AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • article 120 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act,
  • article 36 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • article 120 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act,
  • article 36 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiffs-Respondents, as heirs and legal representatives of Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee, commenced a suit to recover sums allegedly advanced by Bejoy Krishna to a "debutter" estate (an estate created by a donor, Jugo Mohan Mookerjee, for the worship of idols and related ceremonies). The advances were said to have been made because Bejoy Krishna, who became shebait, was wrongfully kept out of possession of the debutter estate by the Defendant Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee. A prior suit had declared the disputed properties to be debutter properties and recognized Bejoy Krishna's right to be shebait; Bejoy Krishna later died. The Plaintiffs sued the debutter estate (and alternatively Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee or other defendants) to recover the money advanced to the estate.

Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee alone defended below, pleading limitation, taking objections to the framing of the suit, and denying both the Plaintiffs' entitlement and his own or the debutter estate's liability. The trial court disallowed the defendant's objection in bar, held Rajah personally liable for sums he had realized belonging to the debutter estate and held the debutter estate liable for the remainder, and directed accounts to be taken. Rajah appealed from that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order appealed from is a "decree" enabling an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether a decree or relief can be granted against the debutter estate when no person has been made a defendant representing the estate (i.e., whether the suit as framed can make the debutter estate liable without identifying or determining the person entitled to represent it).
  3. Whether the Plaintiffs, as creditors of the debutter estate, can maintain a personal claim against Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee merely because he realized moneys belonging to the debutter estate.
  4. Whether the Plaintiffs' claim (against the debutter estate and/or Rajah personally) is barred by limitation.
  5. Whether the advances alleged to have been made by Bejoy Krishna to the debutter estate were in reality donations (such that the Plaintiffs could not recover them).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee) Arguments

  • The suit must fail so far as it seeks relief against the debutter estate because no defendant was made to represent that estate.
  • The Plaintiffs, as creditors of the debutter estate, are not entitled to claim relief against him personally merely as a debtor of the estate.
  • The claim is barred by limitation.
  • The alleged advances were not loans but were not intended to be recovered (i.e., they were effectively donations), so the Plaintiffs cannot recover them as heirs.

Respondents' (Plaintiffs) Arguments

  • A preliminary contention that no appeal lies because the order appealed against was not a decree (this was raised by the respondents' vakil at the hearing).
  • In response to the objection about representation of the debutter estate, the respondents argued that some one or other of the surviving descendants of Jugo Mohan must, under the donor's will, be the shebait; therefore, because all such descendants had been made defendants, the person who is the shebait and entitled to represent the debutter estate was before the Court.
  • When the order was set aside, the respondents asked leave to amend paragraph 19 of the plaint to aver that Rajah Peari Mohan claims to be the present shebait but that there is a dispute, and sought an additional prayer that the Court determine who is shebait for the purpose of the suit and that the debutter estate be represented by that person.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shyam Chand Koondoo v. The Land Mortgage Bank of India Cited as an example where appellate courts have allowed amendments and remitted suits for retrial on amended plaints. The court relied on this class of authority to support allowing the Plaintiffs to amend their plaint and remanding the case for fresh trial.
Dhani Ram Shaha v. Bhagirath Shaha Cited as an example of appellate allowance of amendments and remand for retrial. Used to illustrate that the requested amendment would not be inconsistent with appellate practice and to justify remanding the suit for retrial on an amended plaint.
Seshamma v. Chenappa Cited as another example where amendments were allowed by appellate courts and cases were sent back for retrial. Reinforced the court's conclusion that permitting the amendment and remanding the suit conforms with established appellate practice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Preliminary objection: The respondents contended that no appeal lay because the order appealed from was not a decree. The Court examined the order and concluded that, having regard to its nature, it constituted a decree within the meaning of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure; accordingly the preliminary objection failed.

