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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • S. 4(1)(b) read with S. 4-A of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922,
  • S. 3(59) of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897)
  • Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, VII of 1939.
  • S. 4-B of the Indian Income-Tax Act
  • Style) Act, 1750, (24 Geo. 2 C. 23)
  • S. 4-B of the Income-Tax Act
  • Act [S. 2(15)]. S. 4(1)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 4(1)(b) read with S. 4-A of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922,
  • S. 3(59) of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897)
  • Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, VII of 1939.
  • S. 4-B of the Indian Income-Tax Act
  • Style) Act, 1750, (24 Geo. 2 C. 23)
  • S. 4-B of the Income-Tax Act
  • Act [S. 2(15)]. S. 4(1)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary (Delivered by Patanjali Sastri, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This reference arises from an assessment to Income-Tax and excess-profits duty made on the respondent in his capacity as manager of a Hindu undivided family (HUF) for the year 1940-1941. The HUF carried on business in British India (Kakatiruppupudur, Ramnad District) and in Ceylon. Income from both sources was assessed on the basis that the family was “resident” and “ordinarily resident” in British India. The “previous year” for the Indian business was the Tamil year Pramathi ending 12 April 1940, and for the Ceylon business the financial year ending 31 March 1940, reflecting that the assessee's accounts in the two places were made up to those respective dates.

There was no dispute that the family was “resident” in British India within the meaning of S.4(1)(b) read with S.4-A of the Income-Tax Act, 1922, as amended by the Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, VII of 1939. The assessee contended, however, that the family was “not ordinarily resident” within the meaning of the second proviso to S.4(1) read with S.4-B, and so income arising from the Ceylon business should be excluded from assessment, there being no allegation that the Ceylon business was controlled in India or that its income was brought into British India.

The assessee initially sought to establish non-ordinary residence by reference to the "nine out of ten years" test but, after that attempt failed before the Income-Tax authorities, advanced before the Tribunal the alternative that the "seven years" in S.4-B(a) must be taken as seven calendar years. The Tribunal directed further inquiry and made factual findings about the manager's aggregate days of presence in British India over various seven-year spans. Relying on a calendar-year computation, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's claim and reduced the assessment. The Commissioner of Income-Tax challenged that conclusion and the Tribunal referred to this Court the question whether the "seven years" in S.4-B should be taken as seven calendar years or as seven previous years (i.e., the seven years immediately preceding the relevant previous year).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of computing the period or periods when the manager of the HUF had not been in British India, the "seven years" in S.4-B of the Income-Tax Act should be taken as seven calendar years or as seven previous years (i.e., seven years immediately preceding the commencement of the relevant previous year)?
  2. The assessee raised an alternative point that even if the aggregate stay were 731 days it might not be "more than two years" because the seven-year period would include a leap year; this point was not decided by the Tribunal and was not before this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • Initially attempted to show the manager had not been resident in British India in nine out of the ten years preceding the year of account; that attempt failed before the Income-Tax authorities.
  • Before the Tribunal the assessee contended that the "seven years" in S.4-B(a) must be taken as seven calendar years (calendar years being 1 January to 31 December) — i.e., the seven calendar years preceding the year of account should be used.
  • Relied on S.3(59) of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897), which defines "year" in Central Acts as "a year reckoned according to the British Calendar"; and on the Calendar (New Style) Act, 1750, which established 1 January as the start of the year in England — these statutory provisions were invoked to support the calendar-year construction.
  • An alternative contention (not decided by the Tribunal and not before the Court) was that, even if the manager's aggregate stay amounted to 731 days, it could not be "more than two years" because the seven-year computation would necessarily include at least one leap year.

