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  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
  • C.P Court-fees Amendment Act of 1935.
  • Court Fees Act, S. 5, (1891) 14
  • Section 7(ix) of the Court-fees Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
  • C.P Court-fees Amendment Act of 1935.
  • Court Fees Act, S. 5, (1891) 14
  • Section 7(ix) of the Court-fees Act

    Sheikh Rahman v. Balchand

    1. The office raise an objection in this case that the memorandum of appeal has not been properly stamped. The suit is to enforce a mortgage by conditional sale. The principal amount secured on the mortgage was Rs. 3,900, and the claim is for Rs. 9,539-11-0. The lower Court decreed this sum, and added interest to it from the date of suit to the date fixed by it for payment, thus bringing the decretal amount up to Rs. 10,360, exclusive of costs. In appeal defendant 1 who claims through the mortgagor does not challenge the mortgage, but only the amount fixed for redemption. He admits his liability for Rs. 4,974-12-3, and Wants the amount of the decree against him to be reduced accordingly. He has paid court-fees on Rs. 4,564-14-9 which is the difference between the amount claimed in the plaint and the amount he admits. The office claim he should pay on Rupees 5,385-3-9, that is on the difference between the amount decreed and the amount admitted.

    2. So far as the plaint is concerned, the matter comes under Section 7(ix) of the Court-fees Act as amended by the C.P Court-fees Amendment Act of 1935. The only difference that the amendment makes is that now, in suits by a mortgagee against the owner of the equity of redemption, court-fees must be paid on the amount claimed as due on the date of presenting the plaint, and not on the principal amount, as before. But the old difficulty about interpretation still remains: is value to remain unchanged throughout the entire litigation, or are different; considerations to prevail in appeal? The old rulings which deal with this matter are still relevant.

    3. The expression used in Cl. (ix) is ‘suits.” Can this mean “appeals” as well? The question is not free from difficulty, and the Courts have differed an it. But on the whole I incline to the view that it does, not however without considerable diffidence, for I am aware there is authority against it, and nothing that I have been able to find in favour of my particular point of view. 5 NLR 130, (1909) 5 NLR 130 , 3 IC 920 29 Mad 367 Reference under Court-fees Act (1870), (1906) 29 Mad 367 , 16 MLJ 287 at p. 369, 47 All 926 AIR 1925 All 734 , 88 IC 888 , 47 All 926 , 23 ALJ 853 at p. 929, 36 All 40 AIR 1914 All 520 , 21 IC 723 , 36 All 40 , 11 ALJ 1016 (FB) and 27 All 447 (1905) 27 All 447 , 2 ALJ 105 , 1905 AWN 40 at p. 449, are all against this view. With the utmost respect, I find myself unable to agree with them, although in the end I arrive at the same result; but by different means. Ss. 7(iv), S. 12(i), 13 and 17 deal specifically with appeals and some of them also with plaints. This fact has led the learned Judges in those cases to conclude that original suits and appeals have been dealt with separately in the Act, and so when Article 1 to Sch. 1, speaks of “appeals not otherwise provided for,” and S. 7(ix) only of “suits,” they conclude that the Act must be taken to mean what it says, and cannot be construed to mean an appeal when it only speaks of a suit. It is these very facts which led me to the opposite conclusion.

    4. Section 7 deals throughout with “suits”, except in Cl. (iv), and there it states that in the “suits” therein mentioned the value shall be “according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.” It is clear that here, at any rate, the expression “suit” contemplates both the original and the appellate stages of a litigation, and in accordance with the ordinary rules of construction the same word should be construed in the same way throughout the Act, certainly throughout the same section unless the context indicates something different. Articles 4, 5 and 17 to Sch. 2, are to the same effect: each speaks of a “plaint or memorandum of appeal” in a “suit.” Therefore in my opinion these considerations, so far from pointing to an intention in the legislature to confine the word “suit” to the original stages in the trial Court, indicate just the opposite: the word has been used to cover the entire litigation from its beginning to the end. To that extent I agree with Stanyon, A.J.C, in 6 NLR 164 (1910) 6 NLR 164 at p. 166, but here again I do not accept his reasoning. But that does not help the appellant, for S. 7 does not stand by itself. The charging section is S. 6. It states that with certain exceptions, which do not apply here, no document of any kind specified as chargeable in the first or second schedules to the Act shall be filed, accepted, or recorded in any Court of justice, unless the fees specified in the first or second schedule has been paid on it. Article 1, therefore, fixes not merely a percentage or scale, as 6 NLR 164 (1910) 6 NLR 164 says it does, but the actual amount leviable; and it taxes the document ad valorem in accordance with the amount or value of the “subject matter” in dispute, unless the matter has been “otherwise provided for” in the Act. Even 6 NLR 164 (1910) 6 NLR 164 does not negative the position that the Court-fees payable in appeal and in the first Court need not always be the same in these cases: see 11 NLR 83 AIR 1915 Nag 48 , 29 IC 609 , 11 NLR 83 at p. 84. In my opinion those are the real keywords to the solution of this problem, and the words “plaint or memorandum of appeal” in Col. 1 really indicate that the subject matter in appeal and in the original Court may be different.

