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  • provisions of Sec. 6 read with Sec. 3 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940. Sec. 3 of this Act
  • Sec. 3 or Sec. 6 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940
  • Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940
  • Sec. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Sec. 6 read with Sec. 3 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940. Sec. 3 of this Act
  • Sec. 3 or Sec. 6 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940
  • Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940
  • Sec. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs instituted a suit for ejectment of Defendants from a piece of land in the town of Jalpaiguri after serving a notice to quit. There were three Defendants; the suit was contested by Defendants Nos. 1 and 3. The Defendants raised three defences: (1) that the tenancy was permanent, (2) that the notice to quit was insufficient, and (3) that they were protected from ejectment under Section 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

The trial Court (the learned Munsif of Jalpaiguri) granted a decree for the Plaintiffs. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge reversed that judgment. Both Courts rejected the pleas of permanency and invalidity of the notice to quit. With respect to Section 182, it was common ground that Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were not raiyats and could not avail themselves of that defence; the dispute concerned Defendant No. 3. The trial Court had found that Defendant No. 3 had not proved any interest; the Appellate Court admitted a conveyance in evidence and found Defendant No. 3 to be a tenant to the extent of a half-share (12 annas). The only point argued in the present appeal concerned the applicability of Section 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to Defendant No. 3.

Procedurally, a preliminary objection was raised that the appeal could not be heard because, during the pendency of the appeal, the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940 came into force; that Act (Secs. 3 and 6) provided for a compulsory stay of suits and proceedings for ejectment. The Court considered whether the word “suit” in those provisions included appeals and, after considering prior decisions, held that “suit” excludes appeals. The preliminary objection was overruled.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the words “suit” in Section 3 read with Section 6 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940 include an appeal (i.e., whether the Act operated to stay this appeal).
  2. Whether Section 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies to Defendant No. 3 in respect of the disputed holding — specifically:
    1. whether the disputed land constituted Defendant No. 3's homestead;
    2. whether a tenant having more than one homestead is excluded from protection under Section 182;
    3. whether Section 182 requires that the homestead be a place from which the raiyat actually carries on agricultural operations (i.e., whether actual cultivation from that homestead is a precondition to Section 182 protection).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments (represented by Dr. Basak)

  • Section 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply to Defendant No. 3 because the disputed land was not his homestead; the tenancy was originally created for a shop, and the fact that it was later used in part as residential does not make it the homestead of Defendant No. 3.
  • Defendant No. 3 had other dwelling houses nearby (about 150–200 feet away) where his wife had died; thus the disputed holding could only be regarded as his homestead after that event.
  • Section 182 contemplates a single homestead; if a tenant has more than one homestead, the protection should not extend to each of them.
  • It was not shown that the disputed homestead was one from which Defendant No. 3 actually carried on agricultural operations in his raiyati holdings; the policy of Section 182 is to protect a cultivating raiyat so that agricultural operations are not imperilled.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments (represented by Mr. Gupta)

