CAV JUDGMENT

1. Challenge in this appeal is the order dated 08.05.2013 passed by the learned 11th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Anand below Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No. 57 of 2013 whereby, the learned trial Judge rejected the injunction application Exh.5 preferred by the plaintiffs - appellants herein.

2. The parties to the present proceedings would be referred to as per their original status in the plaint for convenience.

3. Filtering unnecessary details, it is the case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 7 are from the same family lineage. Before 30.06.1965, Mr. Vasantlal Patel (HUF) through its Karta - Mr. Vasantlal Patel was the owner of the land bearing Survey No. 2/4913 corresponding to Survey Nos. 225, 226/1 and 226/2 of Cambay, District: Anand admeasuring 14372.40 sq.mtr (for short, the ‘suit land’). According to the case of the plaintiffs, as per sale deed dated 30.06.1965, entered into between the said HUF through its Karta - Mr. Vasanalal Patel, 3/4 right, title and interest in the suit land was transferred, sold and conveyed in favour of Mr. Balubhai, Mr. Shantilal, Mr. Natwarlal and Mr. Vinodchandra. It is the case of the plaintiffs that said HUF - Mr. Vasantlal Patel retained 1/4 undivided share, right, title and interest in the suit land with itself. It is the case of the plaintiffs that one of the essential terms and conditions of the said sale deed was that family member/purchaser of the HUF property was not entitled to sell, gift, mortgage or incumber his or her respective portion of share in the suit land to any outsider before providing preemption right to the other co-owners to buy the same. As Mr. Vinodchandra died on 27.01.1992 at Bombay, who was holding 1/4 undivided share in the suit land and according to his last Will dated 20.05.1991, deceased - Mr. Vinodchandra bequeathed all his right, title and interest to the suit property in equal portion in favour of the present plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 are entitled for ½ share out of deceased - Mr. Vinodchandra's 1/4 undivided share, right, title and interest in the suit land. Thus, it is the case of the plaintiffs that each plaintiff has 1/8 undivided share in the suit land. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they are permanent resident of Bombay and in the year 2013, they learnt from certain reliable sources that certain undivided share of the suit land has been sold in favour of various third parties and, therefore, the plaintiffs approached the concerned revenue authorities and found that 1/5 portion of undivided suit land was sold in favour of the defendant No. 8 through public auction conducted by D.R.T, Ahmedabad. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant No. 8 sold the said 1/5 undivided share, right, title and interest in the suit land in favour of defendant Nos. 9 to 11 on 05.11.2012 by way of two different Registered Sale Deeds admeasuring 2244 sq.mtr and 374 sq.mtr respectively. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the defendant Nos. 9 to 11 have tried to identify specific portion in the suit land and have further placed wire fencing in the suit land. Therefore, it is the case of the plaintiffs that it is necessary for the protection of the rights of the plaintiffs to the suit land, defendant Nos. 9 to 11 are required to be restrained by way of an order of injunction that they may not use, occupy and possess the suit land exclusively without taking prior consent of the plaintiffs and other co-owners and defendant Nos. 9 to 11 are also required to restrain from creating third party right in any manner till final disposal of the suit. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that defendants have no right to develop any part of the suit land without first having it partitioned by metes and bounds so as to define their share and the share of the plaintiffs in the suit land. On these broad facts, the plaintiffs have filed the suit seeking declaration and permanent injunction and also partition of the suit land by metes and bounds and further, each of the plaintiffs be given possession of 1/8 share in the suit land. The defendants, more particularly, defendant Nos. 8 to 11 resisted the injunction application Exh.5 and contended that the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 7, in collusion, filed the present injunction application. It is specifically denied that the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 7 are in possession of the suit land. It is contended that as the plaintiffs have not obtained any probate or letter of administration as per the provisions of Indian Succession Act in respect of Will of deceased - Mr. Vinodchandra Patel dated 27.01.1992, the injunction application deserves to be rejected. It is contended that 1/5 share of the suit land is sold by D.R.T and as per the sell certificate of D.R.T, defendant No. 8 became owner and later on, the defendant No. 8 executed two Registered Sale Deeds in favour of the defendant Nos. 9 to 11. Lastly, it is contended that the plaintiffs were very well aware about the D.R.T proceedings but they never participated in the D.R.T proceedings and against the order passed by the D.R.T, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present proceedings and, therefore, the injunction application is required to be rejected.

