1. The plaintiffs, appellants sued on a mortgage dated 14th December 1928 for Rs. 4000. The property covered by the mortgage is situate at Balaghat, but by a mistake on the part of everybody concerned, including the Sub-Registrar, the document was registered at Baihar, although Page: 551no portion of the property was situate within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar there. There was no misdescription and there was no fraud; nor was there any attempt to mislead. The deed sets out the situation of the property truthfully and accurately as follows:
In lien of this amount we have hereby mortgaged without possession with you our houses in mouza Lamta, Talks Mau, Tahsil and District Balaghat.
2. The defendants' case is that the Sub-Registrar at Baihar had no jurisdiction to register the deed and so the registration is wholly invalid, and that is the real question we have to investigate here. The learned Judge of the lower Court finds that there was fraud, but we agree with counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants that there is no trace of fraud to be found. It was not pleaded and there is no hint of it in the evidence, nor is there any issue about it. The lower Court's finding is this:
The Sub-Registrar who registered the document must have naturally thought that a document presented before him could be registered there, and to this extent the parties practised a fraud on him in the hope that their troubles of going to Balaghat would be avoided in case the Sub-Registrar does not detect his want of jurisdiction to register the document at Baihar.
3. We agree that this is pure conjecture. The learned counsel for the defendants-respondents endeavoured to support this finding by reference to the following statement made by the Plaintiffs' counsel:
The executants resided at Baihar and some of them being females, they induced the mortgagees to go over to Baihar, where the bond was scribed and registered as a matter of convenience.
4. He stated that this indicated an improper motive which in the circumstances Amounted to fraud. We are unable to read the statement in that light. At the utmost it means that the parties thought the document could be registered at Baihar as well as at some other place, and Baihar being the more convenient, they naturally selected that. This is particularly so when we find that the plaintiffs brought the question of fraud to the notice of the defendants by going out of their way specially to emphasize that there had been no fraud twice in the course of their statements and even then the defendants did not attempt to raise the issue. In the circumstances it is impossible to sustain this finding. What then is the legal position? If a document is wrongly; registered because every one concerned, including the Sub-Registrar, has made an innocent mistake in good faith, can it be given effect to as a registered instrument? There are a number of rulings which decide that if fraud is present, then the document cannot be acted upon, but that is because of the general principle of law that fraud vitiates all. It is not peculiar to registered instruments and does not spring but of the Act. 41 Cal 972, (1914) 1 AIR PC 67 , 23 IC 637 , 41 Cal 972 , 41 IA 110 (PC) 59 Mad 539 (1936) 23 AIR PC 91 , 161 IC 29 , 59 Mad 539 , 63 IA 169 (PC) and 56 All 468 (1934) 21 AIR PC 157 , 150 IC 545 , 56 All 468 , 61 IA 286 (PC) are all illustrations of that, and so though they happen to deal with registered instruments, they are not relevant here. But 10 Pat 481 (1931) 18 AIR PC 52 , 131 IC 321 , 10 Pat 481 , 58 IA 58 (PC) which is also a Privy Council ruling is in point. What their Lordships say there is that registration to be effective must be in accordance with the provisions of the Act and that if it is not, and if the defect is not curable as a defect of procedure under S. 87, then S. 49 applies and the document cannot be used for any of the purposes specified therein. They point out that S. 87 deals with defects of procedure and state that if the defect is one of jurisdiction as opposed to one of procedure, then it is not curable. To the same effect are 23 All 233 (1901) 23 All 233 , 28 IA 15 , 7 Sar 829 (PC) at p. 241 and 7 Rang 624 (1929) 16 AIR PC 279 , 120 IC 645 , 7 Rang 624 , 56 IA 379 (PC) at p. 632. In the latter case their Lordships observed at p. 632 that want of territorial jurisdiction is one of the defects which is not curable. In the circumstances we have no option but to hold that the document is inoperative to effect a mortgage. It is true their Lordships indicated more liberal lines of interpretation in 24 WR 75 (1875) 2 IA 210 , 24 WR 75 , 3 Sar 509 , 15 Beng LR 228 (PC) at p. 77 and that their Lordships repeated these observations in 7 Rang 624 (1929) 16 AIR PC 279 , 120 IC 645 , 7 Rang 624 , 56 IA 379 (PC) and in 63 Cal 1 (1935) 22 AIR PC 165 , 157 IC 419 , 63 Cal 1 , 62 IA 265 (PC) at p. 8, but they were all cases of defects in procedure Page: 552and in view of what their Lordships say about want of territorial jurisdiction, it is unfortunately impossible for us to come to any other conclusion. This is also the view of a Calcutta Full Bench in 18 Cal 556. (1891) 18 Cal 556 (FB)
5. As regards ILR (1936) Nag 104, (1936) 23 AIR PC 301 , 164 IC 345 , ILR (1936) Nag 104 (PC) there was no want of inherent jurisdiction in the Sub-Registrar in that case. The property being situate within his sub-district he was empowered to take seisin of the document and to exercise the powers vested in him of determining whether, on the face of it, the deed purported to make a prohibited transfer. Having exercised those functions, right or wrong, and having registered the document, their Lordships held that the registration could not be ignored. But in the view which their Lordships take in the other cases we have cited, it is impossible for us to hold that the Sub-Registrar of Baihar had seisin of the matter we are now considering. He was therefore incapable of exercising any powers in respect of the document in question here.
