1. This is an application in revision by R.S Ruikar who has been convicted of the abetment of the offence of molestation defined in Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (23 of 1932). He was sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment, and the sentence was upheld on appeal. The facts found are as follows: The Nagpur Textile Union of which the applicant is the President had determined on a strike of textile workers in Nagpur, the ground being that certain conditions in the terms of settlement of a strike in the previous year 1933 had been evaded by the Empress Mills in Nagpur. The strike was ordered, but did not at first meet with the response which the union desired and consequently a system of picketing was inaugurated. On 3rd, 4th and 6th May 1934 the applicant made speeches supporting the strike and in the course of his speeches advocated and encouraged the picketing of the mills and called for Page: 150volunteers to carry on the picketing. On the morning of 5th May as a result of a complaint made by some of the strike committee that two women picketers had been harassed by the police and driven away, the applicant brought his wife to one of the mill gates and posted her there with instructions to beat, with her slippers, any one who interfered with her. Charges were framed under four heads, three relating to the speeches delivered on 3rd, 4th and 6th May 1934 and the fourth relating to the incident of the abetment of picketing by his wife on 5th May. Proceedings were taken against the applicant on 7th May under Section 107 of the Cr PC, and it is admitted that after that there were no further activities on his part. He was not however arrested for the offences of which he has, been charged and of which he has been convicted until the 16th May. The proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC, are in abeyance.
2. The principal contention on behalf of the applicant is that on the facts found against him in trial and in appeal no offence has been committed as Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (23 of 1932), can have no application to purely industrial disputes. Before dealing with this point it will be well to dispose of minor points arising out of what may be called the usual arguments advanced in cases dealing with the effect of reported speeches. It is contended that there has been no proof that in the course of the speeches made by the applicant he did advocate picketing of the mills and abetted it since there is admittedly no full verbatim report of the speeches that he made. It is not the law that in order to establish what a speaker did say at a certain meeting a verbatim report is necessary. The reports which have been made by two experienced reporters have left no doubt in the mind of either of the Courts below that picketing was advocated and volunteers were called for in the speeches and there is ample evidence to support the finding of fact reached that such advocacy was made. It is next contended that the speeches must be regarded as a whole and a casual allusion to picketing should be disregarded when the bulk of the speech was on matters unconnected with actual picketing. It is no defence in a charge for sedition that the bulk of the speech was innocuous if seditious matter is deliberately introduced, and in this case the applicant is not charged with making speeches as such but with abetting the offence of molestation. It is sufficient to prove that part of his speech relates to the abetment without any reference to the greater parts of his speeches which may be entirely legitimate with reference to the object of the strike and the grievances of the worker's. Finally it is contended that what was said, was not “picket but be careful not to use violence” but “if you picket, be careful not to use violence,” and it is urged that one significant word has been omitted in the reports made by the police. It is quite improbable that in the taking down of what the reporters well knew to be the important matter in the speech, they should deliberately have omitted an essential word which would alter the meaning of the speaker, and in any case it was the duty of the applicant to show that there was this omission. He has adduced no evidence whatever on this particular point and indeed the line of his defence precluded him from affording any such evidence, and the argument appears to have been raised here by the applicant in person for the first time. Another point taken is that a paragraph from his written statement made in the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC, has been used against him as showing that he did advocate picketing and that it has been misinterpreted, in that the real meaning was that he advocated picketing only in the previous year 1933. The applicant claims that the statement should be read as a whole, which would show that he did not advocate picketing on this occasion at all. I have read through the whole statement and I find that there has been no misconception on the part of the learned Sessions Judge in dealing with this particular item. Para. 3 of the statement runs:
Strike is a perfectly legal and legitimate method for the redress of the economic grievance of the workers. The Trade Union Act and the Trades Disputes Act have recognized the legality of this weapon. In pursuance of the resolutions of the Nagpur Textile Union, the accused has been advocating the desirability of a strike and also that of peaceful and legal picketing. Neither the law of the land nor the Government have declared peaceful picketing as illegal in industrial disputes. In the last trade dispute in Page: 1511933 in the Model Mills, peaceful picketing was allowed even by the Local Government Officials.
3. This can, in my opinion, have no other interpretation than that the applicant did advocate picketing daring the present strike. The last sentence is a Justification of the present advocacy and in the next paragraph the applicant states:
Whatever picketing was resorted to, was perfectly legal and peaceful (this refers to the strike now under consideration). No intimidation or coercion or molestation was ever used against any worker. On the other hand, every precaution was taken to see that all the activities of the Union were non-violent and peaceful. The accused 1 (the present applicant) was personally keeping a watch over all the activities of the Union workers so as to ensure perfect peace.
