedabad and the panchnamas dated 22.04.2014 and 21.03.2014 respectively drawn by respondent no. 2 at premises of the petitioners is also questioned. The petitioners also question the jurisdiction of the Enforcement Directorate in conducting the inquiry/investigation against the petitioners under the provisions of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (for short “P.M.L Act”).
4. It appears that on 22.04.2014, the petitioner-Foziya's premises were raided and panchnama came to be drawn which is produced on record and the documents relating to the four wheeler as noted in the panchnama, came to be recovered.
5. It also appears that the premises of the petitioner-Afroz Mohamad Hasanfatta in Special Criminal Application No. 1748 of 2014 also came to be raided on 21.03.2013 under Search Warrant No. 3 issued by the Joint Director, Enforcement Directorate, Ahmedabad, but nothing was found. At the same time, Shop Nos. 1 and 2, Halima Palace, Adajan Patiya, New Rander Road, Surat were also raided in the presence of petitioner-Afroz Mohamad Hasanfatta, who is one of the Directors of M/s. Nile Industries Private Limited. Various documents were seized under the panchnama produced at Annexure-C.
6. Both the petitioners were summoned under Section 50 of P.M.L Act inter alia for recording of the statement by respondent no. 2. While petitioner-Afroz Mohamad Hasanfatta appeared and gave his statement, petitioner-Foziya Samir Godil could not appear for the reason stated by her in reply to the summons. She, by way of amendment, contends that being a woman, in absence of compliance of Section 160 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C”), the summons is not sustainable.
7. In the aforesaid backdrop of the facts, the challenge as indicated as above is made to the proceedings under P.M.L Act by the petitioners.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that in absence of report or a private complaint, as contemplated under Section 5 of P.M.L Act, the proceedings in question are incompetent. It was contended that the search being inherently defective, the petition, even in absence of availing of alternative remedy, is maintainable. That petitioner-Foziya Samir Godil being a woman could not have been summoned to the office of the second respondent in view of the mandate under Section 160 of Cr.P.C mandating the interrogation of the woman only at woman's premises. It was argued that in view of Section 65 of P.M.L Act, provisions of Cr.P.C are applicable and Section 160 not being inconsistent with the provisions of P.M.L Act would apply and therefore, petitioner-Foziya Samir Godil was entitled to the treatment as contemplated under Section 160 of Cr.P.C and the summons being contrary to Section 160 of Cr.P.C is not sustainable.
9. It was contended that in two FIRs instituted under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, none of the petitioners have been named as accused and therefore, in absence of compliance of Section 157 or Section 173 of Cr.P.C, the attachment of the petitioners' accounts is illegal. It was also contended that freezing of the account was traceable to only Section 5 of P.M.L Act and if the argument of the respondents that no proceedings were initiated under Section 5 of P.M.L Act is accepted, the proceedings are unauthorized.
10. While relying upon Kottom Raju Vikram Rao v. State of Gujarat [1977 (18) G.L.R 107], it was argued that without disclosing the material to the petitioners, the proceedings under P.M.L Act are not sustainable.
11. It was argued that without search warrant under P.M.L Act, the proceedings were unauthorized. It was contended that the respondents are strictly bound to comply with the procedure under the relevant provisions of P.M.L Act and Section 62 thereof makes a vexatious search an offence indicating that the provisions of P.M.L Act are strict in nature and therefore, must be strictly construed. It was argued that if at all any information was received by the second respondent, only survey as contemplated under Section 60 of P.M.L Act was permissible without search warrant but no proceedings freezing the accounts could have been initiated without complying with Sections 5 and 17 of P.M.L Act.
12. So far as the case of freezing is concerned, in addition to the argument aforementioned, it was contended on assumption that the proceedings under P.M.L Act were permissible on the basis of the search made under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (for short “FEMA”), the compliance with the provisions of FEMA was necessary and in absence thereof, the proceedings are illegal.
13. It was contended that the Assistant Director is not empowered to initiate the proceedings under Sections 5 and 17 of P.M.L Act inasmuch as it is only the Director or the Officer below the rank of Deputy Director as may be authorized by him is entitled to initiate the proceedings under the said provisions. The Court's attention was invited to Section 2(k) of P.M.L Act in support of the aforementioned contentions.
