Deo, J.:— This judgment will also govern Second Appeal No. 18 of 1951. Second Appeal No. 17 of 1951 arises out of civil suit No. 127-A of 1946 for possession of survey No. 8 and Second Appeal No. 18 of 1951 arises out of civil suit No. 123-A of 1946 for possession of survey Nos. 2 and 6 of mouza Malvihir, taluq Chikhli, district Buldana.

2. The plaintiff-respondent who is a Jagirdar of the village sued the defendant tenant for ejectment on the ground that he was an annual tenant of these fields. The suit was instituted on the 4th May 1946 after giving notices determining the leases. According to the plaintiff, the defendant's grandfather was holding survey No. 8 under a lease dated the 5th December 1905 and survey Nos. 2 and 6 under a lease dated the 5th June 1901. As the lands were held under two separate leases, two suits were instituted. The leases were not executed by the lessor in favour of the lessee, but the tenant executed kabuliyats. Exhibit P-3 (in Civil suit no. 127-A of 1946) is the kabuliyat dated the 5th June 1901. It provides that the lessee will put the lessor in possession whenever the latter demands it and that in case the lessor desires to surrender the holding he will put the lessee in possession after ploughing it ready for sowing. The lease is thus not for a definite period. The kabuliyat dated the 5th December 1905 is not on record and is not traceable. The trial Court found that the lessee executed such a kabuliyat and the finding was not disputed either in the lower appellate Court or here. That kabuliyat is said to be similar in terms to Exhibit P-3. In both the suits the defendant claims to be an ante-alienation tenant holding land at a fair assessment or, in the alternative, as a tenant of antiquity.

3. The lower appellate Court found that the defendant had failed to prove that he was holding the land at a rent equal to fair assessment though he had proved that he was in possession prior to 1914 or that he bona fide believed that he was paying rent equal to fair assessment. It consequently held that the defendant was not an ante-alienation tenant. This finding is not disputed and could not fairly be disputed in this appeal in view of the decision in — ‘V.H Shastry v. R.B.V.P Puranik’, (1).

4. There is no evidence that the defendant's predecessors were in possession of these respective survey numbers prior to the dates of the kabuliyats. It is therefore clear that the defendant is not a tenant of antiquity; and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for possession on the date the suit was instituted.

5. During the pendency of the suit in the trial Court the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act (X of 1948) came into force on 2nd April 1948, and during the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate Court the Berar Tenancy Law Amendment Act (19 of 1950) came into force on the 12-5-1950. The defendant claims to be an ante-alienation tenant &, in the alternative, a tenant of antiquity under the former Act. He claims permanent tenancy under the latter Act.

6. Under S. 73A(4) as introduced by Act 5 of 1948, any suit instituted after 1st January 1835 or airy appeal or revision or other proceeding arising out of such suit pending in a civil Court on the date on which the amending Act came into force, i.e on the 2nd April 1948, shall be decided as if ss. 72 and 73 of the Code as amended by this Act were in force on the date of the institution of the suit. The Act is thus retrospective in operation and applies to pending cases.

7. Under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the as added by the amending Act, where, a tenant, not being an ante-alienation tenant, proves that he has personally or through his predecessor-in-title held land continuously for a period in excess of twenty years, he shall be deemed to be a tenant of antiquity unless the landlord proves that such tenant is an annual tenant or a tenant holding land under one or more valid written lease's covering the entire period of twenty years. It is admitted here that the defendant has been holding these lands for a period in excess of twenty years. That being so, the burden shifts on to the plaintiff to prove either that the defendant is an annual tenant or a tenant holding the land under one or more valid written leases covering the entire period of twenty years. See — ‘V.H Shastry v. R.B.V.P Puranik’, (supra).

8. It is admitted that there is no valid written lease covering the entire period of twenty years preceding the institution of this suit. Plaintiff has therefore to prove positively that the defendant is a tenant holding the land from year to year. Annual tenancy comes into existence either by (a) operation of law or (b) by contract. When the lease is for a definite term and the lessee continues in possession on the expiry of the term with the assent of the lessor and pays rent, he is a tenant by operation of law from year to year in the case of an agricultural tenancy. This is not the case here. In the other case the lessor has to prove that the agreement did not contain a clause relating to the period of tenancy.

9. Exhibit P-3 is the kabuliyat for survey Nos. 2 and 6. It is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. See — ‘Imam Ali v. Rani Priyawati Devi’, ILR (1938) Nag 31 and —‘Ganpat Balaji v. Kasturchand’, ILR (1945) Nag 510. It cannot therefore be referred to ascertain the terms on which the land was held by the tenant. An agricultural lease could be created by an oral lease accompanied by delivery of possession. There is no oral evidence about the terms of the lease. The unregistered kabuliyat is admissible only for the purpose of proving the relation of lessor and lessee. The plaintiff has thus failed to prove that the defendant is an annual tenant.

10. The defendant resists the suit on another ground. He claims permanent tenancy in view of S. 47(1A), Berar Alienated Villages Tenancy Law, 1921 as amended on the 12th May 1950 (Act 19 of 1950). This Act came into force during the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate Court. Though there is no formal amendment of the written statement, the facts necessary for this contention are apparent from the record. That section provides:

“An ordinary tenant who, at the commencement of the agricultural year 1950–1951, has been in possession of land either personally or through his predecessor-in-title continuously from a date previous to the first day of April 1940,….shall, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, be deemed to be the permanent tenant of the land.”

11. It is found that there is no agreement to the contrary between the parties. The lower appellate Court disallowed this contention because the possession was interrupted by the plaintiff. The plaintiff obtained an ex parte decree in both these suits on 9-9-1947 and he took possession shortly thereafter. This decree was set aside in appeal on the 24th March 1949 and the defendant was restored to possession thereafter. In view of these facts, it is argued that the defendant was not in continuous possession as required by Act 19 of 1950 and consequently he cannot take advantage of that law. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the plaintiff cannot take advantage of an erroneous decree passed by the Court, in this very suit and his possession must be deemed to be a possession on behalf of the defendant. This argument seems to be sound and the defendant is entitled to the protection of Act 19 of 1950.

12. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff, however, contends that both Act 10 of 1948 and Act 19 of 1950 are ultra vires.

13. Act 13 of 1950 was passed after the Constitution came into force but was not assented to by the President. The provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Constitution are similar on matters in controversy. It is said, the Provincial Government is empowered to compulsorily acquire land only for the purposes specified in Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that too on payment of a reasonable compensation. No such provision is made in this Act. Secondly it is urged that the Provincial Legislature is not empowered to make laws unsettling decrees of civil Courts unless the Act has received the assent of the Governor-General. These are no doubt substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Constitution. Consequently a notice under Order 27A, rule 1 of the CPC, will issue to the Advocate General.

14. Under Chapter 1, rule 9(2) of the Rules of the High Court, a Judge sitting alone shall refer any proceeding other than an original proceeding including a suit pending before him to the Chief Justice with a recommendation that it be placed before a Bench of two Judges when it invokes a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act or of any Order in Council made thereunder. Let these papers be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for orders with a recommendation to constitute a Bench of two Judges to decide the question of ultra vires nature of the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1948, 10 of 1948, & of the Berar Tenancy Law Amendment Act, 1950 (19 of 1950).

ORDER OF REFERENCE

15. In S.A Nos. 818 and 860 of 1950 D/- 27-8-1951.

16. This is plaintiffs' appeal in a suit for possession of survey No. 87, area 22 acres and 35 gunthas, assessment Rs. 32/- of the alienated village mouza Yelgan Jagir.

17. Nurullakhan, father of defendant no. 1, who was then the certificate-holder of the Jagir village, instituted civil suit No. 116-A of 1937, decided on the 16th December 1937, against the plaintiffs' predecessors Sampat and Bapu, sons of Amarsingn, and obtained a decree for possession of the survey number on the ground that Sampat was an annual tenant. Bapu was joined as he was then in possession. The cause of action was not forfeiture of the terms of the lease but a notice under section 74(2) of the Berar Land Revenue Code determining the tenancy. In this suit both Sampat and Bapu admitted that Sampat was an annual tenant of the grandfather of the present certificate-holder. They claimed that the other co-sharers made them ante-alienation tenants under a kabuliyat dated the 6th January 1937. It was held that the cosharers had no right to confer on them the status of ante-alienation tenants. The suit was decreed and Sampat and Bapu were dispossessed sometime in 1938.

18. On the 11th January 1949 the heirs of Sampat and Bapu instituted this suit out of which this appeal arises for possession of the survey number from the certificate-holder and the tenant (defendant no. 2) created by him subsequent to 1938. According to the plaintiffs their predecessors were holding this survey number continuously since at least 1901 at a rent equal in amount to fair assessment, that at any rate they bona fide believed that the rent so paid was equal in amount to fair assessment, and that consequently they must be deemed to be ante-alienation tenants under Section 2 of the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act (X of 1948). Alternatively, it was pleaded that Sampat and Bapu and their predecessors-in-title held this land continuously for a period in excess of twenty years and must be deemed to be tenants of antiquity, under the proviso to S. 73(1) of the Code, added by the said amending Act. It was pleaded that in either case they were entitled to be restored to possession under S. 73A(4) of the Code as added by the amending Act.

19. Both the Courts below have found that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that they were ante-alienation tenants even under the law as amended by Act 10 of 1948. This finding is not disputed here.

20. It is common ground that Amarsingh was occupant of this land from 1917 and after his death Sampat and Bapu were continuously in possession till they were ejected in 1938. In his written statement the defendant no. 2 has specifically alleged that Amarsingh had no right to the field till he executed a kabuliyat dated the 12th November 1917 in favour of the certificate-holder. It is also admitted that one Dagdu was a tenant before Amarsingh. According to the plaintiffs' witnesses the transaction took the form of surrender by Dagdu in favour of the Jagirdar and kabuliyat by the new tenant in his favour, but these witnesses had not seen the execution of these documents nor had they seen the documents at any time. Both the documents, if they existed, must, be with defendant no. 1 who remained ex parte in the trial Court. He was not joined as a party in the lower appellate Court nor here. As a matter of fact, he had no interest left in this litigation.

21. The parties did not care to get the surrender & lease deeds on record, nor have they adduced any secondary evidence of their contents after making out a case for leading secondary evidence. It must therefore be held that the execution of these documents is not proved. There is thus no legal transfer by Dagdu in favour of Amarsingh. Consequently, Dagdu is not the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-title. On the plaintiff's own case the surrender extinguished the tenant-rights of Dagdu and Amarsingh's tenant-rights commenced by the grant by the certificate-holder in his favour; and that grant is, according to the defendant, dated the 12th November 1917. Even so, Amarsingh, Sampat and Bapu were in possession for more than twenty years prior to their dispossession.

22. Having proved that the plaintiffs' predecessors held land continuously for a period in excess, of twenty years, they must be deemed to be tenants of antiquity under the aforesaid proviso to s. 73(1) of the Code, unless the landlord proves that Sampat and Bapu were annual tenants or tenants holding the land under one or more valid written leases covering the entire period of twenty years. It is not the defendants' case that these persons were holding land under one or more valid written leases. The defendant No. 2 must therefore prove that they were annual tenants. The tenants in an alienated village may be classified as under:

1. Ante-alienation tenants either under the old law or under the law as amended by Act 10 of 1948

2. Tenants of antiquity under the old law

3. Tenants in possession for more than twenty years holding land

(a) under one or more valid written leases covering the entire period of twenty years,

(b) as annual tenants, or

(c) as tenants of antiquity under the amended law.

4. Tenants in possession for less than twenty years either under a valid written lease or as annual tenants or as tenants holding over.

23. If the landlord fails to prove that the tenants in class (3) fall either in sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b), they shall be deemed to be tenants of antiquity under the amended law. Defendant no. 2 pleaded that Amarsingh was holding under the kabuliyat dated the 12th November 1947 and that it was a lease for indefinite period terminable at the will of the landlord. This plea cannot be accepted-on account of non-production of the original, kabuliyat, or in the absence of any valid secondary evidence.

