1. In this petition, an assessment notice calling upon the petitioner to pay contribution under Section 76 of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (XIX of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is sought be quashed.
2. The petitioner is the Matadhipathi of Sri Virakthimath in Kalyandurg ???, Anantapur District. This has been founded for propagating the tenets Veerasaivism. On an income computed at Rs. 2,000/-, the Commissioner ??? the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments called upon the petitioner pay contribution at three per cent per annum thereon by notice dated 1st February 1956. Without filing objections as contemplated by Section 78(2) of the Act, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this court questioning the ??? of section 59-A and Section 76 as amended by the Andhra Act XII of 54 and Act XIII of 1955 respectively.
3. The ground of attack against both these sections is that the fund that is ??? to be set up under these sections is to be utilised for purposes other than ??? for which contribution is levied and as such it would amount to a tax ??? not a fee.
4. Before we examine the soundness of this contention, it is useful to state the circumstances under which these provisions were enacted by the amendments mentioned above. Section 76 of the Act provided for payment of contribution ??? the income derived by religious institutions. That section omitting the portions not relevant for the present enquiry, reads thus:
(1) In respect of the services rendered by the Government and their officers, every religious institution shall, from the income derived by it, pay to the Government annually such contribution not exceeding five percentum of its income as may be prescribed.
(2) Every religious institution, the annual income of which, for the fasli year immediately preceding as calculated for the purposes of the levy of contribution under Sub-section (1), is not less than one thousand rupees, shall pay to the Government annually, for meeting the costs of auditing its accounts, such further sum not exceeding one and half percentum, of its income as the Commissioner may determine.”
5. This is one of the sections the validity of which was challenged by a ??? at Sirur then in the composite Madras State and now in the State of Mysore in an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution, of India. The Madras High Court decided that this section was ultra vires the State Legislature ??? the reason that the contribution partook the character of a tax and as such ??? was beyond the competence of the State Legislature to enact this provision. On appeal taken by the Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, this view of the Madras High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of H.R.E, Madras v. Sirur Mutt 1554 S.C.J 335 , 1954 A.L.T 15 (S.C). Dealing with nature of the contribution, this is what Mukherjea, J., who spoke for Court, observed:
“Section 76 of the Madras Act speaks definitely of the contribution being levied in respect to the services rendered by the Government; so far it has the appearance of fees. It is true that religious institutions do not want these services to be rendered to them and it may be that they do not consider the state interference to be a benefit at all. We agree, however, with the learned Attorney-General that in the present day concept of a State, it cannot be said that services could be rendered by the State only at the request of those who require these services. If in the larger interest of the public a State considers it desirable that some special service should be done for certain people, the people must accept these services, whether willing or not. It may be noticed, however that the contribution that has been levied under section 76 of the Act has been made to depend upon the capacity of the payer and not upon the quantum of benefit that is supposed to be conferred on any particular religions institution. Further, the institutions which come under the lower income group and have income less than Rs. 1,000/- annually, are excluded from the liability to pay the additional charges under clause (2) of the Section. These are undoubtedly some of the characteristics of a “Tax” and the imposition bears a close analogy to income-tax. But the material fact which negatives the theory of fees in the present case is that the money raised by levy of the contribution is not ear-marked or specified for defraying the expenses that the Government has to incur in performing the services. All the collections go to the Consolidated Fund of the State and all the expenses have to be met not out of these collections but out of the general revenues by a proper method or appropriation as is done in case of other Government expenses. That in itself might not be conclusive, but in this case there is total absence of any co-relation between the expenses incurred by the Government and the amount raised by contribution under the provision of section 76 and in these circumstances the theory of a return or counterpayment or quid pro quo cannot have any possible application to this case. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in holding the contribution levied under section 76 is a tax and not a fee and consequently it was beyond the power of the State Legislature to enact this provision.”
6. In order to get over this difficulty, the Andhra State Legislature amended Section 76 by the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment (Andhra Second Amendment) Act, 1954, (Act IV of 1954) by adding the word “for meeting the cost of such services” after the word “annually” in sub-section (1) of section 76. The following sentence also was inserted in sub-section (1):
“The contribution so paid shall be kept and administered as a separate fund.”
7. In addition another clause was introduced as sub-section (5):
“The payments made by the Government under sub-section (4) (Except in so far as such payments relate to the cost of auditing the accounts) shall be recouped from the fund referred to in sub-section (1).”
8. Later on, by the Madras Hindu Religions and Charitable Endowment (Andhra Amendment,) Act (XIII of 1955), sub-section (1) was substituted and sub-section (6) and Section 76-A were added. Section 76(1) as amended is in ??? terms:
“In respect of the services rendered by the Government and their officers, every religious institution shall, from the income derived by it, pay to the Government annually for meeting the cost of such services, such contribution not exceeding five per centum of its income as may be prescribed. The contribution so paid shall be kept and administered as a separate fund.”