14. As against that, learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the two FIRs came to be lodged and on the basis of the material detected during search proceedings, it was deemed necessary to inquire into the case under P.M.L Act. It was argued that the petitioners are facing serious proceedings under P.M.L Act and the respondents have authority to inquire into and investigate the same and the petitions at this preliminary stage are not maintainable.
15. It was argued that P.M.L Act deals with the attachment of various properties connected with the money-laundering and provides for adjudication of such attachment and other acts which, according to learned counsel, are civil proceedings as distinguished from Section 3 read with Sections 43 to 47 of P.M.L Act which respectively deals with the offence and its trial. It was contended that in the instant case, it was not yet decided to attach the properties but inquiry has been initiated to ascertain various facts under P.M.L Act. It was thus argued that reliance placed upon Sections 5 and 17 of P.M.L Act with the contention that Sections 173 and 157 of Cr.P.C were not complied with, is misconceived. It was also contended that only prohibitory orders restraining the operation of the accounts which are subject matter of the inquiry under P.M.L Act are issued.
16. It was contended on the assumption that compliance of Sections 5 and 17 of P.M.L Act was necessary in the present case, registration of two FIRs forwarding the necessary entries to the concerned Magistrate constituted the compliance with said provisions.
17. It was contended that it was permissible for the respondents to prohibit the operation of the accounts of the petitioners even before initiating the proceedings under Section 5 of P.M.L Act. In support of such contention, reliance is placed upon FFR Software Private Limited v. Union of India (in Special Civil Application No. 2183 of 2012, decided on 12.11.2013 by the Gujarat High Court). Again, on the assumption that Section 5 of P.M.L Act was applicable at this stage, it was contended, while relying upon FFR Software Private Limited (supra), that account can be frozen even before the situation contemplated under Section 5 of P.M.L Act.
18. In light of the aforementioned contentions, the scheme of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 as is relevant needs to be examined.
19. Section 2(d) defines “attachment” so as to mean prohibition or transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of property by an order issued under Chapter III.
20. Section 2(k) defines “Director” or Additional Director” or “Joint Director” so as to mean such authority appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 49. As per Section 2(p), “money-laundering” has the meaning assigned to it in Section 3 and Section 3 holds the indulging of a person or his conscious assistance or being party to, or his involvement in any process or activity with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property, guilty of offence of money-laundering. Such offences are triable under Section 43 read with Section 44 of P.M.L Act.
21. Section 2(u) defines “proceeds of crime” so as to mean derivation or obtaining of any property or it value directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The expression “property” is defined so as to mean any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible. It also includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located. By explanation, it has been clarified that the said expression includes property of any kind used in the commission of an offence under this Act or any of the scheduled offences.
22. Phrase “investigation” as defined in Section 2(na) includes all the proceedings conducted by the Director or by an authority authorized by the Central Government for the collection of evidence. Phrase “reporting entity” is defined in Section 2(wa) so as to mean a banking company, financial institution, intermediary or a person carrying on a designated business or profession and as per Section 2(y), “scheduled offence” means the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule or the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is thirty lakh rupees or more or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule. As per Section 2(z), “Special Court” means a Court of Session designated as such under sub-section (1) of Section 43.
23. As per Section 4, money-laundering is punishable with rigorous imprisonment of not less than 3 years which may extend to 7 years with fine and if proceeds of crime involved in money-laundering relate to any offence specified under Paragraph-2 of Part A of the Schedule, the punishment may extend to 10 years.
24. Chapter III of P.M.L Act is titled as “Attachment, Adjudication and Confiscation”. Section 5 deals with attachment of the property involved in money-laundering and authorizes the officer, contemplated in subsection (1) to provisionally attach the property for the reason to be recorded in writing and on the basis of the material with him. The proviso to sub-section (1) prescribes compliance of a condition precedent to provisional attachment being lodgment of a report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C or a complaint by person authorized to investigate the scheduled offences to a Magistrate or Court for taking its cognizance, as the case may be, or a similar report or complaint. The first proviso to subsection (1) of Section 5 is further qualified by a second provision which dispenses with the requirement of first proviso in case of urgent need of attachment. Thus, lodgment of the aforementioned proceedings, not necessarily naming the person therein, is sufficient compliance of Section 5.
25. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 obliges the Attaching Officer to immediately forward a copy of the order with material in his possession referred to in sub-section (1) to the Adjudicating Authority. The life of attachment under Section 5(1) as prescribed in sub-section (3) thereof is 180 days or until making of final order under Section 8 whichever is earlier. Subsection 5 of Section 5 obliges the Attaching Officer to registering a complaint stating the facts of attachment with the Adjudicating Authority as defined in sub-section (1)(a) of Section 2 i.e the authority constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 6, within 30 days of attachment. Thus, sufficient safeguards with time bound schedule are provided under Section 5.
26. The next relevant section is 8 which confers powers upon the Adjudicating Authority to adjudicate the complaint received under sub-section (5) of Section 5 or applications made to it under sub-section (4) or Section 17 or under sub-section (10) of Section 18, if the Adjudicating Authority has reason to believe that any person has committed an offence under section 3 or is in possession of proceeds of crime. In such a case, the Adjudicating Authority is obliged to serve a notice upon the suspects for the purposes mentioned in the said provisions and it can either confirm the various acts it is authorized to deal with under Section 8 in which case said action will be valid during the pendency of the proceedings relating to any offence. Such attachment etc. becomes final after passing of an order of confiscation under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7) of Section 8 or Section 58-B or sub-section (2-A) of Section 60. As per sub-section (5) of Section 8, the Court trying the offence is authorized to pass an order confiscating the property to the Central Government after forming an opinion that offence of money-laundering has been committed. Otherwise as required in sub-section (6) thereof, the property has to be released.
27. The next relevant section is 16 which authorize a survey on the basis of material and the belief which has to be recorded in writing, that an offence under Section 3 has been committed. Various Acts to make a survey can thereafter be performed by Surveying Authority.
28. Section 17 authorizes a search and seizure by the Director or an Officer not below the rank of the Deputy Director as may be authorized by him. Search and seizure can be initiated on the basis of information in possession of searching or seizing officer as also on the basis of belief, which has to be recorded in writing, that any person has committed any act constituting money-laundering, etc. Searching and seizing officer then can enter and search the building, place, etc. and carry out various acts as contemplated in Section 17. Such exercise is not permissible in absence of a report or a complaint as the case may be, by a person authorized to investigate the scheduled offence, to the Magistrate or a Court as the case may be, in relation to a scheduled offence and or in cases where such report is unnecessary, the information has to be submitted by the officer authorized to investigate the scheduled offence to an officer mentioned in Section 17. Under sub-section (1-A) of Section 17 of P.M.L Act, freezing orders of properties can be passed if seizure is not practicable. Similarly, an authority authorized under sub-section (1) of Section 17 is obliged to immediately forward a copy of the reasons recorded by it along with the material to the Adjudicating Authority after searching and seizing or upon issuance of freezing orders. Further under sub-section (4) thereof, the Seizing Authority is obliged to file an application within the period of 30 days of seizure or freezing requesting for retention of such record or properties seized, as the case may be. Thus, sufficient safeguards with time bound schedule are provided under Section 17.
29. As per Section 12 of the P.M.L Act, reporting entity is obliged to maintain the records and furnish the information to the Director and perform such other acts as are contemplated therein and as per Section 12A, the Director can have access to the information with the reporting entity. It is also noticed that the Adjudicating Authority under Section 6(15) is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. From the aforesaid provisions of P.M.L Act, it can be noticed that the main purpose and object is to contain money-laundering activities. Other purpose of the Act is to prevent the money-laundering activities by attaching, confiscating and freezing the properties involved in such activities. As can be seen from proviso to Section 17, a report or a complaint under Section 157 of Cr.P.C may be necessary where prosecution is contemplated and may not be necessary where the prosecution is not immediately contemplated. In such a case, information has to be furnished to the authority mentioned under Section 17.
