The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

Rau, J.:— This appeal is by the Defendants in a suit for a declaration that a certain order made by the Board of Revenue, Bengal, on September 13th, 1937, was ultra vires, and void. The facts are briefly these:

2. The revenue-paying estate bearing Touzi No. 655 of the Birbhum Collectorate comprises four separate accounts, viz., Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and the “ejmali” or residuary account. We are concerned in this case mainly with separate account No. 2 comprising 6 annas odd of the estate. The annual revenue payable in respect of this, separate account is Rs. 1,491-9-4 ps. in four kists or instalments, namely, Rs. 21-12-2 in respect of the quarter March 29th— June 28th for which the latest date of payment is June 28th (1st or June kist); Rs. 89-13-3 in respect of the quarter June 29th— September 28th, for which the latest date of payment is September 28th (2nd or September kist); Rs. 624-6-7 in respect of the quarter September 29th— January 12th, for which the latest date of payment is January 12th, (3rd or January kist); and Rs. 755-9-4 ps. in respect of the quarter January 13th— March 28th for which the latest date of payment is March 28th (4th or March kist). We are mainly concerned here with the second kist of the year 1936–37 amounting to Rs. 89-13-3 for which the latest date of payment was September 28th, 1936. There are nine co-sharers in this separate account who are Defendants Nos. 1 to 9 in this suit. By a private apportionment amongst themselves Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 appear to have arranged to pay 4/5ths of the revenue and Defendants Nos. 4 to 9, the remaining 1/5th. Accordingly, Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 paid their share of the September kist amounting to Rs. 71-12-6 ps. There was also an excess payment of Rs. 1-12-4 ps. made, towards the first kist and carried forward to the second. This left Rs. 16-4-5 ps. to be paid by Defendants Nos. 4 to 9 before September, 28th. But there was sent on their behalf a money order of only Rs. 3-14-3 on account of land revenue on September, 22nd, so that there resulted an arrear of Rs. 12-6-2 ps. For the realization of this arrear the separate account was put up to sale under sec. 13 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1859 (Act XI of 1859) on January 8th, 1937. As no bids were forthcoming, the Collector, proceeding under sec. 14, stopped the sale and declared that the entire estate would be sold for arrears of revenue at a future date, unless the other recorded sharer or sharers should within ten days purchase the share in arrear by paying to Government the whole arrear due from the share. On January 11th, 1937, the Plaintiff who was a co-sharer in the zemindary (in the residuary account) asked the Collector for permission to purchase the aforesaid separate account No. 2 by paying the arrear due therefrom. This was allowed and accordingly on January 14th, 1937, his agent paid in Rs. 12-6-2 ps. On January 19th, 1937, the Collector declared him the purchaser of the defaulting share. No appeal having been preferred against the sale within the prescribed sixty days, it was confirmed, and on April 5th 1937, a sale certificate was issued to the Plaintiff under sec. 28 of the Act. On April 7th, 1937, the Collector ordered delivery of possession to him under sec. 29. This last order has not yet, however, been carried out, because before it could be carried out, the Defendants preferred an appeal to the Commissioner on May 1st, 1937, praying that the sale be set aside. The appeal was out of time, and as the Appellants were unable to prove that they were entitled to any extension of time on the ground of fraud, the appeal was rejected on May 11th, 1937. On May 25th, 1937, they presented a petition to the Board, of Revenue against the Commissioner's order. The Board called for the records and a report from the Commissioner, and on September 13th, 1937, after perusing both set aside the sale. It is against this order of the Board that the present suit is mainly directed. The Board's order, so far as it is material, was in the following terms:

“On the merits of the case the Board has no doubt that there was hardship which would have justified the Commissioner in recommending the Board to set aside the sale. The separate account was put up for sale on 8th January, 1937, for arrears of Rs. 12-6-2 due for the September kist. On 14th January, 1937, it was sold to a co-sharer under sec. 14. On the same day. (i.e, 22nd September, 1936) that Rs. 3-14-3 was sent as revenue by money order instead of the proper amount of the September, kist viz., 16-0-9, Rs. 15-7-0 was paid as cess. On 8th January, 1937, the defaulting proprietors who are now the petitioners paid Rs. 711-1-7 for the January kist and again in March they paid Rs. 8412 for the March kist. It is, therefore, obvious that they did not know of the default until March.