4. I have no doubt at all that in his statement the applicant maintained that he had always advocated peaceful picketing both last year and this. There has also been a challenge as to the sufficiency of the evidence on which the applicant was convicted in respect of the incidents on the morning of the 5th of May. The evidence of the Police Sub-Inspector, who was on duty, on this point has been accepted and there is no Mason why it should not have been accepted. It is contended that he had no personal knowledge whether some female picketers had been previously removed or no. This is no way vitiates the testimony regarding the production by the applicant of his wife and posting at the mill gates. It is the applicant's own case that early that morning two female picketers had been driven away by the police and it has been found, and correctly found, that the applicant produced his wife as a dramatic gesture to counter this action on the part of the authorities and instructed her to offer resistance against any attempt at interference with her, so as to make capital out of any incident that should arise. I have no doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence called to, prove this particular incident, or to the correct application of S. 114, I.P.C to this particular charge.
5. In order to support the view that Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, has no reference to picketing in the course of trade disputes I am asked to refer to the statement of objects, and reasons accompanying the Criminal Law Amendment Act on its introduction, and the decision in 1930 All 225 1930 All 125 , 125 IC 477 , 52 All 619 (FB) has been cited as authority for the proposition that such reference is permissible, and old cases from the C.P Law Reports have been cited to show that Judges have made references to Statement of Objects and Reasons in the past for the purpose of interpreting the law. The only other case cited by the applicant is 22 Cal 788 (1895) 22 Cal 788 , 22 IA 107 , 6 Sar 603 (PC) and it is contended that their Lordships of the Privy Council, when holding that proceedings of the legislature in passing a statute are excluded from consideration on the judicial construction of Indian statutes, thereby implied that a reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons is permissible. I am unable to read any such implication in the judgment of their Lordships. The latest C.P case cited was 11 CP LR 111 (1888) 11 CP LR 111 and in that, as in the previous cases, there was doubt as to the exact meaning or intention of a particular section. In 1930 All 225 1930 All 125 , 125 IC 477 , 52 All 619 (FB) which the applicant cites, the Judges of the High Court of Allahabad were equally divided on the question whether it was permissible to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to an Act as introduced and published and the three learned Judges who held that such a reference was permissible qualified their observations by the limitation that such a reference could be made when there was an ambiguity. As the wording of the section under consideration is entirely plain and unambiguous, it seems to me unprofit able and unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the question whether such a reference is permissible at all. The section itself makes no limitation in respect of the parties disputing or the nature of the disputes giving rise to a situation where picketing is employed, and from the wording of the section itself I am unable to see that its application is anything but universal.
6. It is next contended that a perusal of the Act as a whole without any reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons would indicate that Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act is to be utilised only on occasions of combating Page: 152undertakings which are subversive to the Government. Now it is true that the bulk of the sections in the Criminal Law Amendment Act (23 of 1932) do refer to activities subversive to Government and that the Act is a consolidation of some ordinances which had been issued from time to time and which the legislature considered necessary to embody as part of the law, but that in itself does not show that S. 7 cannot be of universal application. There are other sections which are equally of universal application. I cite S. 10 of the Act which gives the Local Government power to declare offences committed under certain sections non-bailable and cognizable despite the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Local Government may publish the requisite notification required by this section at any time when it considers that such proclamation is necessary in the interests of law and order, but once such a notification has been issued the section would become operative in law whether the offences falling under these sections were committed with a subversive object or no. The same criterion would apply to S. 7 of the Act, the effectiveness of which depends on the publication of the notification by the Government that the section shall come into force. The requisite notification was published in August 1933.
