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  • provisions of S. 7 Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act
  • S. 7, Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act.
  • Court Fees Act S. (5) (2) referred
  • S. 7(ix) of the Court Fees Act,
  • Court Fees Act S. 5
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • provisions of S. 7 Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act
  • S. 7, Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act.
  • Court Fees Act S. (5) (2) referred
  • S. 7(ix) of the Court Fees Act,
  • Court Fees Act S. 5
Smart Summary

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (Court-Fee in Redemption Appeals)

Factual and Procedural Background

The proceedings arise from a group of civil revision petitions concerning the correct court-fee payable in appeals from three suits for redemption tried before the District Munsif of Coimbatore. The petitioners are the legal representatives of the first defendant in those suits; the respondents were the plaintiffs seeking redemption. The respondents' case (as plaintiffs) was substantially that Act IV of 1938 applied and that they were entitled to possession without paying anything further. The trial Court accepted those contentions and decreed that the defendants deliver possession to the respondents.

The petitioners (as defendants in the original suits) appealed to the District Judge of Coimbatore. In their grounds of appeal they raised, in various forms, that the respondents were not entitled to redemption, that Act IV of 1938 did not apply, that the principal amount was not fully discharged, and that improvements existed whose value must be paid to the appellants before possession could be delivered. The District Judge considered that the only substantial ground of appeal was that the appellants were entitled to the value of improvements.

The petitioners had paid court-fee on their appeals according to the principal money secured by the mortgage instrument (i.e., as provided by S.7, Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act). The question presented to the court was whether the court-fee payable on these appeals should be calculated on the principal mortgage amount or ad valorem on the amounts claimed to be payable in respect of improvements.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for appeals from decrees in suits for redemption, court-fee must be paid according to the principal amount secured by the mortgage under S.7, Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act, or whether an ad valorem fee under Article 1 of Schedule I (i.e., fee on the amount claimed) is payable when the substantial question in the appeal relates only to the amount to be paid (for example, value of improvements).
  2. Whether, in assessing the proper court-fee for such appeals, the Court should determine the fee obligation by reference to the form (the literal grounds of appeal) or the substance (the real and substantial ground) of the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Petitioners') Arguments

  • They raised in their memoranda of grounds of appeal both the point that Act IV of 1938 did not apply and that the principal sum had not been fully discharged, so as to contest redemption (i.e., in form they disputed both the right to redeem and the amount payable).
  • They specifically contended that there were improvements to the mortgaged properties the value of which had to be paid to them before possession could be delivered.
  • They paid court-fee on their appeals calculated according to the principal money secured by the mortgage (i.e., on the theory that S.7 Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act applied).
  • It was argued (on behalf of those relying on precedent) that when the form of the appeal purports to dispute both the right to redeem and the amount payable, court-fee should be assessed on the principal mortgage amount (invoking authorities such as Pathuma Umma v. Aliyamakkanakath Mohideen).

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The respondents maintained that Act IV of 1938 applied and that they were entitled to possession without paying anything further (i.e., they asserted redemption was complete and no additional payment was necessary).
  • Implicitly, the respondents urged that the substantial controversy on appeal related to the amount payable (value of improvements) and therefore the appeals should attract an ad valorem court-fee under Article 1 of Schedule I, rather than fee based on the mortgage principal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pathuma Umma v. Aliyamakkanakath Mohideen Held in that case that where the substantial question was payment of value of improvements but the question of title was also raised, court-fee had to be paid as on a suit for recovery of possession; an observation by Srinivasa Ayyangar, J. suggested the form of the appeal (not the substance) should determine court-fee, but that observation was to some extent obiter. Reilly, J.'s view (concurred) relied on an earlier Reference under S.5. The District Judge relied on this authority as supporting the form-based approach, but the court in the present opinion treated parts of that authority as obiter and declined to follow its form-oriented commentary in the face of a Full Bench decision holding substance controls.
Reference under Court Fees Act S.5 (earlier Reference) Recorded a dictum that "Even where the only question raised is as to the value of the improvements, the appellant should not be called upon to pay any fee other than that payable in suits for possession of land" (an obiter dictum not adopted in later cases); its actual decision included that a defendant disputing both title and amount need pay court-fee only as on a suit for recovery of possession. The opinion acknowledges this authority as the foundation for Reilly, J.'s view in Pathuma Umma, and notes that the core decision (about a defendant disputing both title and amount) has not been overruled, but that the purportedly form-oriented dictum has not been uniformly followed.
Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Rangachariar (Full Bench) Held that it is the substance and not the form of the suit or appeal that determines the court-fee payable; quoted principle: "the plaintiff must pay court-fee in accordance with the relief which he is actually seeking. He cannot be allowed to evade payment by omitting to ask for relief when the success of his suit depends on relief being granted to him. The Court must look at the real nature of the suit and decide what the plaintiff is asking for." Treated as controlling authority on the question of substance over form; the court applied this principle to conclude that where the substance of the appeals related to the amount payable (value of improvements), an ad valorem fee under Article 1 of Schedule I was payable.
Kattiya Pillai v. Ramaswamia Pillai Held that, in deciding the proper court-fee payable, regard must be had to the substance of the thing and not merely to the form in which relief has been prayed. Cited as supporting authorities that favor a substance-over-form approach; used to reinforce the court's conclusion that substance controls assessment of court-fee.
The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Lakhanna Cited by the opinion as another decision in support of the substance-over-form principle (specific formulation not reproduced beyond that general description in the opinion). Served as additional supporting authority for the proposition that substance should determine court-fee assessment.
Kayathan Roche v. Chinnayya Roche Cited along with Lakhanna as a decision to the same effect (supporting substance-over-form); the opinion does not quote the case's text but lists it among analogous authorities. Relied on as part of the body of decisions endorsing substance-based assessment of court-fee, bolstering the court's reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a step-by-step analysis focused on identifying the "substance" of the appeals rather than being limited to their literal form, and then applying the correct fee rule accordingly.