4. The learned trial Judge, after considering the pleadings, documentary evidence and after hearing submissions made at bar, rejected the injunction application Exh.5 It is observed by the learned trial Judge that the suit land belongs to the HUF of said Mr. Vasantlal; that the plaintiffs are guilty of suppression of facts viz-a-viz the existence of Ghanshyam Mill and Narayan Textile Mill on the suit land; that the plaintiffs failed to aver as to how they claimed 1/8 share in the suit land; that the plaintiffs have not mutated their names in the revenue records in respect of rights accrued in favour of them by virtue of Will of deceased - Mr. Vinodchandra and thus, mandatory provisions contained under Section 135(c) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code are not complied with by the plaintiffs; that the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the relief in respect of the suit land; that out of entire suit land, some portion is auctioned by D.R.T and, therefore, the plaintiffs ought to have challenged the order of D.R.T by way of appropriate proceedings and, therefore, the present suit is not maintainable as efficacious remedy against the proceedings of D.R.T is available; that suit is barred by Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act; that the suit is barred by non-joinder of necessary parties as female members are omitted to be impleaded as party in the present suit and also Ghanshyam Mill, Narayan Textile Mill and Rajendra Textile Mill and at the end, the learned trial Judge found that the plaintiffs have failed to prove all the required ingredients of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. I have heard submissions of learned Senior Counsel Mr. Nirupam Nanavati appearing for M/s. Wadia Ghandy & Co. for the plaintiffs, learned advocate Mr. N.K Pahwa for defendant No. 8 and learned advocate Mr. Mehul S. Shah for defendant Nos. 9 to 11. None was present for defendant Nos. 1 to 7.

6. Upon perusal of the Registered Sale Deed dated 30.06.1965, it appears that the suit land originally belonged to the HUF of said Mr. Vasantlal till the date of registration of the said sale deed. Meaning thereby, the suit land was occupied and possessed by the HUF of said Mr. Vasantlal but by way of said Registered Sale Deed dated 30.06.1965, the right, title and interest in the suit land was transferred, sold and conveyed in favour of the cousin brothers and nephew of said Mr. Vasantlal. Thus, after 30.06.1965, the suit land was no more a property belonging to the HUF of said Mr. Vasantlal but it became a jointly owned property of purchasers of the 3/4 portion of the suit land including HUF of said Mr. Vasantlal. So, prima facie, the plaintiffs are the co-owners/co-sharers of the suit land and they are not the members of the said HUF of Mr. Vasantlal.

7. It appears that the defendant No. 1, in order to avail financial assistance from Bank of Baroda, mortgaged his 1/5 share in the suit land without specific demarcation. As defendant No. 1 failed to repay the Bank's dues, Bank of Baroda filed appropriate proceedings before the Recovery Officer, D.R.T and in auction, defendant No. 8 purchased 1/5 share in the suit land on 30.12.2010 Upon perusal of the documents, more particularly, certificate of sale of immovable property vide Form No. 61 and possession receipt issued in Form No. 63 under the provisions of Recovery of Debt Dues to Page 6 of 16 Bank and Financial Institution Act, 1993 (for short, the ‘Act’), it appears that the defendant No. 8 sold immovable property being 1/5 share in the suit land. Not only that the defendant No. 8 by way of Registered Sale Deed dated 01.09.2012, sold 1/5 undivided share in the suit land to defendant Nos. 9 to 11 and the same becomes clear upon perusal of sale deed, more particularly, description of the property made at page No. 7. So, admittedly, the defendant No. 8, in public auction, got 1/5 undivided share in the suit land and, in turn, defendant Nos. 9 to 11 purchased 1/5 undivided share in the suit land from the defendant No. 8.

8. Learned advocate Mr. Pahwa and learned advocate Mr. M.S Shah appearing for defendant Nos. 8 to 11, vehemently submitted that the suit is not maintainable before the Civil Court against the order of sale of property for recovery of amount of debt made by the Tribunal in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. According to submissions made at bar, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit in respect of the suit land which is purchased by the defendant No. 8 in public auction held by the Tribunal in accordance with law. The contention raised, though find favour with the learned trial Judge, but this Court is not in agreement with the submissions made at bar and also findings recorded by the learned trial Judge holding that the suit is not maintainable in light of the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act read with Section 9 of the Code. The obvious reason is such that in the plaint, nowhere the plaintiffs have challenged the proceedings initiated and concluded by the Tribunal under the Act. What is prayed for by the plaintiffs before the trial Court is the relief of partition of the suit land by metes and bounds and possession of 1/8 share in the suit land. Prima facie, the Court is of the opinion that no partition had ever been taken place and, therefore, the question of handing over of possession of any specific part of the suit land could not arise. It is an admitted fact that the Recovery Officer under the Act, has not handed over possession of any specific part of the suit land i.e 1/5 share of defendant No. 1. Handing over of possession is a physical act and there is no evidence on record to show that physical possession had been handed over by all the co-sharers of the suit lands. In absence of consent of all other co-sharers, the suit land cannot be divided in specific part and, therefore, in the proceedings of D.R.T, the 1/5 share of the defendant No. 1 was put into an auction and, in turn, defendant No. 8 purchased 1/5 undivided share in the suit land, who, in turn, sold the same to the defendant Nos. 9 to 11. In this connection, suffice it to refer to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the following cases cited at bar by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Nirupam Nanavati appearing for M/S Wadia Ghandy & Co. for the plaintiffs:-