30. The main purpose of Section 5 appears to be provisional attachment of the properties where prosecution is intended. Conjoint reading of Sections 5 and 8 clearly indicates their purpose being the prevention of money-laundering activity if such case is made out, by confiscating properties involved in Money-Laundering Act, either during pendency of prosecution or at the conclusion of the trial. Similarly, conjoint reading of Sections 17 and 8 would indicate that its main purpose is to search and seize incriminating material in cases where prosecution is intended and even in cases where it is not immediately intended. Thus, where the prosecution is not immediately intended, compliance with Section 157 of Cr.P.C or lodgment of the complaint is not mandatory. Under Section 8 various acts undertaken under Sections 5, 17 and 18 with which Adjudicating Authority or the Court is authorized to deal with can be confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority or by the Special Court on conclusion of the trial.
31. In light of the aforementioned scheme of several provisions of P.M.L Act, the question as to whether the proceedings under Sections 5, 8 and 17 are civil proceedings or criminal is required to be addressed. The argument is that unless a report or the complaint as contemplated under first proviso to Section 5 and also as contemplated in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 17 is made, the proceedings are not sustainable. As noticed in greater detail, the ultimate object of Section 5 is provisional attachment of the property. The object appears to prevent destruction of the evidence which may be produced in the proposed criminal proceedings or to take in possession the property involved in the money-laundering, though the proceedings can be initiated on the basis of the reports or complaint, etc., as contemplated in the first proviso to Section 5. In view of second proviso, proceedings can be initiated under Section 5 even in absence of compliance of first proviso. Various safeguards impose fetters upon the attaching officer obliging him to immediately send the order made by him and the factum of attachment of the property made by him within the prescribed period to the Adjudicating Authority to enable it to adjudicate upon such attachment. It is pertinent to note that the legislative intent insofar as powers of the Adjudicating Authority are concerned, is made clear under Section 6(15) by clarifying that it is not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, if the Adjudicating Authority was intended to be an authority dealing with the criminal acts, the proviso dispensing with Code of Civil Procedure would not have been made. Instead proviso dispensing with Cr.P.C would have been made. These facts thus sindicate that the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 is authorized to undertake civil proceedings and adjudicate thereupon as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the respondents.
32. True that the first proviso to Section 5(1) and Section 17(1) requiring the compliance of the aforementioned provisions before embarking upon the exercise under Section 5 of P.M.L Act but that would be the basis for proceedings to make attachment or passing of various other orders as contemplated under the Act particularly Section 5 so far as present case is concerned.
33. The contention of the respondents is that the respondents have not reached the stage of Sections 5 and 17 and the proceedings are at a very preliminary stage. It thus appears that the summons are issued to the petitioners at a preliminary stage on the basis of the facts detected by the respondents in pursuant to the lodgment of two FIRs, it appears that the respondents intend to inquire into the fact as to whether properties in question or the petitioners herein are involved in either offence of money-laundering or are connected with such an offence or proceeds of crime or are in possession of such proceeds. Pertinently, in view of Section 65 of P.M.L Act, the powers to search, seizure, attach, confiscate, investigate and all other proceedings under the Act can be performed with the assistance of the provisions made in the Cr.P.C The respondents have frozen the accounts of the petitioners. Considering the fact that the Cr.P.C is applicable as above at this stage, it cannot be said that an act of freezing the account is illegal. As noticed hereinabove, proviso to Section 17(1) indicates that the report under Section 157 of Cr.P.C may not be necessary and therefore, freezing of accounts under Section 17(1-A) without such report is prima facie permissible. However, in view of the preliminary stage of the proceedings initiated against the petitioners, no final verdict can be pronounced on that aspect. However, in this context, FFR Software Private Limited (supra) explains in detail the authority vested in the Directorate of Enforcement to freeze the properties preceding the provisional attachment under Section 5 of P.M.L Act. Paragraphs-5 and 6 of the said case can be quoted herein for convenience:
“5. Having heard learned counsels for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, I find substance in the contention of the respondents that the given statutory mandate under the PML Act makes it imperative for the authorities in the course of investigation i.e collection of facts to establish specific details of the suspected properties from the concerned authorities prior to issuance of the provisional attachment order under section 5 of the Act. As such, it has to be issued with abundant caution. It is therefore necessary that the requisite information/details are ascertained from the repositories of such information. Such repositories may be required during preliminary enquiry/investigation under the Act to be restrained from allowing normal operations in respect of a property suspected to be involved in the offence of money laundering. It is therefore, crucial to achieve the objectives of the Act that the authorities under PML Act are empowered to collect and if need be, compel disclosure of relevant facts including specific details of the suspected properties, movable or immovable, liable to be attached in the course of investigation. The challenge mounted by the petitioners on such powers of the authorities is therefore, erroneous. The term investigation as defined in section 2 (na) of PML Act has to be read in consonance with the provisions of section 65 which empowers the authorities under PML Act to issue such directions/prohibitory orders. Therefore, any such direction issued in the course of investigation is within the four walls of law and in consonance with the object and reasons of the Act to ensure that the proceed of crime do not change hands making it impossible for authorities to trace and recover such proceeds of crime.