“The Commissioner did not make the re-commendation to the Board under sec. 26, because the application to set aside the sale under sec. 25 was filed more than 60 days after the sale. It is not certain that the Commissioner had power to extend the time for an appeal under sec. 25, though according to note 12, p. 57 of the Sale Manual, 1932, he could do so where fraud is proved. If he can do so in case of fraud he ought to be able to do so in case of manifest hardship.

“This seems to the Board to be a case where the same consideration that moved; the Board in its Resolution No. 1851— sales of 8th May, 1918 (page 122 of the Sale Manual) to remand the case to the Commissioner, can be applied. It has always been the declared policy of Government to administer the sale law leniently, and the Board holds that all final Courts including revenue Courts have an inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the sake of justice. Under sec 4, Regulation 1 of 1829, the Board of Revenue has a power of control over the proceedings of Commissioners. There is always a stronger case for exercising this power when the order has been to confirm a sale than when the order has been one setting aside a sale.

“The Board therefore overrules the objections of the auction-purchaser which are based not on the merits of the case but on absence of jurisdiction because the order of a Commissioner under sec. 25 is final. The sale is set aside.”

3. The plaint after setting out the facts asks:

(1) that the Board's order be declared ultra vires, void and unenforceable and set aside;

(2) that the Plaintiff be declared entitled to get possession of the property in suit under sec. 29 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act;

(3) that such other or modified reliefs as the Plaintiff may be entitled to, be granted to him, besdies costs and interest. The Subordinate Judge has decreed the suit, and hence this appeal by the Defendants.

4. The first point taken before us is that the suit is not maintainable,

(1) without a prayer for recovery of possession as consequential relief;

(2) without the addition of the Collector as a party.

5. Amongst the grounds of appeal to this Court it was stated that the Province of Bengal should have been a party but this was modified during argument.

6. So far as consequential relief is concerned the argument is that this is in effect a suit for a declaration of title under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, that the real relief which the Plaintiff needs is possession of the disputed property and that under the aforesaid sec. 42, the Court cannot make a declaration where the Plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. Therefore, it is said, unless he can show that he was unable to ask in his plaint for possession of the disputed property, he cannot get the declaration he seeks.

7. There is an apparent conflict of authority on the question whether sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is exhaustive of the cases in which Courts in India can make decrees merely declaratory. The Appellants rely on the observation of the Privy Council in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh(1) where their Lordships say:

“The Court's power to make a declaration without more is derived from; sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and regard must, therefore, toe had to its precise terms.”

8. Before the passing of the Specific Relief Act, the provision as to declaratory decrees was contained in sec. 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859, and their Lordships made a similar observation in Kathama Natchiar v. Dorasinga Tever(2) with reference to that section: in effect they said that the powers of the Courts in India to make a merely declaratory, decree rested upon the aforesaid sec. 15. Pollock and Mulla in their well-known work express a similar opinion:

“The correct view, it is submitted, is that sec 42 is exhaustive of the leases in which a decree merely declaratory can be made and that the Courts have no power to make such a decree independently of that section.”

9. The Plaintiff Respondent, on the other hand, points to the observations of the Privy Council in Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council(3):

“Now, in the first place it is at least open to doubt whether the present suit is within the purview of see. 42 of the Specific Belief Act. …. It is in substance a suit to have the true construction of a statute declared and to have an act done in contravention of the statute rightly understood, pronounced void and of no effect. That is not the sort of declaratory decree which the framers of the Act had in their mind.”

10. These observations appear to imply that sec. 42 is not exhaustive. We need not cite other authorities in support of either view. If we may say so, the several observations which we have quoted above are not in real conflict. What exactly is meant by the expression, “a declaration without more,” “a merely declaratory decree,” or “a decree merely declaratory”? Let us remember that the act or order sought to be pronounced null and void in Fischer's case, as in this suit, was one which deprived the Plaintiff of certain present rights of property. In Fischer's case, the order of the Governor-in-Council by cancelling the separate registration of the property which had been transferred to the Plaintiff robbed the transfer of all legal force and effect under a local Regulation. In the present suit, similarly, the order of the Board of Revenue by setting aside the sale to the Plaintiff, deprived him of his title and his right to get immediate possession of the property from the Collector. In each case, therefore, the Plaintiff stood deprived of certain present rights of property, and the declaration of the offending order as null and void restored or would restore those rights. We venture to suggest that a declaration of this kind is not “a merely declaratory decree,” since it has the effect of giving relief besides serving to define rights. On the other hand, the declarations provided for in the illustrations under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act may properly be said to be “merely declaratory decrees.” Let us examine these illustrations briefly.

