1. The appellants' learned advocate points out that the District Judge committed an error when he stated in one portion of his judgment that the alienation under Ex. 3, dated 30th June 1883, was by plaintiff 1, Bodi Parvathammal, while, as a matter of fact, it was by Ravipati Parvathammal (the widow of another one-fourth sharer). This incorrect statement cannot have materially affected the findings of the lower appellate Court, and we do not think that a remand is necessitated by the existence of this error.
2. One of the findings of the lower appellate Court is that there was an oral gift by Venkayya to his widowed daughter-in-law, Atchamma of one-fourth of his property about 40 years ago.
3. The District Judge disbelieved the oral evidence ion both sides, as to the different gifts respectively set up by the two parties. We think that if we rejected the evidence on both sides the logical result was that Atchamma, the daughter-in-law, somehow, without any right or title, got possession of one-fourth share of her father-in-law's property. If so, according to the Privy Council rulings, she acquired a full ownership title by adverse possession for 12 years against the next heir entitled to possession as against her and if she was such full owner, the plaintiff's suit admittedly fails and the second appeal by plaintiffs follows.
4. But we shall take it that though the learned District Judge says that the defence evidence is worthless, he still accepts it, as the probabilities support and corroborate that evidence; then as that evidence is to the effect that an absolute title was conveyed to his daughter-in-law by Venkayya the plaintiff's case fairs on this basis also.
5. What however the plaintiffs want us to do is to accept the defendant's case to this extent only, that Venkayya made some gifts to his daughter-in-law and then to reject the defendant's case that it was an absolute gift and lastly to apply the rule of law that a gift to a widowed daughter-in-law by a Hindu is presumably only of a life-estate.
6. We do not see how, when plaintiff's case fails, he could elect to fall back upon only that portion of the defendant's case which suits the plaintiff and then argue that the other portion has not been proved by the defendants. Even if he could do so, we think that there is no presumption of law that a gift by a man to his widowed daughter-in-law is only a gift of a life-estate, as whatever might have been the tendency of certain earlier decisions, it has been held in more recent cases that documents of, gift to daughters or other female members of a Hindu family need not be construed with a bias in favour of the view that an absolute interest could not have been intended to be transferred. Even if there is such a presumption the District Judge has referred to circumstances, such as the gift at the same time of another one-fourth share to a male who was admittedly entitled to an absolute estate in that one-fourth share and the fact that the alienation from other females, who obtained their shares under gifts contemporaneous with the gift to the daughters, had not been questioned by plaintiff before this suit was brought indicating that the gift by Venkayya to his daughter-in-law was prob ably an absolute gift.
7. We therefore dismiss the second appeal with costs.
S.N/R.K
8. Appeal dismissed.