Broome, J.:— This is a reference by the Sessions Judge of Basti recommending that orders passed on 7-1-1961 by Sri Kishori Lal, first class Magistrate of Basti, in a case under Sec. 145 Cr. P.C be set aside.
2. The proceedings under Sec. 145 Cr. P.C started on 23-11-1960 with a report by the Station Officer of Bansi Police Station, and the preliminary order was passed on 28-11-1960. But only a month before this, on 26-10-1960, the Munsif of Bansi had given a clear decision regarding possession of the very land that was the subject of dispute in the case under Sec. 145. Mst. Bipta (the first party) had filed a suit against Dwarka etc. (the second party) for a declaration that she was the Sirdar in possession of the said land, or in the alternative for possession of the land; and the order passed by the learned Munsif was: “the plaintiff is declared to be in possession over the suit plots as a Sirdar.” The position therefore was that on 26-10-1960 there was in existence the decision of a competent civil court regarding the actual possession of one of the parties in the disputed land; and the question is whether in such circumstances it was proper for the learned Magistrate to start proceedings under Sec. 145 Cr. P.C about the very same property less than a month after the aforesaid order.
3. Learned counsel for the second party has laid great stress on the fact that the civil court decision of 26-10-1960 was not final, as it was subject to appeal and in fact an appeal has been filed against it; but to my mind that does not alter the fundamental position. Unless and until the Munsif's decision of 26-10-1960 is modified or set aside, that decision must hold the field and is entitled to be respected.
4. An attempt has been made to argue that the Magistrate was not bound to follow the civil court decision, because it was only one of the many pieces of the evidence that he had to consider before coming to a decision on the question of actual possession in the proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C; and in this connection reliance has been placed on the remarks of Asthana, J. in Ram Eqbal Pandey v. Mahant Ram Nath Gir 1956 A.L.J 450.. That case, however, has little relevance for the decision of the question that arises in the present case. Here we are not concerned with the weight to be attached to the judgment of a civil or revenue court, considered as evidence in the course of proceedings under Sec. 145. What we have to see is whether those proceedings could be started at all, when a civil court had adjudicated on the question of possession less than a month before and there was no possibility of a change having occurred in the possession of the land in the short intervening period.
5. It seems to me that the proper procedure for the Magistrate to adopt in the present case, as soon as the civil court's decision was brought to his notice, was to drop the proceedings under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C and to take action under Sec. 107, Cr. P.C against Dwarka etc. (the second party), if it was found necessary to prevent them from committing a breach of the peace by acting in defiance of the civil court's decision. As pointed out in Mrs. V.E Argles v. Chhail Behari A.I.R 1949 All. 230..
“A Magistrate acting under Sec. 145, Cr. P.C cannot reagitate a dispute that has been settled by a competent Court and give a declaration in favour of the party whose claim to title and subsisting possession has already been negatived in a recent cantested litigation. To allow this would amount to permitting a criminal Court to fly in face of the decision of a competent civil court, being the only Court competent to adjudicate with finality the disputes as to title and possession as between the parties having conflicting claims thereto. The scope and purview of Sec. 145 does not allow such free and untrammelled interference by criminal Courts with the final decision of the civil courts.”
6. This view of the law, if I may say so with respect, appears to be eminently reasonable. Proceedings under Sec. 145 Cr. P.C are appropriate only in those cases in which there is no sufficiently recent decision of a competent civil or revenue court to regulate the relations between disputing parties. In such cases there is the obvious need for a rough and ready decision in favour of one or the other of the parties, based on actual possession of the disputed property, so as to avoid the danger of a clash involving a breach of the peace. But where the competent civil or revenue court has just given its adjudication on the right of one of the parties to retain possession, there is no necessity for any fresh decision by a criminal court; and all that the Magistrate has to do, if the parties still remain at loggerheads, is to take steps to ensure that the civil or revenue court decision is respected and adhered to. When a Magistrate passes orders under Sec. 145(6) Cr. P.C he declares oneparty to be entitled to possession of the disputed property until evicted therefrom in due course of law, which means that the losing party has to go to the civil or revenue court to obtain the eviction of the successful party. But where one party has already obtained a clear declaration of possession from the competent civil or revenue court, there is obviously no necessity for any action by a Magistrate under Sec. 145, unless the decision is of such a prior date as to render it possible for changes in possession to have taken place in the intervening period. In the present instance, it is important to note, the second party have never suggested that any change as regards possession took place between 26-10-1960 (the Munsif's decision) and 28-11-1960 (the preliminary order under Sec. 145). In such circumstances the magistrate's duty was to see that the decision of the competent civil court was upheld (if necessary by the application of Sec. 107 Cr. P.C), and it was improper for him to give a fresh lease of life to the dispute about possession which had already been settled by the competent court's decision.
7. I accordingly accept this reference and set aside the order passed under Sec. 145 by the S.D.M of Bansi. He shall now release the disputed property in conformity with the civil court's decision; and if he still finds it necessary to take action to prevent a breach of the peace, he may in his discretion have recourse to Sec. 107, Cr. P.C The Munsif's decision must be respected until modified or set aside; but of course if that judgment is upset in appeal, it will be the duty of the Magistrate to uphold the appellate decision instead.
Reference accepted.