Illustration (a): Here, A is not deprived of any of his present rights in his land by reason of the claim by his neighbours. Therefore, there is no occasion for administering any present relief and the declaration merely defines A's rights.

Illustration (b): Here again, at the time of the suit B, C and D do not stand deprived of any of their present rights tin the property, and the declaration merely defines their rights and the future rights of their children.

Illustration (c): Here, the property has not even accrued at the time of the suit and the declaration merely defines future rights.

Illustration (d): Here again, the declaration merely defines C's future rights.

Illustration (e): This is similar to illustration (d), and the declaration merely defines the presumptive heir's future rights in the event of his surviving the widow.

Illustrations (f) and (h) do not relate to rights of property.

Illustration (x): Here, A is obviously not deprived of any of his present rights by B's demand: the declaration merely defines A's rights.

11. It would, therefore, seem that the expressions, “merely declaratory decree” and “declaration without more” used in the Privy Council judgments in Kathama Natchair's case and Sheoparsan Singh's case refer to a declaration which merely serves to define rights, present or future, without giving present relief. The power of the Courts in India to make merely declaratory decrees in this sense is, under the above decisions, governed entirely by sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. But where a decree has the effect of giving present relief as well, the power to make it will be governed by the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, e.g, sec. 9 or Or. 7, r. 7 of the Code and not by sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Such a view would be consistent not only with their Lordships' observations in the above two cases but also in Fischer's case. On this view, the present suit would not be governed by sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act.

12. But even assuming that the Specific Relief Act applies to such a suit as this, let us see what is the Plaintiff's claim and who are the parties concerned. The Plaintiff is undoubtedly a person who claims to be entitled to certain rights as to property, namely, the right to own and possess separate account No. 2 of Touzi No. 655 by virtue of his purchase on January 14th, 1937. The Defendants, who are the recorded owners and are in possession of that share of the estate, deny and are interested to deny his title. The Collector, on the other hand, has not denied, nor is he interested to deny, the Plaintiff's title, although he could do nothing to assist the Plaintiff after the Board had set aside the sale. In terms of sec. 42, therefore, the Plaintiff may institute a suit against the Defendants, but not against the Collector, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the Plaintiff need not in such a suit ask for any further relief.

13. We now come to the proviso:

“Provided that no Court shall make any such declaration where the Plaintiff being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.”

14. In considering this proviso with reference to this case, we have to bear in mind that long before the Board's order of September, 1937, the Collector had already passed an order for delivery of possession to the Plaintiff. Once the Board's order is pronounced ultra vires and the Plaintiff's unimpaired title declared, the Collector's order of April 7th, 1937, would revive, and it would be his statutory duty to proceed to give effect to it under sec. 14 and sec. 29 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1859. The Plaintiff was not able to seek further relief in his plaint for the simple reason that he needed no more. The annulling of the Board's order would give him all that he wanted. The circumstances are very similar to those in Fischer's case (3), where the Privy Council made a declaratory decree, holding that no further relief was required. The proviso to sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is no more a bar to a declaration of the Plaintiff's title in the present suit than it was in that suit.

15. We have already indicated that the Plaintiff was right in not including the Collector amongst the Defendants in this suit. A more difficult question is whether the Board of Revenue should have been made a party on the ground that the order impugned was passed by the Board. Now, the Board of Revenue cannot be sued in its official capacity either in the name of the Board itself or in any other name, differing in this respect from the Provincial Government, which can under the new constitution be sued in the name of the Province and which could under the - old constitution be sued in the name of the Secretary of State for India in Council. In Fischer's case, the impugned order was that of the Madras Government, and the Secretary of State for India in Council was impleaded as Defendant. The only way of impleading the Board of Revenue in the present suit would have been by impleading the member of the Board (the Board consists normally of only one member) in his individual capacity and in his own name. In China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. v. Mac Lay(4), the Shipping Controller was impleaded as Defendant by name and in his personal capacity in an action for a declaration implying that a certain order made by him under statutory regulations was ultra vires. The declaration was granted, and incidentally the question was raised whether the Shipping Controller had been rightly impleaded. The Court quoted with approval a statement of the law by the Attorney-General in Raleigh v. Goschen(5) and went on to say:

“That statement of the law plainly contemplates that the officer of State whose conduct is in question would be the Defendant to the action.”

