Appeal from a decree passed by Mr. Justice Macpherson in the Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court.
This was a suit to recover the sum of Rs. 4,605-11-3, being the balance of an account between the plaintiffs and the defendants, for goods sold and delivered. The facts of the case are as follows:—Anundo Chunder Cowar, who had carried on business a merchant in Calcutta, died intestate on the 17th of March 1871, leaving surviving two widows and two infant sons, Nobo Kisto Cowar and Joy Kisto Cowar. After his death the business was carried on by the widows, who gave a power-of-attorney for that purpose to one Hurradhun Roy.
At the date of Anundo Chunder's death, there was a balance of Rs. 570 due by him for gunnies sold and delivered by the plaintiff, who continued his dealings with the firm. Various payments on account of these transactions were made from time to time by Hurradhun Roy to the plaintiff. The accounts were balanced on the 12th of April 1876, when the sum now sued for was found to be due to the plaintiff. It was alleged but denied that the defendant Nobo Kisto had attained majority in the early part of 1875, and had since promised to pay the plaintiff's demand. It was admitted that the defendant Joy Kisto was still an infant. A guardian was appointed for him ad litem, and the case came on for hearing before Mr. Justice Macpherson.
As to the portion of the debt which accrued due in the lifetime of Anundo Chunder, the defence was limitation; as to that portion which had since accrued due, both the defendants pleaded infancy. No evidence was offered on behalf of the defendants, and a decree was given for the amount claimed, with interest and costs. The decree directed that the amount should be realised from whatever property the defendants had succeeded to as heirs of Anundo Chunder. Joy Kisto Cowar appealed.
Bonnerjee, for the Appellant.
A portion of this debt was due at the death of the testator in 1860; as to that we shall contend that the suit is barred by limitation. We contend as to the remainder of the debt that we are not liable, on the ground that the widows could not carry on the trade so as to bind us; and that, even if they could, they had no power to delegate that power to any one else. I admit that if the testator had died leaving one son of full age and the other a minor, that the acts of the elder would bind the minor; but that is only the case where the trade is carried on by a member of the joint family, which the widow is not. In order to bind a minor the trade must have been carried on by a person joint, that is, joint in estate, with the infant, and this the mother is not. In fact, the widows ought to have done as an English executor would do, that is, wind up the business with all convenient speed. Taking it for granted that the widows could carry on the business, yet they clearly cannot bind an infant, who would not be able to contract so as to bind himself; at all events, they could not, by giving a power-of-attorney to Hurradhun to carry on the business, enable him to bind the infant. This case, it is submitted, is governed by Section 247 of the Contract Act, which declares that the minor cannot be made personally liable for any obligation of the firm; it is only his share that is liable.
Counsel cited, on maintenance, and dependent member of a family—Vyavastha Darpana, pp. 360, 270; position of a Hindu widow—Khetramani Dasi v. Kashinath Das, 2 B.L.R 15 (A.C); Srimati Bhagabati Dasi v. Kanailal Mitter, 8 B.L.R, 225; S.M Nistarini Dasi v. Makhanlal Dutt, 9 B.L.R, 11; on liability of testator's assets for debts contracted by his widow in carrying on a trade—Cutbush v. Cutbush, 1 Beavan, 184; on inability of infant to become a partner—Peetumdoss v. Ramdhone Doss, Taylor, 279; or to be bound by the acts of a manager—Boykuntnath Roy Chowdhry v. Pogose, 5 W.R, 2; Radha Pershad Singh v. Mussamut Talook Raj Kooer, 20 W.R, 38; and on the powers of managers of a Hindu family—Ramlal Thakursidas v. Lakhmichand Muniram, 1 Bom., Ap., li; Johurra Bibee v. Sreegopal Misser, I.L.R, 1 Cal., 470; Muddomutty Guptee v. Bamasoondery Dossee, 14 B.L.R, 21; Mahomed Arsad Chowdhry…One Of The Defendants; v. Yakoob Ally…Plaintiff.*, 15 ??? 357.
Branson and Allen, for Respondents.
Allen.—In Hindu law a trade is an inheritance, and in this case it was the only thing the infants had to live upon. It is admitted on the other side that if there had been an adult brother, he might bind the minor, but there is no difference on this point, between the power of such a kurta and the powers of the widow. She can assume all the functions of a kurta and do every thing required for the benefit of the property—Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussamut Baboo Munraj, 6 Moore's Ind. Ap., 393; and this view is supported by the Bombay case and others quoted by the opposite side. The Contract Act does not apply to this case; there is no partnership here, but an ancestral business, which is a totally different thing.
