1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decree dismissing their suit. In a joint suit filed by appellant 1, Ramchandra, claimed to be the adopted son of Tulsi, defendant 4, and appellant 2, Dagdaji, claimed to be a reversioner to Motya, the brother of Tulsi's husband, who was the last male holder. The two claims were in the alternative. The plea in defence was that Tulsi was incompetent to adopt a son to her husband as the inheritance vested in her after the death of her mother, in-law Putai. To elucidate this plea it is necessary to mention that one Punaji had two sons, Motya and Amruta. Putai was the wife of Punaji, and Tulsi, defendant 4, was the wife of Amruta. It appears that the scourge of the influenza epidemic of 1918 had levied its toll on this family as Punya died on 11th October 1918, Amruta died on 15th October 1918 and Motya died on 16th October 1918. There is a dispute as to the date of Putai's death which was material for the decision of the case. While the plaintiffs claim that she had died before Motya, the defendants pleaded that she died after Motya. The lower Court found that appellant 2 was not the reversioner and that Putai died after Motya. Hence a very important question of law arose for decision which was whether Mt. Tulsi, on whom the property devolved as a Gotraja Sapinda (being Motya's brother's widow) was competent to adopt a son to her husband so as to create any right in the property in favour of her adopted son? The lower Court answered’ the question in the negative following the ruling in 25 NLR 144(1). At a very late stage in the course of the litigation a plea was raised by Jairam, defendant 2, that Mt. Tulsi was too young at the time of adoption to understand the effect of adoption on her civil rights. No issue was formulated as to this contention, but the lower Court has accepted the defendant's contention.
2. On behalf of appellant 2, Dagdaji, no substantial argument has been urged against the lower Court's finding that he was not the reversioner. In view of the meagre evidence on record there is hardly any scope for any effective argument. I have perused the evidence relevant to the issue and I fully concur with the lower Court in its finding. The next question is whether Mt. Putai died before or after Motya. It is not denied that Motya died on 16th October 1918. The oral evidence is not very impressive but the certified copies of the extracts from the Birth and Death Ragister and the Record of Rights undoubtedly show that Yasodi died on 18th October 1918. If, as Abhiman 1 D.W 1 states, Putai died at Asadpur, then it is probable that the entry in Ex. 2 D-5 refers to Putai by her maiden name of Yasodi. The Record of Eights, Ex. 3 D-2, also shows that Tulsi, succeeded as heir to Putai, her mother-in-law. These two documents considered along with the admission of Abhiman (1 D.W 1) that Putai died 10 or 12 days after Punaji fully goes to establish, that she died after Motiram. If Tulsi succeeded her mother-in-law in whom the property had vested on the death of her son Motya, the last male holder, she would become an heir in her capacity as a Gotraja Sapinda to Motya and not to her husband Amruta. The question is whether her adoption would have the effect of vesting inheritance in the adopted son. In 25 NLR 144, at was held that such an adoption was void and of no effect on the principle that when a widow succeeds on the termination of an intermediate estate, her power of adoption comes to an end as soon as the estate vests in the intermediate heir other than herself and does not revive even after the inheritance comes to be vested in her. The principle on which the decision rested was deduced from several decisions of the Privy Council which were supposed to lay down that the capacity to adopt was dependent on vesting of the property. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have examined the whole current of decisions in 12 Pat 642(2), and have enunciated the law in clear terms that a widow's right of adoption is derived from and based on spiritual considerations and is not dependent on or trammelled by the material considerations of the vesting of inheritance. It is also pertinent to take into consideration the momentous pronouncement made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in respect of a widow in the Mahratta country, in 57 Bom 157(3), to the effect that she is entitled to adopt without the consent of the surviving co-parceners, even though her husband died undivided, unless of course she was expressly forbidden by her husband.
