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  • Courts' Act, 1952 Page: HC185(15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c. 55) S.
  • Courts' Rules, 1952, r. 9
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  • Courts' Act, 1952 Page: HC185(15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c. 55) S.
  • Courts' Rules, 1952, r. 9
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Bail Application (P.R.C. No. 9 of 1957)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application for bail by Accused 1 and Accused 3 who had been committed for trial in the Sessions Court of Ramanathapuram by the Sub-Magistrate, Aruppukkottai in P.R.C. No. 9 of 1957; the trial was pending.

The prosecution's case, as presented in the opinion, is that a group of accused (numbered among 47 and with others up to about 120 persons) came to Chinnakannanoor Village in connection with the formation of a "kisan sangam" of communist character. Some local persons (including P.W.1) declined to become members. Disputes followed. The accused allegedly made false petitions claiming cultivation and occupancy rights; proceedings under Section 144 Cr.P.C. were instituted; several plots cultivated as pannai by owners were subsequently attacked. On 7-11-1956 at about 8 A.M., the accused are said to have destroyed paddy crops in specific plots (Pottal chei and Ammayar chei), being armed with vel-sticks, aruvals, sticks, slings and bows, and caused injuries to prosecution witnesses who attempted to stop them.

Procedurally, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses, dispensed with four witnesses named in the charge-sheet as having turned hostile, and filed Exhibits P-1 to P-18. The Sub-Magistrate committed the present bail applicants and others to the Sessions Court and discharged a number of others under Section 207A(6) Cr.P.C.

