P.N Mookerjee, J.:— This rule was obtained by the defendant in the pending suit before the learned Judge for recovery of damages for wrongful dismissal. The Rule is directed against an order of the learned Judge, overruling the defence contention that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that the suit was not maintainable in law in its present form. There are the subject matter of two issues, framed in the suit, namely, Issues Nos. 2 and 6. Those issues having been decided against the defendant, the present rule was obtained by the petition for revision of the learned trial Judges order.
2. It appears from the plaint, including the amendment, that the Suit was for recovery of damages on account of wrongful dismissal, the grounds alleged for the wrongful dismissal in question being grounds, on which the suit was clearly entertainable in the civil Court. The objection is that, having regard to the Industrial Disputes Act and the Constitution of the Special Tribunal for decision of similar disputes, the jurisdiction of the civil Court in the matter must be held impliedly barred or taken away.
3. It is an admitted position that there is no express ouster of the civil Court's jurisdiction in the matter by the above special statute. But the petitioner contends that such ouster is implied in the scheme, purpose and provisions of the said statute.
4. Reference has been made in this connection to Section 10 and 10(a) of the above Act, which contemplate reference, to Special Tribunal, of Industrial Disputes, either at the instance of the Government or at the instance of the parties themselves. It is clear, however, that the statute nowhere provides for exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court in matters, which were cognisable by them prior to the introduction of the above special jurisdiction.
5. It is clear also that the right, claimed in the instant case, was a right all along recognised under the general law and did not come into existence and was not brought into existence or created by the above special legislation. In the circumstances, on prnciples, well established (vide Woluerhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hanukesford (1) affirmed on numerous occasions by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court (vide, for instance, Secretary of State for India v. Mask and Co. (2) and Dhulabhai v. State of M.P (3); see also AIR 1964 SC 322(324), the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the instant suit cannot be held to be barred. It will come under the first classification by Willy J., in the above cited English authority. In that view, we agree with the learned trial Judge in holding that his jurisdiction to entertain and try the instant suit was not ousted by the above special statute and we affirm his decision on the point and overrule the petitioner's contention to the contrary.
6. We may add here that, before us, reference was made also to two cases, one of the Madras High Court, reported in Krishnan v. East India Distilleries and Sugar Factories Ltd. (4) and other of the Mysore High Court, reported in Nippani Electricity Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Bhimrao Laxman Patil (5), where, apparently, a different view was taken. But the said two cases appear to be distinguishable, as there the basic right in question really arose out of the special statute, and upon that view, it may very well be contended that those cases, which came under Willy J's. third classification. We would, accordingly, overrule the petitioner's objection on the point of jurisdiction. We may also incidently add that we do not agree with the interpretation, put upon the decision of the Supreme Court, in A.I.R 1964 S.C 322, supra, by the Mysore High Court in the above cited case, that Supreme Court case being carely distinguishable as an instance of express exclusion of the civil Court's jurisdiction (vide para 7 at p. 324).
7. Corning to the next question, namely, as to the maintainability the suit, the objection appears to be that, in the absence of an express prayer for the setting aside of the above order of dismissal alleged to be wrongful by the plaintiff, the instant suit for damages, the claim for which was in the nature of a consequential relief flowing from such alleged wrongful dismissal, was not maintainable. It is to be noted, however, that there were clear and sufficient averment in the body of the plaint, as amended, of the alleged wrongful dismissal and particulars thereof. In the circumstances, it may very well be taken that a prayer of the above declaration was implied or involved in the claim for damages as the same formed the basis of this latter claim. Reading the plaint, as a whole, we find that, in view of the said specific allegation in the body of the plaint, it was not necessary to insert a specific prayer for a declaration that the above dismissal was wrongful for supporting the suit for damages.
8. It is true that, unless the plaintiff can succeed in establishing that the dismissal in question was wrongful, he would not be entitled to any relief in the suit. But that, is a question which will have to be decided on the merit in all its implications in deciding the suit and for that no specific prayer in the plaint was necessary in the instant case in view of the above circumstances. We would accordingly hold that the defence objection that the suit was not maintainable in law in its present form on account of the alleged defect has been rightly overruled by the learned trial Judge and we affirm his decision on the point.
9. In the result, this Rule fails and it is discharged.
10. There will be no order for costs.
11. Let the records go down to the Court below as quickly as possible.
S.K Chakravarti:— I agree.