24. The defendant further relies on the judgment in the previous suit (Ext. P—1) in which is recorded the defendants' admission that Sampat was an annual tenant. The written statement of the defendants in that suit is not placed on record and it is not known whether this admission was qualified or unqualified. It is true that these tenants could not be ejected unless they were annual tenants within the meaning of s. 74(1), liable to be ejected on a notice under s. 74(2). Though there is no express finding in the previous suit that the defendants there were annual tenants, that finding must be assumed in view of the decree for possession.

25. The defendant No. 2 next relies on Ext. P—3 which is an order of the record-of-rights officer, passed on the 1st August 1935. This order is inadmissible to prove the status and must be wholly excluded from consideration. See —‘Baba v. Raje Jagjiwanrao’ . The learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the decision (Ext. P—1) must be ignored otherwise, the amended provision which entitles the tenant to possession on the ground that he is a tenant of antiquity will be otiose.

26. Section 74(1) of the Code runs thus:

“Save as otherwise provided in this law, when a tenant is in possession of land and no agreement exists relating to the period of his tenancy, such tenant shall be deemed to be an annual tenant holding from year to year and each year shall be the agricultural year.”

27. There was no provision regarding the length of possession at the time the former suit was decided, as we and now by the amending Act X of 1948. Annual tenancy comes into existence either by (a) operation of law or (b) contract. When the lease is for a definite term and the lessee continues in possession on the expiry of the term with the as-sept of the lessor and pays rent, he is a tenant by operation of law as one holding over from year to year if the lease is for agricultural purposes. Admittedly, the plaintiffs are not tenants holding over. In the other case, the lessor has to prove that the agreement did not contain a clause regarding the period of tenancy.

28. At the time the former suit was decided any length of possession under a lease for indefinite term did not confer the status of a tenant of antiquity. But the law now provides that a tenant in possession in excess of twenty years will be entitled to such status. If it were enough for the lessor to prove that the lease is for an indefinite period, the amended section becomes otiose. On a true, construction of s. 74(1) in the light of the amendment made by Act X of 1948, it must be held that the annual, tenant referred to in the proviso added to s. 73(1) is the tenant holding over. The decision Exhibit P—2 is therefore not ‘res judicata’. The respondents have thus failed to prove that the plaintiffs are annual tenants. Plaintiffs are thus tenants of antiquity and are entitled to be restored to possession in view of section 73A(4) added by the amending Act X of 1948.

29. The learned Counsel for the respondents however contends that the Act X of 1940 is ‘ultra vires’ the Provincial Legislature. According to him the defendant No. 1 obtained possession of the land on the determination of the plaintiffs' tenancy in execution of a decree of a competent civil Court and granted a valid lease to defendant No. 2. By the amending Act the Provincial Legislature has enabled the plaintiffs to compulsorily acquire the land from defendant No. 2 and that too without any compensation. It is said, the Provincial Government is empowered to compulsorily acquire land only for the purposes specified in Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and that too on payment of a reasonable compensation. No such provision is made in this Act. Secondly it is urged that the Provincial Legislature is not empowered to make laws unsettling decrees of civil courts unless the Act has received the assent of the Governor-General. These are no doubt substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935. Consequently, a notice under Order 27 A, Rule 1 of the CPC, will issue to the Advocate General.

30. Under Chapter 1, rule 9(2) of the Rules of the High Court, a Judge sitting alone shall refer any proceeding other than an original proceeding including a suit pending before him to the Chief Justice with a recommendation that it be placed before a Bench of two Judges when it involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act or of any Order in Council made thereunder. Let these papers be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for orders with a recommendation to constitute a Bench of two Judges to decide whether Act 10 of 1948 is ‘ultra vires’ the Provincial Legislature.

31. Note—The opinion given by the Division Bench governs both the orders of reference and was as follows.

32. OPINION: Dev, J. has referred two points for opinion to a larger bench. They are (i) whether Act 10 of 1948 of the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1948, is ‘ultra vires’ the Provincial Legislature & (ii) whether Act 19 of 1950 of the Berar Tenancy Law Amendment Act, 1950, is ‘ultra vires’ the State Legislature. The ‘vires’ of these two enactments was challenged before him in Second Appeals Nos. 17 and 18 of 1951, while the ‘vires’ only of Act 10 of 1948 was challenged before him in Second Appeals Nos. 818 of 1350 and 860 of 1950. In all these four appeals the appellants are tenants in Jahagir villages in Berar. Second Appeals Nos. 818 of 1950 and 860 of 1900 arise out of suits instituted by the tenants against their respective landlords for restoration of possession of certain fields which were in their respective possession as tenants till their ejectment by their respective landlords in execution of decrees for ejectment obtained by the landlords.

33. In those suits, the contention of the landlords was that the present appellants were their annual tenants. That contention was upheld and the tenants' contention that they were tenants of antiquity was negatived. Subsequent to the amendment of the Tenancy Law in Berar by Act 10 of 1948, the appellants in these two appeals instituted suits for restoration of possession of their respective fields. Those suits were however dismissed by the lower appellate Court and so they have come up in Second Appeals. The appellants in Second Appeals Nos. 17 and 18 of 1951, were defendants to the suits instituted by Mohammad Alimulla Khan, who is the landlord of each of these appellants.

34. The landlord's contention in both these suits was that the appellants were his lessees for different periods while the contention of the appellants was that they were ante-alienation tenants, or, at any rate, tenants of antiquity. The contentions of the appellants were negatived by both the Courts below. Deo J. has however held that the appellants in these two appeals as well as the appellants in Second Appeals Nos. 818 of 1950 and 860 of 1950 are tenants of antiquity in view of the amended definition of ‘Tenants of antiquity’ introduced by Act 10 of 1948. The appellants in Second Appeals Nos. 818 of 1950 and 860 of 1950 alternatively claimed before Deo J. that they are, at any rate, entitled to claim permanent tenancy under Act 19 of 1950. Deo J. has held that the alternative case set up by the appellants in these two appeals is good and that they are entitled to the protection of Act 19 of 1350. The only ground on which the landlords can hope to succeed is by showing that the two Acts are ‘ultra vires’ the Legislature.