Specific allegations described in the opinion: Accused 1 is alleged to have attempted to murder P.W.2, inflicted multiple injuries (including a severe incised circular wound on the head with part of the skull severed). Accused 3 is alleged to have been part of an unlawful assembly causing hurt to P.W.9 (seven incised injuries with the most serious being a fissured fracture); the prosecution contends that Accused 3's conduct could amount to an offence under Section 307 read with Section 149 I.P.C.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Accused 1 should be granted bail pending trial in light of the prosecution evidence and the provisions of Section 497 Cr.P.C.
  2. Whether Accused 3 should be granted bail pending trial in light of the prosecution evidence and the provisions of Section 497 Cr.P.C., including consideration of whether the alleged offences are punishable with imprisonment for life.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Huchinson Cited among authorities on bail and the exercise of judicial discretion under relevant law (as listed by the court). Listed as part of the authorities indicating that courts may, in appropriate cases, impose restrictions when granting bail in non-capital non-bailable cases.
Manikkam Cited as part of established Madras decisions embodying principles on the degree of proof required for refusal or grant of bail. Relied on as one of the Madras authorities establishing the principles applicable when considering bail in non-bailable offences.
Gulam Jilane Cited among authorities on bail principles. Included in the list of cases illustrating principles governing bail under Section 497 Cr.P.C.
Narendra (36 Cal. 366) Listed among decisions relevant to judicial discretion on bail. Used as part of the body of authority on how courts approach bail applications.
Jangbahader (52 Crl. L.J. 1080) Authority cited in the context of bail jurisprudence. Referred to as part of the authorities the court considered when summarising the law on bail.
Kamba Pandey (50 Cr. L.J. 1009 Cal) Included among cases illustrating limitations and considerations on bail. Serves as part of the cited corpus of decisions about bail under the Code.
In re Appalakonda (AIR 1942 Mad. 740) Cited as an example of the proviso to Section 497 permitting bail of persons under 16, women, or sick/infirm even in very serious cases. Used to illustrate the statutory exceptions to the general prohibition on bail in offences punishable with death or life imprisonment.
AIR 1952 M.B. 189 Cited among authorities exemplifying exceptions to refusal of bail in very serious offences for certain classes of persons. Grouped with other authorities to show the limited exceptions in the proviso to Section 497.
AIR 1956 M.B. 103 (F.B) Cited in the same context as the other M.B. authorities concerning exceptions under Section 497. Referred to as an authority illustrating statutory proviso exceptions.
Jai-Ramdas v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 94) Cited for the proposition that English decisions cannot be invoked to extend or curtail the powers conferred by Section 497 Cr.P.C., because Section 497 constitutes a complete code. Relied upon to emphasise that the Indian Code provides its own exhaustive scheme on bail in non-bailable offences.
Gul v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1928 Sind 142) Also cited to support the proposition that English decisions do not displace the statutory code in India. Used to reinforce the same point as Jai-Ramdas regarding the scope of Section 497.
H.M. Advocate v. Saunders ((1913) S.C.(J) 44) Cited as authority illustrating that bail is not usually granted in murder or attempted murder without prosecution consent. Referred to in the court's exposition of comparative (English) law on bail to show caution exercised in serious offences.
Lord Mohun's Case (1697), 1 Salk. 104 Historical English authority cited in the discussion of bail practice in serious offences. Part of the English authorities the court quoted to illustrate how discretion is exercised in bail matters.
R. v. Barronet and Allain (1852), Dears C.C. 51 Cited for the proposition that in exercising discretion regarding bail, justices must consider nature of offence, strength of evidence, character/behaviour of accused and seriousness of possible punishment. Used as supporting authority in the court's summary of English principles bearing on judicial discretion in bail.
R. v. Barthelemy and Morney (1852), Dears C.C. 60 Cited alongside other English authorities about considerations relevant to bail. Quoted as part of the set of English authorities the court used to illustrate how bail decisions are informed by evidence and nature of offence.
R. v. Andrews (1844), 2 Dow. & L. 10 Listed among English authorities on bail and judicial discretion. Included in the court's recital of English precedents relevant to bail.
Short and Mellor's Practice of the Crown Office (2nd edn.) Textual authority cited concerning practice in serious criminal cases (bail practice). Used to support the discussion of English practice on bail in grave offences.
R. v. Robinson (1854), 23 L.J.Q.B. 286 Cited among English cases on judicial discretion in bail. Referred to in the exposition of English principles for comparison with Indian law.
R. v. Rose (1898), 67 L.J.Q.B. 289, C.C.R. Cited with other English authorities on how discretion in bail should be exercised. Part of the English authorities described in the opinion.
Linford v. Fitzroy (1849), 13 Q.B. 240 Cited for the proposition that justices must act judicially (not ministerially) in bail decisions, and that unjust refusals may attract legal consequences. Used in the court's discussion of the judicial nature of bail discretion.
R. v. Banger (1843), 4 Q.B. 468 Cited as authority that a justice may be indicted for improper motives in refusing bail. Included to underscore the judicial (not arbitrary) character of bail decisions.
R. v. Phillips (1947), III J.P. 333, C.C.A. Cited for the proposition that it is undesirable to grant bail where the offence is likely to be repeated pending trial; nature of accusation and evidence must be considered. Quotations and observations from this authority were used to reinforce the caution appropriate in bail for repeat-likely offences.
R. v. Fletcher (1949), 113 J.P. 365, C.C.A. Cited regarding consideration of previous convictions when deciding bail. Referred to in the court's comparative discussion of English practice on assessing antecedents in bail decisions.