Commissioner of Income-Tax's Arguments

The Commissioner challenged the Tribunal's acceptance of the assessee's calendar-year approach and referred the specific question (whether the "seven years" are calendar years or seven previous years) to this Court for decision. The opinion does not set out a detailed account of the Commissioner's alternative legal arguments on the merits beyond the fact of the referral.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay v. Abubaker Abdul (1) The previous holding (prior to amendment) that an assessee could not have two separate "previous years" for Income-Tax purposes. The Court noted that this view had been superseded by the Amending Act (so that, after amendment, an assessee may have different "previous years" for different sources of income), and took that legislative change into account in explaining how residence/ordinary-residence tests are to be applied with reference to each chosen previous year.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis focused on the proper temporal reference point for the phrase "the seven years preceding that year" in S.4-B(a), which provides one of the tests for an individual being "not ordinarily resident" in British India. The issue was whether the period meant (a) seven calendar years (i.e., the seven distinct 1 January–31 December years preceding the year of account) as urged by the assessee, or (b) the period of seven years of twelve calendar months each immediately preceding the commencement of the relevant previous year (a rolling seven-year span ending at the start of the previous year).

The Court first set out the statutory and taxing framework relevant to the question: the tax is charged for each financial year beginning 1 April on the "total income of the previous year" (S.3); a "previous year" may be the financial year or another 12-month period chosen by the assessee for making up accounts (S.2(ii)); the computation of total income and the application of residence/ordinary-residence tests in S.4(1), S.4-A and S.4-B must therefore be performed with reference to the relevant previous year for each source of income.

The Court considered the assessee's reliance on S.3(59) of the General Clauses Act (defining "year" as a year reckoned according to the British Calendar) and on the Calendar (New Style) Act, 1750, which fixed 1 January as the start of the year. The Court rejected this reliance for the present context, observing that adopting the calendar-year construction would produce a temporal gap — an interregnum — between the end of the seven-year period so computed and the commencement of the previous year unless the previous year also began on 1 January. The Court considered such a gap repugnant to the intendment of S.4-B(a) read with S.4(1), because the relevant tests of residence are tied to the preceding period measured with reference to the commencement of the previous year.

The Court also addressed an argument (which had weighed with the Tribunal) that a rolling-seven-year construction might produce an anomaly whereby the same person could be assessed as "resident" for some sources and "not resident" for others depending on differing previous years chosen by the assessee. The Court accepted that under the amended S.2(ii) an assessee may select different previous years for different sources, and acknowledged that applying the residence tests separately to each such year could be cumbrous and could lead to differential treatment. However, the Court found this to be no sufficient reason to adopt the calendar-year construction when the plain language and scheme of the statute pointed to the seven-year period being measured immediately prior to the commencement of the relevant previous year. The Court also observed that the construction urged by the assessee would not necessarily remove the possibility of differing residence determinations across sources.

The Court noted that S.50 (which had been mentioned during argument) offered no support for the assessee's interpretation. Having considered the statutory scheme, the practical consequences, and the specific arguments, the Court concluded that the proper construction of "seven years" in S.4-B is the period of seven consecutive years of twelve calendar months each immediately preceding the commencement of the relevant previous year.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the referred question in the following sense: the expression "seven years" in S.4-B of the Indian Income-Tax Act refers to the period of seven years of twelve calendar months each immediately preceding the commencement of the relevant previous year.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The reference was answered in the manner stated above, thereby rejecting the assessee's contention that the "seven years" must be taken as seven calendar years (i.e., discrete 1 January–31 December years ending on 31 December preceding the previous year).
  • As a direct order in the reference, the assessee was directed to pay Rs. 250 as costs to the Commissioner of Income-Tax.
  • The opinion explains how, under the amended statutory scheme, residence or ordinary-residence tests are to be applied with reference to each chosen previous year and acknowledges that this may produce the practical effect that an assessee could be resident for some sources and not for others; the Court held that this potential consequence is not a reason to adopt the construction urged by the assessee.
  • No broader change beyond the interpretation stated was set out in the opinion; the decision clarifies the method of computing the seven-year period for S.4-B but does not purport to resolve the unrelated alternative contention about leap years (which was not before the Court).