35. It may be mentioned that in Second Appeals Nos. 818 of 1950 and 880 of 1950 the landlords after having obtained possession of the fields from their tenants concerned had let them out to others. These persons have been joined as defendants to the tenants' suits for restoration of possession and it is contended on their behalf that as there is no provision for compensation to them the Amending Act of 1948 being inconsistent with the provisions of Section 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was ‘ultra vires’ and further, that to the extent to which it is inconsistent with Article 31(2) of the Constitution, it is rendered void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution.

36. A ‘Tenant of antiquity’ is defined thus in section 73(1) of the Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928:

“Where by reason of the antiquity of a tenancy in an alienated village or holding, no satisfactory evidence of its commencement and of its period is forthcoming, and there is no usage of the locality as to such period, the period shall, as against the landlord of the tenant, be presumed to be co-extensive with the duration of the tenure of such landlord and those who derive title under him.

Such tenant is called a tenant of antiquity and his rights shall be heritable and transferable in accordance with his personal law.

Explanation.— ‘Antiquity’ does not mean absolute antiquity, but means antiquity in reference to the difficulty of securing evidence.”

37. To this definition the following proviso was added by Act X of 1948:

“Provided that where a tenant not being an ante-alienation tenant proves that he has personally or through his predecessor-in-title held land continuously for a period in excess of twenty years shall be deemed to be a tenant of antiquity unless the landlord proves that such tenant is an annual tenant or a tenant holding the land under one or more valid written leases covering the entire period of twenty years.”

38. That Act further enacted two other provisions, sections 73-A and 73-B which run thus:

“73-A. (1) If after the 1st January 1935 any tenant in an alienated village or holding has been, ejected from any agricultural land as a result of any decree or order in a suit or other proceeding filed or initiated after the said date on the ground that such tenant is an annual tenant and if the tenant had been in possession of such land for a period and under circumstances which would have entitled him to be declared an ante-alienation tenant or a tenant of antiquity in respect of such land had ss. 72 and 73 of the said Code as amended by the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1948, been then in force, such tenant may, notwithstanding any decree or order of a Civil Court to the contrary, institute a suit in a Civil Court claiming back the possession of such land.

(2) Such suit shall be dismissed if it is not instituted within a period of two years from the date of commencement of this Act.

(3) If such a suit is instituted within the period aforesaid, the Court shall decide the same as if ss. 72 and 73 of the said Code as amended by the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1948, were in force on the 1st January 1935 and if the Court finds in favour of the plaintiff, it shall pass an order putting the plaintiff in possession of the land to which the aforesaid suit related:

(i) from the commencement of the next agricultural year if such land is, on the date of the decision, in the possession of the landlord or an annual tenant; or

(ii) from the date immediately following the date of the expiry of the lease if the land is, on the date of the decision, in possession of a lessee for a period exceeding one year under a valid lease in writing.

(4) Any suit instituted after the 1st January 1935 or any appeal, revision or other proceeding arising out of any such suit pending in a Civil Court on the date on which the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1948, comes into force in which the tenant is sought to be ejected from any such land on the ground that he is an annual tenant shall be continued and decided as if Ss. 72 and 73 of the said Code as amended by the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1948, were in force on the date of the institution of the suit.

73-B. (1) If a Civil Court passes a decree restoring the tenant in possession of the land under sub-section (3) of section 73-A, any person adversely affected thereby may make an application to the Court claiming compensation for any improvement made by him on the land before the date of institution of the suit under sub-section (1) of section 73-A.

(2) On receipt of such application the Court shall assess the amount of compensation payable to the applicant and in doing so shall have regard to—

(i) the amount by which the letting value or the produce of the holding, or the value of such produce, is increased by the improvement; and

(ii) the labour and capital required for the making of the improvement.

(3) No person whose claim for compensation has been allowed under sub-section (2), shall be dispossessed of the land until he has received the amount of compensation assessed by the Court under the said sub-section.”

39. In the year 1950, Act 19 of 1950 was passed and this Act introduced two more provisions, Ss. 73-C and 73-D. They run thus:

“73-C. (1) In any alienated village or holding any person who

(i) at the commencement of the agricultural year 1950–1951 is in possession of land as an annual tenant and has held such land either personally or through his predecessor-in-title continuously from a date previous to the first day of April 1940; or

(ii) holds, as lessee, land in the agricultural year 1949–1950 under a valid lease for a term of not less than ten years executed in his favour or in favour of his predecessor-in-title; shall from the commencement of the agricultural year 1950–1951 be deemed to be a permanent tenant of such land.

Explanation: A person shall be deemed to have been continuously in possession at the commencement of the agricultural year 1950–1951 from a date previous to the first day of April 1940, though he may have been ejected on or after the first day of April 1949, if he has been re-instated under S. 73-D.

(2) The provisions contained in sub-Ss. (2) to (6) of S. 73 of the said Code, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract to the contrary, apply to a permanent tenant as they apply to a tenant of antiquity.

73-D. (1) Any annual tenant who has been ejected on or after the first day of April 1949 from his holding or any portion thereof under a decree or order of a Civil Court and who, if he had not been so ejected would be deemed under sub-S. (1) of S. 73-C to be a permanent tenant thereof, may apply to a Revenue Officer within one year from the coming into force of the Berar Tenancy Law Amendment Act, 1950, to be reinstated, in possession of such holding or portion thereof.

(2) The Revenue Officer, shall, after such inquiry as he deemed fit, fix rent of the holding or portion thereof and shall re-instate the tenant.

(3) Any suit or any appeal or any revision pending on the date on which the Berar Tenancy Law Amendment Act, 1950, comes into force in which a tenant to whom sub-S. (1) of 73-C applies is sought to be ejected from any land on the ground that he is an annual tenant, shall, if the tenant is in possession of the land on the date of the commencement of the Berar Tenancy Law Amendment Act, 1950, be continued and decided as if Section 73-C were in force on the date of the institution of the suit”.