R. v. Armstrong ((1951) 2 All E.R. 219) Cited to show that publication of previous convictions by a newspaper is undesirable but not by itself a ground for quashing a conviction; also about inquiry into antecedents on bail applications. Used to illustrate procedural practice and cautions in considering antecedents on bail.
R. v. Dyson (1943), 107 J.P. 178 Cited recommending written presentation of previous convictions in opposition to bail rather than viva voce evidence. Referred to in the discussion of procedural propriety when opposing bail on the basis of antecedents.
Stone's Justices' Manual (88th Ed., 1956) Cited on the procedural right to apply to a High Court judge for bail when committal is for an offence other than treason or murder. Quoted to explain procedural rights and common practice in bail applications.
Corpus Juris / American Jurisprudence (6, Corpus Juris; 6 American Jurisprudence) Cited to explain similar American constitutional principles on bail (bailable except for capital offences where proof is evident or presumption great) and the caution in admitting bail in such cases. Used for comparative illustration on how degree of proof and presumption of guilt affect bail in capital offences; cited to explain the standard of proof that may exclude bail.
Manikkam (6 Mad. 63) Madras authority cited as embodying principles on the degree of proof necessary to refuse bail. Part of the group of Madras decisions the court identified as reflecting the applicable principles in India.
Ponnuswami (6 Mad. 69) Another Madras decision cited on the standards for bail in non-bailable offences. Relied upon as one of the local decisions expressing the prevalent rule.
Kamaraya (FB) (2 Weir 657) Listed among Madras precedents that illustrate the principles governing bail. Included in the court's catalogue of local authorities on bail standards.
Engadu (11 Mad. 98) Madras decision cited for bail principles. Referred to as part of Madras authorities on the required degree of proof to refuse bail.
Thimma Reddi (10 M.L.J. 411) Cited as an authority on bail-related principles. Included among local precedents on the subject.
Chengalroya (2 M.W.N. 138) Listed among Madras decisions reflecting the principles of bail consideration. Part of the body of local precedent the court summarised.
Narayanaswami (36 M. 474) Madras authority on bail principles and degree of proof. Used as part of the established local jurisprudence cited by the court.
Sanyasayya (22 M.L.W. 156) Listed among Madras precedents illustrating bail principles. Included in the aggregation of local authorities on bail considerations.
Public Prosecutor v. George Williams (1951 M.W.N. 199) Cited as a Madras/associated precedent on bail rules. Part of the list the court relied on to show established local principles about bail.
State v. Mahomed Ali Khan (AIR 1956 Bom. 548) High Court decision from another jurisdiction cited among authorities on the degree of proof and bail. Grouped with other High Court decisions as demonstrating the same principles applied across jurisdictions.
Ramachandra v. The State (AIR 1952 Madh. 203) High Court authority cited regarding principles on bail and proof. Included in the court's non-exhaustive list of useful High Court decisions on bail.
Nawaz Jung v. The State of Hyderabad (AIR 1953 Hyd. 30) High Court decision cited for bail principles. Referred to as an authority illustrating applicable principles in bail matters.
Emperor v. Hutchinson (Meerut Conspiracy case) (AIR 1931 All. 356) Cited as an important decision of the All-India Courts relevant to bail principles. Included among the judicial authorities used to explain the required degree of proof to refuse bail.
King-Emperor v. Nga San (AIR 1927 Rang. 205) Colonial-period authority cited in the catalogue of decisions about bail. Part of the corpus of authorities illustrating the principles governing refusal or grant of bail.
King-Emperor v. Bashiram (AIR 1923 All. 479) Listed among decisions on bail and the necessary degree of proof. Referred to in the court's listing of authorities.
Nagendra Nath v. Emperor (AIR 1924 Cal. 476) Cited as a Calcutta decision relevant to bail jurisprudence and degree of proof. Included among the decisions the court noted as embodying the principle regarding degree of proof for bail refusal.
Naranji (30 Bom. L.R. 622; 29 Cr.L.J. 94; Ramchand 1929 Lah. 284) Bombay/Lahore precedents cited on bail principles. Part of the long list of authorities the court identified as expressing the governing principles.
Jogelkar (33 Cr. L.J. 94) Cited among authorities on bail and proof. Included in the court's compendium of relevant cases.
Ghulam Jilani (82 I.C. 755; 25 Cr. L.J. 1363; 1925 Nag. 228) Authority cited for principles relating to bail and proof in serious offences. Referenced among several Indian and pre-Independence decisions embodying the principles governing bail.
Tularam (97 I.C. 39; 27 Cr. L.J. 1063; 1927 Nag. 53) Cited as another authority illustrating arrest and bail principles. Included in the list relied upon for the legal proposition regarding degree of proof.
Fateh Singh (51 All. 603; 30 Cr. L.J. 697; 1929 All. 320) Listed among authorities on bail standards and proof. Part of the court's catalogue of supporting decisions on the matter.
Eusoof (3 Rang. 538; 27 Cr. L.J. 501; 1929 Rang. 51) Cited as an authority on the applicable principles regarding bail. Included in the body of authorities the court referred to when summarising the law.
Veeran Kutty v. Cochin Sirkar (DLR Cochin 91) Cited by the court as a showing of treatment given to co-accused and as a precedent for consistency of treatment among co-accused where appropriate. Applied in reasoning for Accused 3: since persons accused along with Accused 3 in certain charges were allowed bail, there were no distinguishing circumstances to treat Accused 3 differently at this stage.
A.I.R. commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure (5th edn., 1956) s.497 N.3 pt.1d; M.L.J. Commentaries; V.V. Chitaley & S. Appu Rao (The Fifty Years Criminal Digest) Textual/commentary authorities cited for exposition of the principles governing grant of bail in non-bailable offences. Referred to as useful doctrinal sources that encapsulate the court's stated principles on bail and degree of proof.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds from an initial exposition of Section 497 Cr.P.C. as the exhaustive statutory provision governing bail in non-bailable offences and identifies three controlling qualifications to that section:

  1. If the prosecution can satisfy the court that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty of a serious offence punishable with death or transportation for life, the court has no discretion and must refuse bail, subject only to the narrow proviso permitting bail for persons under 16, women, or sick or infirm persons.
  2. If the defence can satisfy the court that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused has committed any non-bailable offence or, after trial and before judgment, there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty, the court must grant bail (sub-sections 2 and 3).
  3. In non-bailable offences not punishable with death or transportation for life, if there are no reasonable grounds to believe the accused has committed the offence, courts must grant bail; and courts may grant bail even where there are reasonable grounds to believe guilt if other general or special considerations weigh for release.

The court supplements these statutory principles by citing comparative English and American authorities and a broad array of Indian High Court and Madras precedents and commentaries to explain how the degree of proof or the presumption of guilt must be assessed at the bail stage. The opinion stresses that the discretion to grant or refuse bail is judicial, not arbitrary, and must be exercised by reference to known principles: strength of evidence, nature of the offence, seriousness of punishment, antecedents, likelihood of repetition, and any special considerations favouring the accused.

Applying these principles to the material before it, the court examined the facts and limited evidence placed on record at the committal stage. The court considered the prosecution evidence and the medical reports describing the injuries to P.W.2 (eight injuries including six incised wounds; most grave being an incised circular wound with a part of skull severed) and P.W.9 (seven incised injuries, most serious being a fissured fracture). The medical evidence was described in some detail and the court treated it as material to the question of whether reasonable grounds existed for believing the accused were guilty of offences punishable with life imprisonment.

On this assessment, the court concluded that:

  • For Accused 1: the available material on the limited record furnished prima facie reasonable grounds for believing he was guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life (specifically, attempt to murder P.W.2 and participation in rioting with deadly weapons contributing to grievous injury). Therefore, under the statutory scheme the court held that there was no discretion to grant bail and his application was dismissed.
  • For Accused 3: on the limited record before the court it could not be said that the evidence disclosed reasonable grounds to believe he was guilty of an offence punishable with life imprisonment. The offence might fall under lesser categories not punishable with life. Further, co-accused placed on the same charges (charges 4 and 5) had been allowed bail and the court found no distinguishing circumstances to treat Accused 3 differently at this stage. The court also noted that certain special circumstances favourable to Accused 3 had been urged by his counsel. Weighing these considerations together, the court concluded that a case had been made out to release Accused 3 on bail, subject to conditions.

Holding and Implications

The court's final rulings are:

Accused 1: The bail petition is DISMISSED. The court found prima facie reasonable grounds for believing Accused 1 guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life; therefore bail could not be granted under Section 497 Cr.P.C.

Accused 3: A case was made out for release on bail. The court directed that Accused 3 be released on bail on furnishing a bond of Rs. 1,000 with two sureties for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Sub-Magistrate of Aruppukkottai.

