1. This is an application by the plaintiff Gopal Hingorani to revise the order, dated 30-10-1950, of the Court of the 1st Civil Judge, Class II, Jabalpur.
2. The material facts are these. According to the plaint, defendant No. 1 T.G.S Narayanan and defendant No. 2 Sewakram were residing in Karachi in 1947 and held the posts of Deputy Secretary and Superintendent respectively in the Finance Department of the Government of Sind. The defendants took a loan of Rs. 1,000/- from Govidram K. Hingorani at Karachi in June 1947 and had executed a promissory note in his favour. The defendants agreed to be jointly and severally liable to repay the loan. The promissory note was given to defendant No. 2 by Govind Ram as he undertook to secure the return of the loan from defendant No. 1. He also agreed to repay it himself and recover it later. The amount, however, was not returned by either of the defendant nor the promissory note was returned. The promissory note was assigned by Govind Ram on 1-7-1949 at Jabalpur in favour of the plaintiff in consideration of Rs. 500/-. The defendants resisted the claim or various grounds. One of the objections raised by them related to jurisdiction. The contention was that as the defendants were residing outside the jurisdiction of the Court and as no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court, the suit was not maintainable. The reply of the plaintiff to the objection was that the Court had jurisdiction in view of the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, 1948, hereafter called the Act, and the assignment of the promissory note at Jabalpur.
3. The trial Court upheld the objection and held that the Act was not applicable as the defendants were also displaced persons and that the suit could not be filed at the place where the promissory note was assigned.
4. The Contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff is that the lower Court was wrong in assuming that the defendants were displaced persons and its interpretation of S. 4 of the Act was erroneous. According to him, the decision in — ‘Dalsukh Nathmal Firm v. Motilal’, AIR 1938 Nag 262 (A), on which the trial Court relied was inapplicable.
5. Section 4 of the Act reads as follows:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 20 of the CPC, 1908 (V of 1908) or in any other law relating to the local limits of the jurisdiction of Courts or in any agreement to the contrary, a displaced person may institute a suit in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction he or the defendant or any of the defendants, where there are more than one at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, if
(i) the defendant or where there are more than one, each of the defendants, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain in India and is not a displaced person;
(ii) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises or has arisen in a place now situate within the territories of Pakistan;
(iii) the Court in which the suit is instituted is otherwise competent to try it; and
(iv) the suit does not relate to immovable property.”
6. It will be clear that S. 4 of the Act would be inapplicable where the defendant is a displaced person. A displaced person is allowed under the section to institute a suit in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction he resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided the defendant is a resident in India and is not a displaced person and the cause of action wholly or in part, has arisen in a place situate within the territories of Pakistan. Here, the plaintiff no doubt is a Resident of Jabalpur. The defendants, however, were residents of Karachi and must be deemed to be displaced persons. The plaintiff did not allege in the lower Court that the defendants were not displaced persons within the definition of S. 3 of the Act. I hold that the plaintiff cannot take advantage of S. 4 of the Act.
7. Turning to the second contention, I am of opinion that the lower Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit as the assignment of the promissory note is said to have taken place in Jabalpur. Section 20(c) of the CPC says that a suit may be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. The expression “cause of action” has not been defined. The question is whether it should have a restricted meaning to signify the cause of action on the document sued on irrespective of the rights of the plaintiff under it. I think that the expression has to be read with reference to the suit instituted by the plaintiff. It means the entire bundle of facts which would necessarily have to be proved by the plaintiff. His right of action depends on the assignment and would, therefore, constitute part of the cause of action. In — ‘Read v. Brown’, (1889) 22 QBD 128 (B), the cause of action was defined as
“including every fact necessary to be proved, if traversed, in order to enable plaintiff to sustain his action and which if not proved will give the defendant an immediate right to judgment.”
8. There the assignment was held to be a part of the cause of action. Krishnan, J. in — ‘Magamma v. Sathiraju’, AIR 1917 Mad 221 (C), made the following observation:
“Thus there is a strong current of authority in India for accepting the definition of cause of action in — ‘Read v. Brown (B)’, and I have no doubt we must follow it. If the words ‘cause of action’ mean the cause of action set out by the plaintiff in his plaint, as held by the Privy Council in — ‘Mt. Chand Kour v. Pratab Singh’, 15 Ind App 156 (PC) (D), above cited, we must necessarily hold that the assignment in plaintiff's favour is an essential part of his cause of action, for without it he could not have sued on the note as he has done. There is nothing in the language of Section 20 of the CPC, itself to show that a restricted meaning should be placed upon the expression ‘cause of action’.”