6. That however does not end the matter. We would be sorry to administer the law in such a manifestly unjust manner unless driven to it. Consider the following case. The property conveyed lies along the border of two adjacent sub-districts. The boundary between them is not clearly defined and a doubt exists as to whether the property lies in sub-district A or sub-district B. A deed in respect of this property is presented to the Sub-Registrar at A. He refuses to register it on the ground that the property lies in sub-district B. The document is then taken to the other. Sub-Registrar and he also refuses to register because, in his opinion, the property is situate in sub-district A. What is to happen? Are the unfortunate parties to be without any remedy? What is to happen if either registers mistakenly thinking that the property lies within his jurisdiction. Are the parties still to suffer?
7. Let us go a step further. The parties finding that they cannot obtain registration either at A or at B go in appeal to the Registrar under S. 72 and he decides in favour of one or the other and decides wrongly. Can his decision be questioned years after and the document be invalidated? It would be monstrous if the law was as unjust as that. It would be shocking if the Courts could not give relief. We cannot believe that the system of justice, which we administer is so bankrupt of resource and good sense as to be unable to afford a remedy. If the trouble had arisen in the Civil Courts, the matter would of course have been curable under Section 21 of the CPC. But in view of their Lordships' pronouncements, we cannot take that view in a case of wrong registration. All the same we are of opinion that the parties cannot be placed in a worse position than they would have been in, if the Sub-Registrar had done his duty and refused to register the document on the ground that the property did not lie within his sub-district. Had he done that, one of the two things would have happened. The parties would either have gone to the Sub-Registrar at Balaghat or they would have appealed to the Registrar under S. 72 and he would then have decided where the document should be registered. The position is much the same as the one which occurred in 24 WR 75 (1875) 2 IA 210 , 24 WR 75 , 3 Sar 509 , 15 Beng LR 228 (PC) and the observations of Sir Barnes Peacock about the necessity of protecting persons who are not easily able to obtain proper legal advice and who therefore rely upon a public officer to do the right thing by them are of peculiar force here. Also as their Lordships observe:
If the registering officer refuses to register, the mistake may be rectified upon appeal under S. 83 (now S. 72) or upon petition under Sec. 84 (now Ss. 73-76) as the case may be; that if he registers where be ought not to register, innocent persona may be misled and may not discover until it is too late to rectify it, the error by which, if the registration is in consequence of it to be treated as a nullity, they may be deprived of their just rights.
8. The facts of that case were as follows: A document was executed on 10th July 1868 and it was registered on 12th November 1868 when it ought not have been registered. In course of time, a suit was instituted and the objection about invalid registration was upheld. The document was then represented for registration and this time registration was refused on two grounds: (1) that it was beyond time and (2) that no refusal to register had been endorsed on the deed. On this a petition was presented to the High Court and the High Court ordered registration. There, upon the registering authorities complied and registered the document. Further litigation ensued and the matter eventually went up to the Privy Council. Their Lordships Page: 553held that the High Court had no power to order registration and so their order was a nullity; but they also decided that the registering officer had authority of his own motion to re-register and having exercised that authority, the mere fact that he was influenced by an incompetent order of the High Court in doing what he might have done without it, did not invalidate the registration. In examining the Registrar's powers to re-register, their Lordships observed that though the statute makes it imperative to present an instrument for registration within four months from the date of its execution, no time is fixed within which a deed presented and accepted for registration must be registered; and indeed, from the nature of the requirements of the Act, the period within which the registration must be completed could not have been fixed.