Implications

Direct effect on the parties:

  • Accused 1 remains in custody pending trial; his bail application has been refused.
  • Accused 3 is to be released on bail subject to the specified bond and sureties and to the satisfaction of the Sub-Magistrate.

Broader legal implications: The opinion applies established statutory principles under Section 497 Cr.P.C. and a body of precedent and commentary to the facts; it does not purport to create a new precedent or to depart from the doctrinal framework it cites. The decision illustrates the application of the statutory threefold qualification to Section 497 and the manner in which committal-stage evidence and medical reports bearing on gravity of injury are weighed in deciding bail.

Prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No facts, arguments or authorities beyond those explicitly present in the opinion have been added or inferred.

    Raman Servai & Another v. State

    This is an application for bail by Accused 1, and Accused 3 who have been committed to take their trial in the Sessions Court of Ramanathapuram by the Sub Magistrate, Aruppukkottai in P.R.C No. 9 of 1957 and in which the trial is pending.

    The case for the prosecution is that Accused 11, 31, 47, 12 and 30 came and found a kisan sangam in Chinnakannanoor Village. The sangam was communist in character. Certain persons of the locality refused to become members of the sangam. P.W 1 is one among such. After the advent of the sangam there was trouble and discontent in what was otherwise a quiet village. There were false petitions to the authorities by these accused that they were cultivating pannai lands and hence entitled to occupancy rights. Their contentions were negatived by the authorities. Later proceedings under S. 144 Cr.P.C were instituted against the accused who were prohibited in such lands as were cultivated in pannai. Pottal chei and Ammayar chei, two plots belonging to Seshadri Iyengar, Advocate, Manamadurai and to Natarajan Chettiar and Valliammai Achi of Virudhunagar respectively were cultivated in Pannai by the respective owners. While so, all the accused 47 in number along with others numbering about hundred and twenty, destroyed the crops in Pottal chei and were likewise engaged in Ammayar chei on 7-11-1956 at about 8 A.M Their object was to destroy the paddy crops in the said place and they were variously armed with vel-sticks, aruvals, sticks, slings and bows. They caused injuries on the prosecution witnesses who pleaded with them to desist from the act of destruction.

    The prosecution examined 15 witnesses and dispensed with four witnesses cited in the charge sheet as having turned hostile, and, filed Exs. P-1 to P-18. The learned Sub Magistrate committed the present bail applicants and others to sessions discharging a number of others under s. 207A (6) Cr.P.C

    The case against Accused 1 is that he attempted to murder P.W 2, inflicted injuries upon him to which reference will be made, and, he was one of the persons who participated in the rioting armed with deadly weapons, and, that in pursuance of the common object injuries were inflicted on a number of persons.

    The case against Accused 3 is that he was a member of an unlawful assembly who committed rioting and that in the course, of that rioting he, along with 6 others caused hurt to P.W 9 with vel-sticks and that in as much as this amounted to an attempt on Page: HC184the life of P.W 9 with such intention or knowledge and under circumstances that if P.W 9 had died, Accused 3 would have been guilty of an offence under s. 307 and therefore guilty of punishment under s. 149 read with s. 307 I.P.C

    The medical evidence gives the following information viz., on P.W 2 who is alleged to have been injured by Accused 1 there were 8 injuries of which six were incised and the most grave of which was injury No. 1, an incised circular wound, 2″ in diameter on the head and a part of the skull had been severed off and was hanging down along with skin and other tissues. During the treatment the doctor removed the cut piece of bone and preserved it. (M.O 4) The doctor states that by severance of the bone there would be a depression on the top of the skull and this portion will be more tender than the surrounding portions, and, if a little more pressure had been exerted death would have necessarily resulted and that even now the injured man must be careful to avoid any pressure on that part of the head. On P.W 9 the doctor found seven incised injuries of which the most serious was injury No. 2 where a fissured fracture was seen.