40. It is argued that the two enactments in so far as they have, a retrospective effect are ‘ultra vires’ the Legislature, firstly, because, they thereby take away the right to hold property without compensation and, secondly, because the law was not within the competence of the Provincial Legislature. It is also urged in Second Appeals Nos. 818 and 860 of 1950 that the law permitting restoration of possession to the tenants who were ejected under decrees of Courts was ‘ultra vires’ because the Provincial Legislature had no power to pass a law unsettling decrees of civil Courts as this would amount to exercise by the Legislature of judicial power which was reserved by the Constitution for Courts of law only.

41. We find it convenient to deal with the argument regarding the legislative competence first. That argument is that the law in question which purports to have been made under Entry No. 21 in List II of Schedule 7 of the Government of India Act, 1935, does not properly fall within that entry in so far as it deals with ex-landlords and also because it is not open to the State Legislature to enact a law authorising compulsory acquisition of land without providing for payment of compensation. The entry reads thus:

“Land that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord & tenant & the collection of rents; transfer, alienation and devolution of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonisation; Courts of Wards; encumbered and attached estate; treasure trove’.

42. Shri Dabir, one of the landlords' counsel, argued on the authority of — ‘Ganeshdas Ramgopal v. Jamuna*’, (1945) I.L.R 24 Pat 449 — ‘Matrimall Satnarain v. Mt. Rami’, and — ‘Sundermull v. Ladhuram Kaluram’, (2) that after landlord gives a notice to the tenant terminating his tenancy, such a person ceases to be a tenant of the demised premises and, since he is thereafter liable to leave the premises, his continuance in possession despite termination of his tenancy is nothing but a trespass. That may be so, but it seems to us that it was within the competence of the Provincial Legislature, while enacting the law relating to land or land tenures or regulating the relations between ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ to define the terms ‘landlord’ and “tenant”. As held in — ‘Empress v. Burah’, (3) and other cases the Provincial Legislature has plenary powers to legislate on any matter committed to it by the Constitution Act. It could therefore make a law which would be retroactive in its operation and, in our opinion, it could so amend the definition of ‘tenant’ as to include a person whose tenancy had been determined by the landlord by giving notice.

43. The learned counsel also referred us to the recent decision of the Patna High Court in — ‘Bankey v. Jhingan*’, (4). In that case, the question was whether a law seeking to give effect to an award made on the 20th May 1939 by Dr. Rajendra Prasad (now the President of the Union) was a valid law. Under that award, it may be mentioned, the possession of the land with regard to which there was dispute was given to a number of raiyats. These persons however did not apply to the Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the award for filing of the award according to the provisions of Schedule II, Rule 20(1) of the CPC which was then in force; nor was the award registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act.

44. The zamindars who were affected adversely by the award did not accept the decision and instituted suits for recovery of possession of the lands from the persons to whom they had been given under the award. One of those cases had actually gone up to the High Court and the decision of the Courts below in favour of the zamindars was upheld. The object of the Act, which was passed to ensure continuance in possession of raiyats in whose favour the award had been given was

“to declare the possession of certain raiyats on certain lands of Barahiya Tal and to-nullify decrees and orders inconsistent with such possession”

45. That Act consists of only three sections of which, the first gives the short title. The second is as follows:

“The persons described in column 3 of the schedule shall be deemed to have been in possession as raiyats on the twentieth day of May 1939, of the lands described in the corresponding entires in columns 4 and 5 thereof and shown in the maps attested by Mr. M.M Phillip, I.C.S Collector of Monghyr, on the thirty-first day of March 1940, and kept in the record room of Collector at Monghyr.”

46. Under the third section a suit to question anything done in pursuance of the Act is barred and anything done in pursuance of the decree made after 20th May 1939 was declared to be null and void. According to Jha C.J this law was referable to entry No. 18 of the Constitution (corresponding to entry No. 21 of the Government of India Act, 1935) fell outside its scope. Chatterji J., who was-the other Judge associated with the C.J in this case, on the other hand, held that the legislation related to land and was within the competence of the State Legislature. Thus, according to him, this law was clearly referable to entry No. 18.

47. Reference is made by the learned counsel to the provision of Section 299(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, which reads thus:

“No Bill or amendment making provision for the transference to public ownership of any land or for the extinguishment or modification of rights therein, including rights or privileges in respect of land revenue, shall be introduced or moved in either Chamber of the Federal Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General in his discretion, or in a Chamber of Provincial Legislature without the-previous sanction of the Governor in his discretion.”

48. On the basis of this provision it is said that previous sanction of the Governor was not obtained before the Bill which was ultimately passed into the Act of 1948 was introduced in the Provincial Legislature and that therefore the Act was no law at all. There is nothing to show that previous sanction of the Governor was not obtained before the Bill was introduced in the Provincial Assembly. A presumption is always to be raised in favour of the regularity of an official act and we must presume that the conditions of S. 299(3) were satisfied before the Bill in question was introduced in the Legislature. Even assuming that sanction of the Governor was not obtained before the Bill was introduced, all that could have been done was to object to the consideration of the Bill in the Assembly. Failure to obtain previous sanction would not, in our opinion, invalidate the Act which was eventually passed, particularly because that Act did, eventually, receive the assent of the Governor.

49. The next argument of Shri Dabir that the law was beyond the competence of the Legislature because the right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution is indirectly affected by its operation, is equally unsound. In the Patna case, just cited, a similar argument was advanced but was negatived. We may also mention that in — ‘Ganpatrao Pande v. The State’, it was argued that under Article 245 of the Constitution which corresponds to Section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the power of the State Legislature to make a law ‘is subject to the provisions of the Constitution’ and therefore the Legislature lacked initial jurisdiction to enact the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahais and Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (which was the law challenged before this Court) since it contravened the fundamental rights conferred by cl. 2 of Article 31.

50. The argument was repelled by this Court following the view taken in — ‘Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar’, and it was held that the Legislature has jurisdiction to pass a law even though it contravenes cl. 2 of Article 31. The view taken by this Court has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court in — ‘State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh’, .