  • On the preliminary point, the word “suit” in Sections 3 and 6 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940 should be read to include appeals and proceedings at any stage, and legislation affecting pending litigation ordinarily affects it in whatever stage it might be pending; reliance was placed on authority to that effect.
  • On the merits, even if the policy of Section 182 is to protect cultivating raiyats, the statute itself requires only some connection between the homestead and the tenant's status as a raiyat; it does not require that the raiyat be an actual cultivator or that actual cultivation be carried on from that homestead.
  • Evidence supported the Appellate Court's factual finding that Defendant No. 3 had been residing in the disputed premises for a long time and that the land had been used for residential purposes by the Defendants and their predecessors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Official Receiver v. Ramratan Kuar (Mukerji) Cited for the proposition that where legislation affects pending litigation it must be deemed to affect the litigation in whatever stage it might be pending (general rule cited by respondent on preliminary objection). The Court noted this authority had been relied upon by counsel for the respondents, but, after considering subsequent local precedent, held that the word "suit" in the relevant Sections did not include appeals and therefore overruled the preliminary objection.
Jagadish Jha v. Aman Khan Also cited in support of the general principle that legislation affecting pending litigation should affect it in whatever stage pending (relied on for the preliminary objection). The Court acknowledged the reliance but declined to accept the broad application urged by respondents because binding local decisions construed "suit" as excluding appeals; the preliminary objection was overruled.
Jahur Mia v. Abdul Gaffur Held (by the author of the present opinion in that case) that the word "suit" does not include an appeal. The Court referred to this earlier decision as showing that "suit" was to be taken as excluding appeals and treated it as precedent relevant to overruling the preliminary objection.
Pran Krishna Mukherji v. Jnanada Roy Confirmed the view that the word "suit" does not include appeals (affirmation of the earlier view). The Court relied on this confirmation as part of the line of authority binding the single Judge to hold that "suit" excludes appeals.
Howrah Mills Co., Ltd. v. Baksa Sk. Napit Part of a batch of later cases where the interpretation excluding appeals was applied and orders for stay of hearing of appeals were set aside. The author noted these later cases and stated that, sitting singly, he was bound to give effect to that line of decisions and therefore overruled the preliminary objection.
Purusottam Mahesri v. Panchanan Mazumdar Relied upon by the Appellants' counsel in support of the contention that the disputed premises could not be regarded as Defendant No. 3's homestead. The Court recorded that reliance had been placed on this case but accepted the Subordinate Judge's factual findings over the Appellants' reliance and did not accept that this authority dictated a contrary result on the facts before the Court.
Isap Ali v. Satis Chandra Roy Cited in support of the proposition that the homestead referred to in Section 182 need not be the only homestead of the raiyat. The Court referred to this authority as supporting the view that multiple homesteads do not preclude protection under Section 182 and treated it as consistent with the conclusion reached.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages: first addressing the preliminary objection under the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940, and then the substantive question concerning Section 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

On the preliminary objection, counsel for the respondents argued that Sections 3 and 6 (stay provisions) applied to appeals because the words “suit” and “proceeding” should both be read broadly to include appeals. The Court reviewed prior decisions in which it had been held that the word “suit” does not include appeals (including Jahur Mia v. Abdul Gaffur and Pran Krishna Mukherji v. Jnanada Roy), and observed later cases in which the same interpretation was applied and stays were set aside. Sitting singly, the Court considered itself bound by that line of authority and therefore held that “suit” excludes every kind of appeal. Consequently, the preliminary objection that the appeal was stayed by the 1940 Act was overruled.

Turning to the merits, the Court confined its inquiry to the proper interpretation and application of Section 182 to Defendant No. 3 in light of the findings of the lower Appellate Court. The Appellate Court had found that the disputed holding had been used for residential purposes by the Defendants and their predecessors, and that Defendant No. 3 was a tenant to the extent of a 12 annas share. The Appellants (Plaintiffs) argued that the tenancy was originally for a shop and that Defendant No. 3 had another house nearby, so the disputed land could not be his homestead; they also argued Section 182 contemplates a single homestead and that actual carrying on of agricultural operations from the homestead was required.

The Court accepted the Subordinate Judge’s factual findings as amply supported by evidence (references were made to Settlement Khatian, previous plaints and the present plaint and notice to quit). The Court explained that occasional residence elsewhere did not negate the fact of residency in the disputed premises, and that it was a question of fact for the trial Court which the Appellate Court had decided in favour of Defendant No. 3.

On the legal points, the Court rejected the restricted interpretation that Section 182 applies only if a tenant has a single homestead. The Court reasoned that construing the section to exclude tenants who possess more than one homestead would defeat the Act’s obvious intention and would be inconsistent with the likely realities of raiyats holding multiple homesteads. The Court referred to Isap Ali v. Satis Chandra Roy as supporting the proposition that homestead need not be the only homestead of the raiyat.

Regarding the requirement of actual cultivation from the homestead, the Court accepted the respondents' submission that Section 182 requires only some connection between the homestead and the tenant's status as a raiyat and does not demand that the raiyat be an actual cultivator or that actual cultivation occur from that homestead. The Court observed that the definition of "raiyat" contemplates a person who has acquired a right to hold lands for the purpose of cultivation and includes successors-in-interest, and therefore actual cultivation is not the test of raiyat status. The Court also noted that no cross-examination was addressed to Defendant No. 3 on whether he could carry on tilling from the homestead, and that the Plaintiffs should have put such a case to him if they intended to deny Section 182's benefit.