9. Sub-section (6) runs thus:
“If, after the recoupment referred to in sub-section (5), there is a surplus in the Fund referred to in sub-section (1), the Government may direct that such surplus or such portion thereof as may be specified in the direction shall form part of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Common Good Fund created under Section 59-A.”
10. ??? far as sub-section (1) is concerned, that is beyond challenge because the collections made are not merged in the General Public Revenue and are not appropriated in the manner laid down for appropriation of expenses for other public purposes. They constitute a separate fund ear-marked for the services ??? be rendered to the institution by the Department which has been created for the purpose of carrying out the object of the statute. Consequently, it could ??? regarded legitimately as ‘Fee’ and it was within the competence of the state Legislature to make the amendment in question. This does not in any way violate the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Sirur Mutt's case.
11. The only provision that could be questioned is sub-section (6) of section 76. Before we consider the legality of this sub-section, it is useful to refer to section 59-A whose constitutionality has also been brought into question by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Section 59-A was inserted by Act XII of 1954 and it is in these words.
“(1) It shall be lawful for the Government to create a fund called “The Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Common Good Fund” out of the contributions made by religious institutions from their surplus funds, for the promotion of all or any of the objects mentioned in section 59, sub-section (1), in respect of any institution, or for the purposes and objects common to all the institutions.”
12. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, this sub-section infringes the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Sirur Mutt's case in that the objects enumerated in section 59 are not all religious and utilisation of the ‘Common Good Fund’ for purposes-set out in section 59 would not be rendering service to an institution from which contribution is collected. This argument ignores the language employed in section 59-A. A reading of that section makes it clear that the ‘Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Common Good Fund’ was to be formed not out of the contributions imposed under Section 76 of the Act but out of voluntary contributions made by religious institutions from their “Surplus Funds” ‘for the promotion of all or any of the objects mentioned in section 59, sub-section (1)’. Section 59-A, therefore, had contemplated the creation of the fund with the aid voluntary contributions and not out of contributions levied under section 7. Hence the vires of this sub-section is not open to question.
13. The only point that remains to be discussed is whether sub-section (6) ??? section 76 introduced by Act XIII of 1955 offends against the rule stated in the Sirur Mutt's case in that it permits the addition of any surplus left over after meeting the expenses of the Office of the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments to the ‘Common Good Fund’ adverted to in section 59-A. We do not think that this is in any way opposed to the principle ??? down in the Sirur Mutt's case. It is to be borne in mind that for purposes ??? sub-section (6) no further levy is made on the religious institutions. The contributions imposed are primarily intended for meeting the expenses connected with the office of the Commissioner for the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay1.
“It may not be possible to prove in every case that the fees that are collected by the Government approximate to the expenses that are incurred by it in rendering any particular kind of service or in performing any particular work for the benefit of certain individuals. But in order that the collections made by the Government can rank as fees, there must be co-relation between the levy imposed and the expenses incurred by the State for the purpose of rendering such services.”
14. Undoubtedly, the imposts under Section 76 are made for special services rendered for the benefit of institutions from which the payments are demanded. Sub-section (6) only envisages addition of surplus, if any, to the ‘Common Good Fund’. Further, discretion is left to the Government to give a direction in this behalf. For one thing, there may or may not be any surplus after meeting the expenditure connected with the establishment of the office of the Commissioner. Secondly, the Government may restrict it to clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 59, which are purely of a religious character, and any services rendered to the institution under any of the three heads would constitute a quid pro quo for the levy of fees. It is not complained that the Government had given direction to add the surplus to the ‘Common Good Fund’ mentioned above. It may be that the Government might direct that such portion of the fund as appertaining to the surplus contemplated by sub-section (6) may be utilised for religious objects such as those enumerated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 59. This will be giving effect to the intentions of the founders of the institutions. For these reasons, we hold that neither of the two provisions is unconstitutional.
15. Another dispute raised is that section 79-A which authorises the levy of contribution with retrospective effect for a period of three years, enables the Commissioner to call upon the petitioner to pay contributions for three faslis preceding 1st February 1950, the date of notice. If it is established that there was no assessment in regard to this institution prior to the issue of notice, then, undoubtedly, the levy could only be for three faslis immediately preceding the ??? of the notice, namely, from 1st February 1953. But there has been no ??? of facts, and we do not know whether any assessment was made ??? to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Sirur Mutt's case. This, question has to be enquired into by the commissioner. It is not as if the petitioner has no remedy in this behalf. Section 78(2) clothes every institution with right to file objections within fifteen days from the date of receipt ??? notice to the levy of contribution in regard to any particular year ??? is open to the petitioner to file his objections now, notwithstanding the fact that ??? period contemplated in section 78(2) has already elapsed, in view of the fact that the various questions raised in the Writ Petition were pending adjudication in this court. In these circumstances no relief can be given to the petitioner even in this regard. He could agitate this matter before the commissioner.
16. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ??? fixed at Rs. 100/-
Ch. R.
17. Petition dismissed.