Straight, J.:— Upon the statement of the facts in the order of reference, as well as from the learned Judge's findings as the Court of first appeal, I have no doubt that the petition filed in Court on the 20th June 1882 by Lala Juala Pershad, the pleader for the decree-holder, under a power-of-attorney, must be regarded as presented on the decree-holder's behalf, and that in this way he asked the Court executing his decree to enter up part satisfaction of it, as required by s. 258 of the Code. At the time this petition was filed, there was an execution-proceeding pending in the Court at the instance of the decree-holder, and, had he not authorized his pleader to put in this petition, he would have laid himself open to a proceeding by the judgment-debtor of the kind mentioned in paragraph 2 of s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, while the payment of Rs. 800, which in a petition of the 5th May 1885, the judgment-debtor admits he made, could not have been recognized by any Court executing the decree, unless so certified by the decree-holder. I think the petition of the 20th June 1882, therefore, was an application by the decree-holder in that execution-proceeding, and the only remaining point for consideration is, was it an application to take some. “step in aid of execution” within the meaning of clause 4, column 3, art. 179 of the Limitation Act? In Sitla Din v. Sheo Prasad(1), I held with the approval of my brother Tyrrell that a joint application by a decree-holder and judgment-debtor asking sanction of the Court to the postponement of a sale [402] that had been advertised was an application to take a step in aid of execution. In Kishori Lal v. Sham Koran(2) my brothers Tyrrell and Mahmood held that an application by a decree-holder to take money out of Court, paid in by a judgment-debtor, was an application to take a step in aid of execution. I expressed a similar view in Paran Singh v. Jawahir Singh(3), which was concurred in by Duthoit, J., and a like opinion was stated by the Madras High Court in Dharanamna v. Subba(4). In Bandopadhya v. Mukhapadhya(5), Cunningham and Ghose, JJ., held that an application by a decree-holder under s. 258 was a step in aid of execution, and the same view was adopted by my brothers Tyrrell and Mahmood in Muhammad Husain Khan v. Ram Sarup(6). Mr. Jogindro Nath for the judgment-debtors, respondents, very frankly admitted that the rulings of the Court on the point were uniform and consistent, and, if my recollection serves me right, besides those reported, which I have noted above, there are many others to the same effect that have not been reported. These reported cases extend over a period from 1880 to 1886, and have, no doubt, been acted upon by the subordinate Courts and parties to execution proceedings therein; and though it is true that the cases to be found in I.L.R, 8 Calc., 89 and 10 Calc. 549, are the other way, I think that, if upon no other ground than that of avoiding disturbance of rights acquired upon the strength of them and other obvious inconveniences likely to follow from a contrary view, we should elect stare decisis. But apart from this, I am of opinion that such an application as that before us here is one to take a step in aid of execution.” I agree with what was said by Cunningham and Ghose, JJ., in the case reported in I.L.R, 12 Calc. 608 as to why it should be so regarded, and it is unnecessary for me to repeat what they said on the subject. Reading cl. 4, art. 179, sch. ii of the Limitation Act, it is clear that the Legislature, by mentioning first an application for execution and then an application to take some step in aid of execution, meant by these latter words to include something other than a mere application for execution pure and simple, [403] and in using the terms “in aid of execution.” I think it was intended to cover any application made according to law, in furtherance of the execution proceedings under a decree. That such an application as was presented by the decree-holder's pleader in the case before us was one in this sense within this limitation article, I have no doubt. It therefore becomes unnecessary to consider or determine the point mentioned in the referring order with regard to the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Ramhit Rai v. Satgur Rai, though I may add that, had it become necessary to do so, I should have declined to reconsider or depart from it, seeing that it was given in 1880 and has been since then frequently followed, notably in Janki Prasad v. Ghulam Ali by my brothers Tyrrell and Mahmood. Applying the view I have expressed to this second appeal from order, I am of opinion that the decree-holder's, applicant's, application for execution of the 20th November 1884, was not barred by limitation, and, the appeal being allowed, the order of the Judge is reversed, and the order of the Subordinate Judge should be restored, the decree-holder to get his costs in these proceedings.

Sir John Edge, C.J:— I can add nothing to my brother Straight's judgment, with which I thoroughly agree.

Brodhurst, J.:— I concur.

Tyrrell, J.:— I agree.

Mahmood, J.:— The facts of this case are fully stated in the order of reference passed by my brother Brodhurst and myself on the 17th February 1888, and I need not repeat them here. The points of law to which they give rise, in the manner in which those points have been argued before the Full Bench, seem to me to be the following:—

(1) Whether the application of 20th June 1882 was an application “in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to lake some step in aid of execution of the decree” within the meaning of cl. 4, art. 179, sch. ii of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877).