7. It is urged that at the time the Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed by the Central Legislature, assurances were given that S. 7 would not be employed in the case of industrial disputes. In interpreting the section this Court is precluded from considering any statements made in the Legislative Assembly or elsewhere on behalf of Government. It is no duty of the Courts of law to examine, criticise or interpret anything that may be said on behalf of Government in debate or elsewhere, and it is beyond the competence of this Court to examine the correctness of the applicant's assertions. The duty of the Court is to interpret the law as enacted. Had it been the intention of the legislature to exclude the application of S. 7 from cases arising out of industrial disputes, it would have said so in explicit terms, more particularly in view of the nature of the majority of the other sections of the Act which have their origin in other ordinances. It is next argued that the ordinance out of which S. 7 arose was enacted with the particular purpose of combating the Civil Disobedience Movement. It is no doubt true that this was the occasion, but neither the ordinance nor the present Act lays down any limitation as to the circumstances in which molestation: becomes an offence. At the time of the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 certain persons discovered a gap in the Indian Penal Code whereby they were enabled to commit acts of intimidation which were not punishable by law. Proceedings taken to remedy this deficiency were not directed personally against such persons who were influenced by motives hostile to Government, but remedied the defect in the law which left open the way for any person who so chose to bring unwarranted pressure on another person whatever his motive might be. The absence of any provision preventing molestation was recognised as a definite lacuna in the Criminal law and an enactment was made to remedy it. That the defect was discovered by the ingenuity of persons taking part in the Civil Disobedience Movement does not limit the universal applicability of the remedy, and I am unable to read, as the applicant desires me to read the opening word of the section “whoever” as “whoever” may be disaffected towards the Government.”
8. The next contention is that there is a definite conflict between Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Trade Unions Act of 1926. It is contended that the valuable right given to Trade Unions to declare a strike and their immunity from liability for criminal conspiracy or to civil suits in connexion with the furtherance of a strike is taken; away if Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, is held to be applicable to trade disputes. I am unable to see any conflict. Trade Unions have the right to declare strikes and to do certain acts in furtherance of trade disputes. They are not liable civilly for such acts or criminally for conspiracy in the furtherance of such acts as Trade Unions Act permits, but there is nothing in that Act which apart from immunity from criminal conspiracy allows immunity from any criminal offences. Indeed any agreement to commit an offence would, Page: 153under Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, make them liable for criminal conspiracy. Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, is part of the Criminal law of the land and an offence committed as defined in that section is an offence to which the concluding sentence of Section 17 of the Trade Unions Act, applies as much as it would do to an agreement to commit murder. The applicant has cited several passages from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes which are all eminently acceptable propositions of law, but have no application to the case in hand. Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act defines a criminal offence of universal application without restriction and it must be interpreted according to its plain and obvious meaning, and as it defines a criminal offence it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, which remains unimpaired by Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. In abetting the commission of this offence, an offence which was undoubtedly committed, the applicant has been correctly convicted. I now turn to the other principal ground taken in revision, namely that the conviction is bad as the form of the charge does not come within the exceptions to S. 233 laid down in Sections 234, 235 and 236 of the Cr PC. The charge sheet runs as follows:
“I, Mr. R.D Beohar, S.D.M and Magistrate First Class, Nagpur, hereby charge yon, R.S Ruikar, as follows: Firstly that you on or about 3rd May 1934 at Nagpur, abetted the commission of an offence of molestation (picketing) punishable under Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1934 (sic, apparently 1932), by textile workers, numbering more than 10 persons, by asking them to enrol as volunteers for the purpose of carrying on picketing, so as to bring about strike in Empress Mills and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 117, I.P.C read with Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, of 1932 and within my cognizance. Secondly that you on or about 4th May 1934, both in the morning and at the evening at Nagpur, abetted the commission of an offence of molestation (picketing) punishable under Section 7 of the Criminal Law Act, 1932, asking them to enrol as volunteers for the purpose of picketing among workers, so as to bring about strike in Empress Mills and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 117, I.P.C, read with Section 7 of the Criminal Law Act, 1932, and within my cognizance. Thirdly that you on or about 6th May 1934 at Nagpur, abetted the commission of an offence of molestation (picketing) punishable under Section 7 of the Criminal Law Act, 1932, by textile workers numbering more than 10 persons by asking them to enrol as volunteers for the purpose of picketing among workers so as to bring about strike in Empress Mills, and thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 117, I.P.C, read with Section 7 of the Criminal Law Act, 1932, and within my cognizance. Fourthly that Mrs. Ruikar on 5th May 1934 at or about the gate of Empress Mill No. 5 committed the offence of molestation (picketing) punishable under Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1932, and that you at Nagpur abetted the said Mrs. Ruikar in the commission of the said offence of molestation punishable under Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1932, which was committed in your presence in consequence of your abetment (sic) and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, read with S. 114, I.P.C and I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charges.”
9. The learned Standing Counsel for the Crown has admitted that even if the fourth head were omitted, the case could not fall under Section 234 of the Cr PC, in view of the fact that the second head refers to more than one speech and that his case must stand or fall entirely on the question whether the offences detailed in the charge can be taken as forming part of the “same transaction” as defined in Section 235(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The main argument before the Sessions Judge was that the transaction itself must be a criminal transaction, that in fact the whole object to be achieved by the offences in respect of which an accused is charged must be illegal and that the object in this case was the admittedly legal object of calling workers of the Empress Mills out on strike. This contention was correctly repudiated by the learned Sessions Judge and he gave examples of cases where offences might be committed in the course of a transaction whose aim was perfectly legitimate.