End of summarized opinion.

    The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras. v. Ve. K.R Savumiamurthy.

    (Delivered by Patanjali Sastri, J.)

    This reference arises out of an assessment to Income-Tax and excess-profits duty made on the respondent as the manager of a Hindu undivided family for the year 1940-1941.

    The family was carrying on business at Kakatiruppupudur (Ramnad District) in British India and in Ceylon, and its income from both these sources has been taxed on the footing that the family was “resident” and “ordinarily resident” in British India. In each case the income taxed was of the “previous year,” which was the Tamil year Pramathi ending 12th April 1940 for the Indian business and the financial year ending 31st March 1940 for the foreign business, the assessee's accounts in the two places having been made up to those dates respectively. There was no dispute that the family was “resident” in British India within the meaning of S. 4(1)(b) read with S. 4-A of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922, as amended by the Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, VII of 1939. The assessee, however, contended that the family was “not ordinarily resident” in British India within the meaning of the second proviso to S. 4(1) read with S 4-B and that accordingly, the income arising to it from the business in Ceylon should not be included in the assessment, there being no suggestion that such business was controlled in India, or that such income was brought into British India.

    Now, a Hindu undivided family is deemed to be “ordinarily resident” in British India if its manager is ordinarily resident in British India [4-B(b)], and an individual is “not ordinarily resident” in British India “in any year if he has not been resident in British India in nine out of the ten years preceding that year or if he has not during the seven years, preceding that year been in British India for a period of, or for periods amounting in all to, more than two years” [4-B(a)]. The assessee's attempt before the Income-Tax authorities to prove that his family was not resident in British India in nine out of the ten years prior to the year of account having proved unsuccessful, he shifted his position before the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal (Madras Bench) and sought to bring the case under the latter part of the Cl. (a), contending that the “seven years” referred to in that clause must be taken to be seven calendar years. The Tribunal ordered a fresh inquiry and it was found (i) that the manager of the family was in British India for 541 (this was subsequently corrected into 606) days on the aggregate during the period of the seven calendar years from 1st January 1932 to 31st December 1938 preceding the year of account, whether of the Ceylon or the Indian business, (ii) that he was in British India for 731 days on the aggregate during the seven Tamil years preceding Pramathi, the year of account of the Indian business; and (iii) that he was in British India for 731 days on the aggregate during the seven financial years preceding the financial year 1939-1940 which was the year of account of the Ceylon business. It will thus be seen that if the “seven years” mentioned in Cl. (a) be taken as seven calendar years, the manager cannot be said to have been in British India during that period for more than two years and the assessee's joint family would be entitled, under the second proviso to S. 4(1) as a person “not ordinarily resident” in British India to claim the exclusion of the foreign income from the assessment. The claim was accepted by the Tribunal and the assessment was ordered accordingly to be reduced. The Commissioner of Income-Tax having challenged the correctness of that view, the Tribunal has referred the following question to this Court for its decision—

    “Whether in the circumstances of the case, in computing the period or periods when the manager of the Hindu undivided family had not been in British India, the seven years in S. 4-B of the Income-Tax Act should be taken as seven Calendar years or seven previous years.”

    It may be mentioned here that the assessee raised before the Tribunal an alternative contention, viz., that, even if the aggregate period of the manager's stay in British India during the relevant years be taken as 731 days, it cannot be said to be “more than two years” as the seven years, however reckoned, must include at least one leap year. But the Tribunal did not decide the point and it is not before us.

