N.N Sharma, J.:— This revision is directed against order dated 30-4-1984 recorded by Shri I.P Mittal, learned District Judge, Aligarh by which he dismissed the defendant's application for setting aside the ex parte decree and restoration of S.C.C Suit No. 12 of 1983.
2. The dispute relates to a shop detailed at the foot of the plaint. Plaintiff was the landlord of the disputed shop and the defendant was his tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 400. The rent was not paid from 1-6-1982 in spite of repealed demands. Plaintiff served a notice on defendant terminating the tenancy. Defendant neither paid the rent nor vacated the shop and so the suit was for recovery of Rs. 5,467 as arrears of rent, damage etc. It was further averred the provisions of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act XIII of 1972) were not applicable to the disputed shop as it was constructed in 1974–1975. Defendant did not contest the suit despite the service of summons: statement of plaintiff was recorded on the date fixed for exparte hearing.
3. The suit was decreed exparte with costs on 14-9-1983.
4. The application for restoration was filed by the revisionist on 29-10-1983. His contention was that he learnt about the exparte decree on 10-10-1983 through one Faiyaz Ahmad. Before that, he has no knowledge about the proceedings. He denied the service of summons. Along with that application, be also filed an application under Section 17 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act for permission to give security for the satisfaction of the decree. This application was presented on 29-10-1983. The security was not furnished and the application was pressed by learned Advocate for revisionist on 31-10-1983.
5. Plaintiff objected to the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure. He maintained that the applicant was present at his shop when the process-server went to serve the summons on him. It was further alleged that in the absence of compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, the application was liable to be rejected.
6. Learned Judge found that the application for permission to give security was not passed, no cash was deposited in Court to satisfy the decretal amount within the statutory period; the amount deposited in Court was not within the time allowed by the Court on applications dated 27-1-1984. 15-2-1984 and 21-2-1984; the total deposit made by him was Rs. 4,000 only; the decretal amount was Rs. 5,467 with costs which comes to Rs. 1783.06 Learned trial Judge referred to Azmat Ullah Khan v. Ahmad Ali, reported in AIR 1925 Alld. 379 which provides that in the absence of deposit of security for the satisfaction of the decree, the provisions of Section 17 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act remained uncomplied with. In the result, the impugned order was recorded.
7. Aggrieved by this decision, the present revision has been filed.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. The first contention put forward before me on behalf of revisionist was that the learned Advocate for the revisionist wrongly refused to press the application dated 29-10-1983 for permission to file personal security. Such concession was erroneous and was not binding on revisionist. In this connection reliance was placed upon Jamuna Doss v. Board of Revenue, reported in AIR 1973 Alld p. 397, which posited:—
“Brief Note: (A) Where an objection as to maintainability of a single writ petition against a common judgment in two suits was raised for the first time at the hearing and the petitioner's counsel having no opportunity to take instructions from the petitioner made an erroneous concession of law about the maintainability of the petition by confining the petition to one of the suits only, the concession was held not binding on him in the writ appeal and he was permitted to press his appeal in regard to both the suits.”
10. Thus, the contention was that the revisionist was not bound by such concession of his Advocate made in the court below.
11. On behalf of respondent, it was pointed out that the aforesaid ruling was on an erroneous concession above a point of law and not on a factual point. When this concession was made before the trial Judge by the Advocate of revisionist and was not shown to be wrong, the applicant-revisionist was held fast by it. In this connection, reliance was placed upon State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, reported in (1982) 2 SCC 463 : AIR 1982 SC 1249. It was laid in para 4 at page 1251:—
“When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney General to the concession made before the High Court, Shri A.K Sen who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to peruse the written submission made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public Policy bare us Judicial deconum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. “Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation.” Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v. Subramnian, AIR 1926 PC 136. We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by the statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that some thing was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence.”
12. Thus, it is obvious that neither the amount in cash nor the security was furnished by the revisionist in the court below. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act leaves no discretion in the matter. It is mandatory and its non-compliance was sufficient for dismissal of application for setting aside the ex parte decree as was held in Smt. Gayatri Devi v. The District Judge, Gorakhpur, reported in ARC, 1982 (1) p. 447.
13. Learned Advocate for revisionist further argued that the affidavit of revisionist about absence of service of summons on him remains unrebutted. This contention is also incorrect. There is a counter affidavit filed by Riyaz Mohammad son of Faqir Mohammad respondent dated 19-11-1983 in rebuttal which prevailed with court below. So this contention is also ruled out.
14. On behalf of revisionist, a further prayer was made to set aside the ex parte decree on merits. His contention was that it was open to the revisionist to assail the decree.
15. Leaving set aside the question of condonation of delay in making such prayer, it was alleged that the revisionist paid the arrears of rent on 5-10-1982, 7-12-1982, 15-6-1983 and 12-8-1983. He filed the counterfoils alleging the payment of arrears of rent for the period for which the suit was brought. There was a prayer that this additional evidence should be admitted at the stage of revision. On behalf of respondent, it was alleged that these receipts were forged. In his statement, Faqir Mohammad denied any payment. Such payment was not mentioned by the revisionist in his application for restoration of the suit. There is no occasion to remand the case now. I have carefully considered over the matter. I do not think that it is expedient in the interest of justice to remand the case and direct the court below to record further evidence in connection with these payments when the aforesaid receipts were alleged to be forged at the time of arguments before me by learned Advocate for respondent. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs. The stay order dated 8-5-1984 is vacated herewith.
16. Revision dismissed.