10. There is also authority on the point in 15 Bom 491 (1891) 15 Bom 49, where certain police officers were charged with wrongful confinement and for causing hurt to extort confessions on several occasions in the course of a police investigation. In that case although some of the offences were held not to form part of the same transaction, necessitating remand of the case for a fresh trial, some offences of assaults at different times were held to have been committed during one transaction, namely a police investigation, into an alleged theft. Although Jardine, J., refused to extend the term “same transaction” in that case to cover an investigation by four police officers at different times and by different officers, he nevertheless held that the hurt Page: 154caused on two persons at varying dates and their wrongful confinement did form part of the same transaction and that the wrongful confinement of one of them together with the hurting of a third person together formed another transaction, and that each of the series formed a transaction in itself. The applicant relies on the following cases: 2 NLR 147 (1906) 2 NLR 147 , 4 Cr LJ 420, 1916 Nag 73 1916 Nag 73 , 38 IC 723 , 18 Cr LJ 389 , 13 NLR 35 and 1933 Nag 327 1933 Nag 327 , 1933 Cr C 1328 , 144 IC 94 , 34 Cr LJ 673. The test laid down by Drake-Brockman, J.C, in 2 NLR 147 (1906) 2 NLR 147 , 4 Cr LJ 420, is that which has been accepted in all other High Courts in India. It states that the acts done must be so related to each other in point of purpose, or as cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary acts, as to constitute one continuous action. The test to be applied is not so much proximity in time as continuity of action and purpose. Where however criminal acts are separated by an interval of time, the length of the interval may be an important indication that such continuity is wanting.
11. In 1933 Nag 327 1933 Nag 327 , 1933 Cr C 1328 , 144 IC 94 , 34 Cr LJ 673, it was held, following a long list of authorities, that three offences of criminal breach of trust and three offences of falsification of accounts cannot be tried together as each false entry amounting to an act of falsification is in itself a separate offence. There is certainly ample authority for the proposition that the same person cannot be tried at the same trial of charges under S. 409 and S. 477-A, I.P.C, but that is hardly applicable to the facts here. An act of criminal breach of trust can be entirely dissociated from one of falsification of accounts which in itself is a complete and self-contained offence. In 1916 Nag. 73 1916 Nag 73 , 38 IC 723 , 18 Cr LJ 389 , 13 NLR 35, Stanyon, A.J.C, was concerned with the case of the forging of a document by one person and its use by another in giving false evidence as to attestation in support of that document and held that the joint trial was illegal. The argument used would certainly be equally applicable if the scribe and the person for whose benefit it was forged and who gave evidence in support of it had been the same person as the forgery of the document and its production in Court might be separated by years of time such as in accordance with the dictum laid down by Drake-Brockman, J.C, in 2 NLR 147 (1906) 2 NLR 147 , 4 Cr LJ 420, would militate against the continuity of purpose. The time consideration also enters into the other two cases cited by the applicant in his reply: 33 Mad 502 (1910) 33 Mad 502 , 5 IC 847 , 11 Cr LJ 258 and 1934 Oudh 325 1934 Oudh 325 , 1934 Cr C 878 , 149 IC 959 , 35 Cr LJ 1048. In the latter case six dacoities were committed by one gang in the course of one night and were held to be no part of the same transaction.
12. In 33 Mad 502 (1910) 33 Mad 502 , 5 IC 847 , 11 Cr LJ 258, it was held that distinct acts of embezzlement committed by the directors of a company with the object of defrauding the public could not be considered to form part of the same transaction if committed in the course of several years. The principle underlying both these cases is that the ultimate object of obtaining money by illegal means is so vague and general that specific acts whereby wrongful gain is obtained could not be held to form part of a general design which might extend during the lifetime of the criminal. As Abdur Rahim, J., correctly pointed out in the Madris case quoted above, on that principle series of thefts extending over a number of years and entirely disconnected except for the fact that they were committed by the same person might be tried at the same trial. In the same principle in the Oudh case reported in 1934 Oudh 325 1934 Oudh 325 , 1934 Cr C 878 , 149 IC 959 , 35 Cr LJ 1048, it would make no difference whatever that dacoities had been committed in one night or extended over a number of years, and the proposition that the acts formed part of the same transaction was only advanced in the latter case in an attempt to evade the provisions of Section 234 of the Cr PC, which limits a number of offences of a similar nature committed within one year to three.