9. They held that it was competent for the registering authority in those circumstances voluntarily to register the document and that it was not necessary to have the orders of a District or other Court to authorize re-registration. As regards the absence of an endorsement containing a refusal to register, their Lordships observed that when it was declared by a competent Court that the registration was Invalid, the registering officer might still have proceeded to compel the appearance of the vendors and, upon their appearance and admission of the execution of the deed, to register it.
10. This then seems to be the solution of the present difficulty. As a Court competent to decide the matter we hold that the registration was invalid because the Sub-Registrar at Baihar had no jurisdiction to accept the document for registration, the property comprised in it lying outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction. That, as their Lordships observe, is enough to enable the parties to present the document for reregistration and is enough to enable the proper registering authority to proceed as if the document was being presented before him for registration for the first time. No question of limitation can arise because, as their Lordships held, there is no limitation for the re-registration of a document. We therefore adjourn this appeal to enable the document to be re-registered and allow the plaintiffs two months from this date, but no more to re-present it for registration before the proper registering authority. When that has been done, a formal order decreeing the Plaintiffs' claim with costs will be made. Of course we have no power to order re-registration. That power, as their Lordships point out, resides in the Civil Court within the local limits of whose original jurisdiction is situate the office in which the document is sought to be registered. (S. 77 of the present Act.)
11. But in view of our observations and in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 24 WR 75, (1875) 2 IA 210 , 24 WR 75 , 3 Sar 509 , 15 Beng LR 228 (PC) we can hardly think that there will be any trouble. If however registration is refused and upon appeal the Registrar also refuses to direct registration, then a Civil suit will lie under S. 72 to compel registration and we would be obliged to keep this appeal pending until the matter is finally settled. A number of other points have been raised but it is not necessary to consider them here except the objection about want of registration under the Partnership Act. The deed Ex. P-1 is in favour of Suganmal and Chunnilal, two brothers (plaintiffs 1 and 2) and Kirodimal and Rameshwar, who are also brothers (plaintiffs 5 and 6). They are not members of one family nor indeed do they belong to the same caste. The first two are Oswals and the other two are Agarwals, but they joined together in this venture and the defendants state that in itself constitutes them partners. It is admitted that they have nothing else in the shape of business in common. The consideration of the mortgage Rs. 4000 was made up as follows: Rs. 1250 was due to the family firm of the first four plaintiffs and a like sum to plaintiffs 4 and 5 on account of old transactions. These debts had nothing in common and the liability for each was admittedly separate and distinct. As regards the balance of the consideration, Rs. 1500, it was advanced by the two sets of plaintiffs half and half. Therefore the only link between the various plaintiffs is the mortgage. Does the mere fact that two persons or sets of persons separately advance money to a third on a joint security make them partners? We are clear it does not. We do not deny that there can be a partnership in respect of a single adventure. Section 8 of the Partnership Act, is clear about that, but before that can happen the other requisites of partnership must be present. Under S. 4 there must be a “business” and there must be an agreement to share the profits of that business, and the business must be carried on by all or any of the partners acting for all. We cannot regard an isolated act of money lending on a joint security as constituting a business within the meaning of that definition. Business is Page: 554defined in the Act to include “every trade, occupation or profession.” Now money-lending may be regarded as either a trade or an occupation but not an isolated act of lending money.
12. Of course we recognize that there were previous dealings between each set of plaintiffs separately and the defendants and that each set separately can be regarded as money-lenders carrying on a money-lending business, but that is not what we have to consider. It is the joint adventure that we have to test and so far as that is concerned, it is no more than an isolated act. There is nothing to indicate that this was the first of a series of such acts entered upon as a business with a view to sharing the profits, and in the absence of evidence that cannot be assumed; as a matter of fact it has not even been pleaded, and since the mortgage was executed in 1928, we have no doubt that plenty of other evidence would have been forthcoming if there had been any substance in this allegation about partnership. The objection therefore fails. As observed before, this appeal will remain pending until the document in question has been re-registered.
R.M/R.K
13. Order accordingly.