51. The argument then is that by passing retroactive provisions which had the effect of unsettling decrees of Court of law the Legislature exercised judicial power, reserved by the Constitution to Courts of law only, and thus did something which was not permitted by the Constitution. Reliance Was strongly placed on the decision in — Bankey v. Jhingan*’, , cited earlier in support of this argument. In view of the decision of the Federal Court in — ‘Piare Dusadh v. King Emperor’, (5) (which is referred to as Piare Dusadh's case in the judgment in the Patna case), it must be taken to be beyond; question that in India the Legislature is competent to put an end to the finality of a decision of a Court and reopen a past controversy and even to pass validating Acts and that enactment of a law having such effects does not constitute exercise of judicial functions by the Legislature. It would appear that in the Patna case the Legislature after passing a law which had the effect of nullifying decisions of Courts also purported to adjudicate upon the rights of the Zamindars and rayats who were parties to the decrees.

52. According to the learned Patna Judges, this amounted to exercise of judicial power and was not warranted by the decision of the Federal Court. Whether their view is correct or not need not be considered by us because the provisions impugned before us are of a different kind. Under neither of the laws impugned before us, the Legislature purports to adjudicate upon the rights of landlords or tenants. What it does is to confer a right on a tenant belonging to a certain class who has been ejected from his holding subsequent to a particular date to institute a suit in a Civil Court or make an application to a revenue court for obtaining restitution of possession Clearly therefore, the ultimate decision was left to a Court or a tribunal. Neither law is thus, bad on the particular ground urged by the learned counsel.

53. The next argument to be considered is whether the laws are bad inasmuch as they take away the landlord's property without making any provision for compensation. The argument is based on the assumption that these laws take away the landlord's property. We must therefore first examine the premise & ascertain how far, if at all, any of the provisions of these laws takes away the property of the landlord.

54. The newly added proviso to section 73(1) merely enacts a rule of evidence by raising a presumption of tenancy of antiquity in the case of a tenant who has personally or through his predecessor-in-title held land continuously for a period in excess of twenty years. Under the proviso, it is, open to the landlord to rebut the presumption by proving either that the tenant is an annual tenant or that he has been holding land under one or more valid written leases covering the entire period of 20 years. In our opinion, this proviso does not take away the landlord's property at all. It is, however, said that if this proviso is read with S. 73A(1) and 73A(3) or with S. 73-A(4), it must clearly be deemed to take away the landlord's property.

55. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 73-A, will have to be read with the proviso where a tenant who has been ejected from his holding in pursuance of a decree obtained by the landlord after the 1st of January 1933 institutes a suit for reinstatement of possession. Similarly, sub-S. (4) of S. 73-A will have to be read with the proviso when a suit is instituted by the landlord after the 1st of January 1935, or any appeal, revision or other proceedings arising out of any such suit pending in a civil Court on the date on which the Berar Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1948, came into force. Apart from these circumstances, the new provisions need not be read along with the proviso.

56. The question then is whether, when sub-sections (1) and (3) of S. 73-A or sub-S. (4) of S. 73-A fall to be read with the proviso to sub-S. (1) of S. 73, the right to property possessed by the landlord is taken away. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 73-A enable a tenant who was ejected from his holding after the 1st of January 1935 to institute a suit for claiming back the possession of his land if he satisfies the conditions of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 73. On being satisfied that such a tenant falls within, the proviso to section 73(1) the Court is bound to put him back in possession of the land from which he was ejected.

57. The question then is whether compelling a landlord to restitute possession of the land to the tenant, which was lawfully obtained by the landlord is inconsistent with the right of the landlord to hold or dispose of property or whether it materially derogates from the right of the landlord to hold or dispose of the property. Part III of the Constitution deals with Fundamental Rights. One of the Fundamental Rights is the right to freedom, and one of the components of the right to freedom is the right specified in Article 19(1)(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.

58. In — ‘Manohar v. G.G Desai, D.C yeotmal’, , it was contended that ‘to hold’ means to ‘possess’ and where (as here) a person is compelled to make over possession of his property to another, the right comprised in Article 19(1)(f) is infringed. The argument was repelled in the following words:—

“The question next to be considered is whether the Act has been rendered unconstitutional because of the provisions of Articles 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The relevant part of Article 19 guarantees to a citizen the right ‘to acquire, hold and dispose of property’. According to the learned counsel, ‘hold’ means to ‘possess’ and as the act of requisitioning interferes with that right, it is unconstitutional. The word ‘hold’ has several meanings one of which is no doubt ‘possess’ but then it also means “be the owner of (property)”. Whether to give the word the meaning contended for by counsel or some other meaning would depend upon the context.

Taken in the context of the preceding word ‘acquire’ and that of the following words ‘dispose of’, it seems that the word ‘hold’ can have no other meaning than ‘own’ or ‘be the owner of’. To assign this meaning to the word would, in our view, be in consonance with the well established canons of interpretation. By the act of requisitioning the ownership of the owner would not be affected. For, despite requisitioning, the owner would continue to have the power to deal with his property in any manner he likes, except letting it out or be in possession thereof. Such an abridgement of his rights would not, however, amount to a violation of Article 19(1)(f).”

59. Placing restrictions on the right of the landlord by compelling him to hand over possession of his land to a tenant is, thus, only an abridgement of his right thereto, that is, if Sub-sections (1) and (3) of section 73-A of the Berar Land Revenue Code, in so far as they lead to such an abridgement, are said to be in derogation of the rights comprised in Article 19(1)(f). We must bear in mind that provision is subject to the provisions of clause (5) of Article 19 which runs thus:

“Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes or prevents the State from making any law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.”

60. It will be seen that this clause enables the State to make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by Article 19(1)(f) in the interests of the general public. As we have said, the provisions of sub-ss.; (1) and (3) of s. 73-A do not, in our judgment, take away completely the landlord's right to hold and dispose of the property. Indeed, they do not go beyond placing certain restrictions on the right of the landlord to hold or dispose of the property.

61. We were referred to the decision in — ‘Subodh Gopal v. Behari Lal’, (para 33 onwards) for ascertaining what should be the test of reasonable restrictions. We agree with the learned Judges that restrictions should not be greater than the mischief it is intended to prevent and that it should be in the interest of the general public to place them. It is for the Legislature to scrutinize the need for restrictions and also, in the first instance, to decide upon their reasonableness. As to the need for restrictions, the judgment of the Legislature must be regarded as final as has been so Often laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council. The question of their reasonableness is justiciable and a Court has undoubtedly the power to go into that question when reasonableness of the restrictions is challenged before it.

