1. This appeal has arisen out of execution proceedings taken on a decree of the Bombay High Court which was sent to Amraoti for execution. The decree was a simple money one in which the defendant was ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 17,500. The clause with which we are principally concerned is the following:
“And this Court doth further order that the payment of the said decretal amount be and the same is hereby charged on the three immovable properties belonging to the defendants firstly and secondly described in the schedule hereto.”
2. The decree-holder proceeded to execute the decree in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Amraoti, and obtained an order for attachment of certain property and moveables.
3. The judgment-debtor then took the objection that the only remedy of the decree-holder was to enforce his charge by a separate suit. The decree-holder said that he could execute it against any of the judgment-debtor's property and offered to give up his charge if necessary, and to treat the decree as a mere money decree without any charge. The lower Court has found that it was not necessary to file a regular suit to enforce the charge but the property can be brought to sale in these execution proceedings. It also held that the decree-holder is entitled to give up his charge and enforce the decree as a money decree against any other property if it is in his interest to do so. It ordered however that if the decree-holder decided to keep the charge alive, he must exhaust the charged property first before attaching other property.
4. This order is now attacked in appeal by the judgment-debtor who maintains that a separate suit was necessary and that the decree-holder was not entitled to give up the charge and treat the decree as a personal one. On the other hand, the decree-holder has brought a cross-objection contending that he is not bound to exhaust the charged property or to give up the charge before proceeding to execute the decree otherwise. The principal question is whether a separate suit was necessary. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that this decree is merely declaratory of a charge and does not of its own force give the Court any jurisdiction to execute it. Reliance is placed on Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, especially as now amended, which says that all the provisions for simple mortgages apply so far as may be to charges, and therefore it is argued, under O. 34, Rr. 14, and 15 a separate suit will have to be brought. As the present decree was a consent one, the appellant concedes for the sake of argument that the necessity for a separate suit might never have been contemplated by the parties, but even so, it is contended that the decree is merely defective and must be given effect to as it stands. The learned counsel admits that different views on the point of enforcement of a charge have been taken by the High Courts in India. He however urges that the present Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, is distinctly in his favour and that the Calcutta decision 22 Cal 903(1) and 1918 Cal 705(2), are correct. He also points that 1932 All 439(3) supports him. He distinguished the adverse cases of 1919 Bom 56(4) and 1926 Pat 31(5). The Bombay case, it is argued, had reference only to the wording of that particular decree, while in the Patna case the terms of the decree were not properly known as neither the decree nor a copy of it was before the Court. The same point arose last year in this Court in 1934 Nag 147(6). There too the Judges had to deal with a compromise decree which imposed a charge on the defendants, property. These words also occurred in that decree:
“If the decree is not satisfied, the plaintiff shall have a right to recover the amount by sale of the property subject to the charge,”
and there was a subsequent amendment which read:
“Property under charge shall be sold if payment is not made.”
5. That decree therefore owing to these recitals about the sale was more explicit than the present one. It will thus have to be seen whether this difference is an essential one. Having considered the relevant cases 22 Cal 859(7), etc. on one side and 1919 Bom 56 on the other Grille, J.C, and Subhedar A.J.C relied on this latter case in preference to 1932 All. 439 and ruled that order 34, Rr. 14 and 15, have no application to a case in which a charge is created by the decree itself. It was pointed out that the opening words of R. 14 only mean that the decree should relate to payment of the
“money in satisfaction of a claim arising under the mortgage, i.e a mortgage independent of the decree. It can certainly have no application where the charge or the mortgage is created by the decree itself, because the agreement to create a charge as contained in a compromise petition which precedes the decree cannot in law validly create any charge.”
6. These remarks have our respectful concurrence. We add also that O. 34, R. 14 does not apply to consent decrees because the mortgagor could waive the benefit of the rule: 1922 Cal 35(8). We are also unable to see how the amendment of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, has improved, the appellant's position. The old wording was:
“All the provisions herein before contained as to a mortgagor shall, so far as may be, apply to the owner of such property.”
7. This now reads:
“All the provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge.”
8. Thus the law is not altered by the amendment but the wording has only been made more clear and succinct. Thus, as we hold that Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, is not any bar in the way of the presents execution, we should look to the decree-itself and interpret it reasonably in the light of the intentions of the parties. This was the criterion relied on by Heaton, J., in 1919 Bom 56. The first part of the decree is in the ordinary form of a personal money decree. The there is the clause about a charge. The question is whether the intention was to replace the ordinary right by a charge or to make the charge ancillary to this right. It is obvious that the decree-holder would not want to put himself into a more disadvantageous position than he would be without a charge. As was remarked in 1934 Nag 147 it cannot be in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to decline to give the decree-holder a remedy in execution, which independently of the direction in the decree creating a charge he would be, entitled to. We are not pressed by the argument that we are thereby going far towards patching up a defective decree. It is true that the present decree contains no words about sale. But surely they are to be implied. How is the, charge to be enforced except by a sale? The only question is whether the sale is to take place in the present proceedings or in a separate suit. We are quite, clear that no separate suit was ever, contemplated. If there is no provision in the present decree prescribing sale in execution, there is also no provision forbidding it. It has to be decided one way or the other how the decree is to be carried out. Even though the terms are not so explicit as they might be, we hold that the same principle applies as in cases where the sale is prescribed and that recourse to a separate suit is not necessary. In 1919 Bom 56, Shah, J., remarks that such declarations as to charges have consistently been enforced without separate suits in that Presidency. As we are now dealing with a decree from Bombay this is an additional reason for our decision.
9. The next point for decision is whether the decree-holder must exhaust his remedy against the charged property before proceeding against other property. It would certainly be inequitable to force him to bring another suit and at the same time to deny him recourse to execution against other property. Even in 1932 All 439, where a separate suit was held necessary, it was conceded that such recourse could be had. It is however argued that as a charge imposes no personal liability, the charge holder is entitled to a charge alone and not to other property. That seems to us to be begging the question. There is no personal liability so far as the charge is concerned, but the question is whether by accepting a charge, a decree-holder gave up all other possible remedies. We have already held that the case is not fettered by Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. We think that in the event of the charge proving insufficient, for example, there is nothing to prevent the decree-holder from proceeding against other property. At the same time, by specially indicating this property the parties evidently intended it to be the primary remedy and the judgment-debtor was entitled to act on this belief with regard to the rest of his property. It therefore might be prejudicial to him if the decree-holder were allowed to desert his charge completely and suddenly pounce upon the other property.
10. For these reasons we uphold the appellant's contention that the decree-holder should be required to exhaust his remedy against the charge first and then if necessary may proceed in the ordinary way in execution as in a money decree. The order of the lower Court will therefore be modified by deleting the provision that the decree-holder may be allowed to abandon the charge and proceed then against the other property. This disposes also of the cross-objection which is dismissed with costs. We fix pleader's fee in it at Rs. 30. As the appeal has partly succeeded, costs in the appeal will be borne as incurred. Pleader's fee Rs. 50.
11. Order modified.