3. This means that the widow in the present case could have validly adopted even during the lifetime of her husband's brother irrespective of his consent, and introduced a stranger into the joint family clothed with all the rights of a coparcener. If so, it is obviously illogical that she should not be held competent to make an adoption after the property vests in her as a female member of the defunct co-parcenary, viz., as a Gotraja Sapinda. The view enunciated in 25 NLR 144 requires reconsideration an the light of the principles laid down in the two decisions of the Privy Council mentioned above. As the question is of great importance and is of frequent occurrence, it should be referred to a Full Bench for consideration. The question in the concrete form may be formulated as follows:
Whether, when a widow adopts a son to her husband, (who predeceased his undivided brother) after the inheritance devolved on her from her mother-in-law who had succeeded as mother to the adopting widow's husband's surviving brother, the adoption is valid so as to vest the property in the adopted son.
OPINION
4. The question which is referred for consideration by this Bench is as follows:
Whether, when a widow adopts a son to her husband (who predeceased his undivided brother) after the inheritance devolved on her from her mother-in-law who had succeeded as mother to the adopting widow's husband's surviving brother, the adoption is valid so as to vest the property in the adopted son.
5. The facts out of which this question arose were that one Poonaji had two sons Motya and Amruta who all formed a joint family. Putai was the wife of Poonaji and Tulsi that of Amruta. Poonaji died on 11th October 1918, Amruta on 15th October 1918, Motya on 16th October 1918 and Putai on 18th October 1918. The only surviving person in the family was Mt. Tulsi, the widow of Amruta. Motya having died last the entire property of the family which had vested in him by survivorship devolved on his mother Putai and on her death it passed to Mt. Tulsi as a Gotraja Sapinda. She adopted Ramchandra after the property vested in her and he claims the property by right of the adoption. The question is whether Mt. Tulsi could validly exercise her power to adopt a son to her husband so as to deviate the course of the devolution of the property which belonged to Motya as the last surviving male member of the family.
6. The parties are residents of Berar who are governed by the Bombay school of Hindu Law. Although it is conceded that a widow governed by the Bombay school of Hindu Law has power to adopt a son to her husband, it is contended that the power became incapable of execution when the property devolved on Putai after Motya's death. On the other hand, it is urged that the widow's power of adoption is unrestricted by any secular considerations as to the vesting of the property. In 25 NLR 144, a Bench of this Court held that when the adopting widow succeeds direct to the last male holder, her power of adoption remains intact, which she can exercise by making an adoption to her deceased husband, but that when she succeeds on the termination of an intermediate estate, her power of adoption comes to an end as soon as the estate vests in the immediate heir other than herself and becomes incapable of execution at any time in future. This view requires to be considered again in the light of the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 12 Pat 642. An adoption, according to the Hindu Law, is a sacrament which confers upon the adopted person the status of a son for the purpose of performing some spiritual Service to the soul of the deceased father and his ancestors and in consideration of such service the adopted son becomes the owner of the estate left by the father. In so far as the object of the adoption is spiritual, there can obviously be no bar to the exercise by the widow of her power to adopt a son to her husband, but as the adoption invests the adopted son with rights over the property, the unlimited exercise of that power is apt to result in conflicting rights respecting the property. This practical consideration made it imperative on the Courts to impose some limitations on the widow's power of adoption. The difficulty was felt as to the principle on which the limitations were to be based.
7. In 10 MIA 279(4), 8 Cal 302(5), 10 Mad 205(6) and 17 Cal 122(7), their Lordsbips of the Privy Council held an adoption by a mother invalid when it was made after the property bad on her son's death vested in his widow. In 8 Cal 302, the adoption by the mother after the estate vested, in her on the death of her daughter-in-law was declared to be void for the reason that the vesting of the estate in the daughter-in-law put an end to the mother's power of adoption and rendered it incapable of execution. The facts in 10 Mad 205 were identically similar to those in 8 Cal 302. These cases were followed by the various High Courts in India as laying down the proposition that a widow is incapable of exercising her power to adopt a son to her husband when the property left by the last male holder devolved on an intermediate heir before it vested in the adopting widow, as will be evident by a reference to 26 Bom 526(8), 33 Cal 1306(9), 33 Mad 228(10) and 40 All 619(11). These cases must now be regarded as having lost their authority except to the extent indicated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 12 Pat 642 (2).