6. The provisional order of attachment of a property suspected to be proceeds of crime in terms of section 2(u) of the Act and prima-facie involved in money laundering and confirmation thereof in terms of section 8 of the Act by the Adjudicating Authority do not violate the provisions of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution of India. Moreover, in the given circumstances when directions are issued to the concerned authorities viz. the letter dated 12.07.2011 issued by the respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 3 in the instant case, the rationale behind such orders being the property would otherwise might change hands frustrating the objectives of the Act. I also find force in the averments of the respondents that the power of the authorities under PMLA to issue such directions is ingrained in the powers of conducting investigation as defined in the PMLA which includes all proceedings under the Act. On the contrary, if the plea of the petitioners in regard to the statutory scheme under the PMLA is accepted, it will cause violence to the spirit and the objects of the Act.”
34. Assuming that Sections 5 and 17 can be interpreted as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, pertinent observations made in FFR Software Private Limited (supra) in Paragraphs-8 & 9 are thus:
“8. It is trite that Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. The court must have good and sufficient reasons to bypass the alternative remedies provided by the statute. In the case of Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd. and others ((1985) 1 SCC 260), the Apex court has held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the tribunal and thereafter to have the cases stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery.
9. In yet another case of Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement Civil Appeal No. 3221 of 2010 Date of judgment 12.04.2010 the Honble Supreme Court has observed that:
“…. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.
35. True that the said FFR Software Private Limited (supra) deals with the case pursuant to registration of the FIR. In the instant case also, two FIRs though not naming the petitioners but on the same subject have been lodged and thus legal proposition as discussed in the aforementioned authority can as well be applied to the facts of the present case. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the contrary thus cannot be accepted.
36. As noticed above, inquiry, investigation, etc., are permissible under Cr.P.C by the authorities or officers exercising the jurisdiction under P.M.L Act. It therefore goes without saying that on noticing an offence under P.M.L Act against the offenders, the case can be tried as provided in Chapter VII of P.M.L.A Act. Thus, a separate machinery for trial of the offences under P.M.L Act is provided under Chapter VII as distinguished from adjudication under Section 8 of the Act. To enable such trial, the investigation and inquiry with the assistance of the provisions of Cr.P.C is permissible. Looking to the fact that the petitioners are not arrayed as accused, it appears that they are sought to be interrogated to ascertain their complicity in the offence if any. Such action cannot be thwarted at a preliminary stage where only summons have been issued after freezing the accounts of the petitioners. Even if the argument of the petitioners that freezing of the accounts was not permissible that Sections 5 and 17 of P.M.L.A Act were applicable at this stage is accepted, as noticed in a greater
10. *****” detail, acts under Sections 5 and 17 are only provisional and subject to confirmation by the Adjudicating Authority. Before such adjudication, a notice to the interested person is contemplated under Section 8 of P.M.L Act and therefore, by convincing the Adjudicating Authority that no offence under Section 3 is committed by the petitioners, the orders de-freezing their accounts can be obtained from the such authority. In the facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove, it is difficult to accept the contention that initiation of the proceedings against the petitioners are illegal.
