Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Puranik, J.
Acts
  • section similar to Section 81 of the new Tenancy Act
  • Section 75 of the C.P Tenancy Act. Section 75
  • C.P Tenancy Act and Land Revenue Act
  • Section 80 of the C.P Tenancy Act,
  • Section 81 of the C.P Tenancy Act.
  • Sub-section (3) of S. 75
  • C.P Tenancy Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Click here to upload
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Puranik, J.
Acts
  • section similar to Section 81 of the new Tenancy Act
  • Section 75 of the C.P Tenancy Act. Section 75
  • C.P Tenancy Act and Land Revenue Act
  • Section 80 of the C.P Tenancy Act,
  • Section 81 of the C.P Tenancy Act.
  • Sub-section (3) of S. 75
  • C.P Tenancy Act
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal arising from a suit for recovery of Rs. 136-13-0 as arrears of rent for 1937–1938 and part of 1938–1939. The plaintiff is the lambardar of the village (appointed on 8 January 1938); the defendants are tenants in occupancy assessed at Rs. 92 rental. The defendants admitted non-payment for the years 1347 and 1348 Fasli but pleaded that they had paid Rs. 114 on 25 November 1935 to the former lambardar as rent for 1344 Fasli. Those rents for 1344 Fasli were later remitted by Government on 8 February 1938 and 14 July 1938. The defendants contended the present plaintiff, as successor in office, must give them credit for the Rs. 114 recovered by the previous lambardar.

At trial, the trial Court accepted the plaintiff's contentions and decreed the claim. On appeal the lower appellate Court allowed the defendants' appeal and reduced the decree so that only Rs. 13 was recoverable instead of Rs. 136-18-0. The plaintiff brought this second appeal. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the appeal abated because the legal representatives of a deceased co-tenant (Pratapchand) were not brought on record; the Court rejected that objection as having no substance. The instant opinion resolves the second appeal and related subsidiary questions (including allowance of pleader's fee).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, as successor in office to the former lambardar, is bound to give credit to the defendants for an amount (Rs. 114) recovered by the former lambardar for the year 1344 Fasli when that year’s rents had been suspended and subsequently remitted by Government.
  2. Whether a defendant in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent can claim set-off for an amount not determined by a competent Court or Revenue Officer, in light of Section 81 of the C.P. Tenancy Act.
  3. Whether Section 75 of the C.P. Tenancy Act (payments by tenant and the effect of declarations as to year credited) applies to permit credit or adjustment of the Rs. 114 payment against later arrears.
  4. Whether the lower appellate Court was correct to disallow pleader's fee (costs for legal practitioner's fees) under Section 80 of the C.P. Tenancy Act.
  5. Whether the appeal abated for non-joinder of legal representatives of a deceased co-tenant (Pratapchand).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff) Arguments

  • The Rs. 114 recovered by the former lambardar was for the year 1344 Fasli, a year for which the Government had suspended rents at the time the payment was made; therefore the recovery by the former lambardar was illegal and beyond his authority.
  • The payment of Rs. 114 was made to the former lambardar and not to the present plaintiff; the successor cannot be held liable for the wrongful or illegal acts of a predecessor in office.
  • No statutory right of set-off exists in a suit for arrears of rent unless the amount claimed as a set-off has been determined by a competent Court or Revenue Officer, per Section 81 of the C.P. Tenancy Act.
  • Section 75 of the C.P. Tenancy Act does not assist the defendants: the payment was expressly for 1344 Fasli and not for the years in suit, and the statutory subsections relied upon do not apply to permit re-crediting to other years.
  • The defendants should have sought refund from the former lambardar once remission was ordered; they cannot pursue that remedy indirectly in this suit against the present lambardar.
  • Pleader's fee should be allowed because (a) the case was contentious, (b) a certificate was in fact filed in the trial Court (contrary to respondents' contention), and (c) the trial Court could have given reasons to allow fees as costs under Section 80.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The defendants had paid Rs. 114 to the former lambardar for 1344 Fasli and, because those rents were subsequently remitted, the present lambardar as successor in office should give credit for the amount recovered by his predecessor by way of adjustment.
  • The defendants contended they were entitled to an adjustment on equitable grounds and referred to Section 75 of the C.P. Tenancy Act (and relied on equitable principles as in an earlier reported case) to support their claim for credit.
  • A preliminary objection argued that the appeal abated because the legal representatives of a deceased co-tenant (Pratapchand) had not been brought on record.
  • Respondents also contended pleader's fees should not have been allowed because, it was urged, no certificate had been filed in the trial Court (a position disputed by the record according to the appellant).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
14 C.P.L.R. 65 Held, in that case under the old C.P. Tenancy Act and Land Revenue Act, that payment of rent in advance could be treated as a loan to the landlord to be adjusted later; an express agreement by the previous lambardar to so adjust was binding on his successor in that peculiar factual situation. The Court distinguished that authority: it was decided under a different statute regime (no provision similar to Section 81 of the new Tenancy Act) and on facts showing an express agreement binding the proprietary body. The Court held 14 C.P.L.R. 65 did not assist the defendants here because there was no such agreement and because the recovery by the former lambardar in this case was illegal (rents suspended and later remitted).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a series of discrete analytical steps, expressly applying statutory text and the facts as admitted in the record:

  1. Preliminary objection on abatement: The Court found no substance in the respondents' objection that the appeal abated because the legal representatives of a deceased co-tenant were not on record; each tenant was jointly and severally liable and non-joinder did not abate the entire appeal.
  2. Characterisation of the Rs. 114 payment: It was admitted that Rs. 114 was paid expressly for 1344 Fasli (supported by Exhibit D-1, the receipt) and that at the time of payment rent for that year had been suspended. The Court concluded the former lambardar, who must have known of the suspension, exceeded his authority by collecting those rents; the collection was therefore illegal. Further, the amount collected (Rs. 114) exceeded the assessed rent for the holding (Rs. 92), underscoring the illegality.
  3. Successor's liability for predecessor's illegal acts: The Court stated it was unaware of any law that would make a successor in office liable for illegal and excessive acts of his predecessor, particularly where the payment was not made to the successor.
  4. Statutory restriction on set-off — Section 81: The Court relied on Section 81 of the C.P. Tenancy Act which precludes allowing a set-off in a suit for rent arrears unless the amount claimed as set-off has been determined by a competent civil Court or by a Revenue Officer. The Rs. 114 payment was not paid to the present plaintiff and was not determined by any such authoritative decision; nor was it pleaded or prosecuted as a set-off with payment of requisite court-fee. Hence Section 81 prevented treating the Rs. 114 as a set-off in this suit.
  5. Applicability of Section 75: The respondents had relied on Section 75. The Court analysed the subsections:
    • Sub-section (1) (presumption that a payment by tenant is on account of rent) was irrelevant because the payment was not for rent due for the years in suit.
    • Sub-section (2), dealing with a tenant's declaration as to the year to which payment is to be credited, in fact supported the appellant's case: the defendants expressly declared the payment was for 1344 Fasli and Exhibit D-1 specified that year; thus the payment must be credited to 1344 Fasli and not to later years.
    • Sub-section (3), which permits a landlord to credit a payment to any arrear in the absence of a declaration, did not apply because there was an express declaration in this case.
    On this basis the Court concluded Section 75 did not assist the defendants in obtaining credit against the later arrears.
  6. Distinguishing the cited precedent (14 C.P.L.R. 65): The Court observed that the cited case was decided under earlier statutes without a provision like Section 81; there was an express agreement in that case binding the successor, so equitable principles compelled credit there. Those peculiar facts were absent here, so the precedent was inapposite.
  7. Remedies and locus of redress: The Court emphasised that the former lambardar, being the person who illegally recovered Rs. 114, was the appropriate person to be pursued for refund once the remission order was passed. The defendants' failure to pursue that remedy did not justify making the present plaintiff liable via adjustment in this suit.
  8. Pleader's fee under Section 80: The Court noted that ordinarily legal practitioner's fees are not allowable as costs under Section 80 unless reasons are given. Although the trial Court and the lower appellate Court did not set out reasons in this record, the Court found the case was contentious and that the record showed a certificate had in fact been filed in the trial Court (contrary to respondents' assertion). On these grounds the Court found reason to include pleader's fee in costs and to restore the trial Court's award in that respect.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED

Holding (core rulings):

  • The decision of the lower appellate Court that the present lambardar (successor in office) was bound to give credit for the Rs. 114 recovered by the former lambardar is set aside.
  • The trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiff is restored (the plaintiff’s claim for arrears as originally decreed by the trial Court is reinstated).
  • Pleader's fee (legal practitioner's fees) are allowed to be included in the costs (the trial Court's allowance in this regard is restored).

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The defendants are not entitled, in this suit for arrears of rent, to claim credit or set-off for the Rs. 114 payment made to the former lambardar for the year 1344 Fasli.
  • The defendants' remedy for recovery of the Rs. 114 (which the Court characterises as illegally collected by the former lambardar and subsequently remitted by Government) lies against the former lambardar, who is bound in law to refund the amount; the present lambardar is not liable to give that credit.
  • The lower appellate Court's judgment is set aside; the trial Court's judgment is restored; the appeal is allowed with costs throughout.