62. As pointed out in — ‘Iswari Prosad v. N.R Sen’ the question whether the restrictions placed on a landlord's rights are justified must be determined by having regard to the circumstances which would inevitably arise if the landlord were free to exercise his rights without let or hindrance. The learned Advocate-general referred us to the objects and reasons which led to the enactment of the impugned laws and also referred us to two decisions of this Court interpreting ss. 72 and 73 of the Berar Land Revenue Code in a way which was not in consonance with the intention of the Legislature when these provisions were enacted and as a result of which a large body of tenants were evicted or were threatened to be evicted. Bearing in mind these circumstances, we are clear that in the interest of law and order and good government, restrictions had to be placed on the landlord's right to evict tenants. Such restrictions could be placed under Article 19(5) of the Constitution. The mere fact that by reason of these restrictions a landlord is precluded from exercising certain rights to property would not attract Article 31(2) of the Constitution either.

63. We were however again referred to the decision in — ‘Bankey v. Jhingan*’, where a contrary view appears to have been taken and a law which places restrictions on the landlord's proprietary right has been held bad as it did not provide for compensation. In our view, placing of reasonable restrictions is specifically permitted by Article 19(5) of the Constitution and a law of this kind does not relate to ‘acquisition’ and thus falls outside the puriew of Article 31(2). We therefore respectfully dissent from the view taken in that case.

64. It was then said that assuming that the Legislature having thought it necessary to place certain restrictions on the landlord's rights in 1948 could place such restrictions, it bad no power to place them retrospectively. According to the learned counsel, only the Legislature which functioned on the date from which the amended law was to take effect (retrospectively) could decide upon the reasonableness of the restrictions and therefore effect a law or laws placing such restrictions. The Legislature which functioned on the 1st April 1935 was one constituted under the Government of India Act, 1919, and its complexion, constitution and powers were different from those of the Legislature which enacted the Amending Act of 1948. Similarly, the complexion, constitution and powers of the Legislature deemed to be functioning in the year 1940 were different from those of the Legislature which enacted the Amending Act of 1950.

65. Even so, the Legislature must be deemed to be performing the same functions of legislating for the good of the community as a whole; and what the Courts have to look to is the latest will of the Legislature as expressed in the laws enacted by it and give effect to it. When the Legislature expresses its latest will the Courts will have to assume that was its will from the beginning when it legislated on the particular topic.

66. There is another reason why we cannot accept this argument. It is always open to a Legislature to specify the point of time from which a law or a particular provision thereof, will operate, we do not see any reason why when the provision amounts to a restriction upon the right to property it is incompetent for the Legislature to specify a point of time which is anterior to the date of legislation itself. Indeed, if the Legislature thinks that it is necessary to give the restriction retrospective operation it can very well give such operation. No doubt, the restrictions have to be reasonable and the judge of the reasonableness of the restrictions must be the Legislature which imposed them, in the first instance. The question whether the predecessor of the Legislature which placed the restrictions, that is, the Legislature which was actually functioning at the date on which the restrictions were to become operative would have thought it fit and reasonable to place such restrictions, therefore, does not arise.

67. It was argued that the need for enacting a law having prospective operation is one thing and need for enacting a law which is retrospective in its operation is quite another thing, and that it is open to the Court to consider whether it was proper for the Legislature to enact a law having retrospective effect. No authority is cited in support of the proposition that a Court has power to question the judgment of the Legislature in the matter of giving a law retrospective operation. In our opinion, the contention of the learned counsel is unsound and cannot be accepted.

68. We are also of the opinion that this law is in the interests of general public even though its object is to ameliorate the conditions of only a class of persons. For one thing it is part of a scheme for land reforms. Then again the class which the Legislature had in view is a large one and the interests of the general public are necessarily bound up with the interest of this class. A law enacted for the benefit of a class must, in this context, be regarded as a law made in the public interest. Here, we may refer to the following observations of Harries C.J in — ‘Iswari Prosad v. N.R Sen’, AIR 1952 Cal 273 at p. 278:

“I do not think it can possibly be said that the words ‘in the interests of the general public’ mean ‘in the interests of the public of the whole of the Republic of India’. Legislation may be essential to redress some urgent grievance, for example in a particular State, though such legislation would be wholly unnecessary in any other State. The fact that such legislation would not affect citizens in other States would not in my opinion, make it impossible to say that such legislation was not in the interests of the general public.

The phrase ‘in the interests of the general public’ means I think nothing more than ‘in the public interest’ and it may well be that legislation affecting a limited class of persons or a limited area might well be legislation in the public interests, though the public of other parts of India might not be directly affected by such legislation. The matter may be in the interest of the general public, though the public generally may not be directly affected by such legislation. If they are indirectly affected that would be quite sufficient to make such legislation in the public interest. Legislation affecting a particular class or a particular area would only directly affect the members of that class or the inhabitants of that particular area. But the removal of some serious abuse or grievance or discontent is a matter indirectly affecting the public generally. It is not in the interests of the general public or in the public interest to allow any class of persons to labour under some grievance and to be genuinely discontented. It is in the interests of the general public or in the public interest that all classes of the citizens of India are content and that their grievances should be removed.

A festering sore on the human body may eventually affect the whole body though at first its effect is localised. Grievances or discontent in some particular area or in some State or in-some class of persons may eventually affect the whole republic of India, though originally the effects might be limited. The removal of any grievance, abuse or discontent is a matter not only of local interest but of general interest and where the discontent or grievance is genuine it may well be in the public interest to remove such, though the public in other parts of India, may not be directly affected. It is in the public interest that persons should be governed justly and well and removal of hardship and grievances of a particular class is I think clearly a matter of public interest.”

69. We respectfully agree with the observations of the learned Chief Justice. Section 73-A is thus valid in so far as it deals with the landlord's interest.

