Jagdish Sahai, J.:— This is a decree holder's second execution of decree appeal.

2. The appellant held a decree dated 22-2-1959 against the respondent under Sec. 202 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The decree was put in execution but the respondent having obtained a stay order from the court of the District Judge, Lucknow proceedings were stayed. On 11-5-1960 the appellant made an application that inasmuch as the appeal in which the stay order was passed by the learned District Judge having been decided, the execution application should proceed. On 8-6-1960 the execution court ordered the execution to proceed. On 10-6-60 a warrant of possession over the land in dispute was issued and possession of the same was delivered to the appellant on 11-6-1960. An objection purporting to be under Sec. 47, C.P.C was then filed by the respondent to the effect that inasmuch as the village in which the land, the possession of which was delivered, (hereinafter referred to as the land in question) was situate in village Merhua, Pergana Bhopamau, district Hardoi in respect of which a notification under Sec. 4 of the U.P Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) had been issued on 27-2-1960, the execution was incapable of being proceeded with and should hive been stayed under Sec. 5 of the Act. The executing court (the learned Assistant Collector), dismissed this objection. An appeal against this decision was filed in the court of the District Judge, Hardoi which was heard by the learned Civil Judge who, on 14-9-1961, allowed the appeal as also the objection filed by the respondent with costs. It is against that order that the present appeal has been filed. The sole question for determination is whether Sec. 5 of the Act requires that even the execution of a decree should remain stayed during the pendency of the consolidation of holding proceedings. Sec. 5 of the Act, in so far as relevant for our purposes, reads:

“5. Upon the publication of the notification under Sec. 4 in the official Gazette, the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, from the date specified thereunder till the publication of notification under Sec. 52 or sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 6, as the case may be, ensue in the area to which the declaration relates; namely—

(a)………

(b)(i) all proceedings for correction of the records and all suits for declaration of rights and interests over land, or for possession of land, or for partition, pending before any authority or court, whether of first instance, appeal, or reference or revision, shall stand stayed, but without prejudice to the right of the persons affected to agitate the right or interests in dispute in the said proceedings or suits before the consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder:…”

(Italicized by me)

3. It is conceded that Sec. 5 of the Act requires stay of all suits for declaration of rights and interest over land or for possession of land or for partition whether in the court of first instance or in appeal or reference or revision and of all proceedings for correction of records. The argument is that execution proceeding is neither a suit nor a proceeding for correction of records and for that reason it is not hit by Sec. 5 of the Act. The lower appellate court was of the opinion that execution of decree for possession “…amounts to proceedings for possession of land and so the same should have been stayed.” The learned Judge did not go into the question that is raised before me, i.e, that the proceeding relating to possession of land must be a suit and not any other proceeding. The learned Civil Judge seems to have taken the view that the words “all proceedings” in clause (b)(i) of Sec. 5 of the Act relates not only to proceedings for correction of records but also to proceedings for declaration of rights and interest over land or for possession of land or for partition. In my judgment, it is difficult to put the words “all proceedings” occurring in Sec. 5(b)(i) of the Act to that use and it appears to me that those words have reference only to proceedings for correction of records and no other proceedings. The question, however, that requires consideration is whether the word “suits” occurring in Sec. 5 of the Act comprehends an execution application also.