Broader legal implications:

The opinion applies and clarifies application of Sections 75 and 81 of the C.P. Tenancy Act to the facts: Section 75 does not permit re-crediting a payment expressly made for a specified year to other arrears where the tenant made an express declaration, and Section 81 bars set-off in suits for rent arrears unless the claimed set-off has been determined by a competent court or revenue officer. The Court distinguished prior authority (14 C.P.L.R. 65) on its factual and statutory differences. The opinion does not purport to create a novel precedent beyond its statutory application; it confines its ruling to the facts and statutory regime before it.

Note: All statements and quotations in this summary are derived exclusively from the provided opinion text and do not add any information beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

    Narayan Krishnarao v. Badridas And Others

    JUDGMENT

    1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 136-13-0 as arrears of rent for 1937–1938 and a part of 1938–1939. The plaintiff is the lambardar of the village, and the defendants are tenants owning land in occupancy right assessed at Rs. 92 rental. The present plaintiff was appointed lambardar on 8th January 1938, and the amount that is claimed by him has fallen due as rent after he became the lambardar of the village. The defendants admitted that they had not paid the rent for the years 1347 and 1348 Fasli; but they pleaded that they had paid Rs. 114 on 25th November 1935, as rent for 1344 Fasli to the former lambardar of the village. These rents for the year 1344 Fasli were subsequently remitted by Government on 8th February 1938 and 14th July 1938. The defendants therefore pleaded that the plaintiff who is now the representative in office of the former lambardar was bound to give them credit for Rs. 114 recovered from them by the previous lambardar. On behalf of the plaintiff it was stated that the defendants ought not to have paid rents for 1344 Fasli inasmuch as Government had suspended rents for that year when defendants allege they paid it. It was further pleaded that payment was made, not to the plaintiff, but to the former lambardar; the plaintiff was not in any way bound by the action of the former lambardar, particularly in view of the fact that action of his was wrong inasmuch as he could not have recovered rent for 1344 Fasli and yet he recovered it; there is no provision of law under which the defendants in a suit for arrears of rent for subsequent years could claim credit for a payment wrongly made in a previous year. The plea of the defendants, it was urged, amounted to a plea of set-off and such a set-off was not permissible under Section 81 of the C.P Tenancy Act. The trial Court accepted the contentions on behalf of the plaintiff and decreed the claim. The lower appellate Court, however, in an appeal filed by the defendants took a different view. It allowed the appeal of the defendants and decreed the claim to the extent of Rs. 13 instead of Rs. 136-18-0. Against this decision the plaintiff has come up in second appeal. On behalf of the respondents a preliminary objection was raised that the entire appeal abated inasmuch as the legal representatives of Pratapchand, who died on 11th February 1943, were not brought on record. Pratapchand was one of the co-tenants. Each tenant is liable jointly and severally to pay the rent. The mere fact that the legal representatives of Pratapchand have not been joined as parties to this appeal does not result in the abatement of the entire appeal. I hold that there is no substance in this objection.

    2. The appellant contended that the decision of the lower appellate Court holding that the plaintiff as a successor in office of the former lambardar was bound to give credit for the amount realized by the former lambardar was against law. I am clearly of the opinion that this contention is sound.

    3. Admittedly Rs. 114 were paid, not as rent for any of the years in suit, but expressly for the year 1344 Fasli, and it is not disputed before me that the said payment was made at a time when payment of rent had been suspended. The defendants paid that amount without knowing that there was a suspension. Though the defendants did not know that there was a suspension the lambardar must have known about it, and if the lambardar realized rent he exceeded his authority and did an illegal act. Moreover it is quite clear that the rent of the holding was only Rs. 92 while he realized Rs. 114 i.e, Rs. 22 in excess. This further demonstrates the illegality of the act of the former lambardar. I am not aware of any law under which a successor in office—assuming that is the position to be assigned to the present lambardar—can be held liable for the illegal and excessive acts of his predecessor. Under the C.P Tenancy Act in a suit for recovery of arrears of rent no set-off can be allowed unless the amount claimed as a set-off has been determined by a decree or order of a competent Court or of a Revenue Officer: see Section 81 of the C.P Tenancy Act. In the first place, this amount was not paid to the present plaintiff, and therefore it could not be claimed as a set-off against the demand for rent for the years 1347 and 1348 Fasli. Secondly, there is nothing to indicate that this amount was determined by a competent civil Court or by a revenue officer. This amount has also not been claimed by the defendants as a set-off in this case; they have not paid any court-fee for the same. Counsel for the respondents contended that they were entitled to claim it by way of an adjustment inasmuch; as the payment was to a former lambardar and the present lambardar was a successor in office of the former lambardar, and that the predecessor in office had realized the same amount from them, which on account of the suspension and the later remission he should not have realized and which therefore he was bound to repay. When asked to point out under what provision of law such an adjustment could be claimed the counsel referred me to Section 75 of the C.P Tenancy Act. Section 75 has really no application to the facts of the case. Sub-section (1) of that section refers to a presumption that when rent is due any payment made by a tenant is on account of rant. This sub-section has no application to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the present payment was not made towards the rent due for the years 1347 and 1348 Fasli. Sub-section (2) of that section has also no application inasmuch as that sub-section only speaks of a declaration made by the tenant and of the effect thereof. It enacts:

    “If a tenant makes a payment on account of rent, may be declare the year or the year and instalment to which he wishes the payment to be credited, and such payment shall be credited accordingly: Provided that, if any rent is in arrears no payment shall be credited to any instalment not yet due.”

    4. In the present case, the defendants when they made the payment of Rs. 114 to the former lambardar expressly declared that the payment was made by them towards the rent of the year 1344 Fasli. Exhibit D-1, the receipt filed by the defendants, mentions the year for which the payment was made and received. The payment having been made for the year 1344 Fasli it has to be credited for the year 1344 Fasli and not towards any other year. Sub-section (3) of S. 75 says that in the absence of a declaration, the landlord may credit the payment to any arrear not barred by limitation. The present case does not fall under that sub-section either. Section 75 has thus been shown by me to be not at all applicable to the facts of the present case.

    5. I was referred to a case in 14 C.P.L.R 65,1 which has also been referred to by the lower appellate Court in its judgment. This was a case decided under the old C.P Tenancy Act and Land Revenue Act where there was no section similar to Section 81 of the new Tenancy Act according to which a defendant can claim a set-off under certain conditions. It was stated in that case that a payment of rent in advance is in effect a loan to the landlord to be applied thereafter in discharge of the tenant's obligations to pay rent as it accrues due. This decision was one given in the peculiar circumstances of that case. The landlord of the village had obtained from a tenant of that village rent in advance for the years 1896–1897 and 1897–1898 and had agreed that the advance would be adjusted by him when the rents fell due for those particular years. He ceased to be the lambardar of the village and another person was appointed lambardar. The new lambardar sued for rent for the year 1897–1898, and it was held that in view of the express agreement between the previous lambardar and the tenant, which agreement was entered into by him on behalf of the entire proprietary body including the plaintiff (the new lambardar) the agreement was binding on him in that case. The amount received by the former lambardar was said to be one received by way of a loan from the defendant on behalf of the entire proprietary body including the plaintiff and therefore it was as if the loan had been incurred by the plaintiff himself under an agreement that he would give credit for it. It was thus that the plaintiff in that case was asked to give credit for the amount under equitable principles 14 C.P.L.R 65 therefore does not in any way help the defendants in the present case. I have already shown that there was no agreement between the former lambardar and the defendants. I have also shown that the former lambardar acted illegally in recovering Rs. 114 from the defendants. The present lambardar is not bound either in law or in equity to do something for the defendants in this suit in order to enable them to recover the amount due to them from the former lambardar. The former lambardar having recovered the amount of Rs. 114 from the defendants at a time when rents had been suspended is bound in law to pay back that amount to the defendants, particularly in view of the fact that an order of remission was passed in the year 1988. As soon as the order of remission was passed, the defendants ought to have asked the former lambardar to refund the amount. Instead of pursuing the obvious legal remedy against the former lambardar the defendants have chosen to raise a frivolous contention in this suit that the plaintiff should give credit for that amount which they wrongly paid to a former lambardar. I am clearly of the opinion that they are not entitled to do so. I therefore set aside the decision of the lower appellate Court.

    6. The next contention on behalf of the appellant was that pleader's fee was wrongly disallowed by the lower appellate Court. It is true that the trial Court has given no reasons for allowing pleader's fee. The lower appellate Court also does not give any reasons for disallowing pleader's fee. This was a contentious suit. Under Section 80 of the C.P Tenancy Act, ordinarily legal practitioner's fees cannot be allowed as costs, and if it has to be allowed reasons have to be given. This was a case in which the trial Court could have given the reason that it was a contested case in which fees could be claimed as costs. It has been brought to my notice by the counsel for the respondents that no certificate had been filed in the trial Court and therefore the fees could not be included as costs. The record, however, shows that a certificate was filed. Under the circumstances I am of the opinion that there is good reason to allow fee to be included in the costs. The result is that the decision of the lower appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout.

    7. Appeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.
    Try AI Pro free for 7 days Upgrade to AI Pro

    Comments

    Narayan Krishnarao v. Badridas And Others
    (Sep 28, 1944)