16. Similarly, in Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co. v. Mac Lay(6), the Court observed:

“No action can be brought against the Shipping Controller as such, as an action can be brought against the Secretary of State for India in Council. The action must be brought against Sir Joseph Mac Lay, if at all, as an individual. It has long been established that if an official of the State does something which if done by any one else would be a tort, and there is no law authorising him, in virtue of his office, to do that particular thing, he must, notwithstanding his official position, answer for it in his own name.”

17. So, too, in this case the only way of bringing in the Board of Revenue would have been to make the particular member concerned a party Defendant in his personal capacity. And it must be owned that there is no statutory provision protecting him from suit when he acts without jurisdiction even in good faith. It is not uncommon to find such provisions in modern statutes, but none occurs in the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1859 or in the Bengal Board of Revenue Act, 1913. The Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850 applies to Collectors and other persons acting judicially. Can it be said that the Board of Revenue was acting judicially in annulling the sale on the ground of hardship? The line between judicial and administrative functions is notoriously difficult to draw.

18. In O. Martineau & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Montreal(7), the Privy Council commented on this difficulty and found it necessary to go into the history of the particular function to decide whether it was judicial or administrative. Following a like course here, what do we find? The function of annulling sales on the ground of hardship which is now embodied in sec. 26 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1859 was vested from 1841 until 1914 in the Local Government, which can hardly be termed a judicial body. The function was obviously regarded as a matter of policy. In 1914, by the Decentralisation Act of that year the function was transferred to the Board of Revenue. The pedigree of the function does not, therefore, indicate that it is of a judicial nature. To remove any doubt or difficulty on this score the legislature sometimes expressly provides that authorities exercising certain specified functions shall be deemed to be acting judicially within the meaning of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850, e.g, see sec. 48 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act III of 1913 or sec. 71 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. There is no such provision in the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act or the Bengal Board of Revenue Act. This may or may not be an omission, but the result appears to be that the member who constitutes the Board of Revenue is not protected from suit in cases like the present. The question, however, is not whether he may, but whether he must, be made a party to the suit. He is no longer in office. The Plaintiff does not want any relief against him personally. His good faith is not disputed. His interests are in no way affected by the result of this litigation, and it can hardly be said that his presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the questions involved in the suit. AH the grounds upon which he acted in making the impugned order are recorded in the order itself, and no further material that he can supply is required for the decision of the suit. The persons benefiting by the order have all been made parties. We notice that in the Privy Council case Baijnath Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar Singh(8), a declaration pronouncing a certain order of the Commissioner to be ultra vires was made, although the Commissioner was not a party. We do not, therefore, think that the member of the Board of Revenue concerned is a necessary party in the present case.

