The decree sought to be executed was passed on the 11th December 1899. The decree-holder applied on the 6th December 1902 for the execution of the decree. The application complied with the terms of section 235, Civil Procedure Code. It was not, however, accompanied (as required by rule 164 of the Civil Rules of Practice which came into force in September 1902) with a copy of the decree. The appellant was required to furnish a copy of the decree within a month and he was not able to do so and applied for further time for the production of the copy on the ground that his application for the same to the Court which had the records had not till then been complied, with. No further time was allowed and the application to execute the decree was dismissed. Thereupon on the 4th September 1903, he made the present application for execution. The lower Courts held that this was barred by limitation inasmuch as the application of December 1903 was, in their view, not an application in accordance with law within the meaning of clause 4, article 179, Limitation Act. The case of Sadashiva Raghunath v. Ramachandra Chintaman(1), no doubt, supports the view, but with all deference to the learned Judges we are unable to agree with that decision. It is scarcely necessary to say that the provision of the article of the Limitation Act in question should receive a fair and not too technical a construction (Adhar Chandra Dass v. Lal Mohun Dos and Kunhi v. Seshagiri(2)). It is in this spirit that the numerous decisions to which our attention has been drawn on behalf of the appellant, of all the High Courts dealing with defects and inaccuracies in applications for execution, have treated such defects and inaccuracies as not rendering the applications otherwise than in accordance with law for the purposes of clause 4, article 179 of the Limitation Act. The present case, in our opinion, is stronger, inasmuch as there was no omission or error in the contents of the application itself which consequently was perfectly in accordance with law having been presented on behalf of a party entitled to present it. The defect relied on has reference to an extraneous circumstance, the failure to produce a copy of the decree sought to be executed. We do not think that this ought to be held to detract from the application being in accordance with law, within the meaning of the provision in question, though it might furnish a ground for the Court not proceeding further with the application until the defect is removed by the production of the copy so as to enable the Court to satisfy itself as to the terms of the decree to be executed. With reference to analogous provisions in section 610 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 the Privy Council observed that they were of a directory nature (Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry v. Kali Sundari Debia(3)), and we do not think that a different or stricter construction ought to be put up upon the rules requiring the production of a copy of the decree to be executed. We think, therefore, that the application of December 1902 was one in accordance with law, viewing it as an application for execution. We ought to add that even if it were otherwise, the present application must be held to be within time, for the reason that the application of December 1902 prayed for notice to the judgment-debtor, and as at the date of that application more than one year had elapsed from the date of the decree, the decree-holder was entitled to apply for the issue of such notice as a step in aid of execution, and in the absence of any provisions prescribing any specific directions as to the form, contents or accompaniments of an application for such a purpose, the application of December 1902 was an application to take a step in aid of execution and valid in law. On these grounds we allow the appeal with costs in this and the lower Appellate Courts and reverse the order and direct that the petition be replaced on the file of the Court of First. Instance and disposed of in accordance with law.