Consideration of the appellant's contentions proceeded in the order adopted by the Court. On the contentions that the Plaintiffs could recover personally against Rajah and that the claim was barred, the Court reasoned as follows:

  • The Court held that Plaintiffs who are creditors of the debutter estate are not entitled to claim relief against Rajah personally simply because he had realized money belonging to the estate; the personal claim against Rajah was also held to be barred by limitation under article 36 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act. The Court observed, however, that the Plaintiffs had not pressed the personal claim on appeal.
  • The Court distinguished the limitation question as to the claim against the debutter estate: it rejected the argument that limitation began to run from the dates of the alleged advances (which, if accepted, would give a three-year period); instead, the Court held that because the alleged advances were made by Bejoy Krishna when he himself was shebait, he could not sue himself and thus the statute of limitation began to run only from his death. Applying article 120 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a six-year period, and noting that the suit was instituted within six years of Bejoy Krishna's death, the Court concluded the claim against the debutter estate was not barred by limitation.
  • On the contention that the advances were donations, the Court examined the two circumstances relied upon (the absence of reference to such advances in Bejoy Krishna's Will and the destruction of certain account memoranda). The Court found these circumstances insufficient to infer that the advances were intended as donations: the Will's silence alone did not establish donation, and the evidence showed that memoranda were destroyed after entries had been made in regular account books, which did not indicate an intent to wipe out any debt.

Having disposed of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th contentions against the appellant, the Court turned to the first contention (that the Plaintiffs had not made any person representing the debutter estate a defendant). The Court agreed with the appellant on this point. It observed that the plaint neither stated who the person entitled to represent the debutter estate (the shebait) was, nor asked the Court to determine who the shebait was for the purposes of the suit. The Plaintiffs' procedural device of joining all surviving descendants of the original donor was insufficient. The Court explained the legal principle: unless the plaintiffs either specifically identify the person to be treated as representing the debutter estate or the Court determines who the shebait is for the purpose of the suit, the person entitled to represent the estate cannot be said to have had notice to defend the estate and be called upon to defend it. The Court therefore concluded that the trial court's decree declaring the liability of the debutter estate and directing accounts was made in the absence of any one representing that estate and could not stand.

On relief after setting aside that decree, the Court considered the parties' positions: the appellant sought dismissal of the suit; the respondents sought leave to amend the plaint to (a) aver that Rajah claims to be the present shebait but there is a dispute, and (b) add a prayer that the Court determine who is the shebait for the purposes of the suit and that the debutter estate be represented by that person. The Court analyzed its power under the Code of Civil Procedure (section 582 read with section 53) to allow amendments. It rejected the appellant's contention that the amendment would alter the character of the suit in a way that would contravene the proviso to section 53, explaining that the suit would remain a suit for money due to the Plaintiffs from the debutter estate and that the proposed changes are ancillary and necessary to enable effective relief against the estate. The Court further relied upon appellate practice (citing cases) where amendments and remands for retrial have been allowed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the lower court's order insofar as it declared the liability of the debutter estate and directed accounts (i.e., that part of the order was vacated with costs). The Plaintiffs were allowed to amend their plaint in the manner indicated by the Court, and the case was remanded to the Court below for a fresh trial. Defendants were entitled to file fresh written statements.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the decree holding the debutter estate liable and ordering accounts has been set aside; the Plaintiffs are permitted to amend their plaint to identify or seek determination of who shall represent the debutter estate (the shebait) for the purposes of the suit, and the matter will be retried in the court below. Defendants may file fresh pleadings.
  • The Court applied existing procedural rules (CPC sections cited) and appellate practice to allow amendment and remand. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond applying settled procedural powers to permit amendment and ensuring representation of an estate before decreeing liability.
S.C.S
Case remanded.

    Rajah Peary Mohan Mukherjee v. Narendra Krishna Mukerjee

    This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiffs-Respondents to recover a certain sum of money against an estate described as a debutter estate, or in the alternative against the Defendant Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee, or any of the other Defendants whom the Court may consider liable for the same. The main allegations of fact upon which the suit is based are, that the late Jugo Mohan Mookerjee, the grandfather of the Plaintiffs and of some of the Defendants, and great-grandfather of the remaining Defendants, established certain idols, dedicated certain properties for their worship and for the performance of certain religious ceremonies, and prescribed a certain order in which his descendants were to become shebaits of the idols; that the properties dedicated, together with other properties acquired with the income thereof, constituted the debutter estate of the idols; that when in due course of succession the office of shebait devolved upon Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee, the father of the Plaintiffs, the Defendant Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee wrongfully kept him out of possession of the debutter estate or a portion of it; that this led to a suit by Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee, against Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee and certain other persons, but before that suit was finally disposed of, Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee departed this life; that a decree was made in that suit declaring the properties in dispute to be debutter properties, and declaring that Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee whose right to the office of shebait had been disputed was entitled to be shebait; that by reason of his having been kept out of possession of the debutter properties by Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee, Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee had to advance money out of his own estate to meet the expenses of the debutter estate; that the Plaintiffs, as the heirs and legal representatives of Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee, are entitled to recover from the debutter estate the money so advanced by their father to that estate; and that as there was a dispute as to who should be appointed shebait upon the death of Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee, the Plaintiffs have made all the surviving male descendants of Jugo Mohan Mookerjee parties to this suit in order that it may be decided in their presence.

    Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee, who alone defended the suit, in his defence pleaded limitation, took various objections to the frame of the suit, denied the right of the Plaintiffs to claim the money sued for, and denied the liability of the debutter estate and of himself personally to the claim.

    The Court below disallowed the objection of the Defendant in bar, and held that the Defendant Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee was personally liable for the claim so far as he had realized money belonging to the debutter estate, and it further held that for the remainder of the claim the debutter estate was liable; and, having come to this conclusion, it directed certain accounts to be taken.

    Against this order of the Court below the present appeal has been preferred by Rajah Peari Mohan Mookerjee; and it is contended on his behalf, first, that the suit must fail so far as it seeks relief against the debutter estate by reason of no one having been made a Defendant as representing that estate; secondly, that the suit so far as it claims relief against the Defendant Rajah Peary Mohan Mookerjee is not maintainable, as the Plaintiffs, who are only creditors of the debutter estate, are not entitled to advance any claim against any debtors of the estate; thirdly, that the claim was barred by limitation; and, fourthly, that the Plaintiffs, as the heirs and legal representatives of Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee, are not entitled to recover the money alleged to have been advanced by Bejoy Krishna to the debutter estate, as there is evidence to show that the advances were not made as loans to the debutter estate and were not intended to be recovered from it.

    At the hearing of the appeal a preliminary objection was raised by the learned vakil for the Respondents, that no appeal lay as the order appealed against was not a decree. Having regard to the nature of the order, we are of opinion that it is a decree within the meaning of the definition of that term in sec. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that the preliminary objection must fail.

    Coming now to the consideration of the contentions in the appeal, we shall dispose of the last of them first. We are of opinion that the Plaintiffs, who claim to be creditors of the debutter estate and sue for recovery of the money that is due to them, are not entitled to claim any relief against the Defendant Rajah Peari Mohan Mookcrjee personally, simply on the ground of his having realized money belonging to that estate. We are also of opinion that the claim against that Defendant personally is barred by limitation under article 36 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. But it is unnecessary to say more upon these points, as the learned vakil for the Plaintiffs-Respondents did not press the claim against the Rajah Defendant personally. We are of opinion however that the claim against the debutter estate is not barred. It is contended that it is barred, because time runs from the date when the advances were made, and the period of limitation is three years. We are, however, of opinion that time did not run from the date when the advances were made: for when the advances are said to have been made the party making the advances was the shebait for the time being, and he could not claim the money against himself though he was entitled to reimburse himself out of moneys that came into his hands from the debutter estate. In our opinion time began to run from the date on which Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee died, and the period of limitation is six years under article 120 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act, and as the suit was brought within six years from the date of Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee's death, the claim against the debutter estate is not barred by limitation. We are further of opinion that it is not made out that the advances were in the nature of donations, to the debutter estate. The only grounds upon which we are asked to come to that conclusion are these, namely, that the Will of Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee, whilst it provides expressly that his executors are to realize moneys due to his estate on account of loan transactions, makes no mention of any money being due from the debutter estate; and that the accounts of Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee in which these advances were entered were subsequently destroyed by him. We do not think that these two circumstances bear the inference that the learned counsel for the Appellant asks us to draw. The absence of any reference to these advances in the Will of Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee, standing by itself, cannot go to show that those advances were meant to be donations to the debutter estate; and as for the destruction of the accounts, the evidence shows that certain memoranda which Bejoy Krishna Mookerjee kept of those advances were destroyed after the amounts had been entered in the regular account books. That does not evince any intention of wiping out the debt that was due from the debutter estate.