    The section governing grant of bail in non-bailable offences which is exhaustive and constitutes a complete code is s. 497 Cr. P.C But this section is controlled by three important qualifications, viz.,

    (1) Where the prosecution can satisfy the court that there are reasonable grounds that the accused is guilty of a serious offence which is punishable with death or transportation for life, the court has no discretion; it shall refuse bail. There is no scope in a case of such non-bailable offences for considering any other general or special consideration. Some sessions Judges appear to think that they can salve their judicial conscience when they irregularly and in violation of the clear statutory restriction release such person on bail even if there are reasonable grounds for finding them guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life by imposing restrictions as if restrictions will regularise otherwise wholly irregular, nay illegal, orders. This practice cannot be sufficiently condemned and, in fact, would constitute on the part of those Sessions Judges a serious dereliction of duty inviting correction and admonition by a court of revision. The only exceptions are those contained in the proviso that even in such cases punishable with death or imprisonment for life a court may direct that any person under the age of 16 years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail. I must not be however understood as meaning that in fitting cases of non-bailable offences not punishable with death or life imprisonment and where on account of general or special considerations notwithstanding reasonable grounds to believe the accused is guilty it is decided to grant bail, suitable restrictions cannot be imposed. They can be imposed; Huchinson, Manikkam, Gulam Jilane (see below); Narendra 36 Cal 366; Jangbahader 52 Crl. L.J 1080; Kamba Pandey 50 Cr. L.J 1009 Cal; In re Appalakonda AIR 1942 Mad 740; AIR 1952 M.B 189. AIR 1956 M.B 103 (F.B)

    (2) On the other hand, where the defence can satisfy the court that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed any non-bailable offence or where after trial and before judgment there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty the court has no option but shall grant bail. (sub-s. 2 and 3).

    (3) In non-bailable offences not punishable with death or transportation for life, courts are bound to grant bail where there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence, and may release such accused even if there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is guilty of such non-bailable offence if there exists other considerations both in favour of and against the accused. It would be hopeless to attempt to draw up an exhaustive list.

    These general and special considerations, both in favour of and against the accused have been set out by me in Cr. M.P No. 597 of 1957 and Cr. M.P 617 of 1957.

    The English law is practically the same. But by reason of the fact that s. 497 Cr.P.C constitutes a complete code by itself it has been laid down in several decisions that English decisions cannot be invoked either to extend or curtail the powers conferred on courts by chapter 39 of the Cr.P.C (Jai-Ramdas v. Emperor A.I.R 1945 P.C 94; Gul v. Emperor A.I.R 1928 Sind 142). In Halsbury's Laws of England (Simonds edition), Vol. 10, at page 374, it is stated,

    In cases of treason no person can be admitted to bail except by order of the Secretary of State or a judge of the High Court. (Magistrates' Courts' Act, 1952 Page: HC185(15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c. 55) S. 8. It is not usual to grant bail in cases of murder, or in cases of attempted murder, unless the prosecution consents. (H.M Advocate v. Saunders, (1913) S.C (J) 44. See Lord Mohun's Case (1697), 1 Salk. 104; R. v. Barronet and Allain (1852), Dears C.C 51; R. v. Barthelemy and Morney (1852), Dears C.C 60; and R. v. Andrews (1844), 2 Dow. & L. 10; and Short and Mellor's Practice of the Crown Office (2nd edn. 282). In exercising their discretion with regard to bail the justices must consider the nature of the offence, the strength of the evidence, the character or behaviour of the accused, and the seriousness of the punishment which may be awarded if the accused is found guilty. (R. v. Barronet and Allain (1852), Dears. C.C 51; R. v. Barthelemy and Morney (1852), Dears C.C 60; R. v. Robinson (1854), 23 L.J.Q.B 286; R. v. Rose (1898), 67 L.J.Q.B 289, C.C.R, at p. 292; H.M Advocate v. Saunders, (1913) S.C (J) (44). In deciding questions relating to the granting of bail justices act judicially, and not ministerially. (Linford v. Fitzroy (1849), 13 Q.B 240, at p. 247. A justice may be indicted, if he refuses bail from improper motives (R. v. Banger (1843) 4 Q.B 468 at 472), or sued, if he does so maliciously (See Linford v. Fitzroy (1849), 13 Q.B 240).