19. The second point urged before us on behalf of the Appellants is that the Board's order was intra vires. The relevant sections are sec. 2 of Act VII of 1868 and sec. 26 of Act XI of 1859. Sec. 2 of the Act of 1868 provides that it shall be lawful for the Commissioner of Revenue to receive an appeal against any sale made under the Act of 1859, provided that the appeal be preferred within a prescribed time. Sec. 26 of the Act of 1859 provides that it shall be competent to the Commissioner of Revenue on the ground of hardship or injustice to suspend the passing of final orders in any case of appeal from a sale and to represent the case to the Board of Revenue, who may annul the sale and cause the estate or share of the estate to be restored to the proprietor on such conditions as may appear equitable and proper. It was decided by this Court in Gossain Chutturbhooj Dut v. Ishri Mul(9) that a sale under sec. 14 of the Act of 1859— a “private sale” as it has been called— is as much a sale for arrears of revenue under the Act as a “public sale” such as that referred to in sec. 22. Therefore, sec. 2 of Act of 1868 and sec. 26 of the Act of 1859 which we have summarised above, apply to a sale under sec. 14 of the Act as much as to public sales. As already mentioned, the sale to the Plaintiff which was under sec. 14 took place on January 14th, 1937. An appeal to the Commissioner was preferred on May 1st, 1937, i.e, long after the 60th day from the date of sale prescribed in sec. 26. It was rejected by the Commissioner on May 11th, 1937, as time-barred. Under sec. 25 that order was final. The Commissioner did not suspend the passing of final orders in the appeal nor did he represent the case to the Board. All these facts are common ground, so that there can be no doubt that the conditions for the exercise of the Board's powers under sec. 26 did not exist. But it is contended that besides the power conferred by sec. 26, the Board has an inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Undoubtedly, the Courts, whether civil or other than Civil Courts, have certain inherent powers for this purpose. But in the first place, for the reasons already given, we do not think that the Board was acting as a Court when setting aside the sale in question. And in the second place, even if it was acting as such, inherent powers cannot be exercised in matters for which the statute has made express provision and in a manner calculated to defeat the statutory provision. As we have already seen, the Act of 1859 has made express provision for cases of hardship. Lest the power of annulling sales on this ground should be exercised improperly, it has been kept, so to speak, under double lock. Unless the Commissioner recommends and the Board concurs, a sale cannot be set aside merely because of hardship or in-justice. Between 1841 and 1914, three separate authorities had to concur; namely, the Commissioner, the Board and the Local Government, the power being then exercisable by the Local Government; now, the power is vested in the Board, but a representation from the Commissioner is still required. The inherent power claimed by the Board to act without such a representation from the Commissioner and indeed after he has passed final orders in the appeal before him would be inconsistent with the statute.

20. We have not thought it necessary to rely on the provisions of sec. 27 in this connection, because, as the section is worded, it refers to sales of which the purchase money has been paid up “as prescribed in sec. 23.” The sale with which we are concerned was not a sale of that kind: here the purchase money was paid up as prescribed in sec. 14. It is therefore not easy to say when the present sale became “final and conclusive” in the sense in which the expression is used in sec. 27. The Collector purported to “confirm” it on April 1st 1937, whatever the precise meaning and effect of the order may be.

21. The Appellants next invoked the aid of sec. 4 of Reg. I of 1829 which runs:

“The Commissioners shall, until otherwise specifically provided for toy law, possess and exercise within the several districts comprised in their respective divisions the powers and authority now vested in the Board of Revenue and Courts of Wards, subject to the control and direction of a Sadar or Head Board, to be ordinarily stationed at the Presidency, unless otherwise directed by the Provincial Government, and to such restrictions and provisions as the Provincial Government or the said Badar, Board, with its authority or sanction, may prescribe.”

22. If the Regulation had stated that the Commissioners must exercise all the powers that may at any time be conferred upon them by any law, subject to the control of the Board, the Appellants would have been on stronger ground. They might then have argued with some degree of plausibility that the Board's control was operative even in respect of orders passed by the Commissioners under Act XI of 1859. But even then the exact degree of control would have been matter for controversy. As it is, the effect of the Regulation is to make the Board's control operative in respect of the powers which the Commissioners inherited from the Boards under the Regulation only “until otherwise specifically provided by law.” Amongst the powers so inherited was the power to annul sales for excessive severity which appears to have been vested in the Board of Revenue by Regulation XI of 1822. The position between 1829 and 1841 appears, therefore, to have been that this power passed to the Commissioner, subject to control by the Board. Then came Act XII of 1841 which vested the power in the Local Government in the following terms:

“And it is hereby enacted, that it shall be competent to the Commissioner of Revenue on the ground of hardship or injustice to suspend the passing of final orders in any case of appeal from a sale and to represent the case to the Sudder Board of Revenue, who, if they see cause, may recommend to the Local Government to annul the sale; and the Local Government in any such case, may annul the sale and cause the estate to be restored to the proprietor on such conditions as may appear equitable and proper.”

23. This was repeated as sec. 18 in Act XVIII of 1845 and then as sec. 26 in Act XI of 1859. In 1914, the Local Government was eliminated from the section. The result of all this legislation subsequent to 1829 is to make specific provision for cases of hardship defining the precise function of each of the authorities concerned, and the Board can now exercise its powers only in accordance with the provision so made. It is noteworthy that the Act of 1859 contains no provision giving the Board a general power of revising the Commissioner's orders, such as is contained for another purpose in sec. 53 of the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913. Our conclusion on this point is, therefore, the same as that reached in 1883 and again in 1885 by the Board of Revenue itself and recorded in the Revenue Sale Manual under sec. 26 of the Act thus:

“The competency of the Board and Government to take action for annulling a sale tinder this section depends on the Commissioner having suspended the passing of final orders in any case of appeal before him, and having represented the case to the Board. Such a representation can only be made if an appeal against the sale is pending before the Commissioner.”