8. In that case their Lordships after an exhaustive examination of the principles underlying the adoption and survey of the case law bearing on it declared the conclusion that vesting or divesting of property is not the sole test of the validity of an adoption, and that the true principle lies on the religious side of the doctrine of adoption. With reference to the cases in 10 MIA 279, 8 Cal 302, 10 Mad 205 and 17 Cal 122, their Lordships pointed out that in all those cases it was the existence of the son's widow that stood in the way of adoption and that in none of them was there any suggestion that the same rule would, apply if the heir in whom the property had vested were someone other than her. In that case the dispute arose between a reversioner and a son adopted by the mother of the deceased owner of an impartible zamindari. According to the custom of the family the females were excluded from inheritance so that the mother of the deceased zamindar was incapable of holding the property which vested in the plaintiff. The contentions against the validity of the adoption were two: (1) that the vesting of the estate in an heir of the last male holder other than the adopting widow put an end to her power of adoption, and (2) that when the person from whom the power to adopt was derived left a son to succeed him and that son attained full legal capacity to continue the line, the power of his mother was at an end. Both these contentions were overruled on the principle enunciated in these words: The vesting of the property on the death of the last holder in someone other than the adopting widow, be it another co-parcener of the joint family or an outsider claiming by reversion or by inheritance cannot be in itself the test of the continuance or extinction of the power of adoption. Their Lordships clearly pointed out that the object of the adoption being spiritual, a widow's power is unrestricted except in cases when the last male holder dies leaving a widow. The effect of this decision is to overrule cases like 32 Bom 499(12), 47 Bom 37(13), 52 Bom 393(14), where it was held that when the estate vests in a widow as a Gotraja Sapinda after the termination of an intermediate estate she is incapable of making an adoption. In 25 NLR 144, the principle enunciated therein was deduced from 10 MIA 279, 8 Cal 302 and 10 Mad 205 and the decisions of the various High Courts in India which purported to give effect to the dictum laid down in those cases. In that case it was specifically contended that the object of an adoption was not merely secular but spiritual and that the validity of the adoption should be made to rest on spiritual considerations and not on the secular ones, such as the vesting or divesting of the property. These contentions were not entertained as they were supposed to run counter to the earlier Privy Council decisions. The scope of the earlier decisions of the Privy Council have now been explained in 12 Pat 642. It must, therefore, follow that the principle based on the temporal considerations of the rights to property can no longer hold good. 25 NLR 144 extends the doctrine underlying the three Privy Council cases, namely 10 MIA 279 8 Cal 302 and 10 Mad 205 far beyond its legitimate scope. These cases arose in respect of the right of a mother to adopt during the lifetime of her son's widow and therefore it was essential to notice the difference between the position of a mother and that of collateral female Gotraja relations of the last male holder. In the several cases which were followed in 25 NLR 144, this vital distinction was overlooked. The origin of the conception of adoption lies in the belief that a man is born burdened with three obligations This is expressed in the well-known text of Taitriya Sanhita which is cited in the Dattaka Mimamsa by Nanda Pandit. It runs as follows:
A Brahmana, immediately on being born, is produced a debtor in three obligations: to the holy saints, for the practice of religious duties: to the gods, for the performance of sacrifice: to his forefathers, for offspring. Or he is absolved from debt who has a son, has performed sacrifices, and practises religious duties. (Dattaka Mimamsa, S. I-V, Ghose's Hindu Law, Vol. 3.)
9. Considering the case of a mother who has a son alive it is obvious that she can have no right to adopt. How the son may the in minority or after attaining: majority. In either case his mother, being devoid of a son, becomes entitled to adopt in pursuance of the well-known, text of Saunaka:
By a man destitute of a eon, must a substitute for the same, be adopted, for the sake of the funeral cake, water and the perpetuation of the lineage.