Summarising, the Court concluded that the Appellate Court had correctly applied Section 182 on the evidence and that the Appellants' legal points failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is refused.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Appellants' challenge fails; the Appellate Court's finding that Defendant No. 3 is entitled to the protection of Section 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act in respect of the disputed holding stands, and the Plaintiffs' suit for ejectment is not sustained by this appeal.
  • Procedural effect: The Court held that the stay provisions of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940 (Secs. 3 & 6) do not include appeals within the word “suit” for the purposes of those Sections, and therefore the appeal was not stayed by that Act.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies and follows existing local authorities on the construction of the word “suit” in the 1940 Act and endorses that a raiyat need not be an actual cultivator nor must the homestead be the only homestead in order to attract protection under Section 182. The Court did not purport to lay down any broader novel principle beyond applying the statute to the facts before it.

End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.

    Rukmini Mahesri v. Prahlad Chandra Agarwalla

    1. This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiffs in a suit for ejectment of the Defendants from a piece of land in the town of Jalpaiguri on service on them of a notice to quit. There were three Defendants, but the suit was contested by only two of them, viz., Defendants Nos. 1 and 3. The defence was three-fold. In the first place, it was alleged that the tenancy was a permanent one, secondly the sufficiency of the notice to quit was questioned, and lastly, the Defendants claimed protection from ejectment under Sec. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The learned Munsif of Jalpaiguri who tried the suit in the first instance gave the Plaintiffs a decree. On appeal that judgment was reversed by the learned Subordinate Judge. Both the Courts agreed in turning down the plea of permanency as well as that based on the alleged invalidity of the notice to quit. As regards the bar of Sec. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it is common case that so far as Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, none of them was a raiyat and they could not consequently avail themselves of this defence. As regards Defendant No. 3, however, the learned Munsif held that the question did not arise at all in his case, as he had failed to prove that he had acquired any interest in the disputed holding. The learned Subordinate Judge, on the other hand, found that Defendant No. 3 was a tenant, and having regard to the fact that he had acquired a number of raiyati holdings in the same mouza in which the disputed tenancy was situated, the learned Judge held that he was entitled to claim the protection of Sec. 182. The only point that has been argued in this appeal relates to applicability of this section.

    2. A preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Gupta on behalf of the Defendants Respondents to the hearing of this appeal under the provisions of Sec. 6 read with Sec. 3 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940. Sec. 3 of this Act provides for a compulsory stay of all suits and proceedings for the ejectment of a non-agricultural tenant for the period of the Act and Sec. 6 makes the same provision applicable in the case of suits and proceedings which were pending at the date the Act came into operation. The suit here was instituted on the 22nd November, 1937, and the judgment of the trial Court was pronounced on the 23rd December, 1938, and that of the lower Appellate Court on the 5th March, 1940. Thereafter the present appeal to this Court was presented on the 16th May, 1940. During the pendency of this appeal the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940 came into force. Mr. Gupta argued that the word “suit” as used in see. 3 or in Sec. 6 of the Act referred to a suit in any stage whether original or Appellate, just as the word “proceeding” would include a proceeding in the Court of first instance as well as in the Appellate Court. It would, he maintained, be inconsistent to restrict the meaning of the word “suit,” but not of the word “proceeding”. It was further contended that where legislation affected pending litigation, the rule was that it must be deemed to affect the litigation in whatever stage it might be pending, unless the legislature expressly provided to the contrary. This particular legislation was obviously made retrospective in its operation by the terms of Sec. 6, and it followed accordingly that it should hit any proceeding which might be pending at the relevant date in any Court. In support of this principle, reliance was placed on the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Mukerji, Official Receiver v. Ramratan Kuar(1) and on the judgment of the Federal Court in the case of Jagadish Jha v. Aman Khan(2).