70. It is then argued that a right of re-entry or to take possession of the property is itself a right to hold property and that as the Amending Act takes away this right without compensation the Amending Act is bad. It is also pointed out that all the Judges in — “State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh’, AIR 1952 SC 252, are agreed that the Legislature had no power to make a law whereunder the property of one is taken away and given to another. In our opinion, the right to hold property means the right of ownership to property. Neither the right of re-entry nor the right to take direct possession of the property is equivalent to this right and therefore deprivation by any law of the right of re-entry or of the right to take direct possession does not amount to deprivation or confiscation of the ownership of the property itself.

71. The right to property consists of a bundle of rights with respect to it and a person can be said to be deprived of his right to property when the entire bundle of his rights to property is taken away. Where one or some of the rights are taken away it would not be correct to say that the person is deprived of his entire property. We can conceive of cases where rights flowing from the ownership of property are substantially taken, away and what is left to the owner is, as is sometimes said, only ‘the empty husk of ownership’. In such a case it may be possible to argue that, deprivation of rights to property amounts to deprivation of the property itself. Such is however, not the case here.

72. The present case is somewhat similar to that which was before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in — ‘Charanjit Lal v. Union of India’, AIR 1951 SC 41. In that case, their Lordships held that where a person is deprived of a right or privilege which is appurtenant to or flows from the ownership in the property, it does not amount to deprivation of the right of ownership to property itself as is contemplated by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The argument of the learned counsel cannot, therefore, he accepted.

73. In two of the appeals before us — Second Appeals Nos. 818/50 and 860/50, the landlords; after obtaining possession had leased out the fields to other persons. There is nothing in the paper books before us from which we can ascertain whether the leases are oral or in writing, or what is the duration of each of them. If the leases are in writing, then the lessees' possession cannot be disturbed during the time prescribed by the leases, and the tenants are entitled to be put back in possession only after the expiration of the leases. There is, therefore, no difficulty in a case of this kind.

74. Where, however, the lease is not in writing and is for a period exceeding one year, the ex-tenant is entitled to be put in possession forthwitn. That is the effect of clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 73-A. The only interest of the lessee whose term has yet to expire is the right to remain in possession for the stipulated term. His property thus consists solely of the right to remain in possession. To require him to hand over possession to the former tenant is to divest him of his entire property & to hand over that property to another person. Where this is done, there is clearly an acquisition of property. Assuming that such an acquisition is for a public purpose, the law permitting it to be made is not valid unless a provision is made therein to pay compensation to the lessee for the loss of possession.

75. It is true that clause (2) of Article 31 will not apply to this case because the law passed in the year 1948 and under clause (5) of article 31, nothing in clause (2) thereof shall affect the provisions of a law passed before the commencement of the Constitution of India even though it be in conflict with article 31(2). The validity of this law will however have to be decided by reference to the corresponding provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was in force when it was enacted. That provision is section 299(2) which runs thus:

“(2) Neither the Dominion Legislature nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land, or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company owing, any commercial or industrial undertaking, unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, it is to be determined.”

76. Even under this provision, the prerequisite for the validity of a law was a provision therein for payment of compensation. In the absence of such a provision in the Act of 1948, we are of opinion that sub-section (3) of section 73-A is ‘ultra vires’ in so far as it has the effect of transferring a third party's interest in the land to the ex-tenant, without any compensation to the former.

77. Sub-section (4) of s. 73-A is not, even when read with the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 73 of the Berar Land Revenue Code, ‘ultra vires’ though it is to apply to a pending proceeding. No doubt the substantive law applicable to a suit is the one which was in force on the date on which the cause of action accrued. But that does not mean that the Legislature has no power to alter that law even to the extent of taking away the cause of action or extinguishing it. Enactment of such a law does not deprive a person of the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property but merely regulates one of the incidents of the right to acquire, hold or dispose of property. There is nothing in part III of the Constitution which precludes the Legislature from making a law of this kind.

78. As regards Act 19 of 1950 of the Berar Tenancy Law Amendment Act, 1950, what is contended is that by creating a new class of tenants, to wit, permanent tenants, the landlord's property was taken away inasmuch as his right of re-entry which was exercisable by him in respect of an annual tenant who was in possession from 1st April 1940 or from a date anterior thereto, and a tenant for a specified period, when that period was in excess of 10 years, was taken away.

79. The right of re-entry is only one of the incidents of the right to ownership and it is open to the Legislature to regulate or restrict any of the rights incidental to ownership if it thinks it proper to do so. The regulation or a right incidental to ownership does not amount to infringement of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property and therefore, in our opinion, Article 19(1)(f) cannot be said to have been infringed by creating this class of tenants. After creating this class of permanent tenants the Legislature has enacted incidental provisions which correspond to those contained in s. 73-A, sub-ss. (1), (3) and (4). Those provisions are therefore valid except in so far as they enable a Revenue Court to hand over possession of the fields to former tenants by dispossessing a lessee under an oral lease for a period exceeding one year.

80. It was argued that the law in effect does indirectly what is expressly prohibited, because in effect it takes away A's property and gives it to B, even though such a course is not permitted by the Constitution. As we have already pointed out, the impugned provisions, except to the extent that we have held to be ‘ultra vires’ do not purport to take away one man's property and to give it to another.

81. It was said that in considering the validity and the effect of Act 19 of 1950, we have to take into consideration Act 18 of 1950 and also the effect of the Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (1 of 1951). In our opinion, the validity of a law has to be considered with reference to its own provisions and to the provisions of the Constitution and nothing else. Our answers to the questions referred to us may be summarized thus:

(1) The proviso to s. 73 added by the Amending Act of 1948 is valid and the provision in that regard is ‘intra vires.’

(2) Sections 73-A & 73-B enacted by the Amending Act of 1948 are ‘intra vires’ except to the ex-tent that they operate so as to take away the right of a third party, other than an annual tenant, to continue in possession of the demised land without compensation.

(3) Sections 73-C and 73-D enacted by the Amending Act of 1950 are ‘intra vires’ except to the extent that they operate so as to take away the right of a third party to continue in possession of the demised land without compensation.

82. The records may now go back to Deo J. for being dealt with further. We leave the question of costs to the learned Judge.

A/V.R.B

83. Reference answered.