10. The question whether the son had attained ceremonial competency before his death is not a material consideration, as has been pointed out in 12 Pat 642 at p. 660. If, however, the son dies survived by his widow, a conflict arises between the rights of the mother and the widow of the last male holder. It was this conflict which came for the first time before their Lordships of the Privy Council for consideration in 10 MIA 279 at p. 310. The mother's right was postponed for two reasons which appear in the judgment of Lord Kingsdown: one was secular and the other spiritual. The secular reason is set out at pp. 310 and 811, of 10 MIA 279 in these words:
On the death of Bhowanee Kishore, his wife succeeded as heir to him, and would have equally succeeded in that character in exclusion of his brothers, if he had any. She took a vested estate, as his widow, in the whole of his property. It would be singular if a brother of Bhowanee Kishore, made such by adoption could take from his widow the whole of his property, when a natural born brother could have taken no part.
11. The spiritual reason is to be found at p. 312 where an allusion is made to the doctrine of Hindu law that the husband and wife are one and that as long as the wife survives, one half of the husband survives. The decision of the case was, however, rested on the first consideration. During the lifetime of the son's widow in whom the son's property vested the mother could not obviously divest the property by bringing into existence a brother of her husband by adoption. That was no doubt a very material consideration and it is in view of its validity that in 12 Pat 612, an exception is made in the case of the mother. At the same time 12 Pat 642, refers to the doctrine of Hindu law that the husband and wife are one and that in the widow that half of the husband survives (at p. 653). So long as the son's widow is alive she alone is entitled to adopt to her husband as she represents him. Consequently if her son is, by fiction of law, partially alive in the body of his widow, his mother cannot be treated as being devoid of a son. It is on the death of the son's widow without adoption that the mother would have the right to exercise her power to adopt. Now these considerations which are peculiar to the position of the mother cannot logically be extended to the collateral Gotraja females such as a brother's widow. Her power to adopt, unless she is prohibited by her husband, is not fettered by the fact that the last male holder left a widow since, as has been already shown, she debars only her mother-in-law from making any adoption. It is in view of this fundamental distinction that their Lordships of the Privy Council have made the observation in 12 Pat 642 at p. 653, namely:
It is at least material that in each of the cases it was the existence of the son's widow that stood in the way of the adoption, and that in none of them was there any suggestion that the same rule would apply if the heir in whom the property had vested were someone other than her.
12. In the case of a Bombay widow their Lordships of the Privy Council declared the law in 57 Bom 157, that she is free to adopt even when her husband dies while a member of the joint family and his share vests in the surviving co-parceners. A Bombay widow's right has always been regarded as absolute (unless prohibited by her husband) when her husband held his property in severalty and died as a sole owner. If the widow of the last male holder's brother was entitled to adopt during his lifetime, it is not easy to see how her right to adopt could be extinguished after his death. In either case, she would be under the obligation to provide for the spiritual service to her husband's soul. It must therefore follow that her right to adopt is not affected by the circumstance of her husband's surviving brother's property having vested in his widow. In 25 NLR 144, it is conceded that if the brother's widow succeeds as Gotraja Sapinda immediately after the death of the last male holder, it is open to her to make an adoption, but that right is denied to her when she succeeds on the termination of an intermediate estate. In principle there is no distinction between the two positions. Even in the latter case she would succeed not to the last male holder's widow or mother but to the last male holder himself. There may be in the latter case the possibility of the last male holder's widow or mother making an adoption and thus defeating her potential right to succeed; but that in no way affects her inherent right to make an adoption to her husband. Her adopted son succeeds because, by fiction of law, he becomes a collateral Sapinda of the last male holder, when his widow or mother dies without making an adoption. In 8 Cal 302, itself, the rule was enunciated that an adopted son occupies the same position in the family of the adopter as a natural born son (except in a few instances) and that he succeeds not only lineally but collaterally to the inheritance of his relations by adoption. In that very case the defendant Gaganohandra, who was the adopted son of Krishna Nath the maternal grandfather of Bhawani, the last male holder, was declared to be entitled to inherit Bhawani's property. For the foregoing reasons, the case reported in 25 NLR 144 must be regarded as overruled and the answer to the question referred to us must be recorded in the affirmative.
K.S/R.K
13. Reference answered.