9. In — ‘Wadhumal v. Noor Ahmad’, AIR 1933 Sind 179 (E) : (1889) 22 QBD 128 (B) was followed and it was held:
“The words ‘cause of action’ may be defined as including every fact necessary to be proved in order to enable the plaintiff to sustain his action and this definition equally applies to a suit filed under Section 20, clause (c) of the CPC, on the strength of bona fide voluntary assignments made within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted.”
10. In — ‘Dilbagh Rai v. Walu Ram’, AIR 1933 Lah 940 (F), the promissory note was payable in the Montgomery district, but the assignment was made in the Multan district. The suit was instituted in the Multan district. The defendant raised the question of jurisdiction which was upheld by the trial Court and the plaint was returned for presentation to the proper Court. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge who held that the assignment having taken place in the Multan district, a part of the cause of action arose in that district and the suit was triable in the Multan Court. The defendant filed a revision before the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that no question of jurisdiction was involved. Regarding the merits of the objection in respect of jurisdiction, Bhide J. observed:
“I may further add that the decision of the learned District Judge on the point seems, to me to be correct. The plaintiff in the present case could not succeed without proving the assignment of the promissory note in his favour. The assignment had admittedly taken place in the Multan district and consequently, it must, I think, be held that the cause of action arose in part in the Multan district and the suit was therefore triable in that district.”
11. The lower Court treated these observations as obiter. It is true that the revision was dismissed on a different ground, but the observations have force as the question of jurisdiction was raised before and examined by Bhide J. in — ‘Harnathrai v. Churamoni Shah’, AIR 1934 Cal 175 (G), Ameer Ali J. held:
“In a suit by an assignee the assignment is a part of the cause of action and upon that cause of action leave is invariably granted. It is impossible before the hearing of the suit to decide whether an assignment is or is not bona fide and the Court will not be justified, on a mere suspicion that the assignor might not have acted in the ordinary way of business, in depriving the plaintiff of the right to bring a suit in the place where the assignment was made.”
12. In — ‘AIR 1938 Nag 262 (A)’, the facts, are distinguishable. That case related to the case of 2 hundis drawn by one Punamchand Bhikamchand of Nagpur on the firm of one Jivraj Agarchand of Bombay in favour of the 1st defendant Dalsukh Nathmal of Nagpur. Dalsukh Nathmal negotiated in favour of the 2nd defendant Prabhoolal who resided at Raipur. After a series of negotiations, ultimately they were negotiated in favour of the plaintiff who was a resident of Raipur by Chootanlal, defendant No. 5. These hundis were dishonoured and the drawee refused to accept them. The suit was filed at Raipur. The lower Court overruled the objection of the defendants on the question of jurisdiction and held that a part of the cause of action arose at Raipur. Dalsukh Nathmal filed a revision in the High Court. Bose J. on an interpretation of certain provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act held that no part of the cause of action arose at Raipur. The question of presentment and notice of dishonour does not arise in the case before me. Consequently, the reasons set out at pages 263 to 265 of Bose J.'s order do not govern the present case. I may also point out that the question which arises in this case did not arise for consideration in that case as well as-in — ‘Jivatlal Purtapshi v. Lalbhai Fulchand’, AIR 1942 Bom 251 (H).
13. I may also refer to the decision in — “Roghoonath Misser v. Gobindnarain’, 22 Cal 451” (I), where a hundi drawn at Benares on the drawer's firm at Bombay in favour of a firm at Mirzapur and Calcutta, was endorsed at Calcutta by the payee to a firm at Calcutta and dishonoured by the drawer's firm at Bombay. In a suit brought in Calcutta by the endorsee to recover the value of the ‘hundi’, the defence was raised that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was held that the endorsement having taken place in Calcutta, part of the cause of action arose in Calcutta so as to give the Court jurisdiction.
14. I hold that the lower Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. I set aside the order and direct the lower Court to proceed with the suit in accordance with law. The revision is allowed with costs.
B/R.G.D
15. Appeal dismissed.