“If the Commissioner does not think fit to exercise his power under this section and dismisses the appeal for the annulment of the sale of an estate, the sale becomes final and neither the Board nor the Government have any jurisdiction to interfere with it.”

24. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Board's order of September 13th, 1937, was without jurisdiction and ultra vires.

25. We have now to consider whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to pronounce the Board's order ultra vires is itself excluded by sec. 6 of the Bengal Board of Revenue Act, 1913. This section runs:

“Any person considering himself aggrieved by any order of the Board of Revenue may apply to the Board for a review of the same; and, if the Board considers there are sufficient reasons for so doing, it may review the order and pass such further order as it thinks fit.

Every application under sub-sec. (1) for a review of any order must be made within, a period of three months from the date of the order;

Provided that the Board may, in its discrition, in any case extend such period, if sufficient reasons be shown, for so doing.”

26. It will be noticed that the section does not say that the Board's order is in any sense final save as provided in the section itself. Therefore, the powers of the Civil Court to declare it ultra vires where the Board acts without jurisdiction remain unaffected.

27. The third point raised on behalf of the Appellants is that even if the Board's order is invalid, so too is the sale by the Collector. This raises a preliminary question as to the bearing of sec. 33 on a sale under sec. 14 such as the one made to the Plaintiff. Sec. 33 provides that no sale for arrears of revenue shall be annulled by a Court of justice except upon the ground of its having been made contrary to the provision of the Act and then

“only on proof that the Plaintiff has sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity complained of.”;

28. There follow certain other conditions not material here. Now, this is not a suit under sec. 33 and the Appellants are not Plaintiffs; can they then ask the Court to pronounce the sale to the Plaintiff invalid? In the case that we have already cited, Gossain Chutturbhooj Dut v. Ishri Mul it was held that sec. 33 of the Act applies to sales under sec. 14 as to other sales, since the prohibition

“No sale for arrears of revenue shall be annulled by a court of justice…”

29. is all-embracing. Again it has been held in a series of cases which it is needless to cite, that sec. 33 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to annul a sale where there were in fact no arrears, such a sale not being a sale for arrears at all and, therefore, not hit by the aforesaid prohibition. It follows that a sale held under sec. 14 in a case where there were arrears of revenue— as in the present case there admittedly were,— can only be annulled by a Civil Court under the conditions prescribed in sec. 33. One of these conditions necessarily implies that the annulment must be at the instance of the Plaintiff; he must bring a suit for the purpose upon the grounds and subject to the conditions mentioned in the section. As we read the provision, such a sale cannot be annulled at the instance of a Defendant in a collateral action or proceeding, assuming, of course, that it was a sale for real arrears of revenue. The Defendants, therefore, appear to be debarred from attacking the sale in the present suit.

30. But apart from this difficulty, their attack fails on the merits. They urge two main grounds. In the first place, it is argued that sec. 14 of Act XI of 1859 under which the Collector proceeded to sell the property to the Plaintiff applies only when the highest bid at the previous sale of the separate account under sec. 13 is insufficient to clear off the arrears and has no application when there are no bids at all, which was the case here. See. 14 runs:

“If in any case of a sale held according to the provisions of the last preceding section, the highest offer for the share exposed to sale shall not equal the amount of arrear due thereupon to the date of sale, the Collector &c.”

31. In this connection, our attention has been invited to sec. 58 of the Act which draws a distinction between a case of no bids and one of insufficient bids. The argument is that when there are no bids at all at the sale of a separate account held under sec. 13, the Collector cannot follow the course laid down in sec. 14, but may buy in the separate account for the Provincial Government for one rupee as provided in the first part of sec. 58. Sec. 58 must be read, it is said, along with the definition of an estate in sec. 1 of Act VII of 1868. Sec. 58 of the Act of 1859 runs:

“When an estate is put up for sale under this Act for the recovery of arrears of revenue due thereon, if there be no bid, the Collector or other officer as aforesaid may purchase the estate on account of the Government for one rupee, or if the highest bid be insufficient to cover the said arrears and those subsequently accruing up to the date of sale, the Collector or other officer as aforesaid may take or purchase the estate on account of the Government at the highest amount bid, in both of which cases the Government shall acquire the property subject to the provisions of this Act.”