4. An execution proceeding is a proceeding which does not originate in itself but follows a decree passed in a suit and consequently is different from a suit. The proceeding upto the stage of the passing of the decree is quite different from the procedure followed in execution of the decree. In Trimbakarao Anandrao Mantri v. Balvantrao Narayanrao Mantri I.L.R 30 Bom. 101. it was held that an execution proceeding is not a suit. Normally, a suit is a proceeding which is set in motion by a plaint. See Vankata Chandrappa Nayanivaru v. Veniatarama Reddi I.L.R 22 Mad. 256.. The Act does not define the word ‘suit’ and there is nothing in it to show that the word ‘suit’ in Sec. 5 of the Act has been used in a sense to include execution proceedings. In Mohammad Habibullah v. Tikam Chand I.L.R XLVII Alld. 57. it has been held by this Court that the word ‘suit’ in Sec. 24, C.P.C, includes execution proceedings. On the other hand, in L. Moradhwaj v. L. Bahadur Das 1955 A.L.J 96. a Hull Bench of this Court took the view that the word ‘suit’ in Sec. 21 of the Arbitration Act does not include an execution proceeding. But these decisions obviously cannot govern this case, being on different provisions. Even with regard to suits it has been clearly provided in Sec. 5 of the Act that the same would be stayed whether in the court of first instance or appeal or reference or revision. There is no mention of stay at the stage of execution. This would show that the word ‘suit’ has been used in the ordinary sense of the term, i.e, those proceedings which are initiated by means of a plaint and is not comprehensive enough to include an execution proceeding.

5. Besides if the word “suits” had been used in Sec. 5 of the Act so as to include “proceedings” also, “proceedings” for correction of papers would not have been separately mentioned therein. The legislature seems to have maintained the distinction between suits and proceedings and the only proceeding it required to be stayed were those for correction of papers.

6. It is well settled that a vested right cannot be disturbed except by an express provision. See Municipal Board, Fyzabad v. Musammat Vidyadhari 63 I.C 334., The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving 1905 A.C 369., Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner Delhi I.L.R 9 Lah. 284., Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudharys 1957 S.C.R 488 at 515.. The decree passed in favour of the appellant has vested him with a right of which he can be divested only by an express provision. Sec. 5 of the Act, far from saying so expressly, does not even by implication provide that the execution of the decree shall remain stayed during consolidation operations and there is no provision in the Act stating what shall happen to a decree already passed. It would be noticed as the words underlined in Sec. 5 of the Act, would show, that the stay operating by virtue of that provision would be “without prejudice to the right of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said proceedings or suits before the Consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the Rules made thereunder…”. The Act does not provide any machinery by which the decree-holder can agitate his rights by virtue of his decree before the Consolidation authorities. The Act is not intended to be used for re-adjudication of rights already settled by a competent court. Its long title reads:

“An Act to provide for the consolidation of agricultural holding in Uttar Pradesh for the development of agriculture.”

The Preamble is—

“It is expedient to provide for the consolidation of agricultural holdings in Uttar Pradesh for the development of agriculture.”

7. From the above it will follow that the Act has been enforced to provide for consolidation, of agricultural holdings and it has got nothing to do with the determination of questions relating to right or title over property or tenancy land. There is no provision in the Act indicating as to what ultimately would be the fate of a decree if it is stayed under Sec. 5 of the Act. There is no section which provides for the re-opening of the decree or for its extinction. Sec. 5 of the Act speaks only of stay. It is trite that if the execution of a decree already passed was intended to be stayed there would have been some provision for dealing with that decree. As already said above, the Act is completely, silent on this point which is another pointer to the conclusion that the execution of decrees was not to be stayed.

8. The Act is divided in five Chapters. Chapter I is preliminary and deals with short title, repeal and definition. Chapter II deals with revision and correction of maps and records. Chapter III with preparation of consolidation scheme. Chapter IV with enforcement of the scheme and Chapter V with miscellaneous matters. The scheme of Chapter II is that the village map, the field book and current annual registers shall be revised and valuation shares of joint holdings shall be determined. Thereafter statement of principles will be prepared of which extracts would be issued and statement published, inviting objections. After this comes the stage where claims in respect of land and for partition of joint holdings will be filed and objections on the statement of principles would be made. Upto this stage the revision of the map, the field book and the current annual register is in the nature of correction of papers proceedings and the same are decided on the basis of possession see Bhopal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1956 A.L.J 929.. Thereafter, under Sec. 12 of the Act objections can be filed relating to charges and transfers in the revised records published under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 10 for which a cause of action had not arisen when proceedings under Secs. 7 to 9 were started or were in progress. In other words, all rights that accrued either by virtue of a transfer or for any other reason, after proceedings under Secs. 7 to 9 of the Act were over, can be gone into under Sec. 12 of the Act.