[404] (2) Whether the payment of Rs. 800 to which the application of 20th June 1882 related, can be regarded as payment of “interest on debt” within the meaning of s. 20 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) so as to entitle the decree-holder “to a new period of limitation” to be “computed from the date when the payment was made.”

In considering the first of these questions it is important to bear in mind that the application of 20th June 1882, was framed and worded so as to purport to have been made not on behalf of the decree-holder but on behalf of the judgment-debtors, respondents; that according to the lower appellate Court's finding the application was neither written by the judgment-debtors nor signed by them, but that it was presented by the decree-holder's pleader with an endorsement thereon as to the receipt of Rs. 800 in part payment of the decree; and that such certification was accepted by the Judge executing the decree. Upon these findings the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court has held that the application was wholly valueless for purposes of furnishing a fresh starting point of limitation to the decree-holder for his present application for execution, dated the 20th November 1884.

It seems to me that in arriving at this conclusion the learned Judge omitted to consider whether or not, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, and upon his own findings, the application was not practically an application by the decree-holder under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, certifying payment of money out of Court, namely the sum of Rs. 800, to which the endorsement by the decree-holder's pleader on the application itself related. I am of opinion that under the circumstances of this case the application of 20th June 1882, though purporting to have been made on behalf of the judgment-debtors, must by reason of the decree-holder's pleader's endorsement thereupon and the fact that such pleader presented it to the Court, be regarded in effect as an application, not on behalf of the judgment-debtors but on behalf of the decree-holder. I am glad to be able to adopt this view, because it renders it unnecessary for me to consider how far I am prepared to adopt the [405] rule laid down in Ghansham v. Mukha that even an application by a judgment-debtor might constitute a step in aid of execution of a decree against himself.

The question then resolves itself into this, whether an application by a decree-holder certifying payment under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, and asking the Court to enter partial or total satisfaction of the decree, is an application within the meaning of cl. 4, art. 179, sch. ii of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877).

In the argument upon this point before the Full Bench, much stress was laid upon the analogy of cases such as Paran Singh v. Jawahir Singh where my brother Straight held that an application by a decree-holder to be paid the proceeds of a sale of property in execution of the decree, is a step in aid of the execution of the decree within the meaning of cl. 4, art. 179, sch. ii of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). To the same effect is the rule laid down by my brother Tyrrell and myself in Kishori Lal v. Shani Karon but these rulings were assailed at the hearing on the authority of two rulings of the Calcutta Court. The first of these is Hemchunder Clowdhry v. Brojo Soondury Debee, where it was held by Morris and Tottenham, JJ., that an application made by a judgment-creditor to take out of Court certain moneys there deposited by his judgment-debtor cannot be considered to be an application to the Court to take a step in aid of execution, and is not therefore within the meaning of cl. 4, art. 179, sch. ii of Act XV of 1877. To the same effect is the second case, Fazallmam v. Metta Singh, where Mitter and Maclean, JJ., expressed their dissent from a ruling of the Madras High Court in Venkatarayalu v. Narasinha. I cannot help feeling that a similar ratio would lead the learned Judges to dissent from another ruling of the Madras Court in Dharanamma v. Subha(7).

This leads me to consider whether or not the analogy upon which the argument addressed to us has rested is appliable or not. [406] I am of opinion that it is so applicable, because it seems to me that an action taken by the decree-holders for the purposes of acquiring the fruit of the execution of decree or rather partial fruit of the execution of decree is a step in aid of the execution of decree. There are in the two Calcutta cases which I have cited, no reason shown why such an application as that contemplated by my brother Straight in Paran Singh v. Jawahir Singh would not amount to an action which intended not only to aid execution but to acquire the fruits of execution, namely, the recovery of fruits which in execution of decree became the property of him who executed the decree, namely, the decree-holder. I think it is not necessary after the concurrence which the Bench has given to the rule laid down in Paran Singh v. Jawahir Singh for me to go further into the exact ratio decidendi which was adopted by the Calcutta Court in those rulings and in which they laid down the rule inconsistent not only with the rulings of this Court as referred to by my brother Straight, but also with the view taken by the Madras Court upon the same question. I hold therefore that when the decree-holder applies to obtain from a deposit in Court moneys therein deposited as the result of execution sale, he takes a step in aid of execution within the meaning of cl. 4, art. 179, sch. ii, Limitation Act (XV of 1877).