(i) Ram Pat v. State of Haryana reported in (2009) 7 SCC 614;

(ii) A. Viswanatha Pillai v. The Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition No. IV reported in (1991) 4 SCC 17 and;

(iii) Bhagwant P. Sulakhe v. Digambar Gopal Sulakhe reported in (1986) 1 SCC 366.

9. Thus, in absence of partition of jointly owned property by metes and bounds either by decree in a partition suit or by settlement amongst the co-sharers, possession of any specific part cannot be handed over to the purchasers which, in fact, is done by defendant No. 8 while executing sale deed in favour of defendant Nos. 9 to 11. Under the circumstances, the learned trial Judge ought to have prevented the defendant Nos. 8 to 11 from erecting fencing on any specific part of the suit land so as to exclude possession of the other co-sharers in the suit land. Thus, the Tribunal under the Act, has not handed over possession of any specific part of the suit land to the defendant No. 8 in the recovery proceedings and in the proceedings conducted under the Act, the defendant No. 8 is given 1/5 share in the suit land and no specific part in the suit land. So, in Court's considered opinion, the learned trial Judge has committed grave error in considering the nature of suit land on one hand and on the other hand, failed to consider the fact that the defendant No. 8 is not put into possession of any specific part of the suit land even in the proceedings conducted under the Act.

10. The learned trial Judge has committed an error in rejecting the injunction application because the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the provisions contained in Section 135(c) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. The object to mutate names in the revenue records is a fiscal purpose and it cannot extinguish the title to the property. Similarly, in a suit like present one, the co-owners/co-sharers of the suit land are the necessary and proper parties and, therefore, the learned trial Judge has committed error in observing that female members are excluded and, therefore, the plaintiffs' suit suffers from non-joinder of necessary party. In fact, the learned trial Judge has not appreciated the nature of suit and wrongly proceeded on the assumption that the suit land belongs to HUF of said Mr. Vasantlal. Thus, the learned trial Judge has misdirected himself in properly appreciating the nature of suit and reading Registered Sale Deed dated 30.06.1965

11. Now, so far as the observations made by the learned trial Judge with regard to suppression of facts viz-a-viz existence of Ghanshyam Mill and Narayan Textile Mill on the suit land are concerned, the present suit filed by the plaintiffs, inter alia, seeks partition of the suit land and not the structures standing on the suit land. In the suit for partition and possession, the issue of ownership of the structures standing on the suit land which is not even the subject matter of the said suit land, becomes irrelevant fact while granting relief of partition. Any person occupying any part on the suit land as a tenant would be properly considered by the Court in the suit while drawing decree for partition and possession, in case the plaintiffs succeed in the suit at the end. Surely, this question has no relevancy in deciding the injunction application restraining the defendants from transferring/developing the suit land without consent of the co-owners/co-sharers. It also appears that all these facts, even otherwise, are reflecting in the very sale deed dated 30.06.1965 and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is suppression of any fact.

12. Not only that, the learned trial Judge has also committed an error by observing that the super structure standing on the suit land belongs to Ghanshyam Mill and Narayan Textile Mill which was ultimately sold in an auction held by D.R.T in favour of defendant No. 8. But, upon perusal of sale deed dated 05.11.2012 executed by the defendant No. 8 in favour of the defendant Nos. 9 to 11 as well as the documents in the form of Form Nos. 61 and 63 and other relevant documents, it clearly show that the D.R.T has sold undivided 1/5 right, title and interest in the suit land in favour of the defendant No. 8. Thus, the learned trial Judge has not properly read the documentary evidence and not given true and correct effect while appreciating the pleadings of the parties.