37. It is worthwhile to note that as per case of the respondents, on consideration of the material found during search aforementioned, a further process to inquire into the matter is initiated. Assuming again that provisions of Sections 5 and 17 were applicable, the material was already collected under FEMA from aforementioned company in which petitioner-Afroz Mohamad Hasanfatta in Special Criminal Application No. 1748 of 2014 is a Director. Once such material was collected, there was no occasion for the respondents to again make search for the same purpose and therefore, in the facts of the case, Sections 5 and 17 were not attracted for the purpose of initiation of inquiry or investigation. In view of the provisions made in Cr.P.C, it is always permissible for the authorities or officers under the Act to proceed ahead with the inquiry or investigation from the stage, the incriminating material was located. The argument however is that in such a case, mandatory provisions of FEMA were required to be complied with. Such an argument is misconceived for the simple reason that so far as present cases are concerned, the respondents after noticing the incriminating material which may lead to the crime under Section 3 of the Act, did not proceed further under FEMA but have chosen to proceed under P.M.L Act. That apart, the question as regards compliance of mandatory provisions can be raised at appropriate stage of the proceedings and not at the threshold as interference by the Court at the threshold may frustrate the very purpose and object of P.M.L Act.
38. True it is that the vexatious search would expose the authority or officer concerned to prosecution but that in fact is a safeguard provided to the suspects so as to prevent them against unnecessary harassment or inconvenience. In view of such safeguard, at this stage, this Court would not doubt the credentials of the respondents when they are inquiring into or investigating what may turn out to be a serious offence. Further Sections 22 and 23 raise various presumptions against the suspects and Section 24 casts a burden of proof under various situations on the person charged with the offence. Thus, the offence under Section 3 is treated as serious offence and interference by this Court at the preliminary stage may frustrate the purpose and object of the Act.
39. Further, a bare perusal of sub-section (2) of Section 50 shows that power to summon any person whose attendance is considered necessary as provided in sub-section (2) is vested with various authorities including Assistant Director and therefore, it is misconceived to say that the officer issuing summons being the Assistant Director is not so empowered.
40. In view of the above discussion, the arguments that without compliance with Sections 5 and 17, Section 16 was the only provision applicable to the respondents, after noticing the material in search under FEMA, also cannot be accepted.
41. In Kottom Raju Vikram Rao (supra), this Court laid down a proposition of law that during hearing of bail matters, material relied upon by the prosecution while attributing the guilt to the accused must be disclosed to the accused. Such proposition of law is sought to be pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioners with the contention that at the threshold of the proceedings, the petitioners are entitled to know the incriminating material against them. I am afraid, such a contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in the bail matters during or after investigation, the question of liberty of the person arises whereas in other cases only the question of inquiry or investigation is involved. It is settled law that accused has no right to interfere or know as to what is being inquired or interrogated against him. Acceptance of such a proposition would lead to a situation where the accused may get a freehand to thwart the proceedings.
42. However, so far as petitioner-Foziya Samir Godil is concerned, being a woman, it is rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that she is entitled to benefits of all the procedures applicable to the woman under the relevant law and to that extent, the respondents at the threshold shall have to comply with the provisions of law.
43. The contention that exclusive procedure for summoning a person under Section 50 not providing the safeguards to a woman as under various provisions of Cr.P.C and therefore, no benefit as is available to the woman under Cr.P.C can be conferred upon her, is devoid of merits and suffers from misconception of law inasmuch as concededly by virtue of Section 65 of P.M.L Act, provisions of Cr.P.C as are not inconsistent with the provisions of P.M.L Act are applicable to the proceedings under P.M.L Act and it cannot be said that the provisions providing safeguard to a woman under Cr.P.C cannot stand with the provisions of P.M.L Act and therefore, such provisions cannot be said to be inconsistent with P.M.L Act.
44. Subject to the aforementioned observations, no substance is found in the petitions. Special Criminal Application No. 1725 of 2014 is thus disposed of with the aforesaid observations and Special Criminal Application No. 1748 of 2014 fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.