Straight, J.:— This petition has been presented ostensibly under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of inducing this Court to exercise its revisional powers under that section. It appears that a suit was instituted by the petitioner in the Court of the Assistant Collector of the second class for recovery of arrears of rent, amounting to the sum of Rs. 78-14-9. For the purpose of disposing of this case it is not necessary for me to say more in regard to the defence set up in answer to the claim than [199] that it was based upon a technical objection to the form of the plaintiff's suit. The first Court dismissed the claim, and there was an appeal by the plaintiff to the Collector of the district as provided in s. 183 of the Rent Act. The Collector of the district upheld the decision of the Assistant Collector of the second class, and it is this order of the Collector in appeal which is made the subject-matter of this application for revision. It is objected by Mr. Madho Prasad, on behalf of the opposite party, that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such an application, for as by s. 183 of the Rent Act the decision of the Collector of the district was final, and as by s. 199 of the same statute provision is made to enable the Board of Revenue as the paramount revenue authority to revise orders of all Courts subordinate to a Commissioner, therefore, there being special provision within the four comers of the Rent Act itself for the revision of such an order as that which is attacked here, this Court cannot exercise its powers under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code.
I am of opinion this is a good contention and must prevail. Mr. Juala Prasad in support of the petition has referred us to the full Bench ruling of this Court in Hur Pershad v. Lalu. But with regard to that case it is to be observed that it was before the present rent law came into operation and when Act X of 1859 was in force, in which no provision in the terms of s. 199 of the present Rent Act was to be found. If I were to adopt that ruling as applicable to this case and to accept Mr. Juala Prasad's contention, this grave inconvenience and confusion of judicial authorities must ensue, namely, that both the Board of Revenue under s. 199 of the Rent Act, and this Court under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, would have coordinate jurisdiction to revise orders of the kind to be found in the present case. I think I am bound in dealing with a question of this kind to guard against so grave a dilemma arising, which I feel sure could never have been intended, and to leave to the Board of Revenue, to whom the power in specific terms is given by the statute, the exclusive jurisdiction [200] thereby in my opinion contemplated and provided. This will certainly procure uniformity of procedure, because while looking to the terms of s. 199 of, the Rent Act the Board of Revenue's jurisdiction so deal with those cases in which an appeal lies under s. 189 of the Rent Act is in terms excluded, and naturally, because they go to the Civil Court Judge and to this Court, on the other hand it leaves their jurisdiction untouched to deal with those cases to which s. 189 of the Rent Act is not applicable. I therefore am of opinion that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this application for revision, and I accordingly dismiss it with costs upon that ground.
Brodhurst, J.:— I entirely concur.
Application rejected.