Desai, C.J:— The applicant's application for the quashing under Secs. 215 and 561, Cr. P.C of an order committing him to the court of session to stand trial for the offence of Sec. 211, I.P.C has been referred by our brother, Katju, to a larger bench. The commitment is sought to be quashed on the sole ground that a Magistrate took cognizance of the offence against the applicant on a complaint by a private person and not by a court. On 26-6-1960 the applicant made a report at a police station against the complainant Gyari and his relations accusing them of committing on June 25 or 26, 1960 the offence of Sec. 307, I.P.C From 14th June, 1960, to 27th June, 1960, the complainant and his relations had all been in the District Jail, Lucknow, in connection with an offence committed under the Railways Act and were released on 27-6-1960. Thus the report made against them was false. The police investigated into the report and arrested the complainant and his relations. Since the police could not complete the investigation within 24 hours, they were produced before a Magistrate, who remanded them to custody on 2-7-1960. Their application for bail was refused by him. They made another application for bail pointing out that on the date on which they were alleged to have committed the offence they were undergoing imprisonment in a jail at Lucknow. On this an enquiry was made by the Magistrate from the police and the police submitted a report under Sec. 175, Cr. P.C to the effect that on investigation the report made by the applicant had been found to be false, that no offence had been committed by the complainant etc. and that they be released from custody. This report was placed before the Magistrate on 27-7-1960 and he discharged the complainant and others on 28-7-1960.
2. It is not in dispute that the allegations made in the complaint against the applicant made out an offence under Sec. 211, I.P.C According to the complaint the report made by the applicant against the complainant and others contained a false charge. Sec. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C is to the effect that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sec. 211, I.P.C “when such an offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, except on the complaint in writing of such Court.” It was contended on behalf of the applicant that the offence alleged to have been committed by him was alleged to have been committed in relation to certain proceedings in the court of a Magistrate.
3. It was not his contention that it was alleged to have been committed in any proceedings in any court. The question before us is whether the offence was alleged to have been committed in relation to any proceeding in any court.
4. The Magistrate had to deal with matters arising out of the report lodged by the applicant on three occasions,
(1) when he remanded the complainant and others on the ground that the investigation could not be complete within twenty four hours,
(2) when he entertained the bail applications of the complainant and others and passed orders on them, and
(3) when he received the investigating officer's report submitted to him under Sec. 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and accepted it.
5. We are of the opinion that when the Magistrate remanded the complainant and others and when he entertained their bail applications and passed orders oil them he held “proceedings” within the meaning of Sec. 195(1)(b).
6. The word “proceeding” is not defined in the Code though “judicial proceeding” is, and apparently is used in a wider sense than “judicial proceeding.” It was contended that a proceeding within the meaning of the provision starts with Chapter XVII which bears the heading “of the Commencement of Proceedings before Magistrate.” It was argued that there can be no proceeding before a Magistrate unless cognizance of an offence has been taken by a Magistrate under Sec. 190 and that prior to cognizance being taken there can be no proceeding. Sec. 190 and other sections appear under the heading “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings.” Refusing to take cognizance of an offence has been held in a number of cases to be an administrative act and not a judicial act, such as Emp. v. Heyat Fateh Din A.I.R 1948 Lah. 184.. When a report under Sec. 173 is placed before a Magistrate it is placed before him only for the purpose of his deciding whether to take cognizance of the offence or not; he is not required to pass any orders on it such as accepting it or rejecting it. Under Sec. 190 he can take cognizance of an offence on a police report and it is only to enable him to take cognizance of an offence that under Sec. 173 a report containing the result of every investigation is required to be placed before him. It is in his discretion whether to take cognizance of an offence on the basis of the report or not. If he takes cognizance of an offence it may be that certain proceeding will come into existence but it does not follow that proceeding that comes into existence after cognizance of an offence has been taken is the only proceeding contemplated by Sec. 195(1)(b). The court itself deals with several proceedings other than a proceeding in a trial. One of them is a remand proceeding. Under Sec. 157 of the Code an investigating officer is required to transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary and forward the accused to him if he cannot complete the investigation within twenty four hours. The Magistrate is empowered to authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as he thinks fit for a term not exceeding fifteen days or to forward the accused to a Magistrate having jurisdiction. If he remands the accused to the custody of the Police or if he is a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate or a Sub-Divisional Magistrate he is required to give reasons for the order of remand and send a copy of his order to the Magistrate to whom he is immediately subordinate. This provision makes it clear that a proceeding held by a Magistrate on receipt of an investigating officer's report made under Sec. 167(1) is a proceeding contemplated by the Act. When a person accused of any non-bailable offence is arrested without a warrant or is brought before a Magistrate he may be released on bail, vide Sec. 497. When he applies to the Magistrate for bail the Magistrate has to consider various matters and then decide whether he should release him on bail or not. When an accused applies for bail a proceeding does come into existence terminating in the order granting or refusing bail. Therefore, even though it may be true that no proceeding comes into existence when a Magistrate considers a report submitted to him by an investigating officer under Sec. 173 it comes into existence when he passes a remand order or passes orders on an application for bail.
