Banerjee, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant, to recover joint possession with the Defendants of certain immoveable property on the allegation that the Plaintiff is entitled to a certain share therein, that he was in possession of such share, that he brought a suit for partition, which was withdrawn with the consent of the Defendants, and that, subsequently, the Defendants turned him out of possession. The defence, in effect, was a denial of the Plaintiff's right; and then in a subsequent written statement the Defendants took the objection that the suit was barred under secs. 13, 43 and 373, Civil Procedure Code.
The Courts below have given effect to the plea in bar, the first Court being of opinion that the suit is barred, as well under sec. 13, as under sec. 373 of the Code, and the Appellate Court holding that it is barred only under the latter section, though not under the former.
In second appeal, it is contended that the Courts below were wrong in holding that the suit was barred without going into the merits of the case; and the contention urged on behalf of the Plaintiff-Appellant, is based, mainly, upon the ground that the present suit is not for the same matter, within the meaning of the second paragraph of sec. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to be barred by reason of the withdrawal of the previous suit. Then it was faintly suggested that the bar under sec. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be further inapplicable to the present case by reason of the withdrawal of the former suit having been with the consent of the Defendants; and the case of Juggobundo Chatterjee v. Watson & Co. is cited as an authority in support of this view.
If it were necessary to determine the second branch of the Appellant's contention, wo should hesitate before assenting to the view expressed in the case cited to us; but as the learned Vakil for the Appellant does not press for any decision upon this point and is content to rest his case upon the first branch of his contention, namely, that the present suit is not barred by sec. 373, because it is not for the same matter within the meaning of the second paragraph of that section, it becomes unnecessary to say more upon the second branch of his contention.
Turning now to the first branch of the Appellant's contention, we find that the case has been disposed of upon the pleadings and without going into any evidence, except such as is afforded by the plaint in the previous suit and the order made on it. Now the plaint in the former suit clearly shows that was a suit for partition based upon the ground stated in the 5th paragraph of the plaint which ran in these words: “It being inconvenient for the other Defendants to hold possession of the aforesaid properties jointly with the Plaintiff, the latter asked them repeatedly to make a partition by metes and bounds and for the last time on the 13th January 1895, but the Defendants have not effected any such partition; the Plaintiff therefore brings the suit.”
In the present suit the Plaintiff, after stating, in the 5th and 5th paragraphs of the plaint, that a suit for partition had been previously brought and withdrawn, states, in the 8th paragraph, that “subsequently the Defendants refused to make over to the Plaintiff the share they had agreed to make over to him and turned him out in the month of November 1895,” and the cause of action is stated to have arisen on that date.
Can it then be said that the present suit, which asks for a decree for possession by reason of dispossession having taken place subsequent to the withdrawal of the former suit, is a suit for the same matter as the former suit, which asked only for partition on the ground of joint possession being inconvenient? We are of opinion that this question must be answered in the negative. The mere fact of two suits being in respect of the same property would not be sufficient to make the latter suit one for the same matter as the former, when the state of facts leading to the two suits and the reliefs claimed under them are different. The view we take is in accordance with that taken by this Court in the case of Kamini Kant Roy v. Ram Nath Chuckerbuty.
It has not been contended for the Respondents that the suit can be barred by sec. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and we do not think it possible for any ??? to be advanced. The ??? is, that the decrees of the ??? must be set aside, and the ??? to the Court of first in ??? on the merits. Having ??? circumstances of the case, ??? opinion that the costs of this ??? abide the result.
??? appellant is entitled to a refund court-fee for the Memorandum of ??? under sec. 13 of the Court Fees ??? suit having been dismissed by ??? below on a preliminary point.
??? B.
Appeal decreed.