    3. The question as to whether the word “suit” in Sec. 3 or Sec. 6 of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1940 includes an appeal was raised in the case of Jahur Mia v. Abdul Gaffur(3), where I took the view that it does not, but my learned brother Mukherjea, J., thought it sufficient merely to hold that the other word in the section “proceeding” was wide enough to include an appeal. In a later case, viz. the case of Pran Krishna Mukherji v. Jnanada Roy(4) which was decided by my learned brother Edgley, J. and myself, the view I had expressed in the earlier judgment was affirmed by both the members of the Bench. With reference to these cases, Mr. Gupta pointed out that these were tenants' appeals directed against decrees for ejectment which had been passed against them by the Court below, and it was sufficient to hold that such appeals, which could not obviously be regarded in any sense as proceedings for ejectment of the tenants, could not and did not come within the meaning of the words “suits for ejectment”. Mr. Gupta maintained that the decision as to the meaning of the word “suit,” as laid down in these judgments, must be taken with reference to the particular facts which were in dispute in those cases. Speaking for myself, responsible as I was for the view indicated above, I am not prepared to say that the viewpoint urged by Mr. Gupta does not merit further consideration, but it so happens that in a batch of later cases which came up before Edgley, J. and myself, which were concerned with landlord's appeals against decrees refusing ejectment, the same interpretation of the word “suit” was applied and the order for stay of hearing of the appeals which had been made by the lower Appellate Court was set aside. [Vide Howrah Mills Co., Ltd. v. Baksa Sk. Napit]. It does not appear that in these later cases the matter was re-argued, much less reargued from the point of view which has now been pressed before me by Mr. Gupta. All the same, sitting singly I think I am bound to give effect to this decision and hold that the word “suit” must be taken to exclude every kind of appeal, whether it be an appeal by the landlord against a decree refusing ejectment, or an appeal by the tenant against a decree granting ejectment. The preliminary objection must accordingly be overruled.

    4. Turning now to the merits of the appeal, the question turns on the findings of the lower Appellate Court and on the correct interpretation of Sec. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Dr. Basak contends that Sec. 182 cannot apply in this case inasmuch as the disputed land was not held by Defendant No. 3 as a homestead. He says that admittedly the tenancy was originally created for the purpose of a shop. It may be that it was used later on for residential purposes, but so far as Defendant No. 3 is concerned, his evidence is that he had other dwelling houses in the neighbourhood and consequently, it is argued, the disputed holding could not be regarded as his homestead within the meaning of Sec. 182. Reliance was placed by the learned Advocate on the case of Purusottam Mahesri v. Panchanan Mazumdar(5). It is necessary to set out the relevant facts in connection with this point. It has been found by both the Courts below and is, in fact, not disputed by either party that the tenancy, at its inception was one for the establishment of a shop. It has also been found at the same time that, in point of fact, it has been used in part as a homestead all along. The original tenant was one Ram Prosad Agarwalla. After him the tenancy was held by his son Ram Chandra, and then by Ram Chandra's widow Basanti, who is Defendant No. 2 in the case, and Ram Chandra's mother's sister, Dhappa Bewa, Defendant No. 1, Basanti being interested to the extent of a 4 as share and Dhappa Bewa to the extent of the remaining 12 annas share. The Plaintiff's case in the plaint was that Defendant No. 3 Prohlad had purchased the interest of Basanti, and though in the absence of the conveyance the trial Court had found against Defendant No. 3 on the question of his title, the Court of Appeal below admitted the conveyance in evidence and found that Defendant No. 3 was a tenant in respect of the disputed holding to the extent of a 12 as share. Defendant No. 3 is the adoptive son of Defendant No. 1, and it appears that though Defendant No. 3's purchase was made only on the 22nd December, 1934, he had been actually residing in the disputed homestead from long before. Dr. Basak, however, contends that this is not sufficient to make the disputed holding the homestead of Defendant No. 3, so as to attract the protection of Sec. 182 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. He relies mainly on the evidence of Defendant No. 3 to the effect that he had another house about 150 to 200 feet away from the disputed premises where his wife had died. It was only from after his wife's death, as Dr. Basak said, that the disputed holding could at all be regarded as his homestead.