13. Lastly, the learned trial Judge has also committed an error in refusing injunction application on the ground that the plaintiffs could not point out as to how they are claiming 1/8 share in the suit land. In the Court's considered opinion, the learned trial Judge ought to have addressed the issue whether the present suit land is undivided or not and further, whether the plaintiffs have any share or right in the suit land independently or on the basis of Will of deceased - Mr. Vinodchandra. Upon bare perusal of plaint and injunction application, it appears that the plaintiffs have categorically averred as to how and in what manner, they are claiming right, title and interest in the suit land. At this stage, no further evidence is required because while seeking relief of partition and possession, the plaintiffs are required to prove their share/right in the suit land which stands established.

14. In nutshell, the learned trial Judge has committed grave error in understanding the crux of the subject matter of the suit and misdirected himself on many vital aspects, as aforesaid and, therefore, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside as the learned trial Judge has rejected the injunction application on the basis of findings which are perverse in nature.

15. It is required to be kept in mind that the present Appeal from Order is filed under the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code and challenge in this appeal is a discretionary order passed by the learned trial Judge under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code. In case of Matrix Telecom Pvt. Ltd. v. Matrix Cellular Services Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2011 (3) GLR 1951, this Court, in paras 6 and 6.1, observed as under:-

“6. Before proceeding further it is required to be noted that the present appeal is against the rejection of interim relief and the main suit is still pending. If this court elaborately deals with the matter on merits it is likely that the same would prejudice the case of either side. Therefore, it is well settled law that this Court is not required to go into the merits of the entire matter at this stage and what is required to be seen is whether the appellant-plaintiff has made out a prima facie case or not for grant of interim injunction.

6.1 It is required to be noted that it is well settled law that the Appellate Court may not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. The Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by the court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion.”

16. Similarly, in the case of Wonder Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. reported in 1990 Supp SCC 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 of the said decision, after considering the scope of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code in an appeal wherein, the discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court is under challenge, observed as under:-

“9. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory remedy which is both temporary and discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction, it is stated

“…is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his rights for which he could not adequately be compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection must be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the “balance of convenience lies”.

The interlocutory remedy is intended to preserve in status quo, the rights of parties which may appear on a prima facie. The court also, in restraining a defendant from exercising what he considers his legal right but what the plaintiff would like to be prevented, puts into the scales, as a relevant consideration whether the defendant has yet to commence his enterprise or whether he has already been doing so in which latter case considerations somewhat different from those that apply to a case where the defendant is yet to commence his enterprise, are attracted.”

17. So, in light of the limited powers of this Court, the Appellate Court can interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court only in exceptional circumstances and the Appellate Court cannot interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except, where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. In nutshell, an appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. To put it differently, the Appellate Court cannot reassess the entire evidence so as to come to its own conclusion contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court, if two views are possible.

18. So, in view of the findings recorded hereinabove, it transpires that the D.R.T has not physically handed over any specific part in the suit land to the defendant No. 8 nor any specific part falling under the share of defendant No. 1 was auctioned by the D.R.T in the proceedings initiated under the Act. Admittedly, the defendant Nos. 9 to 11 purchased 1/5 undivided share from the defendant No. 8 by virtue of Registered Sale Deed dated 01.09.2012 and thus, it becomes crystal clear that the plaintiffs are holding right, title and interest in the suit land and till it is partitioned by metes and bounds, each co-owner/co-sharer has right, title and interest in each inch of the suit land and defendant Nos. 8 to 11 cannot exclude them from enjoying any part of the suit land by placing wire fencing on any specific area of the suit land. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs in terms of paras 26a, 26b and 26c whereas, the plaintiffs have not addressed the Court for the reliefs as prayed for in para 26d i.e for appointment of Court Receiver under the provisions of Order XL of the Code of Civil Procedure.

19. While parting with the order, it is clarified that this Court has examined the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge within the limited scope of provisions of Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code, whereas the main controversy involved in the suit is at large before the trial Court to be adjudicated through full-fledge trial. Therefore, the learned trial Judge shall not be influenced by any observations recorded in the impugned order while deciding the suit at the end of trial. The findings recorded either by the trial Court or by this Court at interlocutory stage of the suit are tentative in its nature and the learned trial Judge shall decide the case on its merit and as per evidence that may be led during the course of trial and decide the suit in accordance with law.

20. Accordingly, impugned order dated 08.05.2013 passed by the learned 11 Additional Senior Civil Judge, Anand below Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No. 57 of 2013 is quashed and set aside. Pending final hearing and disposal of the suit, relief in terms of paras 26a, 26b and 26c of the injunction application Exh.5 is granted against the defendant Nos. 8 to 11. The defendant Nos. 8 to 11 shall remove the wire fencing put up on the suit land within two months from today.

21. In view of the above, the present Appeal from Order is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

Order in Civil Application

In view of the order passed in the Appeal from Order, this application does not survive and the same is also disposed of.