1. This is an appeal from the appellate decree of the District Judge of West Berar. It has been filed one day beyond time, and I am asked to extend time under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, as applied to Berar. I am of opinion that no sufficient cause has been made out for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation prescribed therefor.
2. The decree appealed from was made on the 28th March, 1916. Copies of the judgment and decree were not applied for till the 2nd May, 1916, and they were delivered on the 9th June, 1916.
3. The last day of the prescribed period expired on the 26th July, 1916. The appeal was presented on the 27th July, 1916. The explanation of the delay is given in an affidavit made by the second appellant Motilal. He affirms that owing to the river Purna being in flood he was delayed in his journey from his village to Akola, which place he reached on the 26th July—too late, according to the learned Advocate for the appellants, to catch the mail train to Nagpur that day. Consequently he arrived at Nagpur on the 27th July—a day late. I accept this statement as perfectly true for the purposes of this order, and I say that, by itself, far from showing any sufficient cause for the failure to file the appeal within time, it exhibits nothing but negligence of a kind which the Courts ought not to condone and encourage.
4. I have examined the district map, and questioned the appellant Motilal, and I find that his village (spelt Pathuldee in the map) is 12 or 13 miles from Wagholee, where the Purna river is crossed, and that Akola is another 12 miles from Wagholee. Thus this appellant had 25 miles to travel across country, in the middle of the monsoon, before he reached the railway. He also knew that the only train by which he could reach Nagpur on the 26th July, in time to get the appeal filed, was timed to leave Akola at 1-40 A.M on that date. He admits before me that he left his home on the 25th July. He must be assumed to know that a flooded and temporarily impassable river is a common incident during the monsoon. It will thus be seen that he deferred his journey, and the filing of the appeal, to the last available moment, and that, owing to an obstruction which he ought to have foreseen, he missed the last train which he hoped to catch. But this is not all. The endorsement on the Court-fee stamp of the memorandum of appeal shows that it was purchased by the Hon'ble Mr. M.V Joshi in Nagpur on the 27th July, 1916. Thus, apparently, not merely the presentation of the appeal, but the retaining of a legal adviser to draw it up, and the purchase of a stamp on which to engross it, were all left to be done on the last day of the prescribed period.
5. In following the above course, the appellants in this case acted in accordance with an almost universal habit, among litigants in the Central Provinces and Berar, of filing plaints, memoranda of appeals, and all applications subject to a time limit, on the last day, and almost the last hour, of the period prescribed by law. In the case of appeals this custom entails much additional labour on the ministerial staff of the Courts, in making careful and exact computations of time, with reference to the time requisite for obtaining copies, which would be avoided if appeals were filed obviously within time. Controversial questions as to the correctness of the computation are frequently raised when cases are filed on the boundary line between “within time” and “beyond time.” Frequently, as in this case, some contingency defeats the effort of the litigant by a few days or hours, and then the Appellate Court has the trouble of considering whether relief can be given under Section 5 of the Limitation Act: and, in many cases, a very lenient view seems to have been taken of such failures, and an easy interpretation of the words “sufficient cause” may have encouraged the habit of leaving things to the last moment.
6. This habit has its origin in laxity and negligence, and, in my opinion, having regard to the increasing pressure of business in the law Courts and the many facilities now available for the punctual filing of suits, appeals and applications therein, it is high time that litigants and their legal advisers were made to realize the dangers of the procrastination which defers the presentation of a suit, appeal or application to the last day of the limitation prescribed therefor. In the case of an appeal efforts should be made to file it as soon as possible, and not as late as possible, after the date of the decree to be appealed from. A legal adviser should be given time to study the record and consider his case thoroughly before he draws up a memorandum. The present practice, of receiving cases on the last available day, and putting in an ill-considered memorandum based on a perusal of the judgment, is anything but satisfactory. It wastes the time of the Courts and the money of the appellants. If the Bar were to make an universal practice of refusing to receive appellate briefs, unless time were given by clients to send for and see records, and otherwise consider those briefs, litigants would speedily realize the unwisdom of procrastination. But this is not to be expected under existing circumstances; and I think it is necessary that the Courts should apply the law so as not to encourage eleventh hour procedure of the kind followed in this case. I concur with the judgment of Drake-Brockman, J.C, in Vithia v. Sakhya (1909) 5 N.L.R 25 , 1 I.C 904. The law is clear, and Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, was not provided to encourage negligence, procrastination and laxity. I enunciate nothing new. As far back as in 1880, in Hukum Chand v. J. Bailey (1880) Digest of Civil Rulings of the Court of the J.C, C.P, Part IV, Ruling. No. 9, this Court laid down that inability to get stamps, on the last day allowed by law for instituting a suit, is not one of the conditions under which the time allowed by the Limitation Law can be extended. I follow the same principle when I rule that an appellant, who wilfully leaves the preparation and presentation of his appeal to the last day of the period of limitation prescribed therefor, is guilty of negligence, and is not entitled to an extension of time, if some unexpected or unforeseen contingency prevents him from filing the appeal within time.
7. For the above reasons I reject the above appeal as time-barred.
P.N/R.K
8. Appeal rejected.