9. As the other Chapters of the Act do not deal with questions of right or title to the agricultural plots in a village under consolidation operations and deal with miscellaneous matters or those relating to consolidation, an analysis of their provisions is not necessary for our purposes.

10. It may be that a decree-holder may resort to filing an objection either under Sec. 9-A or Sec. 12 of the Act but the law does not require him to do so and there is no provision in the Act for the same. At any rate, in this case at the time when the consolidation of holding proceedings were opened in village Morhua, the present decree was under appeal before the District Judge and a stay order had been obtained by the respondent. I am not impressed with the submission made on behalf of the respondent on the supposed ground of interference with consolidation proceedings that it would be subversive of the scheme of consolidation to hold that the execution of a decree was not to be stayed for the reason that the consolidation operations would not at all suffer if the decree is executed and if the plot in question is held to belong to the appellant and not to the respondent as a consequence of the execution of the decree. As already held above, the only object and purpose of the Act is to consolidate agricultural plots and not to reopen decrees already passed. I am fortified in this view by the provisions of Sec. 16-A of the Act which permits transfer of holding even during the pendency of consolidation operations. That provision reads:—

“16-A. Prohibition of transfer during Consolidation operation. (1) After the publication of the statement under Sec. 16 and until the issue of a notification under Sec. 52, a tenure-holder shall not except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) previously obtained, transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any plot or share in any holding included in the scheme of consolidation notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

(2) The Settlement Officer shall grant the permission referred to in sub-Sec. (1) unless for reasons to be recorded in writing he is satisfied that the proposed transfer is likely to defeat the scheme of consolidation.”

11. This provision makes it a rule that permission for transfer shall be granted and refusal will only be an exception. If the consolidation authorities can and in Law are required to recognise changes brought in by these private transfers, I fail to see how the scheme of the Act would be subversed if they also take notice of the transfers brought in by execution of a decree already passed.

12. Section 10 of the Act reads:

“10. Preparation and Maintenance of revised annual registers. (1) The annual register shall be revised on the basis of the orders passed under sub-Sec. (1) and sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 9-A. It shall thereafter be prepared in the form prescribed and published in the unit.

(2) Where any entry in the annual register, published under sub-Sec. (1), is modified in pursuance of an order passed under this Act or under any other law, a reference to the order along with an extract of its operative portion shall be noted against the said entry.”

13. Sub-Sec. (b) clearly contemplates an entry in the annual register being modified by an order passed under any other law. It expressly provides that the entry shall be modified and a reference to the order with an extract of its operative portion shall be noted against the said entry. We have to give some meanings to the words “under any other law.” It appears to me that the orders under any other law referred to in Sec. 10 of the Act include orders passed in execution of a decree. Sec. 10 of the Act, therefore, supports the view that the execution of a decree is not to be stayed. Learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to state as to what orders “under any other law” are contemplated by Sec. 10 of the Act and why an order passed on an execution application should not be included in it.

14. Again, it is worthy of note that though Sec. 49 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil or the revenue court to entertain any suit in future with regard to a matter which would have been disposed of by the consolidation of holding authorities, neither this provision nor any other in the Act wipe away or supersede a decree already passed before the consoliation of holding operations started.

15. For the reasons, mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the learned Civil Judge was in error in having stayed the execution of the decree in the present case. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, restore that of the first court, since possession has been given it does not appear that any execution proceeding remains to be completed. If, however, any proceeding in connection with the execution of the decree remain, they may be completed now. The possession of the appellant decree-holder over the land in question shall not be disturbed.

16. Appeal allowed.