    Excessive bail ought not to be required. (Bill of Rights (1688) (1 Will & Mar. Sess 2c 2), s. 1). It is undesirable to grant bail on a charge of housebreaking where there is a likelihood of the offence being repeated pending trial. (R. v. Phillips (1947), III J.P 333, C.C.A) It is proper for justices to be told of a prisoner's previous convictions when considering bail. R. v. Fletcher (1949), 113 J.P 365, C.C.A Though it is very undesirable that a newspaper should disclose information about the accused's previous convictions, the mere fact of publication is no ground for quashing the later conviction (R. v. Armstrong, (1951) 2 All. E.R 219, C.C.A) ”.

    10. In Stone's Justices' Manual, 88th Edition (1956), Vol. I, in page 45 it is mentioned,

    If the committal is for an offence other than reason or murder, a person committed in custody must be informed of his right to apply for bail to a judge of the High Court (Magistrates' Courts' Rules, 1952, r. 9 in App. IV post).

    Where the crime is of a nature that there is a likelihood of its being repeated if the accused is released pending trial, particularly where the evidence indicates that there is no defence to the charge preferred (e.g, where the accused was arrested in the act of housebreaking) the granting of bail pending trial “is a very wrong step to take”; there should be taken into consideration the nature of the accusation, the evidence in support of it, and the severity of punishment which conviction will entail (see observations of Atkinson, J. in C.C.A in R.V Phillips (1947), J.P 333); there may also be taken into consideration previous convictions recorded against the accused (R.V Fletcher (1949), 113 J.P 365), in which case Humphreys, J., commented that it is desirable that if newspapers are reporting the case, they should not include in the report any mention of previous convictions. It is recommended that information of previous convictions, when advanced in opposition to an application for bail, be submitted in writing rather than given viva voce in open court (see R.V Dyson (1943), 107 J.P 178). In R.V Armstrong, (1951) 2 All. E.R 219, the C.C.A reaffirmed that “It is clear that it is the duty of the justice to inquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying to them for bail,” and that it is undesirable that a newspaper should disclose such evidence, but such publication by itself is not a ground for quashing a conviction; and see R.V Wharton (1955), a copy of the judgment in which case is contained in Home Office Circular No. 132/1955.”

    See also C.C.H Moriarty Police Law (thirteenth edition) Butterworth (1954) P. 55 on “Bail.”

    The American law is practically the same, 6, Corpus Juris at pages 953 and 954 mentions,

    The constitution of the United States and the constitution of many of the states provide that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences, where the proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is great.

    Primarily the prisoner cannot demand bail as a matter of right where the offence is a capital one, since upon ascertaining the character of the charge against him, the next question would be as to the decree of proof and the nature of the presumption of guilt. Therefore the power to admit to Page: HC186bail generally becomes a matter of judicial discretion in this class of cases, and, although the exercise of this discretion will not be controlled unless manifestly abused, it should be exercised with great caution.”

    The discretion exercised by the Court in granting or refusing bail is not an arbitrary but a judicial one; it is governed or directed by known and established rules, and in truth cannot be otherwise applied than to decide whether or not the facts bring the case within their operation.

    Where the proof is not evident or the presumption of guilt not great, bail should be allowed, even in capital cases, as a matter of right. Where, however, such proof is evident or the presumption is great, as shown by the evidence, bail in capital cases is not a matter of right, but a matter of judicial discretion, and is usually denied, except under special and extraordinary circumstances.”

    [These extraordinary circumstances are set it in the proviso to S. 497 (1)].