32. The definition clause in sec. 1 of Act VII of 1868 runs:

“In this Act, and in Act XI of 1859, the word “estate” means any land or share in land subject to the payment of Government of an annual sum in respect of which the name of a proprietor is entered on the register known as the general register of all revenue-paying estates, or in, respect of which a separate account may, in pursuance of sec. 10 or sec. 11 of the said Act XI of 1859, have been opened.”

33. Now, it is true that this definition occurs in the Act of 1868 without the usual qualification, “unless there is something repugnant in the context or subject,” but it has been held in Knightsbridge Estates Trust, Ltd. v. Byrne(10) that little weight is to be attributed to such an omission, because some such words are to be implied in all statutes where the expressions which are interpreted by a definition clause are used in a number of sections with meanings sometimes of a wide and sometimes of an obviously limited character, (p. 621 ibid). What is the result in the present case? It is obvious that if in sec. 58 we read “estate” as including a share of an “estate” in respect of which a separate account has been opened the second part of the section would contradict sec. 14. Clearly then, it cannot be so read in the second part of sec. 58; can it be so read in the first part? It seems an unnatural construction that in the same section, consisting of two complementary parts, the same word should have an extended sense in one part and a limited sense in the other part. Again, the result of holding that the first part applies to separate accounts would be this: that when there are no bids at the sale of a separate account, the separate account may be purchased for the Government for Re. 1, but when the highest bid is insufficient to clear off the arrears, the Collector must put up the entire estate to sale at a future date under sec. 14, unless within ten days the other sharers purchase the share in arrear. There would be no logic in the two halves of this ill-assorted combination of clauses: why should the Government have the option of purchase in the one case and the co-sharers in the other? Why, again, should the price be Re. 1 in the former case and the amount of the arrear in the latter? No intelligible explanation can be suggested. We, therefore, think that the most reasonable construction is to regard sec. 58 as applicable only to integral estates in spite of the definition in Act VII of 1868. That definition may apply to certain sections of Act XI of 1859— but not to all. We also consider that the procedure prescribed in sec. 14 applies just as much when there are no bids and the sale proves wholly abortive as when the bids are insufficient and the sale proves partially abortive. The words are, “If in any case…. the highest offer…. shall not equal the amount of arrear.” Without any straining of language, this may well be held to cover all cases except those where the highest offer equals (or exceeds) the amount of the arrear; it would, therefore, cover the case of no bids as well as of low bids. It is interesting to observe that in the case of Mahomed Jan v. Ganga Bishun Singh(11), which went up to the Privy Council, the Collector followed the procedure of sec. 14 when no bids were forthcoming and the Plaintiff Mahomed Jan was allowed to purchase the share in arrear as in the present case. The point now taken was not raised in that case, but in stating the facts their Lordships of the Judicial Committee said:

“On the 17th September, 1901, the Plaintiff (as permitted by sec. 14 already referred to) paid the arrears due, and was declared the purchaser of the ijmali kalam.”

34. We may infer from this that their Lordships considered that sec. 14 permitted such a purchase when there were no bids. Although, as we have said, the point was not argued, one of their Lordships was aware of it, as will be seen from his judgment in Gossain Chutturbhooj Dut v. Ishri Mul. For all these reasons, we must hold against the Appellants on the construction of sec. 14.