The judgment of the Court (1) was delivered by
Garth, C.J:— It appears that Anundo Chunder Cowar, the father of the appellant, who is an infant, died on the 17th of March 1871. Anundo Chunder, up to the time of his death, carried on business as a trader, and had dealings with the plaintiff's firm. He died, leaving him surviving the appellant and his elder brother Nobo Kisto, both then infants under the age of 16 years, and two widows. The sons and widows, after Anundo's death, lived as members of a joint Hindoo family, governed by the Dayabhaga School of Law. The ancestral trade was carried on under the management of the widows. The widows, being purdah nasheen women, could not take the management of the ancestral trade directly into their own hands, but employed their son-in-law, one Hurradhun Roy, for that purpose; and it was under the direct supervision and management of Hurradhun that the business was carried on. It was also proved, that the appellant's elder brother, Nobo Kisto, after he came of age, took part in the management with his brother-in-law, Hurradhun. During the sole management of Hurradhun, and also during the joint management of Nobo Kisto and Hurradhun, dealings with the plaintiff's firm continued; and in the course of these transactions the defendants became indebted to the plaintiffs in the sum of Rs. 4,605-11-3. This debt entirely arises out of transactions connected with the ancestral business carried on by the defendants' family after Anundo Chunder's death. The plaintiffs brought a suit to recover the amount, and Mr. Justice Macpherson has decreed the claim, with this reservation, that the amount decreed is to be realised out of the property of the deceased father, Anundo Chunder Cowar. Against this decree the infant Joy Kisto has alone appealed.
The questions that we have to determine are, whether infant the appellant is at all liable for this debt; and if so, to what extent? It seems to us, that on the authority of decided cases, the guardian of a Hindoo minor is competent to carry on an ancestral trade on behalf of the minor. (See Petum Doss v. Ram Doss, Taylor, 279; Ramlal Thakursidas v. Lakhmichand, 1 Bom. Ap. li, lxii, lxxi; Johurra Bibee v. Sreegopal Misser, I.L.R 1 Cal., 470.) Consequently, the contention raised in this appeal that the infant appellant is not liable to any extent for the debt in question, is not well founded. On the other hand, it seems to us only reasonable, as well as in accordance with legal principles, that a minor, on whose behalf an ancestral business is carried on, ought not to be held personally liable for the debts incurred that business. There must be some defined limit to the minor's liability. The limit apparently laid down by Mr. Justice Macpherson is, that all the ancestral property is to be rendered liable. But there may be instances in which this limit would be found manifestly inadequate and unsuited to reach the justice of the case. For example, a petty trade in the time of an ancestor might expand after his death into a large flourishing business in the hands of a manager for infants. Debts arising out ??? business would naturally become proportionately large, and it would seem unreasonable to hold that such debts should be recoverable from ancestral property only. On the other hand, the trade might not prosper; and in this case the minor ought not to be liable to account for trade losses, out of any property unconnected with the assets of the business, which he may have received from his ancestor.
In the case of a minor being admitted into partnership in the ordinary way, section 247 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) provides, that for any obligation of the firm the share of the minor in the property of the firm is alone liable. We think that this limit of the infant's liability, which has been adopted by the Legislature in the case of a minor being admitted by contract into a partnership business, ought to be adopted in such a case as the present. On principle, there ought not to be any difference between the nature of the liability of an infant admitted by contract into a partnership business, and that of one on whose behalf an ancestral trade is carried on by a manager.
The elder brother Nobo Kisto has not appealed against Mr. Justice Macpherson's order, nor, on the other hand, have the plaintiffs appealed upon the ground that Nobo Kisto should have been made personally liable in the ordinary way. We ought not, under ordinary circumstances, to make a decree which would have the effect of altering his liability, when neither he on the one hand, nor the plaintiffs on the other, have appealed against the decree in the Court below. But under section 337 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act VIII of 1859, we are empowered, in a case like the present, to draw up what would be a fair decree as regards both defendants. We propose, therefore, to make an order, that unless the defendants admit partnership assets, sufficient for the payment of the debt, there should be the usual decree for an account of the partnership property, and a direction that the debts be paid out of that property.
It will be the duty of the plaintiffs to serve Nobo Kisto with a copy of this judgment; and if, within three weeks from the date of Nobo Kisto's receiving a copy of this judgment, neither the plaintiffs nor Nobo Kisto make any application to alter the terms of our proposed decree, the decree will be drawn up accordingly; but either party will be at liberty to apply within that time. The minor defendant is entitled to the costs of the appeal.