    5. Now what is the “subject matter” in a mortgage suit? Obviously it must vary in different cases. When the mortgagor seeks to redeem, the subject matter is not the value of the property, for it is already his, at least it is his so far as the equity of redemption is concerned, and yet it is the property he wants. 14 Mad 480 Reference under Court Fees Act, S. 5, (1891) 14 Mad 480 at p. 484 and 13 All 94 (1890) 13 All 94 , 1890 AWN 231 decide that a claim of this kind cannot be valued, and so conclude that an artificial value had to be fixed in S. 7(ix): so also in a suit for foreclosure, or to enforce a mortgage by conditional sale. There again an artificial valuation has been fixed, and I fully agree with Stanyon, A.J.C, in 6 NLR 164 (1910) 6 NLR 164 at p. 166, that this cannot vary but must remain constant throughout all stages of the litigation, because the word “suit” in Cl. (ix) covers both the claim in the original Court, as well as that in appeal. In neither case can court-fee be charged ad valorem under Article 1, for both the plaint and the memorandum of appeal have been “otherwise provided for,” and so court-fees must be Computed in accordance with Cl. (ix); but Cl. (xi) deals only with those cases and no others. What then is to happen, when in an appeal neither the mortgagor nor the mortgagee challenges either the right to redeem, or the right to sell or foreclose, as the case may be, but only the amount of the price fixed for redemption? Such a relief is neither for foreclosure, nor for sale, nor is it for redemption; those are all admitted; the only dispute is with reference to the difference between the amount fixed in the lower Court, and the amount claimed in appeal. The claim does not come under Cl. (ix) as is explained in 5 NLR 130 (1909) 5 NLR 130 , 3 IC 920 at p. 132; nor does it fall under any other provision in the Act. It is, therefore, not “otherwise provided for,” and so court-fees must be paid on the memorandum of appeal in accordance with Article 1, Sch. 1. There is no difficulty in ascertaining the amount thus in dispute. It is a fixed and certain sum, and so court-fees must be paid ad valorem on that sum.

    6. The correct process of reasoning is really this: one looks to the charging section, S. 6, first, for that authorises the levy of the fee. There we are referred to the schedules. Article 1, Sch. 1 deals with a memorandum of appeal, and directs that unless it is otherwise provided for, court-fees must be paid ad valorem on the value of the subject matter in dispute. In the case of appeals, that can only mean the dispute in appeal. In the case of a mortgage-where the right to redeem or foreclose is challenged, that is provided for in S. 7(ix), for “suit” there includes “appeal,” and so court-fees have to be paid in accord, and with its provisions. But when none of these is challenged then the matter is not “otherwise provided for” in the Act, and so the fees must be paid ad valorem on the value of the subject matter in appeal. Another question also arises with respect to future interest. The amount claimed at the date of the suit was Rs. 9,539-11-0, and naturally this did not include future interest. That was awarded by the lower Court from the date of suit till the date fixed by it for redemption, and comes to Rs. 820-5-0. The appellant claims that he need not pay court-fees on this, especially as he does not dispute the plaintiff's right to future interest.

    7. I have not been referred to any case that is directly in point. But the principle is well settled that court-fees are leviable on sums which can be ascertained with certainty, but not on those which cannot; Consequently, as a general rule, court-fees on a plaint are payable on interest claimed up to date of suit, but not beyond. If, however, the suit is dismissed, and the plaintiff still wants future interest in appeal, he must pay court-fees on the amount he claims up to the date on which he files the appeal, but again not beyond. There may be an exception in certain mortgage appeals because of S. 7(ix). I express no opinion about that, as the point is not before me, but the general rule is clear. In fact, the learned Judges in 1 Pat 19 AIR 1922 Pat 387 , 77 IC 1039 , 1 Pat 19 , 3 PLT 790 go much farther, and hold that an appellate Court ought not to incorporate the amount awarded as future interest in its decree, unless and until the memorandum of appeal has been amended to include it, and the necessary court-fee duly paid. They also say that in any case the decree cannot be executed so far as this extra sum is concerned until court-fees have been paid on it. 27 All 559 (1905) 27 All 559 , 1905 AWN 84 , 2 ALJ 263 does not go as far as that, but the learned Judges there demanded a court-fee of Rs. 10 under Article 17(vi), Sch. 2; the facts, however, were a little different.

    8. The object of the appeal before me is to lessen the burden imposed on the appellant by the decree. The sum fixed in it is definite. Because of the addition of future interest, the value of the subject matter in dispute is more than it was in the first Court. Once it is accepted that S. 7(ix) does not apply, then the general rule in Article 1, Sch. 1, becomes applicable. There is no point in the appellant saying that he does not dispute the mortgagee's right to future interest, because he wants the decree reduced by a sum which is capable of exact calculation, and which he himself names. He must, therefore, pay court-fees on it whatever his reasons for seeking the reduction may be. It follows the office is right, and that court-fees must be paid on Rs. 5,385-3-9. The deficiency must be made good within 15 days.

    B.D/D.S

    9. Order accordingly.

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    Sheikh Rahman v. Balchand
    (Feb 12, 1936)