35. The second ground on which the sale by the Collector is impeached is that the Plaintiff did not pay the arrear due from the share within ten days. It will be remembered that the arrear due was Rs. 12-6-2 on account of the September kist; but when this sum was paid in on behalf of the Plaintiff, the ehalan presented to the Touzi department described the “period for which paid” as “January, 1937”. (Vide Ex. A). The relevant entry in the Touzi Ledger also shows the “year and kist noted in the chalan” as “January, 1937”. P.W 2 Kiran Chandra Sarkar, who made the payment states that he wrote “January, 1937 “in the chalan by mistake. It is contended for the Appellants that as the Plaintiff did not pay the September arrears, he did not complete the purchase as required by sec. 14 of Act XI of 1859 and that, therefore, the Collector had no jurisdiction to issue the sale certificate or to order delivery of possession to him. Before examining this contention, we may dispose of a preliminary point relating to the chalans at once: we shall ignore the Plaintiff's own copy of the chalan (Ex. 4) which purports to show that the money paid in was on account of the arrears of the September kist of 1936 and we shall proceed on the Defendants' document (Ex. A) which shows that the period for which the payment was made was “January, 1937”. Ex. 4 bears signs of having been tampered with— no matter when or by whom. We, therefore, place no reliance on it, while Ex. A is a certified copy of the chalan kept in the Collectorate and, therefore, above suspicion. We have in fact compared Ex. A with the original. We start then with the fact that the money was paid in as stated in Ex. A. Now, Ex. A shows not only that the period for which it was paid was “January, 1937”, but also that the payment was on account of arrears, the word “arrear” being clearly entered in the chalan. The Bengal Sale Law Manual prescribes a special procedure for payment of arrears and one of the rules lays down that the clerk in the Arrear Collection Department to whom the chalan is first presented in triplicate must stamp the word “arrears” across each copy. From the occurrence of this word in Ex. A, therefore, we may safely conclude that the payment was on account of arrears. Now, What could be the meaning of saying that the payment was for the arrears for the period ‘January, 1937’? We have to remember that the payment was made on January 14th, 1937; so, obviously, it was towards arrears which had accrued before that date. The reference may, therefore, have been either (1) to the arrears in respect of the current demand of the quarter ending January 12th, 1937, or (2) to the arrear demand in the accounts of the quarter ending January 12th, 1937. These are the only two meanings which it is possible to give to the chalan entry. Now, the first of the two meanings is ruled out by the fact that there were in fact no arrears in respect of the current demand of the quarter ending January 12th, 1937: in fact, the dues of that quarter were over-paid and there was a small excess of 4 as. 4 ps. at the credit of the land revenue account of this particular share of the estate. The second meaning, on the other hand, is confirmed by several circumstances: (1) that there was an arrear of Rs. 12-6-2 which accrued in the previous quarter and which appealed under the head “arrear” in the accounts of the quarter ending January 12th, 1937; (2) that the chalan was also for precisely the same sum, namely, Rs. 12-6-2 ps.; (3) that on January 11th, 1937, the Plaintiff had sought the Collector's permission to pay this particular arrear and had been allowed to do so; (4) that on January 19th, 1937, the Collector treated the payment as having been made on account of this particular arrear. Undoubtedly, if Kiran Chandra Sarkar when making the payment had stated that it was for the arrears of the September kist of 1936, there would have been no ambiguity; but his mistake has made no material difference. The arrear in question having been paid on January 14th, 1937, the Plaintiff, must be held to have completed the purchase as required by sec. 14, and the Collector was, therefore, justified in issuing a sale certificate and ordering delivery of possession.

36. The Appellants have also alleged certain minor irregularities in connection with the sale to the Plaintiff. This part of the case has been fully examined by the Subordinate Judge and we agree with him that the Collector's proceedings were in order.

37. Finally, the Appellants contend that since the making of a declaration under sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is in the discretion of the Court, that discretion ought to be exercised against the Plaintiff in the particular circumstances of this case. They represent (1) that the sale to the Plaintiff was brought about by collusion between the Plaintiff and one Manmatha Sinha, the then Naib of Defendants Nos. 4 to 9; (2) that the case is one of grave and manifest hardship, inasmuch as for a trifling arrear of Rs. 12 odd, the Appellants, some of whom are minors, have lost valuable property estimated to yield a net annual profit of Rs. 5,500, and the Plaintiff has gained what they have lost.

38. We are relieved from the task of considering this aspect of the case by the fact that the parties have at the last moment arrived at a compromise.

39. We consider that the terms of the settlement are in the interests of the minor Defendants Appellants Nos. 7 to 9 and we accordingly grant leave to their guardian Defendant Appellant No. 4 to enter into the compromise on their behalf.

40. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is disposed of in accordance with the terms embodied in the petition of compromise (supported by an affidavit filed in Court), the petition forming part of the decree of this Court.

Biswas, J.:— I agree.

C.C