    We are therefore of opinion that the objections involved in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th contentions on behalf of the Appellant are not sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the suit.

    We come next to the consideration of the first contention. In our opinion that contention is right and must prevail. Though the Plaintiffs have asked for a decree against the debutter estate they have not stated in their plaint who the person is that is entitled to represent that estate as shebait; nor have they asked the Court to determine for the purposes of this suit who the shebait for the time being is. All that they say in this plaint is that there being a dispute as to who should be appointed shebait the Plaintiffs have made the surviving descendants of Jugo Mohan Mookerjee, the original donor, parties to the suit in order that it may be decided in their presence.

    The argument of the learned vakil for the Plaintiffs-Respondents in answer to the Appellant's contention is, that although it is not stated who the shebait for the time being is, still as some one or other of the surviving descendants of Jugo Mohan Mookerjee must according to the terms of his Will be the shebait and as the Plaintiffs do not claim to be shebaits, we have amongst the Defendants in this suit the person who is the shebait and is therefore entitled to represent the debutter estate. Granting that is so, still, is that sufficient to justify the trial of the suit and the making of a decree or order declaring the liability of the debutter estate for the Plaintiffs' claim, without determining who the shebait is? We are clearly of opinion that the answer to this question must be in the negative; for until it is either definitely stated by the Plaintiffs who the shebait is against whom they ask for a decree making the debutter estate liable or it is determined by the Court for the purpose of this suit who is the shebait and the person entitled to represent the debutter estate, it cannot be said that any of the persons who are made Defendants in the case had notice to defend the debutter estate and was called upon to defend that estate against the Plaintiffs' claim. Practically therefore it must be taken that the Plaintiffs have asked the Court to make, and the Court has made, a decree or order declaring the liability of the debutter estate in the absence of any one representing that estate. Such a proceeding and such an order cannot be allowed to stand. The order of the Court below declaring the liability of the debutter estate, and directing accounts to be taken must therefore be set aside and set aside with costs in this Court and in the Court below.

    There remains then the question as to what would become of the suit. The learned counsel for the Appellant asks us to dismiss it. On the other hand the learned vakil for the Respondents asks us to allow his clients to amend the plaint by modifying paragraph 19 in the manner following, namely, by inserting in its stead the following:—“The Defendant Rajah Peari Mohan claims to be, and as the Plaintiffs have been advised, is, under the Will of the said Jugo Mohan Mookerjee, the present shebait of the Thakurs aforesaid, but there being a dispute as to the person who is now the shebait the Plaintiffs have been obliged to make all the surviving descendants of the late Jugo Mohan Mookerjee parties, and pray that this suit may be decided in their presence;” and by inserting the following additional prayer, namely, “that it may be determined for the purpose of this suit who is the shebait of the said Thakurs; and that the debutter estate be represented by the person so determined as shebait.”

    That this Court has power under the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 582, read with sec. 53, to allow an amendment of the plaint is not disputed; but the learned counsel for the Defendant-Appellant argued that the amendment asked for ought not to be allowed, as it would alter the character of the suit, and would therefore contravene the proviso to sec. 53. We do not consider this contention correct. The suit, even after the amendment, still remains a suit for money due to the Plaintiffs from the debutter estate; and the modification of the 19th paragraph of the plaint and the insertion of the additional prayer are only ancillary to the principal prayer of the Plaintiffs being granted, the determination of the question, who is shebait for the time being, being necessary to enable the Plaintiffs to obtain relief against the debutter estate. We are therefore of opinion that the amendment which the Plaintiffs ask us to allow does not alter the character of the suit.

    We may add that there are many cases in which amendments have been allowed by the Appellate Court and suits have been sent back for retrial on amended plaints—see the cases of Shyam Chand Koondoo v. The Land Mortgage Bank of India, Dhani Ram Shaha v. Bhagirath Shaha, and Seshamma v. Chenappa.

    The result then is that the Plaintiffs will be allowed to amend their plaint in the manner indicated above, and the case will be sent back to the Court below for a fresh trial. The Defendants will be entitled to put in fresh written statements.

    S.C.S
    Case remanded.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Rajah Peary Mohan Mukherjee v. Narendra Krishna Mukerjee
    (Nov 28, 1900)