    It is necessary, in order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, to describe in brief outline the scheme of taxation laid down in the Act so far as it is material here. The tax is levied for each financial year commencing on the 1st of April at the rate or rates prescribed in the Finance Act in force for the time being and is charged on the “total income of the previous year (S. 3). The “previous year” may be either the financial year next preceding or, at the option of the assessee, any other period of twelve months ending within such year if he has made up his accounts for such period. It was held that an assessee could not have two separate “previous years” for the purpose of Income-Tax [Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay v. Abubaker Abdul (1)] but this view was superseded by the Amending Act, and it is now possible for an assessee to have a different “previous year” for each separate source of income. [S. 2(ii)]. “Total income” is the total amount of income, profits and gains referred to in Sub-S. (i) of S. 4 computed in the manner laid down in the Act [S. 2(15)]. S. 4(1) refers to four classes of income and provides for their assessment on a basis which differs according as the assessee is or is not “resident” or “ordinarily resident” in British India during the previous year of which the income falls to be assessed. It is, accordingly, with reference to that year, that the various tests of “residence” or “ordinary residence” as defined in S. 4-A and S. 4-B have to be applied. The question is whether the “seven years preceding that year” mentioned in S. 4-B(a) refers to the seven years ending on that day next preceding the commencement of the previous year or to the period of seven years ending on the 31st December preceding the commencement of such year as suggested for the assessee.

    Mr. Srinivasan appearing for the assessee relies on S. 3(59) of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) which provides that in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of that Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, “year” shall mean “a year reckoned according to the British Calendar.” As the Calendar (new Style) Act, 1750, (24 Geo. 2 C. 23) transferred the beginning of the year in England from the 25th of March to 1st of January in and after 1752, it is urged that, in applying S. 4-B(a) the seven years must be reckoned commencing from the 31st December preceding the year of account and counting backward. We cannot agree. It is obvious that this mode of computation would result in a gap, an interregnum, before the commencement of the “previous year” except, of course, where that year also began from the 1st of January. Such a result is repugnant to the intendment of the provisions of S. 4-B(a) read with S. 4(1) under which the terminus ad quem is the commencement of the “previous year.” We find nothing in S. 50 of the Act to which reference was made in the course of the argument to support the interpretation contended for on behalf of the assessee.

    It was said that if the “seven years” mentioned in S. 4-B(a) were taken as referring to the period immediately preceding the year of account, it would give rise to the anomalous position of one and the same person being liable to assessment as “resident” in respect of some of his sources of income and as “not resident” in respect of others according to the “previous year” he has adopted for the respective sources. This argument, appears to have weighed very much with the Tribunal, but we see no force in it. It is true, as has been stated, that under S. 2(ii) as amended it is possible for an assessee to have as many “previous years” as he has separate sources of income. But, as we have pointed out already, under the scheme of taxation laid down in the Act the charge is made on the total income of the “previous year,” and such income has to be computed on the basis of the assessee's residence or non-residence in British India during that year. That is to say, in respect of each separate source of income the year of account is to be ascertained, and if it is found on applying the provisions of Ss. 4-A and 4-B with reference to that year that the assessee was “resident” or “not resident” or “not ordinarily resident” in British India as the case may be, the income of that year is to be computed on the appropriate basis indicated, and the total of the amounts thus computed for all the sources of income, whether British Indian or Foreign, is to be charged to tax. Such procedure may prove somewhat cumbrous but not unworkable in its application to particular cases where the assessee has adopted different years of account for his separate sources of income, and it is possible in such cases that he should be assessed as resident in respect of some of the sources and non-resident in respect of others. But this, in our opinion, is no reason for disregarding a construction to which the language of the provisions in question plainly points. And, after all, the construction contended for on behalf of the assessee, as we understand it, does not help to resolve the supposed anomaly as, even on such construction, an assessee may, in conceivable cases, have to be dealt with as resident and non-resident in respect of his different sources of income.

    We are, therefore, of opinion that the expression “seven years” in S. 4-B of the Indian Income-Tax Act should be taken as referring to the period of seven years of twelve Calendar months each immediately preceding the commencement of the relevant previous year, and we answer the reference in that sense. The assessee will pay Rs. 250 as costs of the Commissioner of Income-Tax.

    N.R.R

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    The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras. v. Ve. K.R Savumiamurthy.
    (Feb 1, 1946)