7. Sec. 195(1)(b) does not require that the proceeding must be one from which it can be found out whether an offence was committed or not or that it must be such as to give material to the court for deciding whether to make a complaint or not. It is not essential that the proceeding must be one for an inquiry into the very act which is alleged to be an offence. It is because the court may not be in possession of all the facts on the basis of which it can decide whether to make a complaint or not that there is a provision in Sec. 476 of the Code for an application being made to it and for its making an enquiry into the offence alleged to have been committed in relation to the proceeding held by it. If the court has not obtained possession of the necessary facts in the proceeding itself it is open to the applicant to bring those facts to its notice and invite it to make a complaint. Therefore, it cannot be said that neither the remand proceeding nor the proceeding started on a bail application was a proceeding within the meaning of Sec. 195(1)(b) because in neither proceeding could the Magistrate come into possession of facts on the basis of which he could make any complaint against the applicant. The complainant could have made an application under Sec. 476 to the Magistrate praying for an enquiry into the offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant and for making a complaint against him if he was satisfied that it was expedient in the interests of justice to make a complaint against him.
8. Sec. 195(1)(b) simply requires that there should be some relationship between the offence alleged to have been committed and the proceeding; no particular kind of relationship is required. The word “in relation to” do not mean that the offence must have been committed after the proceeding had started. Even if the offence was committed prior to the proceeding it can be said to be in relation to the proceeding if the proceeding was undertaken in consequence of it. If a proceeding is related to an offence the offence itself is related to the proceeding because if A is related to B it means that B is related to A. What we find in the instant case is that the applicant made a false report to the Police against the complainant and others resulting in their being arrested and being remanded to custody and leading to the applications for bail being made by them; the remand proceeding and the bail proceeding were connected with the report made by the applicant and the offence committed by him by making it must be held to be an offence committed in relation to those proceedings. As the proceedings were related to the offence in the manner stated above, the offence must be held to have been committed in relation to them. Sec. 195(1)(b) was, therefore, applicable and no cognizance of the offence could be taken without a complaint by the Magistrate.
9. In this view we are supported by J.D Boywalla v. Sorab Rustomji Engineer A.I.R 1941 Bom. 294. in which there was a false report followed by arrest and an application for bail and submission of a final report under Sec. 173 and it was held that the offence of making a false report was committed in relation to a proceeding in Court. In Baijaji Appaji Kote v. Emp. A.I.R 1946 Bom. 7. it was observed at page 11—
“Where information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is given to an officer in charge of a Police Station under Sec. 154, Criminal Procedure Code, and is followed by an investigation by him, he is bound under Sec. 173(1) to complete it without any unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it is completed, to forward his final report to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, in the form prescribed by the Local Government. That report may be in the form A when the complaint is true, or in the form B when the information is found to be false, or in the form C when the information is neither true nor false and no case is sought to be sent up. An order passed by the said Magistrate on such report would dispose of the complaint made to the police. That order, as pointed out by Beaumont, C.J, is not merely an administrative order but a judicial order of the Court. Hence if the complaint be held to be false and a B summary is issued, the offence under Sec. 211 Penal Code, will have to be alleged to have been committed by the complainant in relation to the proceedings in the Magistrate's Court which ended in an issue of the B Summary.”
10. This view was accepted by the Saurashtra High Court in State v. Bipra Khitnji Gangaram A.I.R 1952 Sauras. 67. by Shah, C.J, as he then was, and Baxi, J. On behalf of the complainant we were referred to the case of Emp. v. Hayat Fateh Din and the Registrar High Court v. Kodangi A.I.R 1932 Mad. 363. in which it was held that Sec. 195(1)(b) does not apply when all that a court does is to accept a report made to it under Sec. 173 to the effect that no offence was made out after investigation. Both these cases are distinguishable from the instant case because there was no other proceeding taken in those cases, for instance, there was no remand proceeding and no application for bail for disposal. In Prag Datt Tiwari v. Emp. A.I.R 1928 All. 765. the reason for the view that the offence of Sec. 211, I.P.C committed by making a false report was not in relation to a proceeding in court was that it did not result in any proceeding in court and that whatever proceeding in court there was, was absolutely unconnected with it. There was a false report to the Police but before the Police could send any information in respect of it to the Court the complainant filed a complaint in the Court himself and on its being dismissed after an inquiry under Sec. 202, Cr. P.C the police filed a complaint and it was held to be in order. There was only one proceeding before the Court and that was the one started on the complaint filed in the Court itself and the offence of Sec. 211 committed by making a false report to the Police could not possibly be said to be in relation to it.
11. The case in Dujai v. State 1961 A.L.J 278. is not of any great assistance to us because in that case there was admittedly a proceeding, viz. trial of the complainant resulting in his acquittal and the offence of Sec. 211, I.P.C committed by making a false report against him resulting in his prosecution was undoubtedly a proceeding in relation to a proceeding in Court.
12. We hold that the offence under Sec. 211, I.P.C alleged to have been committed by the applicant by making a false report against the complainant and others to the police was an offence in relation to the remand proceeding and the bail proceedings because those proceedings were the direct consequence of the making of the report and the subsequent arrest. Therefore, the case was governed by Sec. 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C and no cognizance of the offence could be taken except on a complaint by the Magistrate who held the remand and bail proceedings. As there was no such complaint the applicant could not be tried at all. We, therefore, allow his application and quash the commitment. He stands discharged and his bail bonds are cancelled.
13. Application allowed.