Sir John Edge, C.J:— A Hindu named Hari Singh, had three sons, Mohan Singh, Baoba Singh, and Mahipat Singh. Mahipat became a Muhammadan, and the plaintiff in this case is his son. Bacha died childless, leaving two widows surviving him, Kosila and Banno. Kosila and Banno were recorded proprietors of Bacha Singh's share. On the death of Kosila, Banno was recorded as sole proprietors of the share. Banno sold the property in question to the defendant. Banno has died. The plaintiff claimed the property which was left by Bacha Singh by right of inheritance. The sole question we have to consider in this second appeal is whether the plaintiff, having been born a Muhammadan, can claim as a reversioner to the share of the Hindu family. This in my judgment depends on the construction of Act XXI of 1850. Mr. Bajpai for the purchaser, who is appellant here, very ably argued that Act applies only to a person who has himself or herself renounced his or her religion or been excluded from caste, and that it does not apply to a case like this in which the person claiming by right of inheritance a share in a Hindu family is the son of the person who renounced his religion, and was born a Muhammadan. I was very much struck with the force of Mr. Bajpai's argument. It may be, no doubt inconvenient that a Muhammadan should be introduced into a Hindu family or a Hindu into a Muhammadan family, but this is a matter for which, if it is a grievance, we, who have merely to interpret the law, are not responsible. We can only interpret the law as we find it, without any consideration for the opinions of those persons whom the law may affect. Prior to the passing of Act XXI of 1850 there was in force in the Presidency of the Port William, Bengal, a Regulation known as Regulation VII of 1832. Speaking broadly, s. 9 of that Regulation was passed to relieve Hindus or Mubammadans in that Presidency from any disability with regard to the rights of property under Hindu or Muhammadan law, which might have arisen by [103] reason of a Hindu or Muhammadan having changed his religion, or by reason of a Hindu being out of caste. Act XXI is a very short Act, and I propose to read the whole of it:—
“Whereas it is enacted by s. 9 of Regulation VII, 1832, of the Bengal Code, that whenever in any civil suit the parties to such suit may be of different persuasions, when one party shall be of the Hindu and the other of the Muhammadan persuasion, or where one or more of the parties to the suit shall not be either of the Muhammadan or Hindu persuasion; the laws of those religions shall not be permitted to operate to deprive such party or parties of any property to which, but for the operation of such laws, they would have been entitled, and whereas it will be beneficial to extend the principle of that enactment throughout the territories subject to the Government of the East India Company, it is enacted as follows:—
“So much of any law or usage now in force within the territories subject to the Government of the East India Company, as inflicts on any person forfeiture of rights or property, or may be held in any way to impair or affect any right of inheritance by reason of his or her renouncing, or having been excluded from the communion of any religion, or being deprived of caste, shall cease to be enforced as law in the Courts of the East India Company and in the Courts established by Royal Charter within the said territories.”
The first thing to be observed is that the Legislature in the preamble expresses the intention of the Act to be to extend the principle of s. 9 of Regulation VII of 1832 which was then in operation in the provinces subject to the Presidency of Fort William throughout the territories of the East India Company. That being so one would expect that in the operative part of the Act the principle of s. 9 of Regulation VII of 1832 would not be cut down or curtailed. We have got to see whether Mr. Bajpai's argument is correct that the Act, did, in fact, cut down and curtail the principle of s. 9. His argument was that notwithstanding the intention of the Legislature shown in the preamble, the relief extended to the rest of the Company's provinces was by the operative part of the Act limited by the wording of that part to the actual person who might change his religion or be excluded from caste. No one can read s. 9 of Regulation VII without seeing that if Mr. Bajpai's argument is correct the operative portion of the Act instead of extending the principle to the rest of the Company's provinces, would have limited the relief it was intended to extend. As I read the operative portion of the Act, it relates to different classes of persons. In the earlier portion it protects any person from forfeiture of right of property by reason of his or her renouncing their religion or being excluded from caste. In the case before us those words would have protected the father of the plaintiff, who was the person who renounced his religion, and they protected him from losing any right which he had. The latter portion of the section, in my opinion, protects any person from having any right of inheritance affected by reason of any person having renounced his religion or having been excluded from caste. If the latter part of the section was restricted to the protection of the right of inheritance of the persons renouncing their religion or being excluded from caste, their case was covered by the words of the early part of the section.
Reading the section as I do, and I think it is the natural reading of the section, I give effect to the intention of the Legislature in passing the Act, which we find expressed in the preamble, and to the principle of s. 9, of Regulation VII.
The effect of this construction of the Act is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Straight, J.:— I concur.
Appeal dismissed.
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