1. This is a tenant's appeal against an appellate decree in ejectment of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Hooghly affirming that of the Munsif 2nd Court, Serampore. The suit for ejectment was brought by the landlord respondent under the Act of 1948 on the ground of default in payment of rent and of bona fide requirement of the landlord of the premises for his own use and occupation. Service of notice to quit was also pleaded. Both the courts have held that the notice to quit was properly served.
2. It was urged before the courts below and in this court also that there is a dispute as to whether the tenancy was according to the English calendar or the Bengali calendar.
3. Both the courts have held that as a question of fact the tenancy was under the Bengali calendar. It is clear that the tenancy began under the Bengali calendar. It appears that there was an application for fixation of standard rent before the Rent Controller which ended in a compromise dated the 11th of September, 1947. In the compromise it was stated that the rent would be increased from “this month”. The order of the Rent Controller showed that “this month” was interpreted by him as September, but whether the rent was increased for a part of the Bengali month or whole of the Bengali calendar month at that time is quite immaterial as to the terms of the tenancy because except as to enhancement of the rent the Rent Controller did not purport to affect the other terms of the tenancy at all. Therefore the courts below rightly held that the tenancy was governed by the Bengali calendar.
4. As regards bona fide requirement under the Act of 1948 the case of the plaintiff was that he was living in his sister's house in two rooms much to the inconvenience of the sister and much to his own inconvenience and he wanted to go back to his own house. The courts below have found that he required the accommodation and that he honestly wanted to shift from his sister's house. It has already been pointed out by this Court that the word “require” is something more than the word “desire”. It was said by Mr. Justice Buckland in the well-known decision in the case of Rekhab Chand Doogar v. J.R D'Cruz (1) [(1922) 26 C.W.N 499] that in the case of requirement there is an element of need. With great respect to the learned Judge it may be pointed out that the same element of need is also present in the case of desire. We do not desire what we do not need. Psychologists point out that there cannot be a desire without want or need. The real distinction between “desire” and “require” lies in the insistence of that need. There is an element of “must have” in the case of “require” which is not present in the case of mere “desire”. It is from this standpoint that the question of requirement has to be determined. The word “bona fide” or “in good faith” has got to be interpreted in the light of the definition of “in good faith” given in the Bengal General Clauses Act. “In good faith” according to that Act means “honestly” and without negligence. Therefore in the present case what has got to be seen is that there must be a sort of “must have” element in the need of the landlord and also that his want or need of the house must be honestly felt by him. That both the elements are satisfied in the present case will appear from the judgments of both the courts below. Under the circumstances the courts were right in granting a decree of ejectment. It has already been decided in numerous cases of this Court that the element of bona fide requirement in a suit or proceeding under the Act of 1948 must be determined by that Act and not in the light of the Act of 1950.
5. The decrees of the Courts below being right the appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellant is granted three months' time from this date to vacate the premises.
P.S