Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and perused the record.
2. Only against the letter dated 9.9.2013 sent by Bank to petitioner requesting him to pay balance of Rs. 559902/-, this writ petition has been filed with laches of more than 10 months.
3. Firstly no recovery proceedings under any statue has been initiated so far and, therefore, no cause of action has arisen at this stage and it is always open to petitioner to approach the Bank.
4. Secondly for undue delay and laches, there is no explanation at all whatsoever.
5. Delay and laches constitute substantial reason for disentitling relief in equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh J.T 2007 (4) SC 253, the Apex Court observed that after a long time the writ petition should not have been entertained even if the petitioners are similarly situated and discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approached the Court after a long time. It was held that delay and laches were relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. In Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India, J.T 1994 (6) SC 71 and M.R Gupta v. Union of India (1995) 5 SCC 628 it was held that though there was no period of limitation provided for filing a petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within reasonable time. In K.V Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore, AIR 1961 SC 993, it was said that representation would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. Same view was reiterated in State of Orissa v. Pyari Mohan Samantaray AIR 1976 SC 2617 and State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik (1976) 3 SCC 579 and the said view has also been followed recently in Shiv Dass v. Union of India AIR 2007 SC 1330= 2007 (1) Supreme 455 and New Delhi Municipal Council (supra). The aforesaid authorities of the Apex Court has also been followed by this Court in Chunvad Pandey v. State of U.P, 2008 (4) ESC 2423. This has been followed in Virender Chaudhary v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation, (2009) 1 SCC 297. In S.S Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 the Apex Court held that it is well settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioners approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on account of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to other candidates who have got the benefit. In Yunus v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC 281 the Court referred to the observations of Sir Barnesdelay Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde (1874) 5 PC 239 and held as under:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material…… . Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
6. In view of above, I do not find any reason to interfere. Writ petition is dismissed.