13. The learned standing counsel for the Crown also relies on the dictum laid down by Drake-Brockman, J.C, in 2 NLR 147 (1906) 2 NLR 147 , 4 Cr LJ 420. It has been repeatedly laid down that what constitutes the same transaction is a fact to be determined by the circumstances of each case and that an exact definition of the “same transaction” which could be applied to all cases is impossible. Stanyon Page: 155A.J.C, approved of the dictum laid down by Drake-Brocknoan, J.C, in 2 NLR 147 (1906) 2 NLR 147 , 4 Cr LJ 420 and gave a definition of “same transaction” in 4 NLR 71 (1908) 4 NLR 71 , 8 Cr LJ 11 as a serious of acts connected together so as to amount to what human perception regards as a proceeding begun, continued, and ended.
14. The acts with which we are concerned took place on four successive days. The admitted object was to bring the workers of the Empress Mills, in accordance with the wishes of the Strike Committee of the Textile Union, out on strike. Pickets were employed on these days and the applicant in his speech on each day called on the volunteers to continue the intensive picketing, and in one case when picketers had been driven away replaced them by his own wife. The object was not one of such wide and general nature as was held to be inapplicable for the purpose of S. 235 in the Madras and Oudh cases quoted above. The transaction in the course of which the offences charged were committed was brief, complete and definite and its object was achieved, and there can be no doubt that the picketing had a considerable share in the achievement of that object.
15. It is not necessary that of the offences committed in the course of the same transaction one should be a logical sequence to the others; as for instance when house-breaking is committed with the object of committing adultery and that object is subsequently attained reiteration of the same offence or the commission of similar offences in the course of the same transaction also bring the case within the section: vide 15 Bom 491 (1891) 15 Bom 49. As to the connection of the offence with one another and their connexion with the ultimate object there can be no doubt. Each day an appeal was made for the renewal of picketing when the workers were entering and leaving the mills and for volunteers for the purpose and in the course of his supervision of the operations the applicant replaced the picketers, who had been chased away by others and by a person of peculiar significance, his own wife, whom he believed the police would not dare touch. I am satisfied that in this case the offences charged did form part of the same transaction and that the trial of the four charges together was legal. Were it not legal, the whole trial would have been invalid: 25 Mad. 61 (P.C) (1902) 25 Mad 61 , 28 IA 257 , 8 Sar 160 (PC).
16. There remains the question of sentence. The applicant has served all but six weeks of the term of imprisonment awarded him and has also been in jail as an under trial prisoner during the trial of his case. His application for being released on bail at the commencement of the trial was rejected on grounds which prima facie appear to me insufficient, although no argument has been addressed to me on the subject. There had been no recrudescence of any disturbance for more than a week prior to the applicant's arrest, although it is true the applicant cannot lay this entirely to his own credit as proceedings were pending against him under Section 107 of the Cr PC. The applicant urges that this is the first occasion on which the provisions of Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, have been applied to a purely industrial dispute and that his offence should be treated as a technical offence and a nominal punishment inflicted. It is contended that the unexpected action of Government in prosecuting the applicant has operated harshly on him. I am not concerned with the ethics of Government's action in prosecuting the applicant. After mature consideration, as is shown by the interval between the offences committed and the applicant's arrest. Government considered it desirable to use the means which lay in its hands. The contention that the means were not available to Government has failed, and the offence being in law punishable should carry with it a sentence commensurate with the offence, and not a nominal one. The applicant as a recognized leader in Trade Unions' circles and being a lawyer by profession must have been aware that Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act had, by notification, come into force in August 1933 and should have realized the full implication of that section.
17. The learned Standing Counsel for the Crown has agreed with the statement made by the applicant that it is the first time in this province that Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, has been applied to a private trade dispute and also concedes Page: 156that, so far as he is aware, it has not been applied in such a dispute in any other province. Nothing has been shown me, and I do not find any indication in the record, that the dispute is any other than a bona fide trade dispute. It appears therefore that the applicant may have considered that Government would not take any action against him for the organisation of and the active abetment of picketing the mills. It does not of course follow that had he been aware of the probability of such action on the part of Government, his own course of action would have been different. The sentence awarded cannot be considered an inappropriate one, but in view of the circumstances detailed above I consider it sufficient that the applicant's term of imprisonment should be reduced to the amount that he has already undergone. Taking into account the period spent as an undertrial prisoner the term of his sojourn in jail will be reduced by three weeks. I direct that the sentence be reduced accordingly and the applicant be released.
18. Sentence reduced.