  1. Statutory starting point: S.7 Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act prescribes that court-fee is payable according to the principal money secured by the mortgage in suits against a mortgagee for recovery of mortgaged property. Longstanding decisions also apply that rule to appeals where both the right to redeem and the amount payable are genuinely disputed.
  2. Distinction recognized: If the only substantial ground of appeal is the amount payable (for example, the value of improvements), the court-fee must be paid ad valorem on the amount in dispute under Article 1 of Schedule I.
  3. Examination of the appeals' substance: Although the petitioners' grounds of appeal in form disputed both the right to redeem and the amount payable, the District Judge found (and the court agreed) that the only substantial ground was the claim to the value of improvements. The court reviewed the grounds and the course of proceedings and concluded there was no arguable point other than whether Act IV of 1938 applied and whether improvements had to be paid for.
  4. Consideration of counter-arguments: The petitioners argued that a denial of applicability of Act IV of 1938 equated to a denial of the right to redeem. The court rejected that contention because a finding that the Act did not apply would only mean that some payment would be required before delivery of possession — the respondents' right to redeem would still exist. Similarly, the court rejected the suggestion that a successful appeal by petitioners would necessarily dismiss the suits; the court explained that if their contentions were accepted the appropriate result would be an account and preliminary decree fixing the amount to be paid with time to pay.
  5. Assessment of precedential landscape: The court considered Pathuma Umma and the Reference under S.5 together with the Full Bench decision in Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Rangachariar. It found that Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.'s observation in Pathuma Umma emphasizing form over substance was at least partly obiter and not decisive in the face of the Full Bench's holding that substance controls. The court also noted that Reilly, J.'s reasoning in Pathuma Umma rested on earlier authority and that the core holding (that a defendant disputing both title and amount need pay court-fee as on a suit for recovery of possession) had not been overruled; nevertheless the specific contention that form must be followed regardless of substance lacked uniform support.
  6. Synthesis and rule formulation: The court distilled the position into three clear points (as stated in the opinion):
    • If in an appeal against a decree in a suit for redemption the appeal relates only to the amount payable and not to the right of redemption, court-fee must be paid ad valorem on the amount claimed to be payable.
    • If the appeal purports to dispute both the right of redemption and the amount payable but in substance relates only to the amount payable, again court-fee must be paid ad valorem on the amount claimed.
    • If both the right of redemption and the amount payable are disputed in appeal and both are grounds in substance (not merely in form), the court-fee payable will be that applicable as for a suit under S.7, Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act (i.e., based on the principal mortgage sum).
  7. Application to the present case: As the substance of the petitioners' appeals was the amount to be paid in respect of improvements, the court concluded that the proper court-fee is an ad valorem fee under Article 1 of Schedule I, calculated on the amounts claimed to be payable by the petitioners.
  8. Practical relief: The court ordered that the petitioners must pay court-fee proportionate to the amounts they claimed were payable to them and granted one month's time from the date of the judgment for that payment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petitions are dismissed.