But then what I have said is an argument upon analogy. The exact question before us does not relate to any such application. It relates to an application made by the decree-holder under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code certifying that out of Court a certain sum of money had been paid in part satisfaction of the decree, and I say part satisfaction because the application of 20th June 1882 was an application which, as I have interpreted it under the circumstances of the case, could bear no other interpretation. Upon this point the first case to which I wish to refer is the case of Sitla Din v. Sheo Prasad in which my brothers Straight and Tyrrell agreed in regarding an application of such a character when made jointly by the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor to be an application which would furnish a step in aid of execution of decree. In the referring order I referred to [407] that case as if it was on all fours with the case of Ghansham v. Mukha, but upon reconsideration I find that the case did not undo the principle which I am inclined to hold, namely, that every application to take some step in aid of execution must come from the decree-holder, so that case is no authority against the principle which I have expressed.

The next case is that to which my brother Straight has referred, namely, the case of Tarini Das Bandopadhya v. Bishtoo Lal Mukhopadhya, where Cunningham and Ghose, JJ., concurred inlaying down the rule that an application by a judgment-creditor to bring an execution proceeding on the file and to record his certificate of the payment of a sum of money by the judgment-debtor, is an application to take some step in aid of execution of decree within the meaning of cl. 4, art. 179, sch. ii, Limitation Act (XV of 1877).

The ruling was before my brother Tyrrell and myself in Muhammad Husain Khan v. Ram Sarup, and in that case in delivering our judgment I expressed some doubts as to whether or not the rule laid down in that case was sound. In delivering my judgment I think I went further than might have been said in thinking that the case of Ghansham v. Mukha, which I respectfully doubt here, was an authority in support of the proposition which was then expressed. My brother Tyrrell, in expressing his view went further and in the same direction that I did, in expressing doubts as to the validity of the rule laid down by the Calcutta Court in Tarini Das Bandopadhya v. Bishtoo Lal Mukhopadhya.

This is the first case of this Court which required a decision of the proposition that certification of payment out of Court by the decree-holder under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code is a step in aid of the execution of decree, and when the order referring this case to the Full Bench was made by my brother Brodhurst and myself we felt that not only my judgment in that case, but also [408] the judgment of my brother Tyrrell was so liable to be taken as a judgment not settling the law, that such reference was necessary.

The same question, however, came up before me in Kanhia Lal v. Rudar Sahai, wherewith special reference to the ruling in Muhammad Hussain v. Ram Sarup, I held that before any effect could be given to the execution application for certification such as s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code requires, it was necessary to decide whether or not such payment had been made as a matter of fact, as distinguished from the mere circumstance of such statement in the application which purported to certify the payment out of Court.

I wish now to say, because the matter has been fully considered by the whole Court, that the doubts which I expressed in Muhammad Hussain Khan v. Ram Sarup in delivering my judgment no longer exist in my mind, and I hold that the rule laid down by the Calcutta Court upon the point in Tarini Das Bandopadhya v. Bishtoo Lal Mukhopadhya is a sound rule of law, because where a decree-holder has not only out of Court acquired partial satisfaction of his decree, but when he also comes to certify such partial satisfaction under s. 258 of the Civil Procedure Code, he is taking a step by which he asserts enforcement of his decree in, the exercise of those powers which are vested in him because he is a decree-holder. The later case, namely, Kanhia Lal v. Budar Sahai only supports this view, and following, that ruling I hold that where an actual payment has been made by a judgment-debtor in partial satisfaction of the decree, and such payment is certified by the decree-holder by an application made under s. 258-of the Civil Procedure Code, such application is a step in aid of the execution of decree, and as such falls within the purview of cl. 4, art. 179, sch. ii, of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), provided that the payment asserted in the application for certification was, as a matter of fact, actually made, but that in the absence of the truthfulness of such assertion no such certification is a step in aid of execution of the decree-within the [409] meaning of the clause of the Limitation Act to which I have referred.

Fortunately in this case the finding of the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court shows that, as a matter of fact, the payment of Rs. 800 mentioned in the application of 20th June 1882, to which the endorsement by the decree-holder's pleader of that date related, was actually made, and I therefore hold that it was a step in aid of execution within the meaning of the article of the Limitation Act to which I have referred. The question then is whether it is necessary to enter into the second point which I pointed out at the outset of my judgment, namely, whether the payment of Rs. 800 to which the application of 20th June 1882 related, can be regarded as payment of “interest on a debt,” within the meaning of s. 20 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) so as to entitle the applicant decree-holder to a “new period of limitation” “to be computed from the date when the payment was made.” I should have considerable doubt in giving an answer to such a question, though I feel constrained to respect the full Bench ruling in Ramhit Rai v. Satgnr Rai, but it is not necessary to go into the matter further. I agree in the order which has been made.

Appeal allowed.