    5. In answer to all this, it is sufficient to point out that I am bound to accept the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge on the question, and those findings, as I read them, have been expressed in unequivocal terms. The learned Judge distinctly points out that the disputed land has all along been used for residential purposes by all the Defendants in the suit as also by their predecessors, and it cannot be said that there was no evidence on the record to support this finding. The learned Judge, in fact, refers to the Settlement Khatian and to the plaint in a previous ejectment suit. Reference may also be made to the plaint in the present suit and to the notice to quit which was served by the Plaintiff, where it is expressly admitted that at least Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were residential tenants. It may be that in one part of his judgment the learned Subordinate Judge says that Defendant No. 3 has proved that he lives “at times” in the house on the disputed land as well as in a separate house of his. This, in my opinion, is not sufficient to show that the disputed land could not or did not constitute his homestead. The question is mainly one of fact, and if, as a matter of fact, Defendant No. 3 did reside in these premises, even though it may be that he was living elsewhere at times, I think it was open to the Court of fact to conclude that this was his homestead. Dr. Basak sought to raise a point of law in this connection by suggesting that Sec. 182 contemplated only a single homestead, and that the section was inapplicable where the tenant had more than one homestead. To put such a restricted interpretation on the words in the section would be to defeat its obvious intention. If, in point of fact, a tenant is shown to be residing in more than one homestead, the result would be to deprive him of the protection of this section in the case of any of these homesteads, but that could never have been intended. The tenant may be a raiyat in respect of a number of agricultural holdings, and it is as likely as not that he may have a number of homesteads in the village or villages where these holdings are situated. It would be wrong to say that although he could claim the benefit of Sec. 182 if he had only one homestead, he would necessarily be deprived of such benefit, if he happened to have more than one homestead. The learned Judge has referred to a case [Isap Ali v. Satis Chandra Roy(6)] in support of the proposition that it is not necessary that the homestead referred to in Sec. 182 should be the only homestead of the raiyat. Whether the case cited is a direct authority on the point or not,— the facts of the case seem to leave the matter in some doubt,— I am inclined to think that if the learned Judges did not (?) intend to lay clown any such proposition they could not have been far wrong.

    6. Dr. Basak's next point was that it was not shown in this case that the disputed homestead was one from which Defendant No. 3 was actually carrying on agricultural operations in the raiyati holdings which he held in the village.

    7. He maintained that the policy of Sec. 182 was to ensure protection to a cultivating raiyat from ejectment from his homestead in order that his agricultural operations might not be imperilled. In answer to this argument, Mr. Gupta pointed out that even though this is to be supposed to have been the policy of the Act, the Court is called upon to construe the section as it stands, and construing it in that way, all that seems to be postulated by the statute is that there must be some connection between the homestead and the tenant's status as a raiyat. It is one thing, however, to say that there must be some such connection, and quite a different proposition to lay down that in order to get the protection of the section, the tenant must either be a cultivating raiyat himself, or be actually carrying on agricultural operations from the homestead in question. The Act nowhere requires that a raiyat must” be an actual cultivator, and if a raiyat need not be an actual cultivator, much less need he hold the homestead for the purpose of actual cultivation. The requirements of Sec. 182 would be satisfied if the homestead was one from which the raiyat might, if necessary, carry on agricultural operations in his raiyati holdings, if and when the occasion arose. I think there is considerable force in Mr. Gupta's point of view. It certainly falls in with the general scheme of the Act, which, he is right in pointing out, nowhere requires that ‘a raiyat must be a person actually engaged in cultivating operations. The definition of a raiyat itself shows that a raiyat is primarily a person who has acquired a right to hold lands for the purpose of cultivation, not that he must be a person actually cultivating the land. It also includes successors-in-interest of persons who have acquired such a right. Actual cultivation is, therefore, not the test of the status of a raiyat. It cannot, therefore, be supposed that the legislature intended to make it a sine qua non for the applicability of Sec. 182 that the homestead must be held by the raiyat for the purpose of actual cultivation. In this particular case, I may add, not a word was put to Defendant No. 3 in cross-examination as to whether or not he was in a position to carry on actual tilling in his agricultural holdings from the disputed homestead. If the Plaintiff sought to deny the benefit of Sec. 182 to Defendant No. 3, such a case should certainly have been put to him. This particular point raised on behalf of the Appellant must, therefore, fail. It is not necessary for me to refer in detail to the various authorities which were cited on one side or the other before me. It is sufficient for me to say that these authorities have been all correctly dealt with by the learned Judge in his judgment under appeal.

    8. The result is that in my opinion the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    9. Leave to appeal under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent is prayed for and is refused.

    P.C

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    Rukmini Mahesri v. Prahlad Chandra Agarwalla
    (May 24, 1943)