    Just what probative force evidence must have in order to bring the case within the exemptions mentioned in the constitutions and to exclude bail has been the subject of much judicial discussion. The character and extent of the proof to make the necessary sufficiency depend largely upon the circumstances of each case; and the most generally adapted has been to refuse bail in all cases in which the trial court would sustain a capital conviction if it was pronounced by a jury on such evidence of guilt as was exhibited to the court on the hearing of the application for bail. This rule, however, is not always strictly followed for the rule has been otherwise stated that bail should be allowed where, upon a consideration of the whole evidence a reasonable or well founded doubt of the accused's guilt exists or can be entertained; or that bail should be refused, unless a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt of a capital offence is shown or there are exceptional circumstances justifying bail; and that, even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, if upon an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that the accused is guilty of a capital offence, bail should be refused.” (6, Corpus Juris, page 956, 957.)

    See also 6 American Jurisprudence (Revised edn. 1950) s. 26 p. 72 extracted in C.M.P 618 of 57.

    The degree of proof is also the same in India and these principles will be found embodied in the following Madras decisions and the decisions of other High Courts. Manikkam, (6 Mad. 63); Ponnuswami (6 Mad. 69); Kamaraya (FB) (2 Weir 657); Engadu (11 Mad. 98); Thimma Reddi (10 M.L.J 411); Chengalroya (2 M.W.N 138); Narayanaswami (36 M. 474); Sanyasayya (22 M.L.W 156); Public Prosecutor v. George Williams 1951 M.W.N 199. The important decisions of other High Courts embodying these principles and which may usefully be referred to are State v. Mahomed Ali Khan (AIR 1956 Bom. 548); Ramachandra v. The State (AIR 1952 Madh. 203); Nawaz Jung v. The State of Hyderabad (AIR 1953 Hyd. 30); Emperor v. Hutchinson (Meerut Conspiracy case) (AIR 1931 All. 356); King-Emperor v. Nga San (AIR 1927 Rang. 205); King-Emperor v. Bashiram (AIR 1923 All. 479); Nagendra Nath v. Emperor (AIR 1924 Cal. 476 - 25 Crl. L.J 732); Naranji (30 Bom. L.R 622 - 29 Cr.L.J 94 - Ramchand 1929 Lah. 284; Jogelkar 33 Cr. L.J 94; Ghulam Jilani (82 I.C 755 - 25 Cr. L.J 1363 - 1925 Nag. 228); Tularam (97 I.C 39 - 27 Cr. L.J 1063 - 1927 Nag. 53); Fateh Singh (51 All. 603 - 30 Cr. L.J 697 - 1929 All. 320); Eusoof (3 Rang. 538 - 27 Cr.L.J 501 - 1929 Rang 51). For an exposition of the principles governing grant of bail in non-bailable offences see s. 497 N.3 pt. 1d of the A.I.R commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure Fifth edition (1956) Vol. 4 and M.L.J Commentaries on the Code of Criminal Procedure third edition (1956) Vol. II P. 1798 and their companion volume V.V Chitaley and S. Appu Rao's monumental A.I.R publication, The fifty years Criminal Digest (1904-1953) Vol. 4 P. 2963 and following.

    Bearing these principles in mind, on an examination of the facts of this case I find that there are prima facie reasonable grounds for believing that the first accused is guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life. There are no grounds to grant bail in his case and his petition is dismissed.

    In the case of the third accused, at this stage and on the limited record before me, it cannot be said that the evidence on record is such that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with life imprisonment. On the other hand, the offence may also fall under one of the lesser categories not punishable with imprisonment Page: HC187for life. The persons accused along with accused 3 under charges 4 and 5 have been allowed to be on bail and there are no distinguishing circumstances for meeting out a different treatment to this accused at this stage and before the evidence is tested in the Sessions Court : Veeran Kutty v. Cochin Sirkar (DLR Cochin 91). Certain special circumstances favourable to the accused have also been pressed by the learned advocate. Therefore, a case has been made out for the third accused being released on bail. He is directed to be let on bail on his furnishing a bond for a sum of Rs. 1,000 with two sureties for the like amount to the satisfaction of the Sub Magistrate of Aruppukkottai.

    N.T.R

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    Raman Servai & Another v. State
    (Jun 18, 1957)