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  • provisions of ss. 58, 59 and 60 of Act III of 1877
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  • provisions of ss. 58, 59 and 60 of Act III of 1877

    Mathura Das v. Mitchell

    Straight, J. and Tyrrell, J.:— This is an appeal from a judgment of the Judge of Cawnpore, dated the 9th September, 1880, under the following circumstances. The plaintiffs-appellants on the 11th June, 1879, obtained a money-decree for Rs. 2,036-5-0 against the defendant respondent William Mitchell, upon the basis of an arbitration award. In execution a screw-house situate in Collectorganj, Cownpore, was attached as the property of the judgment-debtor, and thereupon the defendant-respondent Alexander Mitchell field objections on the ground that the premises in question were his property, and that William Mitchell was his tenant. The contention was successful, and on the 11th August, 1879, an order was passed in the miscellaneous department under s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code releasing the attachment. Hence the present suit, which is for a declaration that the screw-house referred to is the property of William Mitchell and liable to execution and sale at the instance of the plaintiffs. The Judge found that the premises did not belong to William Mitchell, and that they had been acquired by purchse in September, 1873, by Alexander Mitchell. He therefore dismissed the plaintiffs claim and they now appeal. Their pleas in substance are that the decision of the Judge was against the weight of evidence, and that he wrongly admitted certain documents in proof, which were inadmissible. The respondents have also filed objections to the order of the lower Court as to costs, and the scale upon which it directed the Pleaders' fees to be assessed.

    The question for us to determine is, whether the screw-house in suit was or was not the property of William Mitchell at the time of it's attachment by the plaintiffs, and in considering this point it will of course become necessary to decide upon the legitimacy or otherwise of the claim set up by Alexander Mitchell. We start with this fact at least certain, that from the end of 1873 or the beginning of 1874 down to the time of the plaintiffs' attachment, William Mitchell was in occupation of and carrying on his business at the premises in question, to all external appearance as the proprietor and owner. Having established this lengthened possession on the part of their judgment-debtor, the plaintiffs reasonably enough contend that they have made out a primâ facie case, which it lies upon the defendants to rebut. We think that this is the correct view of the position, and that it rests with Alexander Mitchell to prove his title. This he seeks to do in a fashion, which is to say the least of it extraordinary. He produces two, documents, one purporting to be a deed of conveyance of the screw house to himself, dated the 25th September, 1873, and the other a confirmation bond, executed by the same parties as the conveyance, and dated the 31st December, 1878. Now it is obvious that the true document of his title is the conveyance of 1873, but unfortunately for him it is unregistered, and therefore inadmissible in evidence. So the expedient of the confirmation bond had to be resorted to, and in March, 1879, it was presented to the Collector for registration. Now even supposing registration had been formally and properly completed, we should have been very strongly disposed to hold that such an obvious attempt to defeat the provisions of the registration law should not be permitted to succeed. Indeed to allow a transaction of such a kind to pass as legitimate would be to throw the door open to the very mischiefs at which this branch of legislation is aimed. But as a matter of fact the confirming bond of the 31st December, 1878, never has been registered, whereas that of the 25th September, 1873, contains the registration certificate. It is said on the part of the defendants that this is a mistake, and that the certificate in reality applies to the document of December, 1878. All we can say to this is that the provisions of ss. 58, 59 and 60 of Act III of 1877 have not been complied with, and that the instrument remains to all intents and purposes unregistered. We cannot regard this as such a “defect in procedure” as is contemplated by s. 87, and one which we can pass over. We therefore think that neither of the documents mentioned was admissible in evidence, and that in admitting that of December, 1878, in proof, the Judge decided erroneously. Then the question arises, whether failing the written evidence of his title, Alexander Mitchell can be permitted to prove it aliunde. If we were rigidly to apply the strict rules of law, we should say, “no” but in order effectually and conclusively to dispose of the suit, we think it best to consider such facts as there are in evidence, and to pass a decision upon them. (The judgment then proceeded to dispose of the case on the merits.)

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    Mathura Das v. Mitchell
    (Jan 16, 1882)