Direct Consequences for the Parties:

  • The court affirmed that, because the substance of the appeals concerned the amount payable for improvements, the correct court-fee to be paid on the appeals is an ad valorem fee under Article 1 of Schedule I (i.e., calculated on the amounts claimed to be payable).
  • The petitioners are ordered to pay court-fee in proportion to the amounts they have claimed; they were given one month's time from the date of the judgment to make the payment.
  • The petitions for revision were dismissed with costs (one set in each batch), as recorded in the judgment.

Broader Implications:

The opinion applies and synthesizes existing authorities regarding whether court-fee is to be assessed by reference to the form or substance of the appeal, aligning with the Full Bench decision that substance controls. The judgment does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond this synthesis; its practical effect is the resolution of the fee liability in these particular appeals in accordance with the substance-over-form approach.

Signature block in the original opinion: N.R.R.

    Pachayakkal And Another v. Shanmughavelayudhasami Gopanna Mannadiar And Others

    The petitioners in this group of civil revision petitions, which all relate to the same question of court-fee, were the legal representatives of the first defendant in three suits for redemption brought by the respondents in the Court of the District Munsif of Coimbatore. The contentions of the respondents as plaintiffs in these suits were substantially that Act IV of 1938 applied and that they were entitled to possession without paying anything more. The contentions were accepted and a decree was passed directing the defendants to deliver possession of the properties to the respondents. Against this decree the petitioners filed appeals in the Court of the District Judge of Coimbatore. In their memoranda of grounds of appeal the contention was raised in one form or another that the respondents were not entitled to redemption; but it was also pleaded that Act IV of 1938 did not apply that the principal amount had not been fully discharged, and that in any case there were improvements, the value of which had to be paid to the appellants before delivery of possession could be given. The learned District Judge was of opinion that in spite of the form of the memorandum of appeal, the only substantial ground of appeal was the allegation that there were improvements the value of which had to be paid before possession could be delivered. The petitioners have paid court-fee in respect of the appeals according to the principal money secured by the instrument of mortgage.

    Under the provisions of S. 7 Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act court-fee is payable according to the principal money secured by the instrument of mortgage in suits against a mortgagee for the recovery of the property mortgaged. S. 7, Cl. (ix) refers to suits, but it is established by a long line of decisions that in appeals also whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant from decrees in suits for redemption provided that both the right to redeem and the amount payable are disputed, court-fee has to be paid only on the principal amount secured by the instrument of mortgage. There is no doubt, however, that where the only ground in an appeal from a decree in a suit for redemption is with regard to the amount payable, court-fee must be paid ad valorem on that amount under Art. 1 of Sch. I of the Act. In effect, therefore, the court-fee payable in these appeals depends on whether it is the substance or the form of the appeal which has to be considered in assessing the court-fee payable. The petitioners in form at least, there can be no doubt, do dispute in their memoranda of grounds of appeal both the right to redeem and the amount payable; but as already stated, the learned District Judge was of opinion that the only substantial ground of appeal was the ground that the appellants were entitled to the value of improvements. In this view there can be no doubt that the learned District Judge was right. There is an omnibus paragraph towards the end of the grounds of appeal to the effect that the lower Court was wrong in failing to note that the suit is barred by estoppel, waiver and laches of plaintiffs-respondents; but it is plain from what has transpired in this Court, that there is no arguable point taken in the grounds of appeal except that Act IV of 1938 did not apply and that there were improvements which had to be paid for. It is argued indeed that the contention with regard to Act IV of 1938 is a contention which in effect amounts to a denial of the right to redemption. There is, however, no substance in this argument since the only result of a finding that Act IV of 1938 did not apply would be that something would have to be paid by the respondents before delivery to them could be effected; their right to redemption would remain. Again it is argued that the petitioners did in effect contest the right to redemption, because, if their contentions were accepted the suits would have to be dismissed. This is not correct. The respondents as plaintiffs claimed that by virtue of Act IV of 1938 nothing more remained to be paid, but they asked that if this submission was not accepted, the amount to be paid should be fixed by the Court. Even, therefore, if the appeals were to be allowed, the result would not be the dismissal of the suits. The result would be that an account would be taken, a preliminary decree passed and time given to the respondents to pay the amount found to be due.

    What then is the position if in spite of certain recitals in the memorandum of appeal the substantial ground of appeal is with regard to the amount paid? It was pressed on the learned District Judge that the question was concluded by the decision in Pathuma Umma v. Aliyamakkanakath Mohideen (1). In that case the substantial question in an appeal against a decree in a suit for possession was with regard to the payment of value of improvements but the question of title was raised. It was held that court-fee had only to be paid as on a suit for recovery of possession. In the course of his judgment Srinivasa Ayyangar, J. observed that though there was considerable force in the contention of the respondents that the subject-matter in dispute had reference only to the amount of compensation and that the question of title raised was a mere “camouflage” for escaping liability for court-fees, he was not prepared to say that it was not open to the parties to avail themselves of any “camouflage” that the law allows or does not forbid; and he expressed the opinion that it was not open to the Court to neglect the actual form of the appeal and determine the question of court-fees having regard to what might be said to be the substance of the claim. The learned District Judge after referring to Pathuma Umma v. Aliyamakkanakath Mohideen and to the decision in Reference under Court Fees Act S. (5) (2) referred to in it, observed that “in the face of these authorities it was difficult not to accept the appellant's contention.” He did not however, accept the contention because in his view a recent decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Rangachariar (3) stood in his way. He says in effect that Srinivasa Ayyangar, J. had stated that it was the form and not the substance of the appeal that must be looked at in order to determine the question of court-fee, whereas in Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Rangachariar , the Full Bench held that it was the substance and not the form that determined the court fee to be paid. As the learned Chief Justice observed in that case,

    “the plaintiff must pay court-fee in accordance with the relief which he is actually seeking. He cannot be allowed to evade payment by omitting to ask for relief when the success of his suit depends on relief being granted to him. The Court must look at the real nature of the suit and decide what the plaintiff is asking for.”

    In my opinion the decision of the learned District Judge is right and since the substance of the appeal is the amount to be paid before redemption can be claimed. I can have no doubt that the fee payable is an ad valorem fee under Art. 1 of Sch. I and not a fee based on the principal amount secured by the original mortgage.

    It should, I think, be pointed out that the observation of Srinivasa Ayyangar, J. in Pathuma Umma v. Aliyamakkanakath Mohideen that it is the form of the appeal which determines the question of court-fee and not the substance seems to have been to some extent obiter. It is not clear that it was necessary for the decision of the case, since it was not specifically found by Srinivasa Ayyangar, J. that the question of title raised in the appeal was without substance; Reilly, J. who delivered a separate but concurring judgment, does not consider whether the question of title was without substance and raised merely for the purpose of escaping court-fee. He bases his decision on the authority of the earlier case reported in Reference under Court Fees Act S. 5 , and pointed out that whereas the obiter dictum in that case that—

    “Even where the only question raised is as to the value of the improvements, the appellant should not be called upon to pay any fee other than that payable in suits for possession of land”

    has not been adopted in later cases. The actual decision, namely that

    “A defendant disputing on appeal both the plaintiff's title to recover and the amount of compensation to be awarded need pay court-fee only as on a suit for recovery of possession.”

    has never been overruled.

    Reilly, J. himself was a party to a case reported in Kattiya Pillai v. Ramaswamia Pillai , in which it was held that in deciding the proper court-fee payable it was to the substance of the thing and not the mere form in which the relief had been prayed for that regard must be had. Other decisions to the same effect which might be cited are The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Lakhanna (4) and Kayathan Roche v. Chinnayya Roche (5): I do not therefore think that in holding that Pathumma Umma v. Aliyamakkanakath Mohideen could not be followed in view of the Full Bench decision, the learned District Judge as he seems to have thought, was departing from a long line of decisions. What the learned Judge was differing from was not the view that where both the right to redeem and the amount payable were disputed the court-fee payable in appeal was as on a suit under S. 7(ix) of the Court Fees Act, but the view that in assessing court-fee it was the form and not the substance of the appeal that had to be considered. And in support of the latter proposition there would seem to have been, even before the decision in Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Rangachariar (6), no uniform body of authority. The position seems clear, (1) that if in an appeal against a decree in a suit brought for redemption the appeal relates only to the amount payable and not to the right of redemption court-fee must be paid ad valorem on the amount claimed to be payable; (2) if the appeal purports to dispute both the right of redemption and the amount payable, but in substance relates only to the amount payable, again court-fee must be paid ad valorem on the amount claimed; but (3) if the right of redemption and the amount payable are disputed in appeal and both grounds are grounds in substance and not merely in form the court-fee payable will be as for a suit under S. 7, Cl. (ix) of the Court Fees Act. It follows from the above that the petitioners have to pay court-fee in respect of their appeals in proportion to the amounts they have claimed to be payable to them. One month's time from to-day is granted for payment of court-fee.

    The petitions are therefore dismissed with costs, one set in each batch.

    N.R.R

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    Pachayakkal And Another v. Shanmughavelayudhasami Gopanna Mannadiar And Others
    (Oct 15, 1942)